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Attempts  by  several  commentators  to  map  categories  from  contemporary 
epistemology  onto  Aquinas'  theory  of  knowledge,  and  their  attempts  to  give  an  account 
of  his  theory  of  perceptual  knowledge  constitute  the  background  to  this  thesis. 
In  the  opening  chapter  we  outline  Aquinas'  theory  of  knowledge.  We  see  that  it  is  a 
complex  theory,  dealing  not  only  with  human  knowledge,  but  also  with  divine  and 
angelic  knowledge.  We  note  Aquinas'  application  of  the  doctrine  of  analogy  to  the 
concept  of  knowledge.  Despite  the  radical  differences  between  the  Creator's  knowledge 
and  that  of  His  creatures  there  are  common  elements:  the  grasp  of  being  as  true  and  the 
assimilation  of  the  knower  to  the  thing  known.  In  the  case  of  angelic  knowledge  we  note 
its  innateness  and  immediacy.  In  our  analysis  of  human  knowledge  we  see  the 
consequences  of  what  Aquinas  refers  to  as  the  dimness  of  the  human  intellect,  both  in 
terms  of  how  humans  know  and  what  they  can  know.  In  particular  we  highlight  the 
fragmented  nature  of  human  knowledge,  noting  the  absence  of  any  mention  of  perceptual 
knowledge  in  Aquinas'  account  of  human  knowledge. 
In  chapter  two  we  sketch  the  various  contemporary  epistemological  categories 
that  philosophers  have  sought  to  map  onto  Aquinas'  epistemology.  Pollock's  theory  of 
Direct  Realism  is  sketched  as  an  example  of  internalism.  Foundationalism  is  discussed 
with  reference  to  Chisholm.  Two  examples  of  externalism  and  reliabilism  are  given: 
Nozick's  tracking  and  Goldman's  reliabilism.  We  also  discuss  the  foundationalist 
externalism  of  Plantinga.  We  then  outline  how  these  various  labels  have  been  applied  to 
Aquinas'  theory  of  knowledge.  We  begin  with  MacDonald's  foundationalist  and 
internalist  interpretation,  noting  his  description  of  perceptual  knowledge  as  secondary 
scientia.  We  then  consider  Ross'  attempt  to  describe  perceptual  knowledge  in  terms  of 
faith.  In  contrast  to  these  we  describe  Stump's  externalist  reading  of  Aquinas,  noting 
that  she  finds  support  in  the  work  of  Norman  Kretzmann. 
In  chapter  three  we  offer  an  analysis  of  Aquinas'  account  of  perceptual 
knowledge.  We  argue  that  judgments  of  perceptual  knowledge  consist  of  a  metaphysical 
and  a  psychological  component.  Discussion  of  the  metaphysical  component 
acknowledges  the  importance  of  Aquinas'  metaphysical  realism  for  his  epistemology: 
the  grasp  of  being  as  the  archimedean  point  of  all  knowledge.  We  examine  the  role  of  the 
senses.  Our  examination  of  the  psychological  component,  the  intellectual  processes 
involved  in  judgments,  uses  material  by  Joseph  McDermott  as  a  catalyst.  This  allows  us 
to  address  issues  surrounding  the  grasp  of  quiddities  and  the  first  act  of  the  intellect.  We 
consider  the  likeness  which  Aquinas  says  exists  between  the  intentional  and  natural 
existence  of  forms,  discussing  the  intellect's  grasp  of  the  truth  before  proposing  an 
interpretation  of  Aquinas'  account  of  perceptual  knowledge.  We  show  the  complexity  of 
Aquinas'  theory  of  perceptual  knowledge.  We  propose  that  under  the  broad  heading  of 
perceptual  knowledge,  some  judgments  will  be  certain  and  infallible.  These  are  properly 
called  'knowledge'.  Other  judgments  will  lack  certainty  and  infallibility,  but  for  the  sake 
of  expediency  we  call  them  'knowledge'.  This  introduces  defeasibility  into  perceptual 
knowledge.  We  notice  a  strong  parallel  to  Alvin  Plantinga's  account  of  perceptual 
knowledge.  We  admit  that  there  are  internalist  and  foundationalist  elements  in 
Aquinas'  epistemology.  However,  we  find  two  major  reasons  for  disagreeing  with 
MacDonald's  interpretation. 
Scientia  and  its  relationship  to  perceptual  knowledge  is  addressed  in  chapter 
four.  We  begin  by  outlining  Stump  and  MacDonald's  differing  accounts  of  scientia.  We 
then  analyse  the  relationship  between  scientia  and  perceptual  knowledge  by  focusing  on 
perceptual  knowledge's  role  in  the  formation  of  scientia's  principles.  We  see  the 
necessity  and  Importance  of  perceptual  knowledge  in  the  enterprise  of  scientia.  Our 
analysis  also  allows  us  to  draw  conclusions  regarding  Stump's  and  MacDonald's 
differing  interpretations. 
In  the  final  chapter  we  set  out  three  conclusions  concerning  the  knowledge  of 
which  STla  q84  speaks,  our  knowledge  of  the  material  world.  Two  focus  on  perceptual 
knowledge  in  Aquinas'  account  of  human  epistemology.  The  third  conclusion  focuses  on 
the  epistemic  naturalism  of  ST  la  q84. 
This  work  does  several  things  ignored  by  other  recent  works  on  the  same  topic:  It 
acknowledges  the  uniqueness  and  complexity  of  Aquinas'  epistemology.  Acknowledging 
his  views  on  the  fragmented  nature  of  human  epistemology  it  gives  an  account  of 
Aquinas'  theory  of  perceptual  knowledge  which  does  not  describe  it  in  terms  of  another 
kind  of  human  knowledge.  It  adjudicates  between  the  attempted  mappings  by 
contemporary  scholars.  Finally,  it  explores  the  relationship  between  perceptual 
knowledge  and  scientia. 2 
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Introduction 
Imagine  the  confusion  if  two  political  commentators  appeared  on  Newsnight  and,  in  a 
discussion  of  the  Prime  Minister's  political  beliefs,  one  described  him  as  a  radical  free 
market  capitalist  while  the  other  described  him  as  an  ardent,  nationalising  socialist.  Imagine 
further,  if  you  will,  the  incredulity,  not  to  say  increasing  confusion  and  hubris,  of  Paxman, 
as  both  commentators  not  only  fail  to  challenge  the  other's  assertions  or  arguments,  but 
choose  instead  to  pat  each  other  on  the  back  for  the  help  they  have  given  one  another  in 
shaping  their  respective  theories. 
It  sounds  a  bizarre  scenario.  Yet  something  akin  to  it  happened,  not  in  a  television  studio  or 
contemporary  politics,  but  in  epistemology.  In  recent  years  there  has  been  a  renewed  interest 
in  the  philosophy  of  St.  Thomas  Aquinas.  Several  philosophers,  in  an  effort  to  understand 
the  epistemology  of  St.  Thomas,  have  sought  to  apply  the  categories  of  contemporary 
epistemology  to  the  epistemology  of  Aquinas.  Perhaps  not  surprisingly,  given  the  700  year 
epistemological  gap  and  the  complexity  of  Aquinas'  theory  different  commentators  have  seen 
it  as  being  an  example  of  different  epistemological  positions.  What  is  surprising,  not  to  say 
shocking,  is  that  within  the  space  of  a  couple  of  years  radically  different,  and  in  some 
instances  diametrically  opposed,  interpretations  of  Aquinas'  epistemology  have  been  offered; 
yet  none  of  the  commentators  involved  chose  to  respond  to  interpretations  contrary  to  their 
own.  Instead  they  patted  one  another's  backs  for  help  given.  So  Eleonore  Stump  concluded 
her  1992  paper  "Aquinas  on  the  Foundations  of  Knowledge"  with  a  word  of  thanks  to  Scott 
MacDonald.  1  In  this  paper  she  described  Aquinas'  epistemology  as  reliabilist  and  externalist 
as  well  as  outlining  what  she  considered  to  be  the  correct  understanding  of  scientia, 
Aquinas'  theory  of  science.  A  year  later  in  his  article  "Theory  of  Knowledge",  for  a  book 
1  Stump  1992,  page  158 6 
co-edited  by  Stump,  Scott  MacDonald  offered  his  interpretation  that  Aquinas'  theory  of 
knowledge  is  internalist  and  foundationalist.  Moreover,  he  also  gave  an  account  of  scientia, 
different  to  that  offered  by  Stump.  The  only  reference  he  made  to  the  philosopher  who 
offered  such  a  radically  different,  and  some  might  say  contradictory  interpretation  to  his 
own,  was  an  expression  of  gratitude  to  her  for  comments  on  the  draft  of  his  paper.  2  They 
are  only  two  philosophers;  others,  as  we  will  see,  have  offered  their  own  interpretations  of 
Aquinas'  epistemology.  Like  Stump  and  MacDonald  they  generally  do  not  respond  to 
interpretations  different  to  their  own. 
It  is  the  kind  of  scenario  that  conspiracy  theorists  love.  However,  this  thesis  does  not  intend 
to  explore  evidence  of  a  conspiracy.  Instead  it  intends  to  explore  Aquinas'  epistemology.  Its 
aim  is  to  analyse  Aquinas'  theory  of  knowledge,  in  particular  his  theory  of  our  knowledge  of 
the  material  world  and  its  place  within  human  epistemology:  the  kind  of  knowledge  which 
Aquinas  begins  to  discuss  in  ST  la  q84.  As  part  of  this  analysis  we  will  clear  the  air  and 
decide  which  of  the  assorted  contemporary  interpretations  are  more  accurate.  In  our  opening 
chapter  we  give  a  broad  sweep  of  Aquinas'  epistemology.  We  see  that  his  epistemological 
theory  deals  not  only  with  humans,  but  also  with  God  and  the  angels.  We  look  at  his 
complex  epistemology,  noting  his  analogical  use  of  `knowledge':  `knowledge'  as  it  is 
predicated  of  God,  the  angels  and  humanity.  We  look  in  detail  at  the  various  factors  and 
processes  pertinent  to  human  knowledge.  Having  outlined  his  epistemology's  complexity 
and  radical  difference  to  post  Cartesian  epistemologies,  in  the  second  chapter  we  sketch  the 
attempts  of  Stump,  MacDonald  and  others  to  describe  Aquinas'  account  of  human 
epistemology.  To  give  a  flavour  of  the  categories  that  these  philosophers  employ  this  chapter 
opens  with  a  sketch  of  the  various  epistemological  positions  used  by  them.  Some  of  the 
interpretations  offered  by  these  commentators  attempt  to  give  an  account  of  Aquinas'  theory 
of  human  perceptual  knowledge.  In  the  third  chapter  we  offer  our  own  account  of  Aquinas' 
theory  of  perceptual  knowledge  by  paying  close  attention  to  the  components  involved  in  the 
judgments  constitutive  of  perceptual  knowledge.  As  part  of  this  analysis  we  indicate  which 
of  the  different  interpretations  comes  closest  to  correctly  describing  this  aspect  of  Aquinas' 
epistemology.  Another  recurring  feature  of  interpretations  of  Aquinas'  theory  is  a  focus  on 
scientia.  In  chapter  four  we  look  at  scientia  and  its  relationship  to  perceptual  knowledge.  In 
the  final  chapter  we  draw  general  conclusions  regarding  Aquinas'  theory  of  human 
knowledge  which  emerge  from  our  discussion,  as  well  as  offering  what  we  consider  to  be 
the  only  feasible  mapping  of  a  contemporary  epistemological  theory  onto  the  epistemology 
of  St.  Thomas. 
2  MacDonald  1993,  page  195 7 
1.  Aquinas  on  Knowledge 
And  thus  I  very  clearly  see  that  the  certitude  and  truth  of  all  science  depends 
on  the  knowledge  alone  of  the  true  God,  in  as  much  that,  before  I  knew  him, 
I  could  have  no  perfect  knowledge  of  any  other  thing. 
Rene  Descartes:  Fifth  Meditation.  1 
To  know  a  proposition  p  is  to  know  that  it  is  true.  But  you  cannot  know  that 
p  is  true  unless  it  is  true. 
Alvin  Goldman:  Epistemology  and  Cognition.  2 
Knowledge  is  a  particular  way  of  being  connected  to  the  world,  having  a 
specific  real  factual  connection  to  the  world:  tracking  it. 
Robert  Nozick:  Philosophical  Explanations.  3 
The  above  authors  have  different  theories  regarding  what  does  and  does  not  constitute 
knowledge.  For  Descartes  knowledge  was  linked  to  what  could  be  clearly  and  distinctly 
perceived  to  be  true.  For  Goldman,  a  person  can  claim  to  know  a  proposition  p  if  and  only 
if  the  claim  is  the  result  of  some  cognitively  reliable  process;  and  for  Nozick  to  know  is  to 
have  a  belief  which  tracks  the  truth.  There  are,  of  course,  many  other  theories  of  knowledge. 
Within  the  multitude  of  post-Cartesian  theories  that  have  been  proposed  one  aspect  is, 
however,  constant.  For  each  of  them  `knowledge'  is  used  univocally.  As  L.  M.  Regis  notes: 
During  the  last  three  centuries  Western  thought  has  tended  constantly  toward 
unifying  the  meaning  of  knowledge.  According  to  this  trend,  the  word  should  not 
1.  Descartes  1992,  page  116. 
2  Goldman  1986,  page  42. 
3  Nozick  1981,  page  178. 8 
have  several  meanings.  4 
Thus  in  Goldman's  theory,  knowledge  is  the  result  of  a  reliable  belief  forming  mechanism. 
The  term  `knowledge'  will  always  be  used  univocally.  It  will  never  be  applied  in  an 
analogical  way.  Distinct  from  this  issue  of  analogical  use  another  remark  can  be  made  about 
contemporary  theories.  It  is  a  remark  which  is  made  at  the  risk  of  pre-empting  our 
discussion:  as  long  as  knowledge  satisfies  whatever  epistemological  criteria  is  used,  say  for 
example,  Goldman's  reliability  criterion,  it  does  not  matter  whether  the  object  of  knowledge 
is  a  piece  of  scientific  knowledge,  such  as  a  geometrical  theorem,  or  a  piece  of  perceptual 
knowledge  such  as  that  the  cat  is  on  the  mat.  Both  are  labelled  `knowledge'.  Aquinas  does 
not  have  a  similar  conception  of  knowledge.  For  a  start  he  says  that  human  knowledge  exists 
in  a  state  of  division  and  multiplicity  .5 
He  speaks  of  different  types  of  human  knowledge, 
each  differentiated  by  their  object: 
In  man  different  objects  of  knowledge  imply  different  kinds  of  knowledge:  in 
knowing  principles  he  is  said  to  have  `understanding',  in  knowing  conclusions 
`science',  in  knowing  the  highest  cause  `wisdom',  in  knowing  human  actions 
`counsel',  or  prudence.  But  all  these  things  God  knows  by  one  simple 
knowledge.....  6 
Neither  does  he  have  a  univocal  concept  of  knowledge.  As  Regis  puts  it: 
The  ancient  philosophers  had  a  much  more  flexible  and  human  method;  instead  of 
surgically  mutilating  man's  cognitive  powers,  they  distinguished  in  order  to  unite. 
They  invented  theories  of  formal  objects  and  of  analogy  which  safeguarded  both  the 
diversity  of  the  types  of  knowledge  and  the  unity  of  meaning  of  the  word 
knowledge,  a  unity  without  which  the  word  becomes  unintelligible? 
It  is  debatable  whether  one  would  describe  Aquinas  as  an  `ancient  philosopher'. 
Nonetheless,  Regis  outlines  an  understanding  and  use  of  the  word  `knowledge'  that  fits 
squarely  with  that  of  Aquinas.  For  St.  Thomas,  as  we  shall  see,  the  concept  `knowledge'  is 
used  analogically. 
The  significance  of  these  two  aspects  of  Aquinas'  epistemology:  the  divided  and  multiple 
nature  of  human  knowledge  and  the  analogical  use  of  the  term  `knowledge'  seems  to  have 
been  lost,  or  at  best  under  emphasised,  by  many  of  today's  Thomistic  interpreters.  Rarely  is 
his  account  of  the  multiple  nature  of  human  knowledge  given  adequate  treatment.  Moreover, 
the  analogical  use  of  the  term  `knowledge'  is  virtually  ignored.  It  appears  that  the  most 
common,  contemporary  way  to  look  at  the  epistemology  of  St.  Thomas  is  through 
`univocally  coloured'  spectacles  focussing  solely  on  human  knowledge  and  ignoring  the 
4  Regis1959,  page  151. 
5  ST1a  g14  a1  ad2. 
6  ibid.  Homo  autem  secundum  diversa  cognita  habet  diversas  cognitiones:  nam  secundum  quod 
cognoscit  principia,  dicitur  habere  inteliigentiam;  scietiam  vero,  secundum  quod  cognoscit 
conclusiones;  sapientiam,  secundum  quod  cognoscit  causam  altissam;  consilium  vel  prudentiam 
secundum  quod  cognoscit  agibilia.  Sed  haec  omnia  Deus  una  simplici  cognitione  cognoscit...... 
7  Regis  1959,  page  152 9 
way  `knowledge'  is  predicated  of  God  and  the  angels.  This  chapter  will  initially  focus  on 
Aquinas'  analogical  understanding  and  use  of  knowledge.  It  will  explore  the  various  ways  in 
which  Aquinas  uses  this  term.  We  will  see  that  `knowledge'  is  used  in  such  an  analogical 
way  that  this  one  term  is  used  of  beings  as  diverse  as  God,  angels  and  humans.  We  will 
begin  by  considering  what  Aquinas  means  by  using  a  term  analogically.  Then  we  will  move 
on  to  look  at  how  `knowledge'  is  used  of  God  and  the  angels  before  giving  a  more  detailed 
treatment  of  its  divided  and  multiple  condition  in  human  intellectual  activity.  This  will  allow 
us  to  define  terms  such  as  scientia  and  perceptual  knowledge  more  clearly,  before  moving  on 
to  consider  the  implications  of  Aquinas'  discussion  in  question  84  of  the  Prima  Pars  of  the 
Summa  Theologiae.  8 
a.  Analogy 
In  Analogy  and  Philosophical  Language  David  Burrell  makes  a  remark  which  we  ought  to 
heed  at  the  outset  of  our  discussion: 
Aquinas  offers  no  theory  of  analogy.  He  does  not  provide  a  method  whereby  one 
can  be  sure  to  speak  responsibly  of  God 
.9 
This  remark  is  important  for  three  reasons.  Firstly,  Aquinas  does  not  offer  a  systematic 
treatment  of  analogy.  This  task  was  left  to  Cardinal  Cajetan  and  others.  However,  in  several 
places  Aquinas  does  speak  about  analogical  usage.  This  takes  us  to  the  second  reason.  When 
he  does  speak  about  analogy  Aquinas  often  does  so  in  the  context  of  theological  language. 
Obviously,  there  is  more  to  analogy  than  our  ability  to  apply  terms  to  both  God  and 
creatures.  Nonetheless,  given  that  our  primary  interest  in  this  section  is  to  draw  out  the 
implications  of  an  analogical  use  of  knowledge,  and  given  that  Aquinas  does  treat 
knowledge  as  an  analogical  concept  applicable  to  God  and  his  creatures,  this  theological 
context  of  analogy  is  a  good  place  to  start.  Thirdly,  as  an  Aristotelian,  Aquinas  holds  that  all 
our  knowledge  finds  its  origins  in  what  we  can  sense.  Our  knowledge  of  God  is  no 
different.  Our  knowledge  of  God  begins  from  what  we  know  and  experience  in  this  world: 
we  know  of  God's  attributes  from  what  we  can  know  of  his  creatures.  10  So,  for  example, 
he  writes  : 
Because  we  know  and  name  God  from  creatures,  the  names  we  attribute  to  God 
signify  what  belongs  to  material  creatures  of  which  the  knowledge  is  natural  to  us-11 
8  Another  way  to  have  approached  the  issue  would  have  been  to  begin  with  with  what  we  know, 
human  knowledge,  then  look  at  what  disembodied  knowledge,  angelic  knowledge,  must  be  like, 
and  then  finally  address  the  question  of  divine  knowledge.  Here  we  follow  the  structure  of  the 
Summa  Theologiae  by  looking  at  divine  knowledge,  then  angelic  and  human  knowledge. 
9  Burrell  1973,  page  170 
10  ST  1a  q13  a3c 
11  ST  1a  q13  al  ad2  Ad  secundum  dicendum  quod  quia  ex  creaturis  in  Dei  cognitionem  venimus, 
et  ex  ipsis  eum  nominamus;  nomina  quae  Deo  tribuimus,  hoc  modo  significat  secundum  quod 
competit  creaturis  materialibus,  quarum  cognitio  est  nobis  connaturalis. 10 
For  these  names  express  God,  so  far  as  our  intellects  know  him.  Now  since  our 
intellect  knows  God  from  creatures,  it  knows  him  as  far  as  creatures  represent 
him.  12 
So  we  can  say  of  God  that  he  is  good,  primarily  because  we  know  what  goodness  is  from 
creatures. 
This  was  explained  above  in  treating  of  the  divine  perfection.  Therefore  the  aforesaid 
names  [  "good"  and  "wise"]  signify  the  divine  substance,  but  in  an  imperfect 
manner,  even  as  creatures  represent  it  imperfectly  .  13 
Despite  this  imperfect  signification,  Aquinas,  as  we  shall  see,  holds  that  the  attributes  which 
we  predicate  of  God,  exist  in  God  absolutely  perfectly.  14  Furthermore,  the  predication  of 
these  attributes  to  God  can  be  taken  as  the  measure  of  all  other  predications  of  these 
attributes.  Thus,  "knowledge"  as  it  is  applied  to  God,  which  will  be  of  interest  to  us,  is  the 
measure  against  which  all  other  uses  of  "knowledge"  are  measured.  15 
Analogy  is  a  linguistic  doctrine.  It  alludes  to  the  way  a  word  is  used.  Chapter  34  of  the  first 
book  of  the  Summa  Contra  Gentiles  [SCG  ]  gives  a  typical  description  of  analogical  use: 
From  what  we  have  said,  therefore,  it  remains  that  the  names  said  of  God  and 
creatures  are  predicated  neither  univocally  nor  equivocally,  but  analogically,  that  is, 
according  to  an  order  or  reference  to  something  one.  16 
Although  the  original  Latin  doesn't  actually  use  the  term  `names',  the  translation  is  accurate. 
That  term  and  the  verb  `predicated'  are  extremely  important  in  the  above  quote.  In  many  of 
the  quotes  which  follow,  we  will  see  that  these  terms  frequently  recur.  They  highlight  that 
analogy  is  fundamentally  a  linguistic  device  which  allows  the  same  word  to  be  predicated  of 
a  variety  of  subjects.  So  we  can  speak  of  God's  knowledge  and  human  knowledge.  Both  are 
radically  different,  as  we  shall  see,  yet  the  use  of  the  same  concept  to  describe  both  shows 
that  what  is  signified  share  elements  in  common.  Two  caveats  must  be  made.  Firstly  in  the 
statements:  `God  is  good'  and  `man  is  good,  '  `good'  is  being  used  analogically.  In  the 
statements:  `man  is  an  animal'  and  `the  cat  is  an  animal,  '  `animal'  is  not  being  used 
analogically.  In  the  case  of  `animal'  a  genus  is  being  predicated  of  a  species.  This  is  not  so 
in  the  case  of  `good.  '  The  reasons  for  this  distinction,  which  will  be  important  in  our 
discussion  of  human  knowledge,  will  become  apparent  when  we  look  at  analogical  usage. 
Secondly,  to  say  that  `knowledge'  is  used  analogically  is  not  to  say  that  knowledge  is  an 
12  ST  1a  q13  a2c  Significant  enim  sic  nomina  Deum  secundum  quod  intellectus  poster  cognoscit 
ipsum.  Intellectus  autem  poster  cum  cognoscat  Deum  ex  creaturis,  sic  cognoscit  ipsum,  secundum 
quod  creaturae  ipsum  repraesentant. 
13  ST  1a  q13  a2c  Et  hoc  supra  expositum  est  cum  perfectione  divina  agebautr.  Sic  igitur  praedicta 
nomina  divinam  substantiam  significant,  imperfecte  tarnen,  sicut  et  creaturae  imperfecte  earn 
repraesentant. 
14  ST  1a  q4  a2c. 
15  See,  for  example,  ST  1a  q16  a5c  quoted  on  page  15  (footnote  23)  of  this  work. 
16  Sic  igitur  ex  dictis  reliquitur,  quod,  ea  quae  de  Deo  et  rebus  aliis  dicuntur,  neque  aequivoce, 
neque  univoce  praedicantur,  sed  analogice;  hoc  est,  secundum  ordinem  vel  respectum  ad  aliquod 
unum. 11 
analogical  concept.  In  Aquinas'  scheme,  analogy  has  no  place  in  his  metaphysics  or 
philosophy  of  mind.  It  is  the  use  of  the  concept,  not  the  concept  itself,  which  is  analogical. 
ST  la  q13  is  devoted  to  theological  language  and  there  we  find  Aquinas  discussing  analogy. 
In  article  5  on  discussing  whether  words  are  used  univocally 
or  equivocally  of  God  and  creatures  he  writes:  * 
Therefore,  it  must  be  said  that  these  names  are  said  of  God  and  creatures  in  an 
analogous  sense,  i.  e.  according  to  proportion  . 
Now  names  are  thus  used  in  two  ways:  either  according  as  many  things  are 
proportionate  to  one  thus,  for  example,  healthy  predicated  of  medicine  and  urine  in 
relation  and  in  proportion  to  health  of  a  body,  of  which  the  former  is  the  cause  and 
the  latter  the  sign:  or  as  according  as  one  thing  is  proportionate  to  another,  thus, 
healthy  is  said  of  medicine  and  animal,  since  medicine  is  the  cause  of  health  in  the 
animal  body.  And  in  this  way  some  things  are  said  of  God  and  creatures 
analogically,  and  not  in  a  purely  equivocal  nor  in  a  purely  univocal  sense.  For  we 
can  name  God  only  from  creatures.  Thus,  whatever  is  said  of  God  and  creatures,  is 
said  according  to  the  relation  of  a  creature  to  God  as  its  principle  and  cause,  wherein 
all  perfections  of  things  preexist  excellently.  17 
Aquinas  discusses  this  matter  further  in  the  following  article: 
In  names  predicated  of  many  in  an  analogical  sense,  all  are  predicated  because  they 
have  reference  to  some  one  thing:  and  this  one  thing  must  be  placed  in  the  definition 
of  them  all.  And  since  that  expressed  by  the  name  is  the  definition,  as  the 
Philosopher  says,  such  a  name  must  be  applied  primarily  to  that  which  is  put  in  the 
definition  of  such  other  things,  and  secondarily  to  those  others  according  as  they 
approach  more  or  less  that  first........  Hence  as  regards  what  the  name  signifies, 
these  names  are  applied  primarily  to  God  rather  than  to  creatures,  because  these 
perfections  flow  from  God  to  creatures:  but  as  regards  the  imposition  of  names,  they 
are  primarily  applied  by  us  to  creatures  which  we  know  first.  Hence 
*This  translation  is  taken,  not  from  the  Blackfriars  edition,  but  from  that  of  the  English  Dominicans. 
Normally,  the  Blackfriar's  edition  of  the  Summa  Theologiae  is  used  to  provide  the  translated  texts 
in  the  body  of  the  paper.  However,  Herbert  McCabe's  translation  of  question  13  is  rather  too  free. 
For  this  reason  the  translation  done  by  the  English  Dominican  Province  is  used  in  quotes  of 
question  13. 
17  Dicendum  est  igitur  quod  hujusmodi  nomina  dicuntur  de  Deo  et  creaturis  secundum  analogiam, 
idest,  proportionem. 
Ouod  quidem  dupliciter  contingit  in  nominibus:  vel  quia  multa  habent  proportionem  ad  unum, 
sicut  sanum  dicitur  de  medicina  et  urina  in  quantum  utrumque  habet  ordinem  et  proportionem  ad 
sanitatem  animalis;  cujus  hoc  quidem  signum  est,  illud  vero  causa:  vel  ex  eo  quod  unum  habet 
proportionem  ad  alterum,  sicut  sanum  dicitur  de  medicina  et  animali,  in  quantum  medicina  est  causa 
sanitatis,  quae  est  in  animali. 
Ex  hoc  modo  aliqua  dicuntur  de  Deo  et  creaturis  analogice,  et  non  aequivoce  pure  neque  pure 
univoce.  Non  enim  possumus  nominare  Deum  nisi  ex  creaturis,  ut  supra  dictum  est.  Et  sic  quidquid 
dicitur  de  Deo  et  creaturis,  dicitur  secundum  quod  est  aliquis  ordo  creaturae  ad  Deum  ut  ad 
principium  et  causam,  in  qua  praeexistunt  excellenter  omnes  rerum  perfectiones. 12 
they  have  a  mode  of  signification  which  belongs  to  creatures,  as  was  said  above.  18 
Both  these  statements  require  some  unpacking  because  they  take  us  to  the  heart  of  Aquinas' 
understanding  of  analogy.  Primarily  words  which  are  used  analogically  of  God  and 
creatures  find  their  proper  meaning,  their  signification,  when  applied  to  God,  for  it  is in  God 
alone  that  the  perfection  signified  by  the  word  is  found.  This  is because  the  perfection  exists 
in  God  essentially,  and  so  the  term  is  predicated  of  God  essentially.  In  us,  such  predications 
are  made  by  participation: 
Now  nothing  is  predicated  of  God  and  creatures  as  though  they  were  in  the  same 
order,  but,  rather,  according  to  priority  and  posteriority.  For  all  things  are  predicated 
of  God  essentially.  For  God  is  called  being  as  being  entity  itself,  and  he  is  called 
good  as  being  goodness  itself.  But  in  other  beings  predications  are  made  by 
participation,  as  Socrates  is  said  to  be  a  man,  not  because  he  is  humanity  itself,  but 
because  he  possesses  humanity.  19 
Moreover,  each  good  thing  that  is  not  its  goodness  is  called  good  by  participation. 
But  that  which  is  named  by  participation  has  something  prior  to  it  from  which  it 
receives  the  character  of  goodness.  This  cannot  proceed  to  infinity,  since  among  final 
causes  there  is  no  regress  to  infinity,  since  the  infinite  is  opposed  to  the  end.  We 
must,  therefore,  reach  some  first  good,  that  is  not  by  participation  good  through  an 
order  toward  some  other  good,  but  is  good  through  its  own  essence.  This  is  God. 
God  is,  therefore,  his  own  goodness.  20 
In  the  first  instance,  as  we  indicated  earlier,  we  predicate  terms  of  creatures  because  it  is  as 
creatures  that  we  know  and  experience  the  world.  However,  when  they  are  predicated  of 
creatures  such  terms  signify  the  creatures'  imperfect  exemplification  of  what  exists  perfectly 
in  God,  for  example,  goodness.  The  terms,  as  ST  la  q13  a6  notes,  are  properly  predicated 
of  God,  it  is  in  him  that  what  the  terms  signify  exist  perfectly  and  essentially.  We 
imperfectly  represent  what  the  terms  signify.  This  concept  of  participation,  imperfect 
18  ST1a  q13  a6c  Dicendum  quod  in  omnibus  nominibus  quae  de  pluribus  analogice  dicuntur, 
necesse  est  quod  omnia  dicantur  per  respectum  ad  unum.  Et  ideo  illud  unum  oportet  quod 
ponatur  in  definitione  omnium.  Et  quia  ratio  quam  significat  nomen  per  prius  dicatur  de  eo  quod 
ponitur  in  definitione  aliorum,  et  per  posterius  de  aliis  secundum  ordinem  quo  appropinquant  ad 
illud  primum  vel  magis  vel  minus  .............. 
Undo  secundum  hoc  dicendum  est  quod  quantum  ad 
rem  significatam  per  nomen  per  prius  dicuntur  de  Deo  quam  de  creaturis,  quia  a  Deo  hujusmodi 
perfectiones  in  creaturas  manant;  sed  quantum  ad  impositionem  nominis  per  prius  a  nobis 
imponuntur  creaturis,  quas  prius  cognoscimus.  Unde  et  modum  significandi  habent  qui  competit 
creaturis,  ut  supra  dictum  est. 
19  SCG  132.7  Nihil  autem  de  Deo  et  rebus  aliis  praedicatur  eodem  ordine,  sed  secundum  prius  et 
posterius,  quum  de  Deo  omnia  praedicentur  essentialiter;  dicitur  enim  ens  quasi  ipsa  essentia,  et 
bonus  quasi  ipsa  Bonitas.  De  aliis  autem  fiunt  praedicationes  per  participationem:  sicut  Socrates 
dicitur  homo,  non  quod  sit  ipsa  humanitas,  sed  humanitatem  habens. 
20  SCG  138.4  Item,  Unumquodque  bonum,  quod  non  est  sua  bonitas,  participatione  dicitur 
bonum.  Quod  autem  per  participationem  dicitur  bonum,  aliquid  ante  se  praesupponit,  a  quo 
rationem  suscipit  bonitatis.  hoc  autem  in  infinitum  non  est  possibile  abire;  quia  in  causis  finalibus 
non  proceditur  in  infinitum;  infinitum  enim  repugnat  fini;  bonum  autem  rationem  finis  habet.  Oportet 
igitur  devenire  ad  aliquid  aliud,  sed  sit  per  essentiam  suam  bonum;  hoc  autem  est  Deus.  Est  igitur 
Deus  sua  Bonitas. 13 
representation,  will  become  more  apparent  as  we  discuss  the  analogical  use  of  'knowledge'. 
In  the  works  of  Cajetan  and  later  commentators  this  feature  was  discussed  under  the  heading 
of  analogy  of  attribution. 
As  creator,  God  is  the  source  of  such  creaturely  exemplifications.  This  is  what  Aquinas 
means  in  ST  la  q13  a5  when  he  talks  of  the  order  that  creatures  have  to  God  as  their 
principle  and  cause.  As  Norbert  Mtega  puts  it: 
Thus  all  the  analogies  used  to  express  the  relation  of  creatures  to  God  must  be  based 
on  this  fact  that  things  bear  a  direct  relation  to  God  as  effect  to  its  cause  and  they 
have  an  ontological  link  of  intrinsic  likeness.  21 
Thus  the  core  meaning  of  such  analogical  terms  which  ground  all  the  other  analogical  uses  is 
found  in  their  application  to  God  who  is  their  cause  and  who  possesses  what  the  terms 
signify  essentially  and  perfectly:  the  other  uses  must  be  seen  in  light  of  this. 
One  further  point  regarding  God  as  principle  and  cause  of  such  creaturely  exemplifications 
must  be  made.  Aquinas  is  aware  that  such  a  statement  is  open  to  misunderstanding.  When 
Aquinas  says  that  God  is,  for  example,  the  cause  of  goodness,  he  does  not  mean  what  Alan 
of  Lille  meant  when  he  said  this.  Alan  of  Lille  said  that  such  a  statement  `God  is  good' 
means  God  is  the  cause  of  goodness.  St.  Thomas  is  quite  adamant  that  this  is  an  erroneous 
opinion.  Aquinas'  meaning  of  `God  is  good'  and  other  statements  like  it  is  much  more 
nuanced: 
So  when  we  say  "God  is  good,  "  the  meaning  is  not  "God  is  the  cause  of  goodness" 
or  "God  is  not  evil";  but  the  meaning  is  "Whatever  good  we  attribute  to  creatures  pre- 
exist  in  God"  and  in  a  more  excellent  and  higher  way.  Hence  it  does  not  follow  that 
God  is  good  because  he  causes  goodness;  but  rather,  on  the  contrary,  he  causes 
goodness  in  things  because  he  is  good.  22 
Knowledge  and  truth  in  God  are  also  discussed  in  similar  terms: 
You  find  truth  in  the  mind  when  it  apprehends  the  thing  as  it  is,  and  truth  in  the  thing 
when  it  possesses  being  conformable  to  mind.  This  is  verified  most  of  all  in  God. 
For  his  being  is  not  only  in  conformity  with  his  intellect,  but  is  his  very  act  of 
knowing;  and  his  act  of  knowing  is  the  measure  and  cause  of  all  other  being  and  all 
other  intellect;  and  he  himself  is  his  own  being  and  his  own  act  of  knowing.  Hence  it 
21  Mtega  1984,  page  78. 
22  ST  1a  q13  a2c  Cum  igitur  dicitur  Deus  est  bonus,  non  est  sensus,  Deus  est  causa  bonitatis,  vel 
Deus  non  est  malus,  sed  est  sensus  Id  quod  bonitatem  dicimus  in  creaturis  praeexistit  in  Deo,  et 
hoc  quodime  secundum  altiorem.  Unde  ex  hoc  non  sequitur  quod  Deo  competat  esse  bonum 
inquantum  causat  bonitatem,  sed  potius  e  converso  quia  est  bonus  bonitatem  rebus  diffundit. 
ý 14 
follows  not  only  that  truth  is  in  God  but  also  that  he  is  the  supreme  and  original 
truth.  23 
The  term  `knowledge'  as  it  is  applied  to  God  is  the  measure  of  all  other  uses  of  the  term 
because  God's  knowledge  is  perfect  knowledge.  This  is  the  sense  in  which  Aquinas  sees 
`knowledge'  being  used  analogically:  the  various  uses  of  the  term  must  be  seen  in  light  of  its 
use  as  it  is  applied  to  God. 
It  is  when  we  consider  what  St.  Thomas  has  to  say  about  the  analogical  use  of  the  term 
`knowledge'  to  God's  knowledge  and  human  knowledge  in  Quaestiones  Disputatae  De 
Veritate  [DV  ]  q2  all  that  we  get  a  deeper  insight  into  the  relationship  of  the  different 
analogical  predications  of  terms.  Deeper,  yet  also  more  confused  because  he  appears  to 
contradict  himself.  In  DV  q2  al  lc  he  writes: 
Consequently,  it  must  be  said  that  knowledge  is  predicated  neither  entirely  univocally 
nor  yet  purely  equivocally  of  God's  knowledge  and  ours.  Instead,  it  is  predicated 
analogously,  or,  in  other  words  according  to  proportion.  Since  an  agreement 
according  to  proportion  can  happen  in  two  ways,  two  kinds  of  community  can  be 
noted  in  analogy.  There  is  a  certain  agreement  between  things  having  a  proportion  to 
each  other  from  the  fact  that  they  have  a  determinate  distance  between  each  other,  like 
the  proportion  which  the  number  two  has  to  unity  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  double  of 
unity.  Again,  the  agreement  is  occasionally  noted  not  between  two  things  which  have 
a  proportion  between  them,  but  rather  between  two  related  proportions,  for  example, 
six  has  something  in  common  with  four  because  six  is  two  times  three,  just  as  four 
is  two  times  two.  The  first  type  of  agreement  is  one  of  proportion;  the  second  of 
proportionality. 
We  find  something  predicated  analogously  of  two  realities  according  to  the  first 
type  of  agreement  when  one  of  them  has  a  relation  to  the  other,  as  when  being  is 
predicated  of  substance  and  accident  because  of  the  relation  which  accident  has  to 
substance,  or  as  when  healthy  is  predicated  of  urine  and  animal  because  urine  has 
some  relation  to  the  health  of  an  animal.  Some  times,  however,  a  thing  is  predicated 
analogously  according  to  the  second  type  of  agreement,  as  when  sight  is  predicated 
of  bodily  sight  and  of  the  intellect  because  understanding  is  in  the  mind  as  sight  is  in 
the  eye. 
In  those  terms  predicated  according  to  the  first  type  of  analogy,  there  must 
be  some  definite  relation  between  the  things  having  something  in  common 
analogously.  Consequently  nothing  can  be  predicated  analogously  of  God  and 
creature  according  to  this  type  of  analogy;  for  no  creature  has  such  a  relation  to  God 
23  ST  1a  q16  a5c  Veritas  incentiur  in  intellectu  secundum  quod  apprehendit  rem  ut  est,  et  in  re 
secundum  quod  habet  esse  conformabile  intellectui.  Hoc  autem  invenitur  maxime  in  Deo.  nam 
esse  suum  non  solum  est  conforms  suo  intellectui,  sed  etiam  est  ipsum  suum  intelleigere;  et  suum 
intelligere  est  mensura  et  causa  omnis  alterius  esse  et  omnis  alterius  intellectus;  et  ipse  est  suum 
intelligere  et  suum  esse.  Unde  sequitur  quod  non  solum  in  ipso  sit  veritas,  sed  quod  ipse  sit 
summa  et  prima  veritas. 15 
that  it  could  determine  the  divine  perfection.  But  in  the  other  type  of  analogy,  no 
definite  relation  is  involved  between  the  things  which  have  something  in  common 
analogously,  so  there  is  no  reason  why  some  name  cannot  be  predicated  analogously 
of  God  and  creature  in  this  manner.  24 
As  we  see  Aquinas'  example  of  the  first  type  of  analogy  is  the  predication  of  being  to  both 
accidents  and  substances  because  of  the  relation  accidents  have  to  substances.  His  standard 
analogical  example  of  the  health  of  urine  and  animal,  which  also  makes  an  appearance,  is 
also  of  this  type.  Sight  being  predicated  of  bodily  sight  and  the  intellect,  in  so  far  as  the 
intellect's  act  of  understanding  is in  the  mind  as  sight  is  in  the  eye,  is  cited  as  an  example  of 
analogy  of  proportionality.  Knowledge,  he  says,  is  used  analogously  of  humans  and  God 
according  to  proportionality.  Hence,  they  signify  something  similar  but  are  radically 
different  enterprises.  There  is  no  definite  relation  between  them  as  there  is in  the  first  case, 
analogy  of  proportion,  in  so  far  as  healthy  urine  is  related  to,  the  sign  of,  a  healthy  body, 
because  the  healthy  body  is  the  cause  of  the  healthy  urine. 
This  seems  to  contradict  ST  1a  q13  a5c  where  he  says  that: 
whatever  is  said  of  God  and  creatures  is  said  according  to  the  relation  of  a  creature  to 
God  as  its  principle  and  cause.  25 
Moreover,  a  passage  fromSCG  I  34  also  seems  to  contradict  DV  q2  al  lc  which,  as  we  saw 
above,  states  that  terms  predicated  analogically  of  God  and  creatures  are  not  predicated 
according  to  an  analogy  of  proportion,  as  in  the  case  of  predicating  being  of  accidents  and 
substance,  rather  the  predication  is  according  to  an  analogy  of  proportionality.  In  SCG  I  34, 
24  Unde  dicendum  est,  quod  nec  omnino  univoce,  nec  pure  aequivoce,  nomen  scientiae  de 
scientia  Dei  et  nostra  praedicatur;  sed  secundum  analogiam,  quod  nihil  est  aliud  dictu  quam 
secundum  proportionem.  Convenientia  enim  secundum  proportionem  potest  esse  duplex;  et 
secundum  hoc  duplex  attenditur  analogiae  communitas. 
Est  enim  quaedem  convenientia  inter  ipsa  quorum  est  ad  invicem  proportio,  eo  quod  habent 
determinatam  distantiam  vel  aliam  habitudinem  ad  Invicem,  sicut  binarius  cum  unitate,  eo  quod  est 
eius  duplum;  convenientia  etiam  quandoque  attenditur  duorum  ad  invicem  inter  quae  non  sit 
proportio,  sed  magis  similitudo  duarum  ad  invicem  proportionum,  sicut  senarius  convenit  cum 
quaternario  ex  hoc  quod  sicut  senarius  est  duplum  ternarii,  ita  quaternarius  binarii. 
Prima  ergo  convenientia  est  proportionis,  secunda  autem  proportionalitatis.;  unde,  et  secundum 
modum  primae  convenientiae  invenimus  aliquid  analogice  dictum  de  duobus  quorum  unum  ad 
alterum  habitudinem  habet;  sicut  ens  dicitur  de  substantia  et  accidente  ex  habitudine  quam 
substantia  et  accidente  ex  habitudine  quam  substantia  et  accdens  habent;  et  sanum  dicitur  de 
uirna  et  animali,  ex  eo  quod  urina  habet  aliquam  similitudinem  ad  sanitatem  animalis. 
Quando  vero  dicitur  aliquid  analogice  secundo  modo  convenientiae;  sicut  nomen  visus  dicitur  de 
visu  corporali  et  intellectu,  eo  quod  sicut  visus  est  in  oculo,  ita  intellectus  est  in  mente.  Quia  ergo  in 
his  quae  primo  modo  analogice  dicuntur,  oportet  esse  aliquam  determinatam  habitudinem  inter  ea 
quibus  est  aliquid  per  analogiam  commune,  impossibile  est  aliquid  per  hunc  modum  analogiae  dici 
de  Deo  et  creatura;  quia  nulla  creatura  habet  talem  habitudinem  ad  Deum  per  quam  possit  divina 
perfectio  determinari. 
Sed  in  alio  modo  analogiae  nulla  determinata  habitudo  attenditur  inter  ea  quibus  est  aliquid  per 
analogiam  commune;  et  ideo  secundum  ilium  modum  nihil  prohibet  aliquod  nomen  analogice  dici 
de  Deo  et  creatura. 
25  Et  sic  quidquid  dicitur  de  Deo  et  creaturis,  dicitur  secundum  quod  est  aliquis  ordo  creaturae  ad 
Deum  ut  ad  principium  et  causam 16 
extensively  quoted  below,  when  discussing  how  names  are  predicated  analogically  of  God 
and  humans  St.  Thomas  writes: 
This  can  take  place  in  two  ways.  In  one  way,  according  as  many  things  have 
reference  to  something  one.  Thus,  with  reference  to  one  health  we  say  that  an  animal 
is  healthy  as  the  subject  of  health,  medicine  is  healthy  as  it  cause,  food  as  its 
preserver,  urine  as  its  sign. 
In  another  way,  the  analogy  can  obtain  according  as  the  order  or  reference  of  two 
things  is  not  to  something  else  but  to  one  of  them.  Thus  being  is  said  of  substance 
and  accident  as  an  accident  has  reference  to  a  substance,  and  not  according  as 
substance  and  accident  are  referred  to  a  third  thing. 
Now,  the  names  said  of  God  and  things  are  not  said  analogically  according  to  the 
first  mode  of  analogy,  since  we  should  have  to  posit  something  prior  to  God,  but 
according  to  the  second  mode. 
In  this  second  mode  of  analogical  predication  the  order  according  to  the  name  and 
according  to  reality  is  sometimes  found  to  be  the  same  and  sometimes  not.  For  the 
order  of  the  name  follows  the  order  of  knowledge,  because  it  is  a  sign  of  an 
intelligible  conception.  When,  therefore,  that  which  is  prior  in  reality  is found  like 
wise  to  be  prior  in  knowledge,  the  same  thing  is  found  to  be  prior  both  according  to 
the  meaning  of  the  name  and  according  to  the  nature  of  the  thing.  Thus,  substance  is 
prior  to  accident  both  in  nature,  in  so  far  as  substance  is  included  in  the  definition  of 
accident,  and  in  knowledge,  in  so  far  as  substance  is  included  in  the  definition  of 
accident.  Hence  being  is  said  of  substance  by  priority  over  accident  both  according  to 
the  nature  of  the  thing  and  according  of  the  meaning  of  the  name.  But  when  that 
which  is  prior  in  nature  is  subsequent  in  our  knowledge,  then  there  is  not  the  same 
order  in  analogicals  according  to  reality  and  according  to  the  meaning  of  the  name. 
Thus  the  power  to  heal,  which  is  found  in  health-giving  things,  is  by  nature  prior  to 
the  health  that  is  in  the  animal,  as  a  cause  is  prior  to  an  effect;  but  because  we  know 
this  healing  power  through  an  effect,  we  likewise  name  it  from  its  effect.  Hence  it  is 
that  the  health-giving  is  prior  in  reality,  but  animal  is  by  priority  called  healthy 
according  to  the  meaning  of  the  name. 
Thus,  therefore,  because  we  come  to  a  knowledge  of  God  from  other  things,  the 
reality  in  the  name  said  of  God  and  other  things  belong  by  priority  in  God  according 
to  his  mode  of  being  but  the  meaning  of  the  name  belongs  to  God  by  posteriority. 17 
and  so  he  named  from  his  effects.  26  [My  emphasis] 
Prior  to  our  consideration  of  the  apparent  contradictions  some  comments  ought  to  be  made 
on  where  the  various  passages  agree  and  disagree.  The  analogical  use  of  health  and  healthy 
things  in  the  discussion  of  the  latter  part  of  SCG  134.4  (the  largest  paragraph  of  the  quote) 
agrees  with  ST  la  q13  a5c  where  Aquinas  states  that  whatever  is  predicated  analogically  of 
God  and  creatures  "is  said  according  to  the  relation  of  a  creature  to  God  as  its  principle  and 
cause.  "  This  is  how  health  is  predicated  of  animals  and  things  which  cause  health  in  the 
animal.  His  consideration  of  what  is  prior  and  posterior  in  signification  and  reality, 
knowledge  and  nature,  in  the  passage  from  SCG  134.4  also  concurs  with  what  we  read  in 
ST  la  q13  a6c.  Yet,  this  passage  from  the  Summa  Contra  Gentiles,  in  using  the  example  of 
the  predication  of  being  to  substance  and  accidents,  conflicts  with  what  he  writes  about  this 
very  example  in  DV  g2  allc. 
To  clarify  the  situation  concisely:  SCG  I  34  concurs  with  ST  la  q13  aa5-6,  while  DV  q2 
al  lc  fails  to  agree  with  either  of  them.  We  noted  earlier  the  apparent  contradiction  between 
DVq2  al  lc  and  ST  la  q13  a5c.  Thus  it  seems  that  DVq2  all  is  something  of  a  misfit,  it  not 
only  fails  to  concur  with,  but  also  appears  to  contradict,  what  he  writes  elsewhere.  What 
should  be  made  of  this? 
Three  comments  must  be  made.  First,  DVq2  al  lc  does  not  contain  a  theory  of  analogy  that 
is  a  historical  development  of  the  other  two  passages.  In  fact,  according  to  authorities  cited 
by  James  Weisheipl,  De  Veritate  is  an  earlier  work  than  theSumma  Contra  Gentiles  and  the 
26  SCG  1  34.3-6  Quod  quidem  dupliciter  contingit.  Uno  modo,  secundum  quod  multa  habent 
respectum  ad  aliquod  unum,  sicut  secundum  respectum  ad  unam  sanitatem,  animal  dicitur  sanum, 
ut  ejus  subjectum;  medicina  ut  ejus  effectivum;  cibus,  ut  ejus  conservativum;  urina,  'ut  ejus  signum. 
Alio  modo,  secundum  quod  duorum  attenditur  ordo  vel  respectus  non  ad  aliquid  alterum,  sed  ad 
unum  ipsorum;  sicut  ens  de  substantia  et  accidente  dicitur,  secundum  quod  accidens  ad 
substantiam  respectum  habet,  non  secundum  quod  substantia  et  accidens  ad  aliquod  tertium 
referantur. 
Hujusmodi  ergo  nomina  de  Deo  et  rebus  aliis  non  dicuntur  analogice  secundum  primum  modum 
(oportet  enim  aliquid  Deo  ponere  prius),  sed  modo  secundo. 
In  hujusmodi  autem  analogica  praedicatione  ordo  attenditur  idem  secundum  nomen  et 
secundum  rem,  quandoque  vero  non  idem.  Nam  ordo  nominis  sequitur  ordinem  cognitionis,  quia 
est  signum  intelligibilis  conceptionis.  Quando  igitur  id,  quod  prius  est  secundum  rem,  invenitur 
etiam  cognitione  prius,  idem  invenitur  prius  et  secundum  nominis  rationem  et  secundum  rei 
naturam.  Sic  substantia  prior  est  accidentis;  et  cognitione,  in  quantum  substantia  in  diffinitione 
accidentis  ponitur.  Et  ideo  ens  dicitur  prius  de  substantia  quam  de  accidente,  et  secundum  rei 
naturam  et  secundum  nominis  rationem.  Quando  vero  illud,  quod  est  prius  secundum  naturam,  est 
posterius  secundum  cognitionem,  tunc  in  analogicis  non  est  idem  ordo  secundum  rem  et 
secundum  nominis  rationem;  sicut  virtus  sanandi,  quae  est  in  sanitivis,  prior  est  naturaliter  sanitate 
quae  est  in  animali,  sicut  causa  effectu.  Sed  quia  hanc  virtutem  per  effectum  cognoscimus,  ideo 
etiam  ex  effectu  nominamus.  Et  inde  est,  quod  sanitivum  est  prius  sanum,  sedcundum  nominus 
rationem.  Sic  igitur,  quia  ex  rebus  aliis  in  Del  cognitionem  pervenimus,  res  nominum  de  Deo  et 
rebus  aliis  dictorum  per  prius  est  in  Deo  secundum  suum  modum,  sed  ratio  nominis  per  posterius; 
unde  et  nominari  dicitur  a  suis  causatis. 18 
Summa  Theologiae.  27  Second,  it  is  possible  that  Aquinas  may  have  contradicted  himself. 
The  third  option  is  to  explain  the  discrepancies  in  terms  of  the  passage  from  De  Veritate 
having  a  different  emphasis  than  the  other  two  and  also  giving  a  more  detailed  account  of 
analogy  than  the  other  two.  That  is  to  say,  the  accounts  in  SCG  I  34  and  ST  1aq  13  aa5-6 
give  an  adequate,  but  not  as  detailed,  account  of  the  analogical  predication  of  terms  to  God 
and  creatures.  They  do  point  out  that  there  is  not  some  third  thing  to  which  analogy  refers  as 
in  the  case  of  health,  medicine  and  urine28  for  there  is  nothing  prior  to  God.  29  They  point 
out  that  the  analogy  is  drawn  strictly  in  so  far  as  terms  are  predicated  of  one  thing  as  the 
cause  and  principle  of  predication  in  all  other  things30;  and  that  we  come  to  know  this  one 
thing  after  the  others  things,  despite  its  ontological  priority.  31 
Certainly  the  examples  used  in  DV  q2  all  appear  to  contradict  SCG  134.4  and  ST  la  q13 
aa5-6  with  regard  to  what  it  says  about  God  as  principle  and  cause.  Rather  than  see  this  as 
undermining  his  position  we  could  view  this  situation  as  showing  the  difficulties  Aquinas 
faced  in  seeking  to  balance  the  total  otherness  of  God,  his  inestimable  distance  from  his 
creatures  with  the  fact  there  is  some  kind  of  similitude,  some  definite  relation,  between  God 
and  creatures.  32  In  DV  q2  all  he  places  more  emphasis  on  God's  otherness  than  on  the 
relationship  of  God  and  creature  which  exists  in  so  far  as  God  is  creator.  He  does  this  by 
drawing  an  even  finer  distinction  in  the  type  of  analogical  predication  used  of  God  and 
creatures  than  in  the  other  relevant  passages.  Hence,  a  distinction  is  drawn  between  analogy 
according  to  proportion  and  analogy  according  to  proportionality.  The  example  of  sight,  the 
concept  of  analogy  of  proportionality,  allows  him  to  highlight,  more  forcefully  than  the 
health  or  being  examples,  the  tension  of  the  sameness  and  difference  of  terms  when  they  are 
analogically  used  of  God  and  creatures  while  at  the  same  time  maintaining  God's  otherness. 
DV  q2  al  1  is  an  extremely  detailed  and  nuanced  description  of  the  theological  usage  of 
analogy.  The  other  two  passages  are  less  concerned  with  God's  otherness  and  treat  the  issue 
of  analogical  predication  in  a  less  detailed  way,  content  to  state  merely  that  terms  are  used 
analogically  of  God  and  creatures,  not  in  reference  to  some  third  thing,  but  to  God  as 
principle  and  cause.  If  this  explanation  fails  to  convince  then  we  must  draw  the  conclusion 
that  he  has  contradicted  himself.  As  this  paper  is  essentially  concerned  with  his  epistemology 
27  Weisheipl  O.  P.  1974.  page360ff.  According  to  Weisheipl  De  Veritate  was  written  in  Paris 
cl  256-57;  the  relevant  part  of  the  Summa  Contra  Gentiles  in  Paris  cl  258-59;  the  Prima  Pars  of 
the  Summa  Theologiae  in  Viterbo  in  1268. 
28  ST  1a  q13  a5c 
29  SCG  134.4 
30  see  the  texts  quoted  in  the  two  previous  footnotes. 
31  ST  1a  q13  a6c;  SCG  134.5 
32DV  q2  a11c  ...  nec  tarnen  potest  dici  quod  omnimo  aequivoce  praedicetur  quidquid  de  Deo  et 
creatura  dicitur,  quia  si  non  esset  aliqua  comvenientia  creaturae  ad  Deum  secundum  rem,  sua 
essentia  non  esset  creaturarum  similitudo;  et  ita  cognoscendo  essentiam  suam  non  cognosceret 
creaturas.  Similiter  etiam  nec  nos  ex  rebus  creatis  in  cognitionem  Del  pervenire  possemus;  nec 
nominum  quae  creaturis  aptantur,  unum  magis  de  eo  dicendum  esset  quam  aliud;  quia  ex 
aequivocis  non  differt  quodcumque  nomen  imponatur,  ex  quo  nulla  rei  convenientia  attenditur. 19 
and  the  role  of  analogy  within  it,  as  opposed  to  analogy  itself  we  will  accept  that  his 
description  of  analogy  is  not  without  its  internal  difficulties,  but  move  on  nonetheless  to 
consider  our  primary  concern:  his  analogical  use  of  the  term  `knowledge'.  As  we  shall  see 
regarding  the  analogical  use  of  knowledge,  God  as  principle  and  cause  forms  a  central  part 
of  his  theory  of  analogical  predication.  We  will  firstly  consider  what  divine  knowledge  is. 
On  this  basis  we  can  them  move  on  to  discuss  the  analogical  uses  of  the  term  as  it  is  applied 
firstly  to  angels  and  then  to  humans. 
b.  God's  knowledge 
The  prologue  to  Aquinas'  consideration  of  divine  knowledge  in  ST  la  q14  is  informative. 
Among  other  things  it  tells  us  that  knowledge  is  an  operation;  it  is  also  a  kind  of  living  and, 
most  importantly,  it  is  of  what  is  true.  Each  of  these  points  are  expanded  upon  in  St. 
Thomas'  detailed  treatment  of  the  issue  in  ST  la  q14.  The  first  article  of  the  question  asks,  is 
there  knowledge  in  God?  The  question  is  answered  affirmatively.  In  fact  "God  has 
knowledge  and  that  in  the  most  perfect  way.  "33  ST  la  q14  al  opens  with  a  thesis  which 
states  that  there  can  be  no  knowledge  in  God  because  knowledge  is  a  disposition  and  God 
cannot  have  dispositions  as  he  is  pure  act.  Aquinas'  rebuttal  of  this  thesis  allows  him  to 
state  explicitly  an  important  feature  of  God's  knowledge: 
The  perfections  that  go  out  from  God  into  creatures  are  in  God  in  a  higher  way,  as 
we  have  said  above;  therefore  whenever  a  description  taken  from  any  perfection  of  a 
creature  is  attributed  to  God,  we  must  eliminate  from  its  meaning  all  that  pertains  to 
the  imperfect  way  it  is  found  in  the  creature.  Hence  knowledge  in  God  is  not  a 
quality  nor  a  habitual  capacity,  but  substance  and  pure  actuality.  34 
God's  knowledge  is  his  being,  his  substance.  For  God  to  know  and  to  be  are  the  same 
thing.  Thus: 
Since,  therefore,  God  has  no  potentiality  but  is  pure  actuality,  in  him  intellect  and 
what  is  known  must  be  identical  in  every  way:  thus  he  is  never  without  the 
knowledge  likeness,  as  our  intellect  is  when  it  is  only  potentially  knowing;  and  in 
him  knowledge  likeness  is  not  different  from  the  substance  of  the  divine  intellect,  as 
in  ourselves  the  knowledge  likeness  is  different  from  the  substance  of  our  intellect 
when  we  are  actually  knowing.  35 
...  since  his  essence  is  also  the  knowledge  species,  as  we  have  said,  it  necessarily 
33  ST  1a  g14  a1  c  Dicendum  quod  in  Deo  perfectissime  est  scientia. 
34  ibid  ad1.  Ad  primum  ergo  dicendum  quod,  quia  perfectiones  procedentes  a  Deo  in  creaturas, 
altiori  modo  sunt  in  Deo,  ut  supra  dictum  est,  oportet  quod  quandocumque  aliquod  nomen 
sumptum  a  quacumque  perfectione  creaturae  Deo  attribuitur,  secludatur  ab  ejus  significatione 
omne  illud  quod  pertinent  ad  imperfectum  modum  qui  competit  creaturae.  Unde  scientia  in  Deo 
non  est  qualitas  vel  habitus,  sed  substantia  et  actus  purus. 
35  ST  1a  q14  a2c.  Cum  igitur  Deus  nihil  potentialitatis  habeat,  sed  sit  actus  purus,  oportet  quod  in 
eo  intellectus  et  intellectum  sint  idem  omnibus  modis:  ita  scilicet  ut  neque  careat  specie  intelligibili, 
sicut  intellectus  noster  cum  intelliget  in  potentia;  neque  species  intelligibilis  sit  aliud  a  substantia 
intellectus  divini,  sicut  accidit  in  intellectu  noStro  cum  est  actu  intelligens. 20 
follows  that  this  act  of  knowing  is his  essence  and  his  being.  36 
Herein  lies  a  major  difference  between  divine  knowledge  and  the  knowledge  of  creatures.  In 
God  such  knowledge  is  his  being,  or  to  put  it  rather  clumsily,  it  is  something  substantial.  As 
existence  is  God's  essence,  St.  Thomas  can  also  say,  as  he  says  above,  that  God's 
knowledge  is  his  essence.  In  creatures,  as  we  shall  see,  knowledge  is  neither  a  part  of  the 
creature's  substance  nor  essence,  but  an  accident.  Despite  this  radical  difference, 
knowledge,  knowing  something  is,  for  God  and  creatures,  an  operation;  an  activity,  albeit 
one  which  in  us  may  only  exist  potentially. 
In  question  14  of  the  Prima  Pars  of  theSumma  Theologiae  and  its  parallel  texts  such  as  De 
Veritate  question  2,  Summa  Contra  Gentiles  I:  44-71,  and  parts  of  book  XII  of  the 
Commentary  on  the  Metaphysics  ofAristotle,  Aquinas  gives  a  full  treatment  of  the  different 
aspects  of  divine  knowledge.  Some  of  what  he  says  we  can  acknowledge  in  passing:  God 
knows  and  understands  himself,  37  in  a  sense  he  also  has  knowledge  of  non  existent  things 
and  evil,  38  God  knows  infinities,  39  God  has  knowledge  of  future  contingent  events,  40  His 
knowledge  is  unchangeable  and  speculative  41  Other  aspects  of  his  thought  deserve  fuller 
comment  because  these  aspects  show  the  importance  of  analogy  in  Aquinas'  use  of  the  term 
`knowledge'.  They  show  how  one  word  can  be  used  analogically  to  signify  what  in  reality 
are  radically  different  processes.  In  St.  Thomas'  discussion  of  these  aspects  we  see  what  he 
meant  when  he  wrote: 
as  regards  what  the  name  signifies,  these  names  are  applied  primarily  to  God  rather 
than  to  creatures,  because  these  perfections  flow  from  God  to  creatures:  but  as 
regards  the  imposition  of  names,  they  are  primarily  applied  by  us  to  creatures  which 
we  know  first.  42 
What  we  know  of  knowledge  we  know  from  our  consideration  of  it  as  it  is  found  in 
creatures.  Yet  the  perfection  of  what  the  word  signifies  is  found  only  in  God.  This  perfect 
signification  is  the  point  of  focus  for  all  other  uses  of  the  word.  Thus  to  fully  understand 
what  is  meant  by  knowledge  careful  consideration  must  be  given  to  its  use  as  he  applies  it  to 
God. 
As  we  have  seen  God's  knowledge  is  his  act  of  being  43  This  fact  grounds  everything  that 
Aquinas  has  to  say  regarding  divine  knowledge.  After  discussing  this,  St.  Thomas  moves 
36  ibid  a4c  Unde,  cum  ipsa  sua  essentia  sit  etiam  species  intelligibilis,  ut  dictum  est,  ex  necessitate 
sequitur  quod  ipsum  ejus  intelligere  sit  ejus  essentia  et  ejus  esse. 
37  ST  1a  q14  aa2-3;  DVq2  a2;  SCG  I,  47;  111,55;  In  Meta  XII  8. 
38  ST  1a  q14  a9;  a10;  DV  q2  a8;  a15;  SCG  166;  71 
39  ST  1a  g14  a  12;  DV  q2  a9;  g20  a4  ad  1;  SCG  169. 
40  ST  1a  q14  a13;  DV  q2  a12;  SCG  167. 
41  ST  1a  g14  a15;  a16;  DVg2  a5;  g3  a3. 
42  ST  1a  q13  a6c.  See  footnote  18  for  full  extract 
43  ST  1a  q14  a4c 21 
on  to  consider  God's  knowledge  of  things  other  than  himself.  44  What  he  says  gives  an 
important  insight  into  the  nature  of  divine  knowledge,  in  particular,  and  to  knowledge  in 
general: 
God  must  know  things  other  than  himself.  For  evidently  he  knows  himself  perfectly: 
otherwise  his  being  would  not  be  perfect,  since  his  being  is  his  act  of  knowledge. 
But  if  something  is  known  perfectly,  its  power  must  be  known  perfectly.  Now  the 
power  of  a  thing  cannot  be  known  perfectly  unless  the  objects  to  which  the  power 
extends  are  known.  Hence,  since  the  divine  power  extends  to  other  things  by  being 
the  first  cause  which  produces  all  beings,  as  is  clear  from  what  has  been  said  above, 
God  must  know  things  other  than  himself.  And  this  will  be  still  more  evident  if  we 
add  that  the  very  being  of  God,  the  first  efficient  cause  must  be  in  his  act  of 
knowledge;  and  everything  there  must  be  in  the  condition  of  intelligibility;  for  all  that 
is  there  in  another  is  therein  according  to  the  condition  of  that  which  it  is  45 
The  insight  is  this:  the  power  of  a  thing  cannot  be  known  perfectly  unless  the  objects  to 
which  the  power  extends  are  known.  Knowledge  always  has  an  object.  In  other  words, 
knowledge,  whether  it  is  reflexive  or  otherwise,  is  always  knowledge  of  something,  or  to 
put  it  more  technically,  knowledge  is  always  knowledge  of  being. 
Before  we  go  on  to  discuss  divine  knowledge  further  it  is  worth  noting  that  reflexive 
knowledge  is  of  no  great  interest  to  us  in  this  work.  Hence,  in  this  work,  when  we  speak  of 
knowledge  we  mean  knowledge  of  objects  external  to  the  knower.  Whether  this  knowledge 
is  divine,  angelic  or  human  they  share  a  fundamental  feature;  they  are  the  result  of  the 
intellect  grasping  being  external  to  it.  In  the  case  of  divine  knowledge  God  knows  such 
beings  "not  in  themselves  but  in  himself,  because  his  essence  contains  the  likeness  of  things 
other  than  himself.  "46  This  issue  of  `likeness,  '  is  of  crucial  importance  in  his  account  of 
knowledge.  We  will  return  to  it  later.  However,  at  the  moment  we  can  note  that  it  is  by 
proposing  this  concept  of  likeness  that  St.  Thomas  can  speak  of  knowledge  as  a  kind  of 
living,  in  so  far  as  the  knowledge-likeness  of  the  thing  is  nothing  other  than  the  thing's 
form,  which  has  real  existence  in  the  thing,  existing  intentionally  in  the  intellect. 
Several  other  articles  of  ST  la  q14  are  devoted  to  explaining  and  expanding  what  is  meant 
44  ST  q  14  a5c;  SCG  148;  49 
45  ST  1a  q14  a5c.  Dicendum  quod  necesse  est  deum  cognoscere  alia  a  se.  Manifestum  est  enim 
quod  seipsum  perfecte  intelligit:  alioquin  suum  esse  non  esset  perfectum,  cum  suum  esse  sit 
suum  intelligere.  Si  autem  aliquid  perfecte  cognoscitur,  necesse  est  quod  virtus  ejus  perfecte 
cognoscantur.  Virtus  autem  alicujus  rei  perfecte  cognosci  non  potest,  nisi  cognoscantur  ea  ad 
quae  virtus  se  extendit.  Unde,  cum  virtus  divina  se  extendat  ad  alia,  eo  quod  ipsa  est  prima  causa 
effectiva  omnium  entium,  ut  ex  supra  dictis  patet,  necesse  est  quod  Deus  alia  a  se  cognoscat.  Et 
hoc  etiam  evidentius  fit  si  adjungatur  quod  ipsum  esse  causae  agentis  primae,  scilicet  Dei,  est  ejus 
intelligere.  Unde  quicumque  effectus  prae  existunt  in  Deo  sicut  in  causa  prima,  necesse  est  quod 
sint  in  ipso  ejus  intelligere;  et  quod  omnia  in  eo  sint  secundum  intelligibilem  modum:  nam  omne 
quod  est  in  altero,  est  in  eo  secundum  modum  ejus  in  quo  est. 
46  STg14  a5c  Alia  autem  a  se  videt  non  in  ipsis,  sed  in  seipso,  inquantum  essentia  sua  continet 
similtudinem  aliorum  ab  ipso. 22 
by  God's  essence  containing  the  likeness  of  things  other  than  himself.  Much  of  what  he  says 
is  just  as  pertinent  for  human  intellection.  God  knows  things  specifically,  that  is in  their 
differences  from  one  another.  47  If  God  did  not  know  things  specifically,  but  merely  in  terms 
of  universals,  his  knowledge  would  not  be  perfect.  Furthermore,  to  return  to  an  important 
issue  alluded  to  in  article  five,  God's  knowledge  is  the  cause  of  things.  Aquinas  says  that 
God's  knowledge  stands  to  created  things  as  an  artist's  to  his  products  48  God's  knowledge 
is  like  the  artist's  in  so  far  as  the  artist  knows  his  work  prior  to  its  creation,  the  effect  in  the 
cause.  Two  important  corollaries  arise  from  this.  Firstly: 
Just  as  the  knowable  things  of  nature  are  prior  to  our  knowledge,  and  are  its 
measure,  so  God's  knowledge  is  prior  to  natural  things  and  is  their  measure.  49 
Both  divine  and  human  intellects  know  the  things  of  nature,  both  know  by  means  of 
likenesses,  yet  the  relations  of  such  knowledge  to  the  things  of  nature  are  different:  one  is 
measured  by  them,  the  other  is  not.  Secondly,  God  even  knows  individual  material  things.  50 
As  God's  knowledge  is  the  same  as  his  causality;  his  active  power  and  thus  knowledge 
extend  also  to  matter.  This  is  where  the  parallel  between  the  artist  and  God,  made  above, 
breaks  down,  for  the  artist's  knowledge  of  his  product  extends  only  to  its  form,  but  God  is 
the  cause  of  both  the  matter  and  form  of  the  individual,  and  as  such  must  have  knowledge  of 
them.  Moreover,  he  has  such  knowledge  essentially: 
He  [God]  must  know  things  other  than  himself  through  his  essence,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
the  likeness  of  things  as  their  productive  principles;  therefore,  his  essence  must  be 
the  sufficient  principle  for  knowing  all  things  that  come  into  existence  through  him, 
not  merely  in  their  human  natures  but  in  their  individuality.  51 
In  light  of  the  essential  nature  of  this  knowledge,  God's  knowledge  is  not  discursive;  52 
unlike  us  he  does  not  have  to  form  propositions  or  reason  to  acquire  knowledge.  53 
Aquinas  sums  all  of  this  up  by  saying  that  God's  knowledge  is  simple.  We  have  already 
encountered  this  in  the  earlier  quote  from  ST  la  q14  al  ad  2.  This  simplicity  rests  on  God's 
complete  perfection  and  freedom  from  materiality.  54  According  to  St.  Thomas  the  more  free 
from  matter  a  thing  is  the  more  it  has  a  capacity  to  know.  Human  knowledge  is  limited  in  its 
perfection  because  of  the  intellect's  relationship  to  the  body  and  the  fact  that  its  object  exists 
in  material  reality;  hence  human  knowledge  exists  in  a  state  of  division  and  multiplicity,  it 
47  STlaq14a6c 
48  ibid  a8 
49  ibid  ad3  Unde,  sicut  scibilia  naturalia  sunt  priora  quam  scientia  nostra,  et  mensura  ejus,  ita 
scientia  Dei  est  prior  quam  res  naturales,  et  mensura  ipsarum. 
50  ibid  all  c 
51  ibid.  Cum  enim  sciat  alia  a  se  per  essentiam  suam,  inquantum  est  similtudo  rerum  velut 
principium  activum  earum,  necesse  est  quod  essentia  sua  sit  principium  sufficiens  cognoscendi 
omnia  quae  per  ipsum  fiunt,  non  solum  in  universali,  sed  etiam  in  singulari. 
52  ST  1aq  14  a7c 
53ST1aq14a14c 
54ST1aq14a1c 23 
lacks  the  simplicity  indicative  of  God's  knowledge.  This  issue  of  imperfect  representation 
which  we  have  already  noted  is  also  echoed  in  Aquinas'  treatment  of  angelic  knowledge: 
The  greater  an  angel  is  in  being  the  fewer  ideas  he  requires  in  order  to  grasp  the 
intelligible  universe.  55 
The  further  one  moves  down  the  hierarchy  of  creation  from  God  through  the  various  ranks 
of  angels  to  the  lowest  intellect,  that  of  humans,  the  more  knowledge  exists  in  a  state  of 
division  and  multiplicity,  the  more  the  knowledge  in  question  imperfectly  represents  divine 
knowledge. 
Despite  what  you  might  term  this  deterioration,  the  analogical  use  of  `knowledge'  allows 
Aquinas  to  use  the  same  word  to  describe  the  radically  different  intellectual  activities  of  each. 
Fundamentally  these  different  activities  have  some  things  in  common:  knowledge  is  an 
assimilation  between  the  knower  and  the  thing  known  as  the  result  of  the  intellect's 
encounter  with  being  external  to  it.  56  As  he  puts  it  in  ST  1a  q85  a2  ad1  when  challenging  the 
thesis  that  intelligible  species  are  the  object  of  knowledge,  as  opposed  to  the  means: 
What  is  understood  is  in  the  one  who  understands  by  means  of  its  likeness.  57 
Moreover  the  goal  of  this  intellectual  activity  is  always  the  same:  truth  58  As  the  opening 
question  of  De  Veritate  puts  it: 
True  expresses  the  correspondence  of  being  and  the  knowing  power,  for  all  knowing 
is  produced  by  an  assimilation  of  the  knower  to  the  thing  known,  so  that  assimilation 
is  said  to  be  the  cause  of  knowledge.......  this  is  what  true  adds  to  being,  namely  the 
conformity  or  equation  of  thing  and  intellect.  59 
In  God  there  is  no  assimilation  between  the  knowing  power  and  the  object.  As  we  have  seen 
God  knows  the  object  through  his  own  essence.  Nonetheless,  truth  is  indicative  of  God's 
knowledge  for  the  simple  reason  that  God  is  Truth: 
Truth  is  a  certain  perfection  of  understanding  or  of  intellectual  operation,  as  has  been 
said.  But  the  understanding  of  God  is  his  substance.  Furthermore,  since  this 
understanding  is,  as  we  have  shown,  the  divine  being,  it  is  not  perfected  through  any 
superadded  perfection;  it  is  perfect  through  itself,  in  the  same  manner  as  we  have 
shown  of  the  divine  being.  It  remains,  therefore,  that  the  divine  substance  is  truth 
55  ST  1a  q55  a3  c  Sic  igitur  quanto  angelus  fuerit  superior,  tanto  per  pauciores  species 
universalitatem  intelligibilium  apprehendere  poterit. 
56  See  for  example,  Aristotle's  De.  Anima.  III.  5  where  he  writes:  "Knowledge  in  act  Is  the  same  as 
the  thing  itself.  "  Aquinas  makes  several  comments  on  this,  one  of  which  is:  "its  [the  intellect]  actual 
knowledge  is  identical  with  the  thing  known...  "  In  D.  A.  111  10  [...  scientia  in  actu,  est  idem  rei 
scitae..  ] 
57  Ad  primum  ergo  dicendum  quod  intellectum  est  in  intelligente  per  suam  similitudinem. 
58  ST1a  q16  a1c 
59  DVq1  a1  c  Convenientiam  vero  entis  ad  intellectum  exprimit  hoc  nomen  verum.  Omnis  autem 
cognitio  perficitur  per  assimilationem  cognoscentis  ad  rem  cognitionam,  ita  quod  assimilatio  dicta 
est  causa  cognitionis......  Hoc  est  ergo  addit  verum  supra  ens,  scilicet  conformitatem,  sive 
adaequationem  rei  et  intellectus. 24 
itself  60 
Furthermore,  nothing  can  be  said  of  God  by  participation,  since  He  is  his  own 
being,  which  participates  in  nothing.  but,  as  was  shown  above,  there  is  truth  in  God. 
If,  then,  it  is  not  said  by  participation,  it  must  be  said  essentially.  Therefore,  God  is 
His  truth.  61 
As  we  now  move  on  to  consider  creatures  who  have  knowledge  not  essentially,  but  by 
participation,  we  will  see  that  assimilation  and  truth  are  common  features.  What  differs  is  the 
manner  in  which  each  know  being  and  the  intellects'  subsequent  grasp  of  truth.  Throughout 
all  that  follows  the  measure,  "  the  some,  one  thing,  "  as  ST  la  q13  a6  puts  it,  to  which 
angelic  and  human  knowledge  are  compared  is  the  account  of  divine  knowledge  which  we 
have  outlined  over  the  last  few  pages. 
c.  Angelic  knowledge 
St.  Thomas  divides  creatures  into  three  categories:  those  which  are  solely  spiritual;  those 
which  are  solely  corporeal;  and  humans  who  are  composed  of  body  and  spirit.  62  According 
to  Aquinas  a  complete  universe  must  contain  some  incorporeal  creatures  which  stand 
midway  between  God  and  corporeal  things.  63  These,  Aquinas  notes,  are  what  the  bible 
termed  `angels.  '64  The  presuppositions  and  arguments  which  underpin  his  belief  in  the 
existence  of  angels  are  not  our  concern. 
We  have  already  pointed  out  that  everything  which  Aquinas  has  to  say  about  God's 
knowledge  ultimately  springs  from  what  we  can  say  of  knowledge  as  it  exists  in  humans:  on 
the  basis  of  what  he  knows  regarding  human  knowledge,  he  posits  a  theory  of  what  divine 
knowledge  must  be  like.  Similarly  with  his  account  of  angelic  knowledge,  it  is  essentially  an 
account  of  a  creature's  knowledge  minus  the  constraints  that  corporeality  places  on  human 
knowledge:  an  account  of  what  an  intellectual,  non-corporeal  creature's  knowledge  must  be 
like. 
60  SCG  160.2.  Veritas  enim  quaedam  perfectio  intelligentiae  est  sive  intellectualis  operationis,  ut 
dictum  est.  Intelligere  autem  Del  est  substantia;  ipsum  etiam  Intelligere,  quum  sit  divinum  esse,  ut 
ostensum  est,  non  superveniente  aliqua  perfectione  perfectum  est,  sed  est  per  seipsum 
perfectum,  sicut  et  de  divino  esse  supra  ostensum  est.  Relinquitur  igitur  quod  divina  substantia  sit 
ipsa  veritas. 
61  ibid  4.  Praeterea,  de  Deo  nihil  participative  dici  potest,  quum  sit  suum  esse,  quod  nihil  participat. 
Sed  veritas  est  in  Deo  ut  supra  ostensum  est.  Si  igitur  non  dicatur  participative,  oportet  quod  non 
dicatur  essentialiter,  ut  supra  ostensum  est.  Deus  ergo  est  sua  veritas. 
62See  the  prologue  to  his  treatise  on  angels.  ST  1a  qq  50-64  deal  with  the  angels;  qq65-74  deal 
with  corporeal  creatures;  qq75-102  deal  with  humanity. 
63  ST  1a  q50  a1  c.  Unde  necesse  est  ponere,  ad  hoc  quod  universum  sit  perfectum,  quod  sit  aliqua 
incorporea  creatura. 
bid  ad1.  Ad  primum  ergo  dicendum  quod  substantiae  incorporeae  medium  sunt  inter  Deum  et 
creaturas  corporeas. 
64  See  the  prologue  to  his  discussion  of  angels. 25 
We  will  base  our  discussion  of  his  theory  of  angelic  epistemology  on  what  he  writes  about 
angels  in  the  Summa  Theologiae.  There,  Aquinas  tells  us  that  angels: 
have  no  bodies  as  part  of  their  nature;  hence  none  of  the  powers  that  we  find  in  the 
soul  can  be  attributed  to  angels  except  intelligence  and  volition......  Moreover  the 
order  of  the  universe  would  seem  to  require  that  creatures  most  abundantly  endowed 
with  intelligence  should  be  wholly  intellectual,  and  not  only  partly  so  like  the  human 
soul.  Hence,  too,  angels  are  called'intellects'  or  `minds.  '65 
The  angels  are  called  intellects  because  their  knowledge  is  wholly  intellectual.  66  On  the  one 
hand  this  seems  a  rather  obvious  conclusion  to  draw.  If  the  angels  do  not  have  bodies,  they 
do  not  have  any  senses  and  so  cannot  have  any  sensory  knowledge.  Intellectually  is  the  sole 
manner  in  which  they  know  something.  On  the  other  hand,  the  above  statement  is  indicative 
of  Aquinas'  method  in  discussing  angelic  knowledge:  there  is  a  reference  to  human 
intellectual  capacity,  such  references  will  occur  again  and  again  in  his  discussion  on  angelic 
epistemology  as  he  develops  the  point  he  is  making.  This  reinforces  our  earlier  point 
regarding  his  method:  beginning  from  his  account  of  human  knowledge,  he  strips  away  all 
those  features  of  our  knowledge  which  are  a  result  of  our  corporeality,  in  order  to  arrive  at  a 
description  of  the  knowledge  which  a  purely  intellectual,  noncorporeal  creature  must 
possess.  This  aspect  of  his  methodology  notwithstanding,  the  central  role  of  divine 
knowledge  in  his  epistemology  will  also  also  become  apparent.  As  we  have  said,  it  is  the 
measure  against  which  all  other  predications  of  `knowledge'  are  measured:  the  very  structure 
of  his  discussion  on  angelic  knowledge  in  question  54  of  the  Prima  Pars  of  the  Summa 
Theologiae  bears  this  out. 
Our  consideration  of  divine  knowledge  in  ST  la  q14  revealed  that  God's  act  of  knowledge  is 
identical  with  his  substance,  his  being.  God  can  have  no  accidents,  he  is  utterly  simple.  He 
knows  things  in  himself  in  so  far  as  he  is  the  cause  of  them.  Furthermore,  given  that,  in  God 
existence  and  essence  are  identical,  God's  knowledge  is  identical  with  his  essence,  his 
existence.  The  first  three  articles  of  question  54  on  angelic  knowledge  address  these  issues 
with  regard  to  angels. 
Article  one  asks  if  the  angel's  act  of  understanding  is  identical  with  his  substance?  St. 
Thomas  answers  negatively  for  three  reasons:  in  no  created  thing  is  substance  identical  with 
activity,  thus  the  intellectual  activity  of  an  angel  cannot  be  his  substance;  secondly,  if  the 
angel's  act  of  understanding  were  his  substance  it  would  be  a  form  existing  on  its  own,  as 
such  he  says,  it  would  not  be  distinguishable  from  God's  substance  or  from  that  of  any 
other  angel;  thirdly,  Aquinas  maintains  that  angels  have  knowledge  to  a  greater  or  lesser 
degree  depending  on  their  place  in  the  heavenly  hierarchy,  that  is  depending  on  how  much 
they  participate  in  the  divine  perfection,  this  would  not  be  the  case  if  their  act  of 
65  ST1a  q54  a5c.  Angeli  autem  non  habent  corpora  sibi  naturaliter  unita,  ut  ex  supra  dictis  patet. 
Unde  de  viribs  animae  non  possunt  eis  competere  nisi  intellectus  et  voluntas........  Et  hoc  convenit 
ordini  universi,  ut  suprema  creatura  intellectualis  sit  totaliter  intellectiva,  et  non  secundum  partem, 
ut  anima  nostra.  Et  propter  hoc  etiam  angeli  vocantur  intellectus  et  mentes,  ut  supra  dictum  est. 
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understanding  were  identical  with  their  substance. 
Article  two  asks  if  the  angel's  act  of  understanding  is  identical  with  his  existence?  Again  this 
is  answered  negatively  because  activity  and  existence  are  distinct  in  angels,  as  they  are  in  all 
creatures.  God  alone  exists  as  pure  act,  in  creatures,  even  the  angels,  as  we  shall  see,  there 
is  always  an  element  of  potentiality  regarding  the  act  of  understanding.  The  next  article  of 
ST  1a  q54  asks  if  the  angel's  power  to  understand  is identical  with  his  essence?  Again  a 
negative  response  is  given: 
Neither  in  the  angel  nor  in  any  other  creature  can  the  power  or  capacity  to  act  be 
identical  with  the  essence:  and  this  for  the  following  reason.  Since  a  power  or 
potentiality  is  always  a  power  to  be  in  act  in  some  way,  therefore  different  acts  imply 
different  powers;  hence  the  saying,  `as  the  act,  so  the  power.  '  Now  in  every  created 
being,  as  we  have  already  seen,  the  essence  differs  from  the  act  of  existence,  and  is 
related  to  it  as  a  potentiality  to  exist  to  actual  existence.  Now  the  act  that  corresponds 
to  the  capacity,  for  any  action  is  simply  that  action.  But  in  the  angels  the  action  of 
understanding  differs  from  the  act  of  existing;  indeed  every  action  of  created  beings, 
whether  angels  or  anything  else,  is  distinct  from  the  act  of  existing.  Therefore 
the  angel's  essence  is  not  identical  with  his  power  to  understand;  nor  is  any  created 
essence  identical  with  a  capacity  for  activity.  67 
This  quote  brings  together  some  of  the  elements  to  which  we  have  briefly  alluded  in  our 
outline  of  the  first  three  articles  of  his  treatment  of  angelic  knowledge.  We  can  see  that  much 
of  what  they  say  takes  its  cue  from  what  he  said  regarding  divine  knowledge.  As  in  God,  so 
in  the  angels,  the  act  of  understanding  is  a  power.  However,  the  angel's  possession  of  this 
power  is  unlike  God's  in  several  important  respects:  it  is  an  accident,  it  does  not  pertain  to 
the  angel's  substance,  essence  or  existence.  Once  this  comparison  has  been  made  in  ST  1a 
q54  aal-3  and  the  distinctions  between  angelic  and  divine  knowledge  made  clear,  he  moves 
on  to  consider  a  comparison  to  the  human  act  of  understanding. 
Angelic  knowledge,  as  we  have  seen,  is  different  from  God's  knowledge,  it  is  an  accident  of 
the  angel.  In  this  regard  the  angel's  knowledge  is  like  the  human's  knowledge  which  is  an 
accident  of  his  soul.  ST  1a  q54  a4  is  an  example  of  how  Aquinas  moves  from  what  he 
knows  of  the  human  intellect  in  order  to  clarify  what  an  angelic  intellect  must  be  like.  He 
asks  if  there  is  a  difference  between  the  agent  and  potential  intellects  in  angels.  Aquinas 
explains  the  rationale  behind  this  distinction.  It  arises  from  the  human  intellect's  endeavour 
to  know  material  reality.  Firstly,  on  the  side  of  the  human  intellect,  he  says  that  when  we 
look  at  the  human  intellect  we  find  that  it  is  only  potentially  understanding,  that  is,  it  is  in 
67  op.  cit.  Dicendum  quod  nec  in  angelo  neque  in  aliqua  creatura  virtus  vel  potentia  operativa  est 
idem  quod  sua  essentia.  Quod  sic  patet.  Cum  enim  potentia  dicautr  ad  actum,  oportet  quod 
secundum  diversitatem  actuum  sit  diversitas  potentiarum;  propter  quod  dicitur  quod  proprius  actus 
respondet  propriae  potentiae.  In  omni  autem  creato  essentia  differt  ab  ejus  esse  et  comparatur  ad 
ipsum  sicut  potentia  operativa  est  operatio.  In  angelo  autem  non  est  idem  intelligere  et  esse;  nec 
aliqua  alia  operatio  aut  in  ipso,  aut  in  quocumque  alio  creato,  est  idem  quod  ejus  esse.  Unde 
essentia  angeli  non  est  ejus  potentia  intellectiva,  nec  alicujus  creati  essentia  est  ejus  operativa 
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potency  to  intelligible  objects  before  it  actually  understands  them.  This  power  is  called  the 
potential  intellect.  68  Then,  on  the  side  of  the  object  of  the  human  intellect,  material  reality, 
we  see  that: 
.. 
immattered  forms  are  not  actually  intelligible,  it  followed  that  the  natures  or  forms 
of  sense  things  we  understand  are  not,  as  things  stand,  open  to  understanding...  . 
So 
it  was  necessary  to  posit  a  power  of  the  intellectual  order  which  made  things  actually 
able  to  be  understood  by  abstracting  the  thought  of  them  from  their  material 
conditions.  That  is  why  we  speak  of  the  abstractive  power  of  the  mind.  69 
A  more  accurate  translation  of  the  last  the  sentence  of  this  quote  would  be:  "And  this  is 
necessary  to  posit  the  agent  intellect.  "  The  important  point,  however,  is  that  for  the  above 
reasons  a  distinction  is  drawn  in  the  human  intellect  between  the  potential  intellect  and  the 
agent  intellect.  Aquinas'  argument  in  ST  1a  q54  progresses  as  follows:  having  discounted 
any  similarity  between  the  divine  intellect  and  the  angelic  intellect  in  their  act  of 
understanding;  in  article  four  Aquinas  considers  if  there  is  a  similarity  between  angelic  and 
human  intellects  by  asking  if  the  same  distinction  of  agent  and  potential  intellects  exists  in  the 
angel's  intellect,  as  it  does  in  those  of  the  angel's  fellow  creatures,  human  beings.  The 
answer  is  no.  The  reasons  for  this  can  be  found  in  his  consideration  of  how  the  angelic 
intellect  functions;  this  draws  heavily  on  Aquinas'  psychology  of  the  human  mind. 
ST  la  q58,  discusses  the  functioning  of  the  angelic  intellect.  He  states  in  the  first  article  that 
while  the  human  mind  can  be  in  potentiality  to  what  it  can  know  before  it  has  acquired 
knowledge,  this  is  not  the  case  with  the  angelic  intellect  because: 
the  angelic  intelligences  have  no  capacity  to  understand  to  which  there  does  not 
correspond,  inborn  in  their  nature,  and  as  the  fulfilment  of  such  a  capacity,  some 
intelligible  representation  of  reality  70 
This  issue  of  inborn  knowledge  is  a  crucial  feature  of  Aquinas'  angelic  epistemology. 
According  to  St.  Thomas,  if  an  angel  is  to  know  things  other  than  himself,  his  intellect  must 
be  brought  to  completion  by  ideas  which  represent  them  71  As  an  angel  has  no  senses  the 
acquisition  and  formation  of  these  ideas  cannot  follow  the  model  found  in  human 
intellection.  Aquinas  proposes  that  the  ideas  by  which  an  angel  knows  something  must  be 
intrinsic  to  the  angel's  nature: 
68  op.  cit.  Dicendum  quod  necessitas  ponendi  intellectum  possibilem  in  nobis  fuit  propter  hoc 
quod  nos  invenimur  quandoque  intelligentes  in  potentia  et  non  in  actu.  Unde  oportet  esse 
quamdam  virtutem  quae  sit  in  potentia  ad  intelligibilia  ante  ipsum  intelligere,  sed  educitur  in  actum 
eorum  cum  fit  sciens,  et  ulterius  cum  fit  considerans.  Et  haec  virtus  vocatur  intellectus  possibilis. 
69ST  1a  q79  a3c  formae  autem  in  materia  existentes  non  sunt  intelligibiles  actu,  sequebatur  quod 
naturae  seu  formae  rerum  sensibilium  quas  intelligimus  non  essent  intelligibiles  actu........  Oportet 
igitur  ponere  aliquam  virtutem  ex  parte  intellectus  quae  faceret  intelligibilia  in  actu  per  abstractionem 
specierum  a  conditionibus  materialibus.  Et  haec  est  necessitas  ponendi  intellectum  agentem. 
70  ST1a  g58  a1c  Ita  coelestes  intellectus,  scilicet  angeli,  non  habent  aliquam  intelligibilem 
potentiam  quae  non  sit  totaliter  completa  per  species  intelligibiles  connaturales  eis. 
71  ST  1a  q55  a1  c...  angelus  autem  per  suam  essentiam  non  potest  omnia  cognoscere,  sed  oportet 
intellectum  ejus  aliquibus  speciebus  perfici  ad  res  cognoscendas. 28 
the  higher  substances,  the  angels,  exist  non-materially  in  complete  freedom  from 
bodies,  subsisting  simply  as  intelligible  essences.  Hence,  they  attain  their  appropriate 
perfection  by  an  inflow  of  intelligibility  from  God,  which  gives  them, 
simultaneously  with  the  intellectual  nature  they  receive  from  him,  the  intelligible 
forms  in  which  they  know  things  other  than  themselves  72 
A  reply  to  an  objection  makes  the  connection  between  angelic  knowledge  and  God 
even  more  explicit: 
It  is  true  that  the  angelic  mind  contains  likenesses  of  other  creatures;  but  likenesses 
derived  not  from  creatures  but  from  their  cause,  namely  God,  in  whom,  as  in  their 
causal  origin,  the  likenesses  of  all  these  things  preexist.  73 
In  short,  angels  know  things  by  means  of  innate  ideas  which  the  creator  infused  into  them 
when  he  created  them.  As  ST  la  q56  a2c  puts  it: 
God  imprinted  on  the  angelic  mind  certain  likenesses  of  the  things  that  he  produced 
in  their  own  natural  being.  And  this  included  not  only  the  likenesses  of  bodily 
things,  but  also  those  of  all  spiritual  creatures;  for  the  forms  of  both  types  of 
creatures  exist  from  eternity  in  the  divine  Word  74 
It  is  from  God  that  angels  have  knowledge.  This  innate  knowledge  which  angels  have  is 
radically  different  from  human  knowledge  because  unlike  human  knowledge,  the  knowledge 
of  an  angel  is  solely  intellectual.  This  innate,  intellectual  knowledge  is  one  reason  why  there 
is  no  distinction  in  the  angelic  intellect  between  a  potential  and  an  agent  intellect.  Other 
aspects  of  ST  1a  q58  emphasise  the  uniquely  intellectual  character  of  angelic  knowledge 
which  distinguishes  it  from  human  knowledge.  Unlike  humans,  angels  can  understand 
several  things  at  once  because  of  their  intellectual  knowledge  which  they  have  from  the 
divine  essence.  75  Equally,  unlike  the  human  intellect,  the  angelic  intellect  does  not  know  by 
means  of  discursive  thinking  nor  by  distinguishing  and  combining  concepts: 
This  is  why  they  are  called  intellectual  beings;  for  even  in  our  case,  the  things  we 
grasp  immediately  we  say  we  see  `intellectually,  '  and  so  we  give  the  name 
`intelligence'  to  our  latent  habitual  capacity  to  intuit  first  principles.  But  the  human 
soul  in  general  we  describe  as  `rational'  to  indicate  its  way  of  acquiring  true 
knowledge  by  a  discursive  process,  a  way  imposed  by  the  dimness  of  intellectual 
72  op.  cit.  a2c  Substantiae  immaterialiter  et  in  esse  intelligibili  subsistentes.  Et  ideo  suam 
perfectionem  intelligibilem  consequuntur  per  intelligibilem  effiuxum,  quo  a  Deo  species  rerum 
cognitarum  acceperunt  simul  cum  intellectuali  natura. 
73  op.  cit.  a2  ad1  Ad  primum  ergo  dicendum  quod  in  mente  angeli  sunt  similitudines  creaturarum, 
non  quidem  ab  ipsis  creaturis  acceptae,  sed  a  Deo,  qui  est  creaturarum  causa,  et  in  quo  primo 
similitudines  rerum  existunt. 
74  op.  Cit.  In  intellectum  autem  angelicum  processerunt  per  hoc  quod  Deus  menti  angelicae 
impressit  rerum  similitudines,  quas  in  esse  naturali  produxit.  In  Verbo  autem  Del  ab  aeterno 
exstiterunt  non  solum  rationes  rerum  corporalium,  sed  etiam  rationes  omnium  spiritualium 
creaturarum. 
75  ST  1a  q58  a2  c  Angell  igitur  ea  cognitione  qua  cognoscunt  res  per  Verbum,  omnia  cognoscunt 
una  intelligbibili  specie,  quae  est  essentia  divina,  et  ideo  quantum  ad  talem  cognitionem  omnia 
simul  cognoscunt. 29 
light  in  it  76 
Since  then  this  light  [the  intellectual  light]  is  at  its  full  strength  in  an  angel...  we  have 
to  say  that  just  as  an  angel  does  not  understand  discursively,  by  syllogisms,  so  he 
does  not  understandably  distinguishing  and  combining  77 
This  perfect  sharing  in  the  intellectual  light  also  means  that  angels  cannot  be  mistaken  about 
what  they  know:  in  knowing  a  given  essence  they  know  all  that  can  be  affirmed  or  denied  of 
the  essence  in  the  natural  order.  78  Thus  an  angel's  knowledge  is  also  immediate;  the  innate 
knowledge  it  possesses  tells  it  everything  that  can  be  known  or predicated  about  what  is  the 
object  of  its  knowledge.  Such  innate  and  immediate  knowledge  also  entails  a  grasp  of  truth: 
.....  the  angelic  mind  contains  likenesses  of  other  creatures;  but  likenesses  derived 
not  from  creatures  but  from  their  cause,  namely  God,  in  whom,  as  in  their  causal 
origin,  the  likenesses  of  all  these  things  preexist  79 
As  was  stated  earlier,  truth  is  in  the  intellect  when  it  apprehends  a  thing  as  it  is.  80  Clearly,  as 
the  knowledge.  likeness  comes  from  God  as  the  causal  origin  of  the  creature,  such  a. 
knowledge  likeness  must  correspond  to  the  object  of  knowledge.  Thus,  the  angel 
apprehends  the  thing  as  it  is  by  virtue  of  its  innate  knowledge:  thus  by  virtue  of  its  innate 
knowledge  it  possesses  the  truth.  Moreover,  to  return  to  the  matter  of  perfectly  sharing  in  the 
intellectual  light,  this  is  another  reason  for  not  positing  a  potential  and  an  agent  intellect 
operative  in  the  angelic  act  of  understanding. 
It  is  interesting  to  note  the  language  that  St.  Thomas  uses  in  comparing  angelic  and  human 
intellection:  he  refers  to  the  `perfect  light'  of  the  angelic  intellect  and  the  human  intellect's 
`dimness'  in  comparison.  This  alludes  to  a  theme  which  is  very  much  an  undercurrent  of  his 
thought:  creation's  imperfect  representation  of  the  divine  perfection  and  the  deterioration  of 
creation's  participation  in  this  perfection  as  we  move  further  down  the  chain  of  beings  from 
the  Godhead.  We  also  see  this  phenomenon  in  ST  1a  q55  a3c  where  he  discusses  how  the 
greater  angels  know  more  by  means  of  more  general  ideas  than  the  lesser  angels.  According 
to  him  the  closer  an  angel  is  to  the  Godhead,  or  as  he  puts  it  `the  greater  an  angel  is  in 
being,  '81  the  more  it  knows  by  means  of  fewer  ideas.  God  knows  by  means  of  his  one 
76ibid.  a3c  Et  ideo  dicuntur  intellec  tuales;  quia  etiam  apud  nos  ea  quae  statim  naturaliter 
apprehenduntur,  'intelligi'  dicuntur;  unde  'intellectus'  dicitur  habitus  primorum  principiorum.  Animae 
vero  humanae,  quae  veritatis  notitiam  per  quemdam  discursum  acquirunt,  'rationales'  vocantur. 
Quod  quid  contingit  ex  debilitate  intellectualis  luminis  in  eis. 
77  ibid.  a4  Unde  cum  in  angelo  sit  lumen  intellectuale  perfectum....  relinquitur  quod  angelus  sicut 
non  intelligit  ratiocinando,  ita  non  intelligit  componendo  et  dividendo. 
78  ibid.  a5c. 
79  ST  1a  q55  a2  ad1  Ad  primum  ergo  dicendum  quod  in  mente  angeli  sunt  similitudines 
creaturarum,  non  quidem  ab  ipsis  creaturis  acceptae,  sed  a  Deo,  qui  est  creaturarum  causa,  et  in 
quo  primo  similitudines  rerum  existunt. 
80  ST1a  q16  a5c. 
81  op.  cit.  Sic  igitur  quanto  angelus  fuerit  superior,  tanto  per  pauciores  species  universalitatem 
intelligibilium  apprehendere  poterit;  et  ideo  oportet  quod  ejus  formae  sint  universaliores,  quasi  ad 
plura  se  extendentes  unaquaeque  earum. 30 
divine  essence.  Those  closest  to  him  have  a  knowledge  which  approaches  this,  but 
obviously  lacks  the  perfection  of  God's.  Conversely,  angels  further  from  the  Godhead, 
those  of  a  lower  rank,  82  require  more  ideas  by  which  to  know  the  intelligible  universe: 
knowledge  exists  in  them  in  a  more  piecemeal  and  fragmented  fashion.  As  we  shall  see 
when  we  come  to  look  at  human  intellection,  because  of  the  dimness  of  the  intellectual  light 
in  the  human  intellect,  knowledge  exists  there  per  se  in  a  fragmented  and  divided  manner. 
As  the  earlier  quote  from  ST  1a  q56  a2  makes  clear,  angels,  regardless  of  rank,  have  an 
innate  knowledge  of  spiritual  and  material  reality.  As  a  means  of  concluding  our 
consideration  of  angelic  knowledge  we  will  look  briefly  at  some  features  of  angelic 
knowledge  which  we  have  not  yet  discussed. 
At  the  basis  of  what  Aquinas  has  to  say  on  angelic  knowledge  is  his  belief  that  an  angel  is  a 
"non-material  form  existing  on  its  own.  "83  and  that  all  that  they  know,  they  know  by  an 
infusion  of  knowledge  from  God.  Thus: 
So  then  in  every  spiritual  creature  the  forms  of  all  things,  both  bodily  things  and 
spiritual,  were  imprinted  by  the  word.  But  here  we  must  draw  a  distinction.  Each 
angel  received  his  own  specific  form  from  the  Word,  both  as  his  natural  being  and  as 
the  object  of  his  intelligence;  received  it,  that  is,  so  that  he  should  now  both  subsist 
in  his  own  specific  nature  and  at  the  same  time  understand  himself  by  it.  But  the 
forms  of  other  beings  whether  spiritual  or  corporeal,  he  received  only  as  objects  of 
intelligence,  that  is  to  say  as  ideas  through  which  he  might  know  both  corporeal  and 
spiritual  creatures.  84 
Angels'  knowledge  of  both  spiritual  and  material  things  is  accomplished  by  the  same  means: 
intelligible  forms  infused  into  them  by  God.  Even  their  knowledge  of  God  has  an  innate 
aspect  to  it:  they  know  him,  not  through  creation  as  we  know  him,  but  through  the  imprint 
of  God  that  their  own  essence  bears.  85 
As  creatures,  angelst  knowledge  is  limited  in  some  respects;  they  cannot  know  the  future  or 
the  thoughts  of  another  angel  or  man  in  the  way  that  God  can  know  these.  86  However,  since 
they  share  more  perfectly  in  the  intellectual  light,  their  knowledge  is  far  superior  to  ours.  We 
have  already  seen  one  consequence  of  this  superior,  innate  knowledge:  angelic  knowledge  of 
82  According  to  Dionysius,  from  whom  Aquinas  developed  much  of  his  angelology,  the  angels 
were  graded  into  a  hierarchy  of  choirs.  ST  1a  q108 
83  ST  1a  q56.  a1  c  Angelus  autem,  cum  sit  immaterialis,  est  quaedem  forma  subsistens. 
84  ST  1a  q56  a2c  Sic  igitur  unicuique  spiritualium  creaturarum  a  Verbo  Del  impressae  sunt  omnes 
rationes  rerum  omnium  tam  corporalium  quam  spiritualium;  ita  tarnen  quod  unicuique  angelo 
impressa  est  ratio  suae  speciei  secundum  esse  naturale  et  intelligibile  simul,  ita  scilicet  quod  in 
natura  suae  speciei  subsisteret,  et  per  earn  se  intelligeret.  Aliarum  vero  naturarum,  tam  spiritualium 
quam  coporalium,  rationes  sunt  ei  impressae  secundum  esse  intelligibile  tantum,  ut  videlicet  per 
hujusmodi  species  impressas  tam  creaturas  corporales  quam  spirituals  cognosceret. 
85  ST  1a  q56  a3c. 
86  ST  1a  q57  aa3-4. 31 
an  object  is  complete  and  certain  knowledge,  it  cannot  be  mistaken.  87  Another  aspect  of  its 
superiority  is  that  angels  not  only  know  material  things,  they  also  know  material  things  in 
their  particularity: 
As  therefore  the  divine  essence,  by  which  God  causes  all  things,  is  that  likeness  of 
all  things  through  which  he  knows  all  things-  and  not  only  in  general  but  also  in 
particular-  so  too  the  angels,  through  representational  likeness  imparted  to  them  by 
God,  know  things,  not  only  in  terms  of  their  natures  in  general  but  also  in  their 
individual  particularity,  knowing  them  as  manifold  representations  of  that  one  simple 
divine  essence.  88 
The  human  intellect,  on  the  other  hand,  can  only  have  direct  intellectual  knowledge  of 
universals,  of  the  natures  which  particular  things  instantiate.  Thus,  in  itself  the  human 
intellect  cannot  directly  know  a  material  individual;  to  know  such  a  particular,  the  human 
intellect  must  turn  to  the  sense  images.  A  fuller  exposition  of  this  will  be  given  below.  For 
the  moment  it  is  sufficient  to  acknowledge  that  knowing  things  is  their  particularity  is 
another  sign  of  the  superiority  of  the  angelic  intellect. 
This  outline  of  angelic  knowledge  shows  that  angelic  knowledge  differs  vastly  from  divine 
knowledge:  the  latter  knowledge  is  always  in  act,  being  the  very  substance  of  God  himself. 
The  knowledge  attributed  to  the  angels  has  a  degree  of  potentiality,  and  more  importantly,  is 
an  accident  of  their  substance.  We  have  seen,  and  will  see,  that  angelic  knowledge  is  also 
vastly  different  from  that  attributed  to  humans:  its  innateness,  immediacy,  knowledge  of 
particulars  are  just  some  of  its  features  which  mark  its  uniqueness. 
x 
While  we  have  yet  to  fully  discuss  Aquinas'  account  of  human  acts  of  understanding,  it  is 
interesting  to  note  the  interplay  and  comparisons  that  are  drawn  between  the  intellectual  acts 
of  God,  angels  and  creatures,  and  within  this,  the  role  that  divine  understanding,  divine 
knowledge,  plays  as  the  measure  of  the  whole  enterprise.  What  he  said  of  divine  knowledge 
is  significant  for  his  discussion  of  angelic  knowledge  in  ST  la  q54.  As  we  progress  further 
away  from  the  divine  perfection  to  creatures  whose  share  of  the  intellectual  light  is  extremely 
dim,  `knowledge'  is  still  used  to  describe  the  consequences  of  these  vastly  different 
intellectual  operations  when  they  attain  their  good:  the  grasp  of  truth.  We  will  now  move  on 
to  consider  `knowledge'  as  he  predicates  it  of  the  result  of  human  intellectual  activity.  As  we 
consider  this,  we  will  also  see  that  such  knowledge  exists  in  a  fragmented  and  divided 
manner,  yet  when  knowledge  is  predicated  of  these  different  types  of  human  knowledge,  it 
is  not  predicated  analogically. 
87  ST  1a  q58  a3 
88  ST  1a  q57  a2  c  Sicut  igitur  Deus  per  essentiam  suam,  per  quam  omnia  causat,  est  similitudo 
omnium,  et  per  earn  omnia  cognoscit  non  solum  quantum  ad  naturas  universales,  sed  etiam 
quantum  ad  singularitatem,  ita  angeli  per  species  a  Deo  inditas  cognoscunt  res  non  solum  quantum 
ad  naturam  universalem,  sed  etiam  secundum  earum  singularitatem,  inquanturn  sunt  quaedam 
repraesentationes  multiplicatae  illius  unicae  et  simplicis  essentiae. 32 
d.  Human  knowledge 
Throughout  this  discussion  we  have  alluded  to  aspects  of  human  intellectual  activity  and 
knowledge.  It  is  now  time  to  draw  these  aspects  together  in  a  more  systematic  way.  We  have 
already  seen  that  St.  Thomas  often  speaks  of  the  dimness  of  the  human  intellect.  Our 
discussion  in  this  section  of  the  paper  will  highlight  the  implications  of  this  dimness.  When 
we  come  to  look  at  how  human  beings  know,  and  indeed  the  fragmented  nature  of  human 
knowledge,  we  will  be  content  merely  to  offer  a  sketch  of  the  various  acts  of  the  human 
intellect  and  the  various  types  of  human  knowledge.  This  will  set  the  scene  for  our  deeper 
discussion  of  our  knowledge  of  material  reality  which  is  the  subject  of  ST  la  q84.  That  later 
discussion  will  entail  a  detailed  treatment  of  perceptual  knowledge  and  other  elements  of 
Aquinas'  human  epistemology. 
In  a  discussion  of  the  intellectual  powers  of  the  human  soul,  Aquinas  writes  that: 
The  scope  of  our  intellectual  activity,  as  we  have  seen,  is  being  in  general.  89 
In  ST  la  q84  a8  he  is  a  little  more  specific: 
As  mentioned,  the  proper  object  proportioned  to  our  intellect  is  the  nature  of  sensible 
things.  90 
Unlike  God  and  the  angels  the  human  intellect  cannot  know  such  material  individuals 
directly  91  This  is  another  feature  of  the  human  intellect's  dimness,  or  to  put  it  more 
technically,  another  example  of  how  our  knowledge  imperfectly  represents  the  divine 
perfection  which  is  knowledge.  St.  Thomas  is  never  reluctant  to  point  out  this  debilitated 
aspect  of  the  human  intellectual  capacity:  the  dimness  of  our  intellect  retards  our  intellect's 
grasp  of  its  proper  object.  The  following  extracts  give  a  flavour  of  his  thoughts  on  this 
matter: 
We  do  not  know  a  great  many  of  the  properties  of  sensible  things,  and  in  most  cases 
we  are  not  able  to  discover  fully  the  natures  of  those  properties  that  we  apprehend  by 
sense.  92 
So  it  is  clear  that  our  way  of  understanding  discursively  and  our  way  of 
understanding  by  putting  ideas  together  and  taking  them  apart  are  due  to  the  same 
cause;  that  our  first  apprehension  of  any  object  does  not  immediately  show  us 
whatever  is  implicitly  contained  in  it.  And  this  is  what  I  have  called  the  dimness  of 
89  ST1a  q79  a2.  Intellectus  enim,  sicut  supra  dictum  est,  habet  operationem  circa  ens  in  universali. 
90  Dicendum  quod,  sicut  dictum  est,  proprium  objectum  intellectui  nostro  proportionatum  est 
natura  rei  sensibilis. 
91  ST1ag86a1. 
92  SCG  13.4.  Rerum  enim  sensibilium  plurimas  proprietates  ignoramus,  earumque  proprietatum, 
quas  sensu  apprehendimus,  rationem  perfecte  in  pluribus  invenire  non  possumus. 33 
the  intellectual  light  in  our  souls  93 
Since  the  essential  principles  things  are  hidden  from  us  we  are  compelled  to  make 
use  of  accidental  differences  as  indications  of  what  is  essential.  94 
As  Thomas  Collins  notes  we  must  engage: 
in  long  reasoning  processes  which  are  beset  with  doubt  and  uncertainty  in  the 
perception  of  truth.  We  are  forced  to  make  a  gradual  discovery  of  truth,  advancing 
by  means  of  first  principles  and  experimental  data  to  the  investigation  of  an  unknown 
field.  95 
We  are  in  danger  of  preempting  much  of  our  consideration  of  human  knowledge.  The  crucial 
point  to  note  at  the  outset  is  that  the  human  intellect  can  know  the  truth:  it  is  capable  of 
knowledge  despite  the  fact  that  its  intellectual  light  is  dim  and  its  object  is  material  reality.  In 
ST  1a  qq84-89  Aquinas  gives  a  full  treatment  of  human  intellectual  ability.  It  is  to  that 
treatment,  given  in  those  questions  and  elsewhere,  that  we  now  turn  our  attention.  As  we 
consider  his  account  we  will  see  once  again  the  importance  of  the  analogical  use  of 
`knowledge'  and  how  divine  knowledge  is  seen  as  the  measure  of  all  knowledge.. 
That  the  human  soul  knows  material  things  is  stated  in  the  first  article  of  ST  1a  q84.  Having 
granted  this,  the  first  thing  Aquinas  does  is  to  consider  the  manner  in  which  the  human  soul 
has  this  knowledge.  Just  as  in  the  case  of  angelic  knowledge  in  ST  la  q54  al,  an  allusion  is 
immediately  made  to  divine  knowledge  when  the  second  article  of  question  84  asks  if  the 
soul  understands  material  things  through  its  own  essence  or  through  species.  Aquinas' 
discussion  of  this  issue  summarises  the  positions  of  various  pre-Socratic  philosophers  and 
Plato  before  concluding  that  it  is  the  characteristic  of  God  alone  to  understand  everything  by 
his  own  essence,  the  human  intellect  knows  by  means  of  immaterial  species.  In  the  angels 
such  immaterial  species  are  innate.  ST  la  q84  a3  asks  if  this  is  the  case  with  species  of  the 
human  intellect?  No,  the  human  intellect,  Aristotle  tells  us  and  Aquinas  reiterates,  is  like  "a 
sheet  of  paper  on  which  no  word  is  yet  written,  but  many  can  be  written.  "96  As  Aristotle 
makes  clear: 
Have  we  not  already  disposed  of  the  difficulty  about  interaction  involving  a  common 
element,  when  we  said  that  the  mind  is  in  a  sense  potentially  whatever  is  thinkable, 
though  actually  it  is  nothing  until  it  has  thought?  What  it  thinks  must  be  in  it  just  as 
characters  may  be  said  to  be  on  a  writing  tablet  on  which  as  yet  nothing  actually 
93  ST  1a  q58  a4  Sic  igitur  patet  quod  ex  eodem  provenit  quod  intellectus  noster  intelligit 
discurrendo,  et  componendo,  et  dividendo,  ex  hoc  sciliciet  quod  non  statim  in  prima 
apprehensione  alicujus  primi  apprehensi  potest  inspicere  quidquid  in  eo  virtute  continetur;  quod 
contingit  ex  debilitate  luminis  intellectualis  in  nobis,  sicut  dictum  est.  The  translator  has  opted  to 
insert  the  word  'soul',  whereas  the  original  text  merely  talks  of  the  dimness  of  the  intellectual  light  in 
us. 
94  In  D.  A.  I.  1  Sed  quia  principia  essentialia  rerum  sunt  nobis  ignota,  ideo  oportet  quod  utamur 
differentiis  accidentalibus  in  designitione  essentialium. 
95  Collins  1947,  page  181. 
96  In  D.  A.  111.9. 34 
stands  written  this  is  exactly  what  happens  with  mind.  97 
Unlike  the  angels: 
the  lesser  intellectual  substances,  namely  human  souls,  have  an 
intellectual  capacity  which  is  not  fulfilled  by  the  natures  they  start  with,  but  has  to  be 
fulfilled  gradually,  through  a  reception  of  intelligible  forms  drawn  from  other 
realities.  98 
The  species  by  which  the  human  intellect  knows  are  neither  of  its  own  essence  nor  innate. 
Aquinas  goes  on  to  discount  any  notion  of  Platonic  forms  or  a  Christian  version  of  them.  As 
he  discusses  Augustine's  theory  that  the  soul  knows  all  truths  in  the  divine  ideas  he  reiterates 
the  notion  of  humanity's  imperfect  representation  of  the  divine  light: 
For  the  intellectual  light  in  us  is  nothing  more  than  a  participating  likeness  of  the 
uncreated  light  in  which  the  divine  ideas  are  contained.  99 
Having  done  this  he  begins  his  account  of  how  human  knowledge  is  possible. 
The  immaterial  species  by  which  the  human  intellect  knows  are  the  result  of  the  intellect 
acting  on  sense  impressions,  or  as  Aquinas  calls  them,  the  phantasmata..  100  ST  la  q84  aa6- 
8  and  ST  la  q85  aal-2  outline  the  relationship  between  the  intellect  and  the  senses  in  the 
acquisition  of  knowledge:  this  relationship  is  essential  to  the  human  act  of  knowing.  Much 
of  what  St.  Thomas  has  to  say  regarding  the  relationship  of  the  intellect  and  the  senses  is  tied 
up  with  his  philosophy  of  mind  and  his  account  of  human  psychological  processes.  This 
may  seem  to  put  this  relationship  out  with  the  remit  of  a  discussion  of  his  epistemology. 
However,  to  fully  appreciate  what  he  has  to  say  regarding  human  knowledge  we  must 
consider  his  account  of  how  human  beings  acquire  knowledge.  Moreover,  although  only  a 
brief  consideration  of  the  relationship  between  the  intellect  and  senses  will  be  given  here, 
this  will  nonetheless  help  to  show  that  Aquinas'  theory  of  knowledge  has  an  important 
descriptive  dimension. 
A  man,  Aquinas  tells  us  in  the  prologue  to  ST  1a  qq75-83,  is  a  compound  whose  substance 
is  both  spiritual  and  corporeal:  he  consists  of  a  body  and  soul.  Interestingly  Aquinas  is  at 
pains  to  stress  that  the  soul  is  not  the  individual,  the  individual  is  the  body/soul 
compound.  101  Without  getting  distracted  with  the  minutiae  of  his  account  of  the  soul's 
97  De  Anima  III  4. 
98  ST  1a  q55  a5  inferiores  substantiae  intellectivae,  scilicet  animae  humanae,  habent  potentiam 
intellectivam  non  completam  naturaliter  sed  completur  in  eis  successive  per  hoc  quod  accipiunt 
species  intelligibiles  a  rebus 
99  ST  1a  q84  a5  Ipsum  enim  lumen  intellectuale  quod  est  in  nobis  nihil  est  aliud  quam  quaedam 
participata  similitudo  luminis  increati,  in  quo  continetur  rationes  aeternae.  "aeternae",  has  been 
translated  as  "divine"  as  opposed  to  "eternal". 
100  DV  q  19  al  c.  In  the  translations  of  the  different  extracts  which  will  be  taken  from  the  Thomistic 
corpus  we  will  see  phantasmata  translated  in  a  variety  of  ways:  phantasms,  sense  images,  sense 
impressions. 
101  ST  la  q75  a4. 35 
relationship  to  the  body,  we  can  note  in  passing  that  the  soul  is  the  form  of  the  body,  102  that 
it  subsists,  103  that  every  individual  has  a  soul,  104  that  the  soul  survives  the  death  of  the 
body,  105  that  it  is  not  like  an  angel,  106  and  that  the  human  soul  has  many  powers.  107 
Following  Aristotle,  Aquinas  singles  out  five  powers  of  the  soul  for  special  mention:  the 
vegetative,  the  sensitive,  the  appetitive,  the  intellective  and  the  locomotive.  108  In  ST  la  q78 
alc  St.  Thomas  discusses  the  five  powers  of  the  soul  at  length,  in  particular  the  relationship 
of  each  and  the  rationale  for  positing  these  different  powers.  Of  interest  to  us  is  the 
relationship  between  the  senses,  which  pertain  to  the  soul's  sensitive  power,  and  the 
intellective  power  of  the  soul.  As  a  means  of  considering  this  relationship  we  must  recall  a 
feature  of  the  human  intellective  power  that  appeared  earlier  in  our  discussion  of  angelic 
knowledge 
There  we  referred  to  the  distinction  in  the  human  intellect  between  the  possible  intellect  and 
the  agent  intellect.  At  the  basis  of  this  distinction  is  Aquinas'  belief  that  human  intellect  is 
only  potentially  knowing: 
...  the  human  understanding,  lowest  among  intellects  and  remotest  from  the 
perfection  of  God's  mind,  is  in  a  state  of  potentiality  in  relation  to  what  it  can 
understand,  and  is  initially  like  a  blank  page  on  which  nothing  is  written,  as  Aristotle 
writes.  Which  is  obvious  from  the  fact  that  initially  we  are  solely  able  to  understand 
and  afterwards  we  come  actually  to  understand.  109  [Editor's  emphasis] 
This  `coming  to  actually  understand'  Aquinas  describes  in  terms  of  passivity: 
But  the  word  `passivity'  is  also  used  in  a  more  general  sense,  when  a  thing  which 
can  receive  something  does  receive  it  without  losing  anything  thereby.  And  in  this 
sense  anything  that  passes  from  a  state  of  potential  to  one  of  actual  being  is  said  to  be 
passive,  even  when  it  comes  to  its  fulfilment,  and  thus  our  act  of  understanding  is  an 
undergoing  or  being  passive.  1'0 
As  a  created  intellect  the  human  intellect  is  receptive  or  passive.  Prior  to  the  acquisition  of 
knowledge,  it  is  not  in  actuality  to  all  it  can  understand,  it  has  however,  the  potentiality  or 
102  ST1a  q76  al. 
103  ST  1a  q75  a3. 
104  ST  1a  q76  a2. 
105  ST  1a  q75  a6. 
106  ST  1a  q76  a7. 
107  ST  1a  q77  a2. 
108  ST  1a  q78  a1  sc. 
109  ST  1a  q79  a2c  Intellectus  autem  humanus,  qui  est  infimus  in  ordine  intellectum  et  maxime 
remotus  a  perfectione  divini  intellectus,  est  in  potentia  respectu  intelligibilium,  et  in  principio  est 
sicut  tabula  rasa  in  qua  nihil  est  scriptum,  ut  Philosophus  dicit.  quod  manifeste  apparet  ex  hoc, 
quod  in  principio  sumus  intelligentes  solum  in  potentia,  postmodum  autem  efficimur  intelligentes  in 
actu.  "Divini  intellectus"  has  been  translated  as  "God's  mind.  " 
110  ibid.  Tertio  modo  dicitur  aliquid  pati  communiter,  ex  hoc  solo  quod  id  quod  est  in  potentia  ad 
aliquid  recipit  illud  ad  quod  erat  in  potentia,  absque  hoc  quod  aliquid  abjiciatur.  Secundum  quem 
modum  omne  quod  exit  de  potentia  in  actum  potest  dici  pati,  etiam  cum  perficitur,  et  sic  intelligere 
nostrum  est  pati. 36 
possibility  to  understand.  It  is,  as  the  reference  to  Aristotle  acknowledges,  a  tabula  rasa. 
This  blankness  of  the  human  intellect  is  compounded  by  the  fact  that  material  things  existing 
in  the  world,  are  not  actually  intelligible.  We  saw  Aquinas  discussing  the  unintelligibility  of 
material  things  in  ST  1a  q79  a3c.  I  II 
The  abstractive  power  of  the  mind,  the  agent  intellect,  makes  what  is  unintelligible 
intelligible  and  so  reduces  the  possible  intellect  to  act.  In  the  next  article  Aquinas  defends  the 
thesis  of  an  agent  intellect,  not  from  the  point  of  view  of  making  the  unintelligible 
intelligible,  but  from  the  human  intellect's  representation  of  the  divine  act  of  understanding: 
The  abstractive  [agens,  agent]  intellect  of  which  Aristotle  speaks  belongs  to  the  soul. 
This  is  evident  if  we  consider  that  above  man's  intellectual  soul  there  must  be  a 
higher  intelligence  from  which  the  soul  receives  the  power  of  understanding.  For 
what  is  such  by  way  of  participation  and  subject  to  change  and  imperfect  always 
presupposes  something  essentially  and  changelessly  and  perfectly  such.  Now  the 
human  intellectual  soul  is  described  as  participating"Athe  power  of  understanding.  One 
sign  of  this  is  that  it  is  not  totally  intellectual,  but  only  partly  so.  It  also  arrives  at  an 
understanding  discursively,  by  a  process,  pro  and  con.  And  it  has  but  an  imperfect 
understanding,  both  in  that  it  does  not  understand  it  comes  to  understand  everything 
and  in  that  what  it  does  understand  it  comes  to  understand,  passing  from  potential  to 
actual  understanding.  So  there  must  be  some  higher  intelligence  which  accounts  for 
the  soul's  understanding.  112 
The  possible  and  agent  intellects  are  not  two  different  intellectual  powers,  but  different  facets 
of  the  one  intellectual  power.  The  activity  of  each  is  essential  to  the  enterprise  of  knowing, 
as  is  the  activity  of  the  senses.  St.  Thomas  addresses  the  relationship  of  the  possible 
intellect,  the  agent  intellect  and  the  senses  in  SCG  II  77.  The  following  quote  from  this 
passage  forms  part  of  a  much  wider  discussion  on  the  human  soul  in  which  Aquinas 
challenges  the  doctrines  of  Avicenna  who  said  that  there  was  only  one  agent  intellect  for  all 
human  beings  and  that  the  possible  intellect  does  not  preserve  intelligible  species.  113  On  the 
relationship  in  question  Aquinas  writes: 
For  the  intellective  soul  has  something  actual  to  which  the  phantasm  is  potential,  and 
is  potential  to  something  present  actually  in  the  phantasm;  'since  the  substance  of  the 
human  soul  is  possessed  of  immateriality,  and,  as  is  clear  from  what  has  been  said,  it 
111  See  page  27. 
112  ST  1a  q79  a4c  Dicendum  quod  intellectus  agens  de  quo  Philosophus  loquitur  est  aliquid 
animae.  Ad  cujus  evidentiam  considerandum  est  quod  supra  animam  intellectivam  humanam 
necesse  est  ponere  aliquem  superiorem  intellectum  a  quo  anima  virtutem  intelligendi  obtineat. 
Semper  enim  quod  participat  aliquid  et  quod  est  mobile  et  quod  est  imperfectum  praeexigit  ante  se 
aliquid  quod  est  per  essentiam  suam  tale,  et  quod  est  immobile  et  perfectum.  anima  autem  humana 
intellectiva  dicitur  per  participationem  intellectualis  virtutis.  Cujus  signum  est,  quod  non  tota  est 
intellectiva,  sed  secundum  aliquam  sui  partem.  peretingit  etiam  ad  intelligentiam  veritatis  cum 
quodam  discursu  et  motu,  arguendo.  Habet  etiam  imperfectam  intelligentiam,  turn  quia  non  omnia 
intelligit,  turn  quia  in  his  quae  intelligit  de  potentia  procedit  in  actum.  Oportet  ergo  esse  aliquem 
altiorem  intellectum  quo  anima  juvetur  ad  intelligendum. 
113  Chapters  55-90  of  SCG  II  deal  with  issues  pertaining  to  the  soul's  union  with  the  body. 37 
therefore  has  an  intellectual  nature-  every  immaterial  substance  being  of  this  kind. 
But  this  does  not  mean  that  the  soul  is  now  likened  to  this  or  that  determinate  thing, 
as  it  must  be  in  order  to  know  this  or  that  thing  determinately;  for  all  knowledge  is 
brought  about  by  the  likeness  of  the  thing  known  being  present  in  the  knower.  Thus, 
the  intellectual  soul  itself  remains  potential  with  respect  to  the  determinate  likenesses 
of  things  that  can  be  known  by  us,  namely,  the  natures  of  sensible  things.  It  is  the 
phantasms  which  present  these  determinate  sensible  natures  to  us.  But  these 
phantasms  have  not  yet  acquired  intelligible  actuality,  since  they  are  likenesses  of 
sensible  things  even  as  to  material  conditions,  which  are  the  individual  properties, 
and,  moreover,  the  phantasms  exist  in  material  organs.  Consequently,  they  are  not 
actually  intelligible.  They  are,  however,  potentially  intelligible,  since  in  the  individual 
man  whose  likenesses  the  phantasms  reflect  it  is  possible  to  receive  the  universal 
nature  stripped  of  all  individuating  conditions.  And  so,  the  phantasms  have 
intelligibility  potentially,  while  being  actually  determinate  as  likenesses  of  things.  In 
the  intellective  soul  the  opposite  was  the  case.  Hence,  there  is in  that  soul  an  active 
power  vis-a-vis  the  phantasms,  making  them  actually  intelligible;  and  this  power  is 
called  the  agent  intellect;  while  there  is  also  in  the  soul  a  power  that  is  in  potentiality 
to  the  determinate  likenesses  of  sensible  things;  and  this  power  is  the  possible 
intellect.  114 
This  lengthy  extract  contains  much  of  what  Aquinas  discusses  in  ST  1a  q84  aa6-8  and  q85 
aal-2,  not  least  that  all  knowledge  is  brought  about  by  the  likeness  of  the  thing  known  being 
present  in  the  knower. 
His  story  of  human  knowledge  is  that  in  this  life  what  we  know  comes  from  what  we 
sense.  115  For  it: 
is  for  the  good  of  the  soul  to  be  joined  to  the  body  and  to  understand  by  turning  to 
114  SCG  II.  77.2  Habet  enim  anima  intellectiva  aliquid  in  actu,  ad  quod  phantasma  est  in  potentia; 
et  ad  aliquid  est  in  potentia,  quod  in  phantasmatibus  actu  invenitur.  Habet  enim  substantia  animae 
humanae  immaterialitatem;  et  sicut  ex  dictis  patet,  ex  hoc  habet  naturam  intellectualem,  quia  omnis 
substantia  immaterialis  est  hujusmodi.  Ex  hoc  autem  nondum  habet  quod  assimiletur  huic  vel  illi  rei 
determinate,  quod  requiritur  ad  hoc  quod  anima  nostra  hanc  vel  illam  rem  determinate  cognoscat; 
omnis  enim  cognitio  fit  secundum  similitudinem  cogniti  in  cognoscente.  Remanet  igitur  ipsa  anima 
intellectiva  in  potentia  ad  determinatas  similitudines  rerum  cognoscibiliurn  a  nobis  quae  sunt 
naturae  rerum  sensibilium.  Et  has  quidern  determinatas  naturas  rerum  sensibilium  praesentant 
nobis  phantasmata,  quae  tamen  nondum  prevenerunt  ad  esse  intelligibile,  quum  sint  similitudines 
rerum  sensibilium  etiam  secundum  conditiones  materiales,  quae  sunt  proprietates  individuales  et 
sunt  etiam  in  organis  materialibus.  Non  igitur  sunt  intelligibilia  actu;  et  tarnen  quia,  in  hoc  homine 
cujus  similitudinem  repraesentant  phantasmata,  et  accipere  naturam  universalem  denudatam  ab 
omnibus  conditionibus  individuantibus,  sunt  intelligibilia  in  potentia.  Sic  igitur  habent 
intelligibilitatem  in  potentia,  determinationem  autem  similitudinis  rerum  in  actu.  E  contrario  autem 
erat  in  anima  intellectiva.  Est  igitur  in  anima  intellectiva  virtus  activa  in  phantasmata,  faciens  ea 
intelligibilia  actu;  et  haec  potentia  animae  vocatur  intellectus  agens.  Est  etiam  in  ea  virtus  quae  est 
in  potentia  ad  determinatas  similitudines  rerum  sensibilium;  et  haec  est  potentia  intellectus 
possibilis. 
115  We  will  leave  aside,  for  the  moment,  what  he  has  to  say  about  the  disembodied  soul's 
knowledge. 38 
sense  images.  116 
In  fact: 
It  is  impossible  for  intellect,  in  its  present  state  of  being  joined  to  a  body  capable  of 
receiving  impressions,  actually  to  understand  anything  without  turning  to  sense 
images.  117 
St.  Thomas  reiterates  this  in  the  last  article  of  ST  la  q84  by  stating  that  it  is  impossible  for 
us  to  have  complete  knowledge  of  a  thing  when  the  senses  are  bound,  or  sensory  experience 
lacking.  However,  as  the  text  of  SCG  11.77.2  makes  clear,  such  sensory  images,  because  of 
their  materiality,  cannot  be  the  whole  cause  of  our  knowledge.  They  are,  as  he  puts  it,  in  ST 
1a  q84  a6  the  matter  of  the  cause  of  our  knowledge. 
Alexander  Broadie  in  his  introduction  to  Robert  Kilwardby's  On  Time  and  Imagination  118 
points  out  that  in  a  hierarchically  arranged  system  like  that  proposed  by  Kilwardby,  and 
indeed  St.  Thomas,  the  direction  of  government  is  from  the  more  perfect  to  the  less  perfect. 
Within  such  a  system,  the  lower  cannot  act  upon  the  higher:  the  sensory  power  cannot  act  on 
the  intellectual  power.  Yet  clearly,  we  know  things  because  we  sense  them,  is  this  not  an 
example  of  the  lower  power  acting  on  the  higher?  No,  Aquinas  outlines  the  relationship  of 
the  lower  and  higher  powers,  the  senses  and  the  intellect,  as  follows: 
...  the  intellectual  activity  is  caused  by  the  senses  by  way  of  these  images.  However, 
since  these  images  are  not  capable  of  effecting  a  change  in  the  possible  intellect  but 
must  be  made  actually  intelligible,  by  the  agent  intellect,  it  is  not  right  to  say  that 
sensible  knowledge  is  the  total  and  complete  cause  of  intellectual  knowledge-better  to 
say  it  is  somehow  the  material  of  the  causes.  119 
Sensible  objects  impinge  on  the  sense  organs,  which  eventually  leads  to  sensory  images  in 
the  sensory  sou1.120  Such  sensory  images,  however,  cannot  reduce  the  possible  intellect  to 
act.  The  superior  activity  of  the  agent  intellect  acting  on  the  phantasmata,  the  sensory  images, 
is  required  to  create  intelligible  species.  Without  the  activity  of  the  agent  intellect  there  would 
be  no  intellectual  activity.  Sense  knowledge  is  crucial  for  intellectual  knowledge,  but  of  itself 
it  cannot  cause  intellectual  knowledge;  this  is  a  result  of  the  higher,  intellectual  power  acting 
on  the  lower,  sensory  power.  St.  Thomas  sums  up  the  situation: 
Sense  knowledge  is  not  the  whole  cause  of  intellectual  knowledge,  and  it  is  no  cause 
116  ST  1a  q89  a1  c  Sic  ergo  patet  quod  propter  melius  animae  est  ut  corpori  uniatur,  et  intelligat  per 
conversionem  ad  phantasmata. 
117  ST  1a  q84  a7c  Dicendum  quod  impossibile  est  intellectum  nostrum  secundum  praesentis  vitae 
statum  quo  passibili  corpori  conjungitur,  aliquid  intelligere  in  actu  nisi  convertendo  se  ad 
phantasmata. 
118  Kilwardby  1993  pages  12-15. 
119  ST  1a  q84  a6c.  Secundum  hoc  ergo,  ex  parte  phantasmatum  intellectuallis  operatio  a  sensu 
causatur.  Sed  quia  phantasmata  non  suffciunt  immutare  intellectum  possibilem,  sed  oportet  quod 
fiant  intelligibiiia  actu  per  intellectum  agentem;  non  potest  dici  quod  sensibilis  cognitio  sit  totalis  et 
perfecta  causa  intellectualis  cognitionis,  sed  magis  quodammodo  est  materia  causae. 
120  ST  1a  q78  aa3-4 39 
for  wonder  if  intellectual  knowledge  goes  beyond  sense  knowledge.  121 
Leo  Elders  makes  a  similar  comment: 
St.  Thomas  repeatedly  points  out  that  although  all  our  knowledge  comes  to  us 
through  the  senses,  nevertheless  our  intellect  sees  more  in  the  data  of  sense 
experience  than  the  senses  themselves  which  present  the  data.  122 
We  will  see  what  this  "more"  is  shortly. 
As  we  have  just  seen  the  agent  intellect  is  required  to  abstract  intelligible  species  from  the 
phantasms.  He  discusses  this  abstraction  in  ST  la  q85  al: 
...  this  is  what  I  mean  by  abstracting  the  universal  from  the  particular,  the  idea  from 
the  sense  images,  to  consider  the  nature  of  a  species  without  considering 
individuating  conditions  represented  by  sense  images.  123 
He  goes  on  to  expand  on  this: 
Another  way  of  speaking  is  thus  required,  distinguishing  between  two  kinds  of 
matter,  common  and  designated  or  individual:  common  would  be,  for  instance,  flesh 
and  bones,  and  individual,  this  flesh  and  these  bones.  The  intellect  abstracts  the 
species  of  a  natural  thing  from  individual  sensible  matter,  but  not  from  common 
sensible  matter.  Thus  it  abstracts  the  species  of  man  from  this  flesh  and  these  bones 
which  do  not  pertain  to  the  definition  of  the  specific  nature-  they  are,  rather,  as 
Aristotle  says,  parts  of  the  individual.  The  specific  nature  therefore  can  be  considered 
without  them.  However,  the  species  of  man  cannot  be  abstracted  by  the  intellect  from 
flesh  and  bones  as  such.  124 
Our  intellect  knows  by  means  of  intelligible  species  abstracted  from  the  material  particular. 
These  intelligible  species,  Aquinas  notes,  are  not  what  we  know,  but  the  means  by  which 
we  know.  125  What  we  know  is  the  likeness  of  the  specific  nature  which  the  individual 
instantiates: 
What  is  understood  is  in  the  one  who  understands  by  means  of  its  likeness.  This  is 
the  meaning  of  the  saying  that  what  is  actually  understood  is  identical  with  the 
intellect  as  actualised,  in  so  far  as  a  likeness  of  the  thing  understood  is  the  form  of 
the  intellect,  just  as  a  likeness  of  a  sensible  reality  is  the  form  of  a  sense  when 
actualised.  Hence  it  does  not  follow  that  an  abstracted  species  is  what  is  actually 
121  ST  1a  q84  a6  ad3  Ad  tertium  dicendum  quod  sensitiva  cognitio  non  est  totä  causa  intellectualis 
cognitionis.  Et  ideo  non  est  mirum  si  intellectualis  cognitio  ultra  sensitivam  se  extendit. 
122  Elders1993,  page  12. 
123  ST  1a  q85  al  adlEt  hoc  est  abstrahere  universale  a  particulari,  vel  speciem  intelligibilem  a 
phantasmatibus,  considerare  scilicet  naturam  speciei  absque  consideratione  individualium 
principiorum,  quae  per  phantasmata  repraesentantur. 
124  ibid  ad2  Et  ideo  aliter  dicendum  est,  quod  materia  est  duplex,  scilicet  communis,  et  signa  vel 
individualis:  communis  quidem,  ut  caro  et  os;  individualis  autem,  ut  hae  carnes  et  haec  ossa. 
intellectus  igitur  abstrahit  speciem  rei  naturalis  a  materia  sensibili  individuali,  non  autem  a  materia 
sensibili  communi.  Sicut  speciem  hominis  abstrahit  ab  his  carnibus  et  his  ossibus,  quae  non  sunt 
de  ratione  speciei,  sed  sunt  partes  individui,  ut  dicitur,  et  ideo  sine  eis  considerari  potest.  Sed 
species  hominis  non  potest  abstrahi  per  intellectum  a  carnibus  et  ossibus. 
125  ST  1a  q85  a2sc. 40 
understood,  but  only  that  it  is  a  likeness  of  it.  126 
Another  way  to  describe  this  is  to  say  that  our  intellect  knows  directly  the  universal  which 
the  particular  instantiates:  the  agent  intellect  abstracting  the  universal  from  the  particular,  as 
we  saw  in  ST  la  q85  al  adl.  However,  we  will  avoid  talking  of  universals  for  the  moment 
as  we  will  return  to  consider  the  issue  of  universals  in  a  later  chapter. 
The  above  has  been  a  brief,  and  indeed  partial,  summary  of  Aquinas'  account  how  human 
beings  acquire  knowledge.  Much  has  not  been  discussed:  the  role  of  the  internal  senses;  127 
the  various  intellectual  acts,  while  other  facets  of  his  account  have  been  alluded  to  only  in 
passing.  Nevertheless,  the  interplay  between  the  senses  and  the  intellect  in  the  enterprise  of 
human  knowledge  is  clear.  Leaving  aside,  for  the  moment,  how  humans  know  we  will  now 
focus  on  what  human  beings  know.,  In  particular  this  will  highlight  the  differences  between 
`knowledge'  as  it  is  predicated  of  God,  the  angels  and  humans.  We  will  then  return  to 
Aquinas'  account  of  the  different  acts  of  the  human  intellect  involved  in  the  process  of 
knowing  before  looking  at  the  fragmented  nature  of  human  knowledge. 
. 
ST  la  q89  alc  states  a  recurring  theme  of  this  chapter,  one  which  it  is  useful  to  restate  as  we 
focus  on  what  human  being  can  know: 
In  all  intellectual  substances  the  power  of  intelligence  comes  from  the  influence  of 
divine  light.  Now  this  at  its  source,  is  one  and  simple,  and  the  further  intellectual 
creatures  are  from  this  origin,  the  more  the  light  will  be  divided  and  diversified,  as 
with  lines  radiating  from  a  centre.  128 
This  passage  is,  of  course,  referring  to  Aquinas  belief  that  the  further  one  goes  from  the 
Godhead,  the  dimmer  the  intellectual  light  becomes,  the  more  imperfect  is  the  representation 
of  the  divine  intelligence.  Thus,  with  regard  to  material  objects,  God  knows  everything  in  its 
materiality  and  particularity  through  his  essence.  Angels,  on  the  other  hand,  do  not  know  the 
actual  materiality  of  individual,  material  things,  but  do  know  them  in  their  particularity,  and 
not  just  their  specific  natures,  through  ideas  infused  into  the  angels  by  God.  129  Human 
beings,  however,  do  not  know  singulars  directly  and  immediately.  DV  q10  a5c  gives  a 
detailed  description,  in  terms  of  the  workings  of  the  soul,  of  how  the  soul  knows  singulars. 
We  will,  however,  look  at  the  more  general  account  which  he  gives  in  ST  la  q86  alc. 
Directly  and  immediately  our  intellect  cannot  know  the  singular  in  material  realities. 
The  reason  is  that  the  principle  of  singularity  in  material  things  is  individual  matter, 
126  ST1a  q85  a2  ad1  Ad  primum  ergo  dicendum  quod  intellectum  est  in  intelligente  per  suam 
similitudinem.  Et  per  hunc  modum  dicitur  quod  intellectum  in  actu  est  intellectus  in  actu,  inquantum 
similitudo  rei  intellectae  est  forma  intellectus;  sicut  similitudo  rei  sensibilis  est  forma  sensus  in  actu. 
unde  non  sequitur  quod  species  intelligibilis  abstracta  sit  id  quod  actu  intelligitur,  sed  quod  sit 
similitudo  ejus. 
127  ST  1a  q78  a4 
128  op.  cit.  In  omnibus  enim  substantiis  intellectualibus  invenitur  virtus  intellectiva  per  influentiam 
divini  luminis.  Quod  quidem  in  primo  principio  est  unum  et  simplex;  et  quanto  magis  creaturae 
intellectuales  distant  a  primo  principio  tanto  magis  dividitur  illud  lumen  et  diversificatur,  sicut  accidit 
in  lineis  a  centro  egredientibus. 
129  cf  above. 41 
and  our  intellect  -as  said  before-  understands  by  abstracting  species  from  this  sort  of 
matter.  But  what  is  abstracted  from  individual  matter  is  universal.  Therefore  our 
intellect  has  direct  knowledge  only  of  universals. 
Indirectly  and  by  quasi-reflection,  on  the  other  hand,  the  intellect  can  know  the 
singular,  because,  as  mentioned  before,  even  after  it  has  abstracted  the  species  it 
cannot  actually  understand  by  means  of  them  except  by  a  return  to  sense  images  in 
which  it  understands  the  species  as  Aristotle  says.  130 
In  ST  la  q84  a7c  he  makes  a  similar  point: 
Therefore  if  it  is  actually  to  understand  its  proper  object,  then  the  intellect  must  needs 
turn  to  sense  images  in  order  to  look  at  universal  natures  existing  in  particular 
things.  131 
be 
This  conversio  adphantasmata,  turning  to  the.  sense  images,  should  not"seen  to  suggest  that 
this  is  something  which  is  laborious  for  the  human  intellect  to  do-As  Bernard  Lonergan.: 
states: 
....  conversion  of  the  possible  intellect  to  phantasm  is  described  by,  Aquinas  neither 
as  an  activity  nor  as  a  shift  in  activity  but  as  a  natural.  orientation  of  the  human 
intellect  in  this  life:  it  results  from  the  perfection  of  the  conjunction  of  the  soul  to 
body,  it  consists  in  human  intellect  having  its  gaze  turned  to  phantasms  and  inferior 
things;  and  in  this  present  state  of  intellect  is  contrasted  with  that  of  the  next  life 
when  conversion  is  not  to  phantasms  nor  bodies  but  to  superior  things  and  pure 
intelligibles.  l32 
Norman  Kretzmann  reiterates  this  point,  that  turning  to  the  sense  images  is  the  natural 
orientation  of  our  intellect,  something  which  it  does  spontaneously  and  naturally.  133  Nor 
should  the  statement  that  we  don't  know  particulars  directly  be  taken  to  mean  that  there  is 
some  kind  of  time  lapse  or  intellectual  exercise  that  we  must  consciously  undergo.  There  is 
no  time  lapse,  we  don't  engage  in  intellectual  gymnastics  to  know  a  particular  thing;  the  lack 
of  immediacy  in  knowing  singulars  refers  to  the  internal  workings  of  the  soul.  Much  of  what 
he  has  to  say  with  regard  to  singulars  also  holds  good  with  regard  to  what  he  says  of  our 
knowledge  of  contingent  things.  134  The  important  point,  however,  is  that  in  moving  further 
down  the  intellectual  hierarchy  the  intellectual  power  becomes  dimmer,  yet  what  it  yields  can 
still  be  called  knowledge. 
130  ST  1a  q86  a1  c  Dicendum  quod  singulare  in  rebus  materialibus  intellectus  noster  directe  et 
primo  cognoscere  non  potest.  Cujus  ratio  est,  quia  principium  singularitatis  in  rebus  materialibus  est 
materia  indviidualisa:  intellectus  autem  noster,  sicut  supra  dictum  est,  intelligit  abstrahendo 
speciem  intelligibilem  ab  hujusmodi  materia.  Quod  autem  a  materia  individuali  abstrahitur  est 
universale.  unde  intellectus  noster  directe  non  est  cognoscitivus  nisi  universalium. 
Indirecte  autem,  et  quasi  per  quandam  reflexionem,  potest  cognoscere  singulare:  quia,  sicut 
supra  dictum  est,  etiam  postquam  species  intelligibiles  abstraxit,  non  potest  secundum  eas  actu 
intelligere  nisi  convertendo  se  ad  phantasmata,  in  quibus  species  intellgibiles  intelligit,  ut  dicitur. 
131  Et  ideo  necesse  est  ad  hoc  quod  intellectus  actu  intelligat  suum  objectum  proprium,  quod 
convertat  se  ad  phantasmata,  ut  speculetur  naturam  universalem  in  particulari  existentem. 
132  Lonergan  1968,  page  160. 
133  Kretzmann1993,  page  142. 
134  ST  1a  q86  a3. 42 
Other  aspects  of  what  human  beings  know  exhibit  our,  impoverished  imperfect 
representation.  We  do  not  know  infinites.  135  Nor,  like  the  angels,  can  we  know  future 
things  in  themselves.  136  Unlike  the  angels,  137  however,  the  human  soul  cannot  know  itself 
by  means  of  its  own  essence,  the  reason  for  this  re-emphasises  the  dimness  of  the  human 
intellectual  light: 
Now  the  human  intellect  only  comes  under  the  class  of  intelligible  things  as  a 
potential  being-  in  the  way  primary  matter  is in  the  class  of  sensible  things-  hence  its 
name,  possible  intellect.  Accordingly  therefore,  considered  in  its  essence,  it  is 
potentially  intelligent-  thus  it  has,  of  itself,  the  power  to  understand  but  not  to  be 
understood  except  in  so  far  as  it  is  actualised....  Therefore  our  intellect  knows  itself, 
not  by  its  essence,  but  means  of  its  activity.  138  [Editor's  emphasis] 
The  soul  cannot  know  itself  directly.  It  can  only  know  of  itself  when  it  understands 
something  else.  Like  Hume,  Aquinas  would  agree  that  all  you  find  when  you  look  for  the 
self  are  bundles  of  perceptions.  While  angels  can  know  material  things,  human  beings  in  this 
life  cannot  know  immaterial  substances  directly.  139  We  can  only  rise  to  a  limited  knowledge 
of  them  from  material  things.  l40  However,  according  to  Aquinas  the  disembodied  soul  can 
know  immaterial  substances.  141 
In  discussing  the  knowledge  which  the  disembodied  soul  has,  Aquinas  appears  to  be  caught 
between  a  rock  and  a  hard  place.  One  the  one  hand,  he  is  is  at  pains  to  protect  his  thesis, 
taken  from  Aristotle,  that  it  is  entirely  natural  for  the  human  soul  to  know  by  means  of  the 
senses.  While,  on  the  other  hand,  trying  to  reconcile  the  thesis,  much  of  it  obtained  from 
Scripture,  142  that  disembodied  souls  exist  and  have  knowledge.  ST  la  q89  alsc  sums  up  his 
dilemma: 
On  the  other  hand,  Aristotle  says  that  if  there  is  no  way  of  acting  proper  to  the  soul, 
its  separated  existence  is  impossible.  But  it  does  have  a  separated  existence. 
Therefore,  it  has  a  proper  activity,  above  all  that  of  understanding.  Thus,  when 
135  ST  1a  q86  a2. 
136  ST  1a  q86  a4. 
137ST1ag56al. 
138  ST  1a  q87  a1  c  Intellectus  autem  humanus  se  habet  in  genere  rerum  intelligibilium  ut  ens  in 
potentia  tantum,  sicut  et  materia  prima  se  habet  in  genere  rerum  sensibilium:  unde  possibilis 
nominatur.  Sic  igitur  in  sua  essentia  consideratus,  se  habet  ut  potentia  intelligens.  Unde  ex  seipso 
habet  virtutem  ut  intelligat,  non  autem  ut  intelligatur,  nisi  secundum  id  quod  fit  actu.......  Non  ergo 
per  essentiam  suam,  sed  per  actum  suum  se  cognoscit  intellectus  poster. 
139  ST  1a  q88  a1  sc. 
140  ST1a  q88  a2  ad1  Ad  primum  ergo  dicendum  quod  ex  rebus  materialibus  ascendere  possumus 
in  aliqualem  cognitionem  immaterialium  rerum;  non  tamen  in  perfectam. 
141  ST1ag89a2 
142  The  sed  contra  of  almost  every  article  in  ST1a  q89  quotes  from  Scripture,  especially  the  story 
of  Dives  and  Lazarus,  Lk  16:  19-31. 43 
existing  apart  from  the  body,  it  still  understands.  143  [Editor's  emphasis] 
Aquinas'  solution  to  the  dilemma,  proposed  by  the  above  example,  is  to  attribute  to  the 
disembodied  soul  a  knowledge  like  that  of  the  angels,  but  of  an  imperfect  and  confused 
nature.  144  This  has  several  consequences  for  what  the  disembodied  soul  can  know.  We  will 
not  be  distracted  by  what  he  has  to  say  on  this  matter.  Rather  we  will  move  on  to  look  at  the 
single  most  important  feature  of  the  human  intellect  as  it  exists  in  a  soul  united  to  a  body. 
We  have  seen  that  the  human  intellect  is  initially  like  a  blank  page.  An  obvious  consequence 
of  this  is  that  human  knowledge  must  start  and  grow:  the  human  soul  has  an  intellectual 
capacity  which  has  to  be  fulfilled  gradually.  145  The  increase  and  growth  of  knowledge,  as 
we  shall  see,  is  something  of  a  laborious  endeavour.  Unlike  the  angels,  who  have  a 
knowledge  which  tells  them  everything  that  can  be  known  or predicated  about  what  is  the 
object  of  their  knowledge,  146  our  first  knowledge  of  a  thing  is  not  a  complete  knowledge  of 
the  object.  We  have  to  reason  to  such  complete  knowledge.  Aquinas  writes: 
...  the  human  form  of  intelligence  goes  to  its  perfection  in  the  knowledge  of  truth  by  a 
kind  of  movement,  a  discursive  process  of  understanding,  advancing  from  one  thing 
to  another.  If  the  human  mind  were  able,  in  seeing  a  given  principle  to  see  straight 
away  all  the  conclusions  that  follow,  it  would  never  be  involved  in  any  such  process. 
And  this,  in  fact,  is  the  condition  of  the  angels;  in  the  truths  which  their  nature 
enables  them  to  know  they  apprehend  immediately  all  that  such  truths  can  possibly 
imply  for  them. 
This  is  why  they  are  called  intellectual  beings......  But  the  human  soul  in  general 
we  describe  as  `rational,  '  to  indicate  its  way  of  acquiring  true  knowledge  by  a 
discursive  process,  a  way  imposed  by  the  dimness  of  intellectual  light  in  it.  147 
We  will  look  at  this  `rational'  aspect  of  human  intellection,  and  the  goal  of  human 
143  Sed  contra  est  quod  Philosophicus  dicit,  Si  non  est  aliqua  operatnionem  animae  propria,  non 
contingit  ipsam  separari.  Contingit  autem  ipsam  separari.  Ergo  habet  aliquarn  operationem 
propriam;  et  maxime  earn  quae  est  intelligere.  intelligit  ergo  sine  corpore  existens.  [Editor's 
emphasis] 
144  For  example  in  ST1a  q89  a3c  Dicendum  quod,  sicut  supra  dictum  est,  anima  separata  intelligit 
per  species  quas  recipit  ex  influnti  divini  luminis,  sicut  et  angeli:  sed  tarnen,  quia  natura  animae  est 
infra  naturam  angeli,  cui  iste  modus  cognoscendi  est  connaturalis,  anima  separata  per  hujusmodi 
species  non  accipit  perfectam  rerum  cognitionem,  sed  quasi  in  communi  et  confusam.  Sicut  igitur 
se  habent  angeli  ad  perfectam  cognitionern  rerum  naturalium  per  hujusmodi  species,  ita  animae 
separatae  ad  imperfectam  et  confusam. 
145  ST  1a  q55  a2c. 
146  ST  1a  q58  aa3-4. 
147  ST1a  q58  a3c  ...  scilicet  hominum,  per  quemdam  motum  et  discursum  intellectualis  operationis 
perfectionem  in  cognitione  veritatis  adipiscuntur,  dum  scilicet  ex  uno  cognito  in  aliud  cognitum 
procedunt.  Si  autem  statim  in  ipsa  cognitione  principii  noti  inspicerunt  quasi  notas  omnes 
conclusiones  consequentes,  in  eis  discursus  locum  non  haberet.  Et  hoc  est  in  angelis;  quia  statim 
in  illis  quae  primo  naturaliter  cognoscunt,  inspiciunt  omnia  quacumque  in  eis  cognosci 
possunt......  Et  ideo  dicuntur  intellectuales......  Animae  vero  humanae,  quae  veritatis  notitiam  per 
quemdam  discursum  acquirunt,  'rationales'  vocantur.  Quod  quidem  contingit  ex  debilitate 
intellectualis  luminis  in  eis. 44 
intellection:  the  grasp  of  truth,  shortly  when  we  discuss  the  various  acts  of  the  intellect  that 
constitute  the  human  search  for  knowledge.  Two  points  ought  to  be  made  beforehand.  First, 
all  people  regardless  of  intellectual  ability  seek  knowledge,  seek  to  write  on  that  blank  page 
which  is  their  intellect.  So  a  connected,  and  obvious,  issue  is  that  different  people  can  know 
more  than  others.  148  Second,  we  will  pay  closer  attention  to  one  aspect  of  knowledge's 
growth:  how  the  intellect  stores  the  knowledge  it  acquires. 
In  ST  1a2ae  q52  alc  Aquinas  states: 
It  is  now  clear  that  since  habits  and  conditions,  as  Aristotle  says,  are  relational  states 
they  can  possess  intensive  magnitude  in  two  ways.  First,  in  themselves,  as  we  speak 
of  greater  and  lesser  health,  and  greater  and  lesser  knowledge.  Secondly  in  their 
possession  by  their  possessor:  an  equal  knowledge  or  an  equal  degree  of  health  can 
be  more  fully  possessed  by  one  than  by  another,  according  to  aptitude  which  each 
derives  from  nature  or  custom.  149 
This  extract  is  taken  from  a  discussion  on  the  growth  of  habits.  We  will  clarify  what  a  habit 
is  shortly.  As  the  human  intellect  acquires  knowledge  such  knowledge  is  preserved  in  the 
possible  intellect:  it  exists  habitually  in  the  intellect. 
For  the  possible  intellect  is  completely  actualised  with  respect  to  the  intelligible 
species  when  actually  exercising  its  power:  when  it  is  not  so  doing,  it  is  not  in  their 
regard  completely  actualised,  but  is  a  state  between  potentiality  and  act.  And  Aristotle 
remarks  that,  when  this  part,  namely,  the  possible  intellect,  "has  become  each  of  its 
objects,  it  is  said  to  be  actually  possessed  of  knowledge;  and  this  happens  when  it  is 
capable  of  acting  on  its  own  initiative,  yet,  even  so,  its  condition  is  one  of 
potentiality,  in  a  certain  sense,  but  not  the  same  as  before  learning  or 
discovering.  "150 
The  human  intellect  can  know  many  things,  knowledge  which  exists  as  a  habit  of  the 
intellect,  but  it  can  only  think  of  one  thing  at  a  time.  151  Anthony  Kenny  describes  Aquinas' 
thought: 
A  human  baby,  not  having  yet  learned  language,  is  in  a  state  of  remote  potentiality 
with  regard  to  the  use  of  language:  he  has  a  capacity  for  language  learning  that 
148ST1ag85a7. 
149  ST  1  a2ae  q52  a1  c  Sic  igitur  patet  quod,  cum  habitibus  et  dispositiones  dicantur  secundem 
ordinem  ad  aliquid  ut  dicitur  in  Physic.  VII,  dupliciter  potest  intensio  et  remissio  in  habitibus  et 
dispositionibus  considerari.  Uno  modo,  secundum  se:  prout  dicitur  major  vel  minor  sanitas;  vel 
major  vel  minor  scientia  quae  ad  plura  vel  pauciora  se  extendit.  Alio  modo,  secundum 
participationem  subjecti:  prout  scilicet  aequalis  scientia  vel  sanitas  magis  recipitur  In  uno  quam  in 
alio,  secundum  diversam  aptitudinem  vel  ex  natura  vel  ex  consuetudine. 
150  SCG  II  74.161ntellectus  enim  possibilis  est  in  actu  perfecto  secundum  species  intelligibiles, 
quum  considerat  actu;  quum  vero  non  considerat  actu,  non  est  in  actu  perfecto  secundum  illas 
species,  sed  se  habet  medio  modo  inter  potentiam  et  actum.  Et  hoc  est  quod  Aristoteles  dicit  (De 
Anima  III  8)  quod  "  quum  haec  pars  (scilicet  intellectus  possiblis)  unaquaeque  fiat  sciens  dicitur 
secundum  actum;  hoc  autem  accidit,  quum  possit  operari  per  seipsum.  Est  quidem  similiter,  et  tunc 
potentia  quodammodo;  non  tarnen  similiter  atque  ante  addiscere  aut  invenire.  " 
151  ST  1a  q85  a4c. 45 
animals  lack,  but  he  is  not  yet  able  to  use  language  as  an  adult  can.  An  adult  who  has 
learned  English,  even  if  he  is  not  at  this  moment  speaking  English,  is  in  a  state  of 
actuality  in  comparison  with  the  child's  potentiality:  this  was  called  first  actuality  [ST 
1a  q79  al0].  But  a  state  of  first  actuality  is  still  itself  a  potentiality:  the  knowledge  of 
English  is  the  ability  to  speak  English  and  understand  it  when  spoken  to.  The  first 
actuality  can  be  called  a  habitus  or  disposition,  it  is  something  halfway  between 
potentiality  and  full  blooded  actuality  [ST  la  q79  a6  ad3].  152 
Aquinas'  position  on  this  matter  is  contrary  to  the  opinion  of  Avicenna,  which  has  already 
been  mentioned,  who  said  that  intelligible  species  do  not  remain  in  the  possible  intellect 
except  when  they  are  being  actually  understood.  153  Kenny  characterises  Avicenna's  position 
as: 
He  [Avicenna]  concluded  that  when  we  reuse  a  concept,  or  recall  a  belief,  we  must 
go  through  the  same  process  as  when  we  first  mastered  the  concept  or  acquired  the 
belief.  154 
The  above  may  suggest  that  Avicenna  holds  that  we  have  to  relearn  again  and  again  whatever 
it  is  we  wish  to  know.  Avicenna's  theory,  however,  is  more  subtle  and  nuanced  than  this. 
John  Marenbon  gives  a  fuller  description  than  Kenny: 
Avicenna  argues  that  intellectual  ideas-  unlike  sensible  forms-  cannot  be  stored. 
Learning  is  not  a  matter  of  putting  information  away  in  the  mind,  but  of  acquiring 
the  ability  to  join  the  intellect  with  the  intelligentia  agens.  The  educated  man  is  like 
someone  with  sick  eyes  which  have  been  healed:  if  he  looks  at  something  he  can  see 
it;  if  he  turns  his  gaze  away,  he  can  still  decide  to  look  at  it  again.  The  embodied  soul 
does  not  generally  have  the  power  to  receive  forms  from  the  intelligentia  agens 
without  preparation;  learning  brings  the  capacity  to  do  so.  155 
Aquinas'  position  is  far  simpler:  the  possible  intellect  has  the  ability  to  preserve  knowledge- 
species: 
For  the  recipient  intellect  is  said  to  become  things  when  it  receives  them  as 
knowledge-forms.  And  from  the  fact  that  it  holds  these  it  has  the  power  to  think 
about  them  when  it  will,  though  it  does  not  follow  that  it  is  always  actually  doing 
So.  156 
Leaving  aside  this  debate  between  Aristotle's  mediaeval  interpreters  we  now  turn  to  the 
processes  involved  in  the  `rational'  endeavour  of  the  human  intellect.  As  we  do  so,  we  note 
one  final  aspect  of  the  human  intellect  which  sets  it  apart  from  all  other  intellects,  divine  or 
angelic;  an  aspect  which  illuminates  the  dimness  of  the  human  intellect  like  no  other:  it  makes 
152  Kenny  1993,  page  53. 
153  Avicenna  De  Anima  V,  6.  (trans.  Van  Riet  and  Verbeke)  1972,  vols  IV-V,  1968. 
154  Kenny  op.  cit.  page  52. 
155  Marenbon  1987,  page  105 
156  ST  1a  q79  a6c  Dicendum  enim  intellectus  possibilis  fieri  singula  secundum  quod  recipit 
species  singulorum.  Ex  hoc  ergo  quod  recipit  species  intelligibilium  habet  quod  possit  operari  cum 
voluerit,  non  autem  quod  semper  operetur.  Yet  again  we  see  that  the  translation  is  not  entirely 
accurate;  knowledge  species  are  not  mentioned  until  the  second  sentence. 46 
mistakes.  St.  Thomas  discusses  this  issue,  among  other  places,  in  ST  la  q17  a3  and  ST  la 
q85  a6.  For  the  moment  it  is  sufficient  to  note  this  in  passing.  We  will  leave  aside  what  it 
means  for  the  intellect  to  be  in  error  until  the  issue  arises  in  our  discussion  of  the  acts  of  the 
intellect. 
According  to  Aquinas  there  are  three  acts  of  the  intellect  that  constitute  the  human  search  for 
knowledge:  the  first  act,  the  grasp  of  quiddities;  the  second  act,  combining  and  separating; 
and  the  third  act,  reasoning. 
We  have  seen  that  the  intellect  begins  its  process  of  understanding  by  abstraction  from  the 
phantasmata,  the  sense  images.  What  is  abstracted  and  grasped  in  the  first  act  of  the  intellect 
will  be  discussed  in  a  later  chapter,  as  will  the  knowledge  which  results  from  this  and  from 
subsequent  acts  of  the  intellect.  Consequently,  here  we  will  merely  offer  a  sketch,  no  more 
than  a  mise  en  scene,  of  what  Aquinas  says. 
According  to  St.  Thomas  what  is  abstracted  is  the  intellect's  proper  object: 
The  object  of  the  intellect,  in  its  present  state,  is  the  whatness  of  material  things 
which  the  intellect  abstracts  from  sense  images.  l57 
The  grasping  of  this  quiddity,  or  whatness,  constitutes  the  first  act  of  the  intellect.  Aquinas 
makes  an  important  remark  concerning  this  first  act: 
So  the  human  intellect  does  not  immediately,  in  first  apprehending  a  thing,  have 
complete  knowledge;  rather,  it  first  apprehends  only  one  aspect  of  the  thing-  namely, 
its  whatness,  which  is  the  primary  and  proper  object  of  the  intellect-  and  only  then 
can  it  understand  the  properties,  accidents  and  relationships  incidental  to  the  thing's 
essence.  158 
Grasping  a  thing's  quiddity  does  not  give  us  complete  knowledge  of  the  thing,  rather  it  is 
knowledge  of  the  thing  at  its  most  inchoate  stage.  The  first  act  is  but  the  initial  step  on  the 
way  to  complete  knowledge  of  the  thing.  Interestingly: 
Now  the  proper  object  of  the  intellect  is  the  whatness  of  things.  Hence  with  respect 
to  the  whatness  of  things,  speaking  essentially,  the  intellect  makes  no  mistakes.  159 
There  can  never  be  a  question  of  error  with  regard  to  the  first  act.  Moreover,  just  as  there 
can  never  be  a  question  of  falsity,  there  also  cannot  be  a  question  of  truth: 
Accordingly  truth  is  defined  as  conformity  between  intellect  and  thing.......  Intellect 
157  ST  1a  q85  a8c  Dicendum  quod  objectum  intellectus  nostri,  secundum  praesentem  statum,  est 
quidditas  rei  materialis,  quam  a  phantasmatibus  abstrahit. 
158  ST1  a  q85  a5c  Et  similiter  intellectus  humanus  non  statim  in  prima  apprehensione  capit 
perfectam  rei  cognitionem;  sed  primo  apprehendit  aliquid  de  ipsa,  puta  quidditatem  ipsius  rel,  quae 
est  primum  et  proprium  objectum  intellectus;  et  deinde  intelligit  proprietates  et  accidentia  et 
habitudines  circumstantes  rei  essentiam. 
159  ST  1a  q85  a6c  Objectum  autem  proprium  intellectus  est  quidditas  rei.  Unde  circa  quidditatem 
rei,  per  se  loquendo,  intellectus  non  fallitur.  Aquinas  does  discuss  error  with  regard  to  the  first  act, 
but  such  error  is  incidental,  or  as  he  says  accidental,  to  the  grasping  of  quiddities;  the  error  does 
not  pertain  to  the  grasping  of  the  quiddity  as  such;  for  example  in  ST  1a  q85  a6c  when  the 
definition  of  a  circle  is  applied  to  a  triangle. 47 
can  know  its  own  conformity  to  the  thing  known;  yet  it  does  not  grasp  that 
conformity  in  the  mere  act  of  knowing  the  essence  of  a  thing.  160 
Elsewhere  we  have  seen  that  the  goal  of  the  intellect,  knowledge,  occurs  when  the  intellect 
knows  being  as  true.  In  the  case  of  the  angels  we  saw  that  truth  was  a  feature  of  their  innate 
knowledge:  there  was  an  assimilation  between  the  form  existing  in  the  angelic  mind  and  the 
form  naturally  existing  in  the  object.  In  the  case  of  the  weaker  human  intellect,  the  intellect 
must  judge  this  conformity  before  it  can  claim  to  know  and  possess  truth.  This  judgment  is 
constitutive  of  the  second  act  of  the  intellect,  at  which  we  shall  shortly  look.  Absence  of  this 
grasp  of  truth  in  the  first  act  of  the  intellect  is  another  indication  of  the  inchoateness  of  the 
knowledge  which  Aquinas  terms  the  apprehension  of  quiddities.  Mindful  of  not  wanting  to 
preempt  our  discussion  of  the  first  act  of  the  intellect,  we  will  nonetheless  take  note  of 
Norman  Kretzmann's  description  of  the  first  act  of  the  intellect  as  the  "alpha  cognition",  one 
which  leaves  us  in  a  state  of  almost  total  ignorance,  but  nevertheless  grounds  the  pursuit  of 
knowledge.  161 
The  word  that  Aquinas  uses  to  describe  the  first  act  of  the  intellect  is  intelligere,  to 
understand.  In  De  Veritate  ql  al2c  he  discusses  this  act  of  understanding,  drawing  together 
some  aspects  of  intelligere  that  we  have  already  seen  and  some  which  we  have,  not: 
The  name  intellect  arises  from  the  intellect's  ability  to  know  the  most  profound 
elements  of  a  thing;  for  to  understand  means  to  read  what  is  inside  a  thing.  Sense  and 
imagination  know  only  external  accidents,  but  the  intellect  alone  penetrates  to  the 
interior  and  to  the  essence  of  a  thing.  But  even  beyond  this,  the  intellect,  having 
perceived  essences  operates  in  different  ways  by  reasoning  and  inquiring.  Hence 
intellect  is  taken  in  two  senses.  First  it  can  be  taken  merely  according  to  its  relation  to 
that  from  which  it  first  received  its  name.  We  are  said  to  understand  properly 
speaking  when  we  apprehend  the  quiddity  of  things  or  when  we  understand  those 
truths  that  are  immediately  known  by  the  intellect,  once  it  knows  the  quiddities  of 
things.  For  example,  first  principles  are  immediately  known  when  we  know  their 
terms  and  for  this  reason  intellect  or  understanding  is  called  a  habit  of  principles.  The 
proper  object  of  the  intellect  however  is  the  quiddity  of  a  thing.  Hence  just  as  the 
sensing  of  proper  sensibles  is  always  true,  so  the  intellect  is  always  true  in  knowing 
160  ST  1a  q16  a2c  Et  propter  hoc  per  conformitatem  intellectus  et  rei  veritas 
definitur.......  Intellectus  autem  conformitatem  sui  ad  rem  intelligibilem  cognoscere  potest;  sed 
tarnen  non  apprehendit  earn  secundum  quod  cognoscit  de  aliquo  quod  quid  est. 
161  Kretzmann  1992,  page  190 
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what  a  thing  is,  as  is  said  in  De  Anima  111.6.162  [My  emphasis] 
He  then  moves  on  to  discuss  how  error  occurs  in  the  intellect  and  how  intelligere  can  be 
used  in  a  broad  sense  to  refer  to  all  acts  of  the  intellect  such  as  opinion  and  reasoning.  The 
above  extract  gives  a  powerful  description  of  the  intellect's  power  to  grasp  the  quiddity  of  a 
thing,  to  grasp  what  is  essential.  This  is  the  `more'  of  which  we  saw  Leo  Elders  speak 
earlier.  163  This  passage  from  DV  q1  al2c  reiterates  that  the  object  which  the  intellect  grasps 
in  its  first  act  is  the  proper  object  of  intellect:  something  which  it  does  unerringly.  It  is 
interesting  to  note  that  `understanding'  is  also  used  to  refer  to  the  habit  of  grasping  first 
principles.  The  relevant  section  has  been  highlighted.  Apprehending  a  quiddity  and  our 
habitual  capacity  to  grasp  first  principles  are  the  same  type  of  intellectual  act.  What  we  mean 
by  this  will  have  to  be  made  clear  because,  as  we  have  seen,  Aquinas  says  that  the 
understanding  of  a  quiddity  is  not  complete  knowledge  of  a  thing;  yet,  when  he  discusses 
the  habit  of  understanding  first  principles  he  says  that  it  is  not  merely  a  habit,  but  an 
intellectual  virtue.  164  How  can  the  same  word,  intellectus,  be  used  to  describe  such  inchoate 
knowledge,  yet,  in  other  circumstances,  used  to  describe  an  intellectual  virtue? 
The  first  thing  which  must  be  done  is  clarify  what  is  meant  by  the  term  `intellectual  virtue'. 
Understanding,  like  scientia  and  wisdom,  is  called  an  intellectual  virtue  because: 
.....  they  make  us  capable  of  good  activity,  namely  to  consider  the  truth,  which  is  a 
good  work  for  the  intellect.  165 
In  the  next  article  he  reiterates  this: 
The  virtues  of  of  the  speculative  intellect  are  those  which  complete  the  speculative 
intellect  for  the  consideration  of  truth...  166 
Understanding  helps  the  intellect  attain  its  goal  because  by  the  habit  of  understanding  the 
intellect  immediately  grasps  the  truth  of  principles.  Similarly  scientia  is  a  virtue  because  by 
scientia  the  intellect  attains  its  goal,  the  grasp  of  truth,  with  respect  to  different  classes  of 
things.  167  As  an  intellectual  virtue  understanding,  like  scientia  and  wisdom,  is  a  habit  of  the 
162  DV  q1  al  2c  Dicendum  quod  nomen  intellectus  sumitur  ex  hoc  quod  intima  rei  cognoscit:  est 
enim  intelligere  quasi  intus  legere:  sensus  enim  et  imaginatio  sola  exteriora  accidentia  cognoscunt; 
solus  autem  intellectus  ad  essentiam  rei  pertingit.  Sed  ulterius  intellectus  ex  essentiis  rerum 
comprehensis  diversimode  negotiatur  ratiocinando  et  inquirendo.  Nomen  ergo  intellectus 
dupliciter  accipi  potest.  Uno  modo  secundum  quod  se  habet  ad  hoc  tantum  a  quo  primo  nomen 
impositum  fuit;  et  sic  dicitur  proprie  intelligere  cum  apprehendimus  quidditatem  rerum,  vel  cum 
intelligimus  illa  quae  statim  nota  sunt  intellectui  notis  rerum  quidditatibus,  sicut  sunt  prima  principia, 
quae  cognoscimus  cum  terminos  cognoscimus;  unde  et  intellectus  habitus  principiorum  dicitur. 
Quidditas  autem  rei  est  proprie  obiectum  intellectus;  unde,  sicut  sensus  sensibiliurn  proprium 
semper  est  verus,  ita  et  intellectus  in  cognoscendo  quod  quid  est  ut  dicitur  in  III  Do  Anima  [corn 
26] 
163  cf  page  39. 
164ST  1  a2ae  q57  a2. 
165  ST  1  a2ae  q57  a1  c  ... 
inquantum  faciunt  facultatem  bonae  operationis  quae  est  consideratio 
veri,  hoc  enim  est  bonum  opus  intellectus. 
166  ST  1  a2ae  q57  a2c  Virtus  intellectualis  speculativa  est  per  quam  intellectus  speculativus 
perficitur  ad  considerandum  verum. 
167  ibid. 49 
speculative  intellect.  168  Close  analysis  of  Aquinas'  theory  of  habits  is  outwith  the  scope  of 
this  work.  Nevertheless,  in  this  discussion  occasional  reference  has  been  made  and  will  be 
made  to  scientia  and  understanding  as  habits,  therefore  we  ought  to  be  clear  what  we  mean 
by  the  term  `habit'. 
Aquinas  is  not  at  his  most  lucid  when  discussing  habits.  In  different  places  he  uses  different 
but  related  terms  to  classify  what  he  means  by  `habit'.  In  ST  la2ae  q49  at  Aquinas  asks  if 
habits  are  qualities.  The  sed  contra  of  this  article  answers  yes. 
Aristotle  says  that  a  habit  is  a  quality  difficult  to  change.  169 
Aquinas  goes  on  to  tell  us  that  as  a  quality,  a  habit  is  a  simple  form.  170  Moreover,  it  is  a 
form  of  a  particular  kind  because  it  involves  a  relationship  to  something,  either  to  the  nature 
of  the  thing  itself  or  to  activities  which  follow  from  the  nature: 
But  habits  are  states  related  to  two  things:  namely,  to  natures,  and  to  natural 
activities.  171 
In  short,  habits  are  modifications  of  a  nature  to  help  the  nature  better  attain  its  end,  which  in 
the  case  of  the  human  intellect  is  the  grasp  of  truth.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  there  are  many 
ways  in  which  a  nature,  or  an  activity  which  follows  from  a  nature,  such  as  the  human 
intellect,  can  achieve  its  end.  Therefore,  the  nature  or  natural  activity  actually  needs  the 
habits  to  attain  its  end: 
But  if  a  form,  like  the  soul,  is  such  that  it  can  act  in  more  than  one  way,  then  it  needs 
habits  to  bring  it  into  the  state  appropriate  to  each  action.  172 
Thus,  when  discussing  the  necessity  of  habits  he  opens  and  concludes  with  the  following 
remarks: 
A  habit,  as  was  said  above,  is  a  good  or  a  bad  state  of  adaptation  to  the  nature, 
operation,  or  goals  of  its  possessor.... 
.....  Because  therefore,  there  are  many  beings  whose  natures  and  actions  cannot  be 
brought  to  completion  without  the  presence  of  many  elements  which  can  be 
combined  in  various  proportions,  it  follows  that  it  is  necessary  that  there  should  be 
168  ibid  See  also  ST  1  a2ae  g55al  c. 
169  ST  1  a2ae  g49a1  sc  Sed  contra  est  quod  Philosophus  dicit  quod  habitus  est  qualitas  de  difficili 
mobilis. 
In  his  Blackfriars  translation  Anthony  Kenny  translates  "  qualitas  de  diff  icili  mobilis"  as  "a  quasi- 
permanent  quality.  While  it  conveys  the  meaning  of  Aquinas'  definition,  the  introdution  of 
"permanent"  could  lead  to  confusion. 
170  ST  1  a2ae  q54  a4sc  Sed  contra,  habitus,  cum  sit  qualitas  quidem,  est  forma  simplex. 
171  ST  1  a2ae  q54  a2c  Est  autem  habitus  dispositio  quaedam  ad  duo  ordinata,  scilicet  ad  naturam, 
et  ad  operationem  consequentem  naturam. 
172  ST  1  a2ae  q49a4  ad1  Si  autem  sit  talis  forma  quae  possit  diversimode  operari,  sicut  est  anima, 
oportet  quod  disponatur  ad  suas  operationes  per  aliquos  habitus. 50 
such  things  as  habits.  173 
We  could  go  on  to  explore  further  the  relationship  between  habits,  natures  and  abilities 
which  follow  from  natures,  but  that  would  take  us  away  from  our  task.  It  is  sufficient  to 
note  that  a  habit  is  an  adaptation  of  a  thing's  nature  to  help  it  attain  its  end  and  that  a  virtue 
denotes  the  determinate  perfection  of  a  power,  174  which,  in  the  case  of  the  intellectual 
virtues  help  the  intellect  to  grasp  the  truth.  Having  clarified  what  an  intellectual  virtue  is  we 
return  to  our  question:  How  can  an  intellectual  act  which  results  in  such  inchoate  knowledge, 
in  other  circumstances  also  be  called  an  intellectual  virtue? 
`Understanding'  is  used  of  both  the  grasp  of  a  quiddity  and  the  intellectual  virtue  because  in 
both  instances  there  is  an  immediate  and  unerring  grasp  of  their  objects.  In  the  case  of  the 
first  intellectual  act  the  intellect  immediately  grasps  the  quiddity  of  a  thing,  it  does  not  need  to 
reason  in  order  to  get  this  object.  In  the  case  of  the  habit  of  first  principles  there  is  also  an 
immediate  grasp  of  its  object,  in  this  case  the  truth  of  the  principles. 
Now  a  truth  can  come  into  the  mind  in  two  ways,  namely  as  known  in  itself,  and  as 
known  through  another.  What  is  known  in  itself  is  like  a  principle,  and  is  perceived 
immediately  by  the  mind.  And  so  the  habit  which  perfects  the  intellect  in  considering 
such  a  truth  is  called  `understanding';  it  is  a  firm  and  easy  quality  of  mind  which 
sees  into  principles.  175 
The  translation  of  the  last  sentence  is  rather  free,  Aquinas  merely  says  that  "it  is  the  habit  of 
principles,  "  not  that  "it  is  a  firm  and  easy  quality  of  mind  which  sees  into  principles.  "  Such 
free  translation  doesn't  undermine  the  point  we  wish  to  make.  This  habit,  this  kind  of 
understanding,  is  an  intellectual  virtue  because  it  is  an  immediate  grasp  of  the  truth,  and 
knowing  the  truth  is  the  perfection  of  the  intellect.  Thus,  both  the  grasp  of  quiddities  and  the 
habit  of  first  principles  are  similar  kinds  of  act,  but  in  the  case  of  the  virtue  what  is 
immediately  grasped  is  the  truth.  We  will  return  to  a  consideration  of  the  habit  of  grasping 
first  principles  when,  in  a  later  chapter,  we  come  to  look  at  scientia.  The  significant  point,  at 
the  moment,  is  that  Aquinas  views  understanding  as  a  distinct  form  of  human  knowledge, 
different  from  other  types  of  knowledge,  or  intellectual  virtues.  These  other  types  arise  from 
further  operations  of  the  intellect,  to  which  we  now  turn  our  attention. 
The  first  act  of  the  intellect  serves  as  the  basis  for  the  second  act  of  the  intellect.  In  this  act 
the  intellect  understands  the  properties,  accidents  and  relationships  incidental  to  the  thing's 
essence.  The  second  act  is  also  an  act  of  judgment.  Aquinas  calls  this  second  act  by  the 
173  ST  1  a2ae  q49  a4c  Dicendum  quod,  sicut  supra  dictum  est,  habitus  importat  dispositionem 
quamdam  in  ordine  ad  naturam  rei,  et  ad  operationem  vel  finem  eius,  secundum  quam  bene  vel 
male  aliquid  ad  hoc  disponitur..... 
...  Quia  igitur  multa  sunt  entium  ad  quorum  naturas  et  operationes  necesse  est  plura  concurrere 
quae  diversis  modis  commensurari  possunt,  ideo  necesse  est  habitus  esse. 
174  op.  cit.  Dicendum  quod  virtus  nominat  quamdam  potentiae  perfectionem. 
175  ST  1  a2ae  q57  a2c  Verum  autem  est  dupliciter  considerabile:  uno  modo,  sicut  per  se  notum; 
alio  modo,  sicut  per  aliud  notum.  Quod  autem  est  per  se  notum  se  habet  ut  principium,  et  percipitur 
statim  ab  intellectu.  Et  ideo  habitus  perficiens  intellectum  ad  hujusmodi  veri  considerationem 
vocatur  intellectus,  qui  est  habitus  principiorum. 51 
peculiar  name  of  "combining  and  separating.  "176  This  second  act  is  necessary  because  of  the 
human  intellect's  dimness  as  compared  to  the  power  of  the  intellects  of  God  and  the  angels. 
The  intellects  of  God  and  the  angels,  on  the  other  hand,  are  like  incorruptible  realities 
which  do  have  their  total  perfection  immediately  and  from  the  outset;  thus  the 
intellects  of  God  and  the  angels  have  a  completely  perfect  knowledge  of  a  thing  from 
the  outset.  Therefore,  in  knowing  a  whatness  of  a  thing,  they  know  at  the  same  time 
all  things  that  we  are  able  to  know  by  combining,  separating  and  reasoning.  177 
Lacking  the  intellectual  light  of  the  higher  intelligences  the  human  intellect  must  combine  and 
separate;  that  is,  joining  subjects  and  predicates  to  form  propositions,  complexes  isomorphic 
with  reality.  Aquinas  uses  the  example  "A  man  is  white.  "  In  reality,  this  consists  of  a 
substance:  -man,  and  an  accident:  -  white.  Corresponding  to  this  composition  in  reality  is  the 
intellectual  combination  in  which  a  predicate  is  attributed  to  a  subject  as  in  the  proposition  "A 
man  is  white.  "178  In  Aquinas  on  Mind,  Anthony  Kenny  gives  an  illustration  of  the  peculiar 
name  which  St.  Thomas  attributes  to  this  act  of  the  intellect.  An  example  of  combining 
would  be  the  phrase  "arsenic  is  poisonous.  "  The  act  of  combining  is  positive  because, 
Kenny  says,  arsenic  and  poisonous  are  composed,  put  together,  in  reality.  An  example  of 
separating  is  "arsenic  is  not  poisonous.  "  The  act  of  separation  is  negative  because  it  states 
that  they  are  apart  from  each  other  in  reality.  179 
On  the  basis  of  such  combinations  and  separations  the  intellect  judges  the  correspondence  of 
what  it  has  formed  to  the  thing  as  it  exists  in  reality.  That  is,  it  judges  if  what  it  has  formed  is 
true  or  false.  If  what  it  has  formed  is  true,  then  the  intellect  can,  for  the  first  time  be  said  to 
know  the  truth  and  possess  knowledge: 
Intellect  can  know  its  own  conformity  to  the  thing  known;  yet  it  does  not  grasp  that 
conformity  in  the  mere  act  of  knowing  the  essence  of  a  thing.  But  when  the  intellect 
judges  that  the  thing  corresponds  to  the  form  of  the  thing  which  it  apprehends,  then 
for  the  first  time  it  knows  and  affirms  truth.  This  it  does  in  the  act  of  joining  or 
separating  concepts  in  judgment;  for  in  every  proposition  some  form  signified  by  the 
predicate  is  either  joined  to  some  thing  signified  by  the  subject  or  separated  from 
it.  180 
176  The  techn  ical  phrase  which  Aquinas  uses  "componendo  et  dividendo"  is  sometimes 
translated  as  "composing  and  dividing"  and  "sometimes  as  affirming  and  denying" 
177  ST  1a  q85  a5c  Intellectus  autem  angelicus  et  divinus  se  habet  sicut  res  incorruptibiles,  quae 
statim  a  principio  habent  suam  totam  perfectionem.  Unde  intellectus  angelicus  et  divinus  statim 
perfecte  totarn  rei  cognitionem  habet.  Unde  in  cognoscendo  quidditatem  rei,  cognoscit  simul 
quidquid  nos  cognoscere  possumus  componendo  et  dividendo  et  ratiocinando. 
178  ibid 
179  Kenny  1993,  page  163 
180  ST1a  q16  a2c  Intellectus  autem  conformitatem  sui  ad  rem  intelligibilem  cognoscere  potest; 
sed  tarnen  non  apprehendit  earn  secundum  quod  cognoscit  de  aliquo  quod  quid  est.  Sed  quando 
judicat  rem  ita  se  habere  sicut  est  forma  quarr  de  re  apprehendit,  tunc  primo  cognoscit  et  dicit 
verum.  Et  hoc  facit  componendo  et  dividendo;  narr  in  omni  propositione  aliquam  formam 
significatam  per  praedicatum,  vel  applicat  alicui  rei  significatae  per  subjectum,  vel  removet  ab  ea. 52 
But  in  affirming  or  denying  one  thing  of  another,  intellect  can  be  deceived  in 
affirming  of  a  thing  whose  essence  it  understands,  something  which  does  not  follow 
from  the  essence  or  is  incompatible  with  it..........  falsity  can  be  in  the  intellect  not 
only  because  the  intellect's  knowledge  is  false,  but  also  because  the  intellect  knows 
falsity,  just  as  it  knows  the  truth.  181 
In  DV  qI  a2c,  Aquinas  tells  us  that  things  in  this  world  are  placed  between  two  intellects: 
God's  and  ours.  As  creator,  God  is  the  measure  of  things  in  the  world.  Things  in  the  world, 
on  the  other  hand,  are  the  measure  of  our  knowledge  of  them.  Our  intellect  must  judge  the 
correspondence  between  what  it  has  formed  and  the  thing  in  the  world  in  order  to  determine 
if  what  it  has  formed  is  true.  If  what  it  has  formed  corresponds  then  the  intellect  knows  and 
possesses  truth.  If  correspondence  is lacking  then  what  it  has  formed  is false  and  is  not 
knowledge. 
The  judgments  about  material  reality  which  constitute  the  second  act  of  the  intellect  and  . 
which  can  be  placed  under  the  broad  heading  of  perceptual  knowledge  will  be  a  central  focus 
of  this  work,  as  will  the  prior  processes  involved  which  enable  us  to  make  such  judgments. 
In  that  discussion  our  analysis  will  show  how  some  of  these  judgments  can  be  knowledge. 
That,  however,  is  for  later.  The  important  point  here  is  that  the  intellect  can  judge  what  it  has 
formed  to  determine  whether  it  is  true  or  false. 
On  the  basis  of  the  second  act  the  intellect  can  undertake  a  third:  reasoning.  In  several  of  the 
quotes  scattered  throughout  this  work  we  have  seen  St.  Thomas  make  reference  to  the 
rational  nature  of  human  intellectual  endeavour:  a  nature  which  is  the  result  of  the  dimness  of 
the  human  intellect,  making  it  incumbent  on  humans  to  reason  to  a  complete  knowledge  of  a 
thing: 
Accordingly,  it  [the  human  intellect]  must  combine  one  apprehension  with  another  or 
separate  them,  or  else  it  must  go  from  one  combination  or  separation  to  another 
(which  is  the  process  of  reasoning).  182 
The  same  point  is  made  in  ST  1a  q79  a8c: 
To  understand  is  to  apprehend  quite  simply  an  intelligible  truth.  To  reason  is  to  move 
from  one  thing  understood  to  another,  so  as  to  know  an  intelligible  truth.  And  so 
angels  who,  in  keeping  with  their  nature,  have  perfect  possession  of  truth  in  its 
intelligibility,  have  no  need  to  move  from  one  thing  to  another,  but  simply,  without 
intellectual  process,  grasp  the  truth  of  things,  As  Dionysius  says.  But  men  come  to 
grasp  intelligible  truth  by  moving  from  point  to  point,  as  the  same  passage  notes,  and 
181  ST  la  q17  a3c  In  componendo  vero  vel  dividendo  potest  decipi,  dum  attribuit  rei  cujus 
quidditatem  intelligt  aliquid  quod  eam  non  consequitur,  vel  quod  ei  opponitur..........  falsitas  in 
intellectu  esse  potest  non  solum  quia  cognitio  intellectus  falsa  est,  sed  quia  intellectus  eam 
cognoscit,  sicut  veritatem 
182  ST  la  q85  a5c  Et  secundum  hoc,  necesse  habet  unum  apprehensum  alii  componere  vel 
dividere;  et  ex  una  compositione  vel  divisioni  ad  aliam  procedere,  quod  est  ratiocinari. 53 
are  therefore  described  as  reasoning.  183 
This  process  of  reasoning  can  take  on  a  systematic  nature  which  utilises  the  first  act  of  the 
intellect  and  results  in  complete  knowledge  of  a  thing:  scientia.  John  Marenbon  describes 
what  happens: 
When  the  mind  has  formed  a  proposition,  it  is  able  to  begin  the  mental  discourse 
which  Aquinas  describes  in  terms  of  syllogistic  reasoning.  This  discourse  requires 
the  other  strictly  intellectual  act  of  which  men  are  capable  besides  apprehending 
quiddities:  grasping  the  indemonstrable  first  principles  of  scientific  reasoning.  184 
Aquinas  devotes  his  attention  to  this  syllogistic  reasoning  and  its  result,  scientia,  in  the 
Commentary  on  the  Posterior  Analytics.  What  is  involved  in  this  syllogistic  reasoning  and 
scientia  will  be  important  aspects  of  discussion  which  we  will  leave  till  later.  We  will 
however  outline  what  Aquinas  says  about  scientia.  As  we  will  see  later,  this  matter  of 
scientia  is  the  focus  of  some  contention  with  different  commentators  offering  different 
interpretations.  If  we  look  at  the  Commentary  on  the  Posterior  Analytics  we  see  that  in  lectio 
four  of  book  one  of  this  work  scientia  is  defined  in  these  terms: 
..  to  know  something  scientifically  is  to  know  it  completely,  which  means  to 
apprehend  its  truth  perfectly.  For  the  principles  of  a  thing's  being  are  the  same  as 
those  of  its  truth.  Therefore  the  scientific  knower,  if  he  is  to  know  perfectly,  must 
know  the  cause  of  the  thing  known........  science  is  the  sure  and  certain  knowledge 
of  a  thing,  whereas  a  thing  which  could  be  otherwise  cannot  be  known  with 
certainty,  it  is  further  required  that  what  is  scientifically  known  could  not  be 
otherwise........  That  of  which  there  is  scientific  knowledge  must  be  something 
necessary.  185 
The  above  extract  makes  a  number  of  assertions  about  scientia:  scientia  is  sure  and  certain 
knowledge,  that  to  have  scientia  of  an  object  is  to  have  complete  knowledge  of  that  object 
which  means  that  the  knower  must  know  the  causes  of  the  object.  These  are  bold  claims  to 
make.  Two  factors  contribute  to  these  claims:  the  objects  of  scientia  are  universal  and 
necessary,  there  is  then  no  element  of  contingency  with  regard  to  the  claims  of  scientia,  the 
axioms  of  geometry  which  Aquinas  often  cites  as  examples  of  scientia  indicate  the  necessity 
183  op.  cit.  Quod  manifeste  cognoscitur  si  utriusque  actus  consideretur.  Intelligere  enim  est 
simpliciter  veritatem  intelligibilem  apprehendere.  Ratiocinari  autem  est  procedere  de  uno  intellecto 
ad  aliud  ad  veritatem  intelligibilem  cognoscendam.  Et  ideo  angeli,  qui  perfecte  possident 
secundum  modum  suae  naturae  cognitionem  intelligibilis  veritatis,  non  habent  necesse  procedere 
de  uno  ad  aliud,  sed  simpliciter  et  absque  discursu  veritatem  rerum  apprehendunt,  ut  Dionysius 
dicit.  Homines  autem  ad  intelligibilem  veritatem  cognoscendam  perveniunt  procedendo  de  uno  ad 
aliud,  ut  ibidem  dicitur,  et  ideo  rationales  dicuntur. 
184  Marenbon  1991,  page  127. 
185  op.  cit.  A  fuller  version  reads:  Circa  quod  considerandum  est  quod  scire  aliquid  est  perfecte 
cognoscere  ipsum,  hoc  autem  est  perfecte  apprehendere  veritatem  ipsius:  eadem  enim  sunt 
principia  esse  rei  et  veritatis  ipsius.  Oportet  igitur  scientiem  si  est  perfecte  cognoscens,  quod 
cognoscat  causam  rei  scitae....  Quia  vero  scientia  est  etiam  certa  cognitio  rei;  quod  autem  contingit 
aliter  se  habere,  non  potest  aliquis  per  certudinem  cognoscere;  ideo  ulterius  oportet  quod  id  quod 
scitur  non  possit  aliter  se  habere.  Quia  ergo  scientia  est  perfecta  cognitio,  ideo  dicit:  cum  causam 
arbitramur  cognoscere;  quia  vero  est  actualis  cognitio  per  quam  scimus  simpliciter,  addit:  et 
quoniam  illius  est  causa  quia  vero  est  certa  cognitio,  subdit;  et  non  est  contigere  aliter  se  habere. 54 
which  is  indicative  of  scientia.  The  second  factor  is  the  methodology  employed  in  acquiring 
scientia.  Scientia  is  the  result  of  a  demonstrative  syllogism  whose  premises  are  immediately 
known  or  are  themselves  the  conclusions  of  other  demonstrative  syllogisms.  In  short,  the 
sure  and  certain  knowledge  of  scientia  is  the  goal  at  which  all  human  knowledge  aims. 
This  complete  knowledge  is  the  result  of  reasoning  from  indemonstrable  principles  which 
are  themselves  known  through  an  act  of  understanding.  Understanding,  as  we  have  noted,  is 
another  intellectual  virtue  and  type  of  human  knowledge,  different  from  scientia,  but 
knowledge  nonetheless.  This  brings  us  to  the  final  element  of  our  discussion  of  human 
knowledge:  human  knowledge  because  of  the  dimness  of  the  human  intellect  exists  in  a 
fragmented  fashion. 
We  have  already  mentioned  this  at  the  very  beginning  of  this  chapter,  where  in  discussing  if 
there  is  knowledge  in  God,  we  noted: 
Perfections  found  in  creatures  in  a  state  of  division  and  multiplicity  exist  in  God 
without  division  and  in  unity  as  we  have  said  above.  In  man  different  objects  of 
knowledge  imply  different  kinds  of  knowledge:  in  knowing  principles  he  is  said  to 
have  `understanding',  in  knowing  conclusions  `science',  in  knowing  the  highest 
cause  `wisdom',  in  knowing  human  actions  `counsel',  or  prudence.  But  all  these 
things  God  knows  by  one  simple  knowledge......  186 
This  extract  lists  four  of  the  five  intellectual  virtues  that  are  found  in  the  human  soul.  Art  is 
the  intellectual  virtue  which  is  omitted  from  this  list.  187  Three  of  the  virtues  pertain 
specifically  to  the  speculative  intellect,  as  opposed  to  the  practical  intellect.  These  virtues  of 
the  speculative  intellect  are  of  interest  to  us  because  they  indicate  not  only  how  the  human 
intellect  grasps  truth  in  different  ways,  but  also  how  these  various  grasps  of  truth  constitute 
different  types  of  knowledge.  In  ST  1  a2ae  q57  a2c,  St.  Thomas,  as  we  have  seen,  writes: 
Now  a  truth  can  come  into  the  mind  in  two  ways,  namely,  as  known  in  itself,  and  as 
known  in  another.  What  is  known  in  itself  is  like  a  principle,  and  is  perceived 
immediately  by  the  mind.  And  so  the  habit  which  perfects  the  intellect  in  considering 
such  truth  is  called  `understanding';  it  is  a  firm  and  easy  quality  of  mind  which  sees 
into  principles.  A  truth,  however,  which  is  known  through  another  is  understood  by 
the  intellect,  not  immediately,  but  through  an  inquiry  of  reason  of  which  it  is  the 
finish.  Here  there  can  be  two  stages:  first,  a  finish  at  an  ultimate  in  some  class; 
second,  at  an  ultimate  with  respect  to  all  human  knowledge.  And  because  the  things 
which  are  known  last  from  our  standpoint  are  truths  which  are  first  and  more  evident 
in  their  nature,  it  follows  that  what  comes  last  with  respect  to  all  human  knowledge  is 
186  ST  1a  g14  al  ad2.  Ad  secundum  dicendum  quod  ea  quae  sunt  divisim  et  multipliciter  in 
creaturis,  in  Deo  sunt  simpliciter  et  unite,  ut  supra  dictum  est.  Homo  autem  secundum  diversa 
cognita  habet  diversas  cognitiones:  nam  secundum  quod  cognoscit  principia,  dicitur  habere 
inteliigentiam;  scientiam  vero,  secundum  quod  cognoscit  conclusiones;  sapientiam,  secundum 
quod  cognoscit  causam  altissimam;  consilium  vel  prudentiam  secundum  quod  cognoscit  agibilia. 
Sed  haec  omnia  Deus  una  simplici  cognitione  cognoscit...... 
187  ST  1  a2ae  q57  a3. 55 
what  is  in  reality  the  principal  and  most  evident  truth.  Here  is  wisdom,  which 
considers  the  highest  and  deepest  causes,  as  is described  in  the  Metaphysics. 
Rightly,  then  it  judges  and  orders  all  things,  because  there  can  be  no  complete  and 
embracing  judgment  except  by  going  back  to  first  causes.  As  to  what  is  ultimate  in 
this  or  that  class  of  knowable  truths,  the  mind  is  perfected  by  the  habit  of  science. 
According  to  the  various  classes  of  truths  which  can  be  proved,  there  are  various 
habits  of  the  sciences,  whereas  there  is  but  one  wisdom.  188 
Later  we  will  look  at  Aquinas'  treatment  of  scientia.  As  we  will  see  there  is  an  important 
relationship  between  scientia  and  understanding.  Consequently,  our  treatment  of  scientia  will 
necessarily  entail  a  brief  consideration  of  what  he  says  regarding  understanding. 
When  we  looked  at  how  `knowledge'  is  predicated  of  God  we  saw  that  it  referred  to 
something  simple  and  one.  Angelic  knowledge  lacks  the  simplicity  of  divine  knowledge,  but 
is  equally  as  different  from  human  knowledge.  In  humans  the  term  `knowledge'  is 
predicated  of  something  which  exists  in  the  intellect  in  a  fragmented  way.  Aquinas  does 
allow  that  sometimes  the  terms  `understanding'  and'scientia'  can  be  used  in  wide  sense  to 
refer  to  any  aspect  of  human  intellection,  for  example: 
He  [Aristotle]  says  therefore,  that  not  all  scientific  knowledge  is  demonstrative,  i.  e. 
obtained  through  demonstration,  but  the  scientific  knowledge  of  immediate  principles 
is  indemonstrable.....  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  Aristotle  is  here  taking 
science  in  a  wide  sense  to  include  any  knowledge  that  is  certain,  and  not  in  the  sense 
in  which  science  is  set  off  against  understanding,  according  to  the  dictum  that  science 
A  deals  with  conclusions  and  understanding  with  principles.  189 
Generally,  however,  the  terms  'scientia'  and  'understanding'  are  used  to  refer  to  distinct 
forms  of  human  knowledge.  Eleanor  Stump  neatly  describes  the  fragmented  nature  of 
human  knowledge: 
In  fact,  Aquinas  explains  scientia  in  a  way  which  suggests  that  he  has  in  mind  a 
188  op.  cit.  Verum  autem  est  dupliciter  considerabile:  uno  modo,  sicut  per  se  notum;  alio  modo,  per 
aliud  notum.  Quod  autem  est  per  se  notum  se  habet  ut  principium,  er  percipitur  statim  ab  intellectu. 
Et  ideo  habitus  perficiens  intellectum  ad  hujusmodi  veri  considerationem  vocatur  intellectus,  qui 
est  habitus  principiorum.  Verum  autem  quod  est  per  aliud  notum,  non  statim  percipitur  ab  intellectu, 
sed  per  inquisitionem  rationis,  et  se  habet  in  ratione  termini.  Quod  quidem  potest  esse 
dupliciter;  uno  modo,  ut  sit  ultimum  in  aliquo  genere;  alio  modo,  ut  sit  ultimum  respectu  totius 
cognitionis  humanae.  Et  quia  ea  quae  sunt  posterius  nota  quod  nos,  sunt  priora,  et  magis  nota 
secundurn  naturam,  ut  dicitur  in  I  Physic.  ideo  id  quod  est  ultimum  respectu  totius  cognitonis 
humanae  est  id  quod  est  primum  et  maxime  cognoscibile  secundum  naturam.  Et  circa  hujusmodi 
est  sapientia,  quae  considerat  altissimas  causas,  ut  dicitur  in  Meta.  Unde  convenienter  judicat  et 
ordinat  de  omnibus,  quia  judicium  perfecturn  et  universale  haberi  non  potest  nisi  per  resolutionern 
ad  primas  causas.  Ad  id  vero  quod  est  ultimum  in  hoc  vel  in  illo  genere  cognoscibilium,  perficit 
intelelctum  scientia.  Et  ideo  secundum  diversa  genera  scibilium  sunt  diversi  habitus  scientiarum, 
cum  tarnen  sapientia  non  sit  nisi  una. 
189  In  P.  A.  I.  7.  Dicit  ergo  primo  quod  non  omnis  scientia  est  demonstrativa,  idest  per 
demonstrationem  accepta;  sed  immediatorum  principiorum  est  scientia  indemonstrabilis,  idest  non 
per  demonstrationem  accepta.  Secundum  est  tarnen  quod  hic  Aristoteles  large  accipit  scientiam 
pro  qualibet  certudinali  cognitione,  et  non  secundum  quod  scientia  dividitur  contra  intellectum, 
prout  dicitur  quod,  scientia  est  conclusionem  et  intellectus  principiorum. 56 
Porphyrian  tree  of  cognition,  with  scientia  occupying  one  of  the  branches,  along 
with  other  species  of  cognition.  Scientia,  he  says,  is  one  of  several  dispositions 
(habitus  )  which  are  related  to  what  is  true.  There  are  five  such  dispositions,  and 
they  all  are  types  of  cognition.  Following,  Aristotle,  he  lists  the  five  as  art,  wisdom, 
prudence,  understanding  and  scientia.  190 
Stump's  description  of  these  different  types  of  cognition,  as  she  calls  them,  as  constituting  a 
Porphyrian  tree  is  useful  for  it  highlights  that  the  different  forms  of  knowledge  are  different 
species  of  the  same  genus:  knowledge  as  it  exists  in  the  human  intellect.  Throughout  this 
chapter  we  have  sought  to  explore  the  analogical  use  of  `knowledge'.  Faced  with  the  reality 
of  different  types  of  human  knowledge  we  must  stress  that  `knowledge'  as  it  is  applied  to 
understanding  or  scientia  is  not  used  analogically. 
These  different  types  of  knowledge  are,  as  we  have  said,  different  species  of  the  same 
genus.  Aquinas  in  his  Commentary  on  Boethius'  De  Trinitate  discusses  the  division  of  the 
sciences  into  Metaphysics,  Mathematical  science  and  Natural  Philosophy  in  much  the  same 
way.  Each  science  has  its  own  method  and  object,  yet  the  term  `science'  is  applied 
univocally  to  each.  They  are  different  species  of  the  same  genus.  Armand  Maurer  in  the 
introduction  to  his  translation  of  his  work  writes: 
It  will  be  noticed  at  once  that  St.  Thomas  adopts  a  pluralistic  attitude  toward  scientific 
method;  he  does  not  propose  one  method  for  all  the  sciences.  He  recognises,  of 
course,  that  they  have  a  common  method  in  that  they  follow  the  same  basic  laws  of 
logic;  but  besides  this  he  maintains  that  each  science  has  its  own  special  way  of 
inquiring  after  truth.  191 
In  a  footnote  Maurer  comments  that: 
St.  Thomas  opposes  the  notion,  which  has  become  prevalent  in  our  day,  that  science 
is  essentially  one,  with  the  same  scientific  method.  Descartes  did  much  to  introduce 
this  conception  into  modern  thought.  192 
Descartes  also  did  much  to  introduce  a  similar  conception  of  knowledge,  very  different  from 
the  one  we  have  ascribed  to  Aquinas:  for  Descartes  `knowledge'  was  not  predicated 
analogically,  nor  was  there  such  a  thing  as  a  genus  of  knowledge  consisting  of  different 
species.  But  as  L.  M.  Regis  notes: 
the  realities  expressed  by  the  words,  truth,  knowledge  and  science  must  be  granted  a 
diversity  that  Kant  and  Descartes  always  refused  them.  193 
In  the  Categories  we  find  Aristotle  speaking  about  the  species  of  knowledge.  Discussing 
how  the  differentiae  of  species  in  one  genus  are  not  the  same  as  those  of  another  he  writes: 
If  genera  are  different  and  co-ordinate,  their  differentiae  are  themselves  different  in 
190  Stump  1991,  page  135. 
191  Thomas  Aquinas,  The  Division  and  Method  of  the  Sciences.  Translated  by  Armand 
Maurer,  Toronto:  The  Pontifical  Institute  of  Medieval  Studies  ,  1963,  page  XXX 
192  ibid  page  XXXI 
193  Regis1959,  page  72. 57 
kind.  Take  as  an  instance  the  genus  `animal'  and  the  genus  `knowledge'.  `With  feet', 
`two-footed',  `winged',  `aquatic',  are  differentiae  of  `animal';  the  species  of 
knowledge  are  not  distinguished  by  the  same  differentiae.  One  species  does  not 
differ  from  another  by  being  two-footed.  194 
Aristotle  discusses  the  various  uses  of  genus  in  Book  V,  lectio  28  of  the  Metaphysics. 
According  to  him  there  are  four  senses  of  genus.  Aquinas,  in  his  Commentary  on  the 
Metaphysics  describes  the  sense  which  is  relevant  to  this  discussion: 
In  the  fourth  sense  genus  means  the  primary  element  given  in  a  definition,  which  is 
predicated  quidditatively,  and  differences  are  its  qualities.  For  example,  in  the 
definition  of  man  animal  is  given  first  and  then  two-footed  or  rational  which  is  a 
certain  substantial  quality  of  man.  195 
With  regard  to  species  we  find  Aristotle  writing: 
The  things,  then,  which,  are  other  in  species  must  be  in  the  same  genus.  For  by 
genus  I  mean  that  one  identical  thing  which  is  predicated  of  both  and  is  differentiated 
in  no  mere  accidental  way,  whether  conceived  as  matter  or  otherwise.  For  not  only 
must  the  common  nature  attach  to  the  different  thing,  e.  g.  not  only  must  both  be 
animals,  but  this  very  animality  must  also  be  different  in  each  (e.  g.  in  the  case 
equinity,  in  the  other  humanity)  and  so  this  common  nature  is  specifically  different 
for  each  from  what  it  is  for  the  other.  196 
What  can  be  said  quidditatively  of  understanding  and  scientia  is  that  both  are  knowledge. 
Yet,  taking  up  from  what  Aristotle  says  in  Metaphysics  X  8,  this  common  nature  attaches  to 
each  in  different  ways.  Understanding  and  scientia  are  specifically  different  from  each  other 
in  two  ways.  Their  difference  constituted  by  their  objects:  understanding  being  the  grasp  of 
quiddities  and  scientia  being  knowledge  of  conclusions;  and  secondly  they  are  differentiated, 
as  we  have  seen,  by  their  modus  operandi. 
Different  as  they  are,  one  feature  that  understanding  and  scientia  have  in  common  is  that  they 
both  involve  assent.  The  intellect  cannot  fail  to  assent  to  what  it  understands  or  knows 
through  scientific  demonstration: 
Among  the  acts  of  the  intellect,  some  include  firm  assent  without  pondering-  thus 
when  someone  thinks  about  what  he  knows  scientifically  or  intuitively;  thinking  of 
that  kind  reaches  a  finished  term.  Other  mental  acts  are  marked  by  a  pondering  that  is 
inconclusive,  lacking  firm  assent,  either  because  the  act  leans  towards  neither  of  the 
alternatives-  the  case  with  doubt;  or  because  it  leans  to  one  alternative,  but  only 
tentatively-  the  case  with  suspicion;  or  because  it  decides  for  one  side  but  with  fear  of 
the  opposite-  the  case  with  opinion.  The  act  of  believing  however,  is  firmly  attached 
to  one  alternative  and  in  this  respect  the  believer  is  in  the  same  state  of  mind  as  one 
194  Aristotle  Categories  Chapter  3. 
195  In  Meta  V  22.  Quarto  modo  genus  dicitur,  quod  primo  ponitur  in  definitione  et  praedicatur  in  eo 
quod  quid,  et  differentiae  sunt  eius  qualitates.  Sicut  in  definitione  hominis  primo  ponitur  animal,  et 
bipes  sive  rationale  quod  est  quaedam  substantialis  qualitas  hominis 
196  Aristotle  Metaphysics  X  8. 58 
who  has  understanding.  Yet  the  believer's  knowledge  is  not  completed  by  a  clear 
vision,  and  in  this  respect  he  is like  one  having  a  doubt,  suspicion  or  an  opinion.  To 
ponder  with  assent  is,  then,  distinctive  of  the  believer;  this  is  how  his  act  of  belief  is 
set  offrom  all  other  acts  of  the  mind  concerned  with  the  true  or  the  false.  197 
This  statement,  taken  from  Aquinas'  discussion  on  the  act  of  faith,  is  most  illuminating. 
According  to  him,  the  will  must  prompt  the  intellect  to  assent  to  the  truths  of  faith.  This  is 
the  only  instance  where  the  will  is involved  in  assenting  to  what  the  intellect  can  claim  to 
know.  As  the  extract  shows,  in  the  case  of  understanding  and  scientia,  the  intellect  firmly 
assents.  There  are  also,  as  we  can  see  from  the  extract,  various  other  types  of  intellectual 
acts,  such  as  opinion  and  doubt,  which  entail  varying  degrees  of  assent,  and  which,  because 
of  their  inconclusiveness,  are  not  counted  as  knowledge. 
When  we  take  this  list  of  inconclusive  intellectual  operations  and  the  list  of  conclusive 
intellectual  operations,  the  acts  which  constitute  the  intellectual  virtues,  we  notice  that  one 
intellectual  act  is  unaccounted  for,  in  fact  it  is  not  discussed  at  all:  ordinary  everyday 
perceptual  knowledge,  that  which  is  the  result  of  the  second  act  of  the  intellect. 
By  perceptual  knowledge  we  mean  knowledge  of  material  reality  as  outlined  in  ST  la  q84. 
That  is:  a  knowledge  of  material  reality  which  is  immaterial,  universal  and  necessary.  198  The 
type  of  knowledge  expressed  by  propositions  such  as  `the  traffic  light  is  at  red,  '  `there  is  a 
dog.  '  The  type  of  knowledge  constituted  by  judgments  about  the  common  sense  material 
objects  of  our  world,  judgments  which  can  be  true  and  at  other  times  mistaken  as  in 
Descartes'  tower  example,  Joseph  Owens'  salt  and  sugar  example  where  one  mistakes  salt 
for  sugar,  199  Goldman's  Judy/Trudy  example.  200  As  we  will  see  in  the  next  chapter, 
various  contemporary  authors  have  attempted  to  describe  St.  Thomas'  epistemology  in 
contemporary  epistemological  terms  and,  as  part  of  these  projects  also  attempt  to  give  an 
account  of  St.  Thomas'  thoughts  on  perceptual  knowledge.  In  that  chapter  we  will  set  out 
what  they  say.  In  subsequent  chapters,  with  reference  to  ST  1a  q84  and  other  relevant 
passages,  we  will  explore  the  issue  of  perceptual  knowledge  and  its  role  in  Aquinas'  wider 
epistemology.  Before  we  move  on  to  these  tasks  we  will  recap  what  we  have  seen  in  this 
chapter. 
197  ST  2a2ae  q2  a1  c  Actuum  enim  ad  intellectum  pertinentium  quidam  habent  firmam 
assensionem  absque  tali  cogitatione,  sicut  cum  aliquis  considerat  ea  quae  scit  vel  Intelligit;  talis 
enim  consideratio  jam  est  formata.  Quidam  vero  actus  intellectus  habent  quidem  cogitationem 
informem  absque  firma  assensione  sive  in  neutram  partem  declinent,  sicut  accidit  dubitanti;  sive  in 
unam  partem  magis  declinent  sed  tenentur  aliquo  levi  signo,  sicut  accidit  suspicanti;  sive  uni  parti 
adhaereant,  tarnen  cum  formidine  alterius,  quod  accidit  opinanti.  Sed  actus  iste  qui  est  credere 
habet  firmam  adhaesionem  ad  unam  partem,  in  quo  convenit  credens  cum  sciente  et  intelligente; 
et  tarnen  ejus  cognitio  non  est  perfecta  per  manifestam  visionem,  in  quo  convenit  cum  dubitante, 
suspicante  et  opinante.  Et  sic  proprium  est  credentis  ut  cum  assensu  cogitet;  et  propter  hoc 
distinguitur  iste  actus  qui  est  credere  ab  omnibus  actibus  intellectus  qui  sunt  circa  verum  vel  falsum 
198  ST  1a  q84  a1  c. 
199  Owens  1992b,  page  272. 
200  Goldman  1986,  page  46. 59 
We  began  by  stating  that  unlike  modem  philosophers,  Aquinas  used  the  term  `knowledge' 
analogically  and  not  univocally.  We  then  looked  at  what  St.  Thomas  had  to  say  about 
analogical  usage.  We  saw  that  this  was  not  without  its  internal  difficulties.  The  bulk  of  this 
chapter  has  been  devoted  to  considering  how  an  analogical  use  of  `knowledge'  allowed  to 
Aquinas  to  use  the  same  term  of  three  radically  different  enterprises:  divine  knowledge, 
angelic  knowledge  and  human  knowledge.  We  looked  at  the  main  features  of  divine,  angelic 
and  human  knowledge  and  we  saw  that  the  latter  two  are  imperfect  representations  of  the 
first.  Mindful  of  ST  la  q88  a3c  admonition  that  what  is  understood  first  by  us  is  material 
reality  and  that  we  arrive  at  knowledge  of  God  by  way  of  creatures,  we  nevertheless  saw 
that  `knowledge'  as  it  is  applied  to  God  is  the  measure  of  all  other  uses  of  the  term,  because 
God  has  knowledge  in  the  most  perfect  way. 
In  particular,  we  paid  close  attention  to  human  knowledge.  We  saw  again  and  again  the 
consequences  of  the  dimness  of  the  human  intellectual  light:  the  need  for  the  agent  intellect; 
the  necessity  for  reasoning  in  human  intellectual  endeavour;  our  tendency  to  make  mistakes. 
We  saw  that  human  knowledge  exists  in  a  fragmented  and  divided  manner.  In  our 
discussion  of  human  knowledge  we  also  acknowledged  issues  which  will  be  the  subject  of 
fuller  investigation  in  the  following  chapters:  the  first  and  second  acts  of  the  intellect, 
universals  and  scientia. 
Despite  the  limitations  of  human  intellectual  ability  we  saw  that  human  knowledge,  like 
divine  and  angelic  knowledge  is  fundamentally  the  intellect's  grasp  of  being.  A  grasp  of 
being  which  results  in  a  likeness  of  the  thing  known  existing  in  the  knower.  As  Maritain 
puts  it: 
It  [knowledge]  shows  itself  to  us  as  an  immanent  and  vital  operation,  which 
essentially  consists  not  in  making,  but  in  being,  in  being  or  becoming  a  thing-itself 
or  others-  otherwise  than  by  the  existence  actuating  a  subject:  which  implies  a  much 
higher  union  than  that  of  form  and  matter,  composing  a  conjunction  or  tertium  quid, 
and  which  also  presupposes  that  the  object  known  is  intentionally  made  present  in 
the  faculty  thanks  to  a  species.....  201 
Knowledge  is  the  intentional  existence  of  the  object  known  in  the  knower  by  means  of  a 
knowledge-likeness: 
A  thing  is  known  in  itself  when  it  is  known  through  a  likeness  proper  to  the  thing 
itself,  co-terminus  with  the  thing  known.  202 
Unlike  the  divine  and  angelic  intellects,  the  human  intellect  must  judge  if  this  likeness 
corresponds  to  the  object  of  knowledge.  203  If  it  does,  the  human  intellect  knows  the  truth,  it 
possesses  knowledge.  In  the  case  of  God  and  the  angels  such  a  grasp  of  truth  is  inherent  in 
201  Maritain  1937,  page  142. 
202  ST  1a  q14  a5c  In  seipso  quidem  cognoscitur  aliquid,  quando  cognoscitur  per  propriam 
speciem  adaequatam  ipsi  cognoscibili. 
203  ST  1a  q16  a2c. 60 
their  very  act  of  knowing.  204  The  crucial  feature,  however,  is  this  issue  of  likeness  between 
what  exists  in  the  intellect  and  what  exists  in  the  world. 
In  the  wake  of  Gettier,  many  contemporary  epistemologists  have  sought  a  criterion  that  will 
turn  a  justified  true  belief  into  a  knowledge  claim.  What  ought  to  be  apparent  from  our 
discussion  in  this  chapter  is  that,  for  Aquinas,  there  is  no  magic  criterion,  or  set  of  criteria, 
that  will  turn  a  belief  claim  into  knowledge.  We  have  seen  that  the  bulk  of  his  discussion 
focuses  on  knowledge,  not  belief.  Belief  is  seen  in  the  light  of  knowledge,  as  lacking 
something  which  knowledge  has;  in  contemporary  accounts  knowledge  is  often  seen  in  the 
light  of  belief,  as  belief  transmogrified  by  some  magic  criterion. 
In  the  coming  chapters  relatively  little  reference  will  be  made  to  analogy,  divine  knowledge 
or  angelic  knowledge.  The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  show  how  different  and  rich 
Aquinas'  epistemology  is.  We  ought  to  remember  this  difference  as  we  now  consider  how 
some  authors  attempt  to  pigeonhole  him  into  the  categories  of  Descartes  and  more  modern 
epistemologies.  After  considering  them  we  will  then  return  to  explore  some  of  the  richness 
of  St.  Thomas. 
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2.  The  Interpreters 
When  the  issue  is  adjudicated,  however,  it  should  be  resolved  with  a  clear 
recognition  of  Aquinas  as  holding  not  Foundationalism  but  rather  an 
interesting  theological  externalism  with  reliabilist  elements.  ,, 
Eleonore  Stump,  "Aquinas  on  the  Foundations  of  Knowledge" 
Aquinas's  elevation  of  this  essentially  metaphorical  vocabulary  to  virtually 
technical  status  is  testimony  to  the  thoroughly  internalistic  nature  of  his 
theory  of  knowledge.  Moreover,  Aquinas's  explicit  commitment  to  the 
reliability  of  our  cognitive  faculties  has  no  tendency  to  show  that  his  view  is 
reliabilist  or  externalist. 
Scott  MacDonald,  "Theory  of  Knowledge"2 
Roderick  M.  Chisholm  once  remarked  that  for  some  epistemological  terms  (he  was 
discussing  foündationalism  and  coherentism)  there  was  a  lack  of  agreement  on  what  the 
terms  actually  meant,  and  for  that  reason  we  would  perhaps  be  wise  to  avoid  them.  3  The 
various  epistemological  terms,  used  in  the  above  descriptions  of  St.  Thomas'  theory  of 
knowledge,  also  vary  in  meaning  depending  on  which  epistemologist  is  using  them.  Such 
fluidity  in  meaning,  however,  cannot  account  for  the  radically  different,  in  fact,  opposing 
interpretations  offered  by  Stump  and  MacDonald.  This  chapter  will  outline  their 
interpretations  and  those  of  two  other  well  known  scholars,  Norman  Kretzmann4  and  James 
F.  Ross 
.5  Kretzmann,  like  Stump,  gives  an  externalistic  and  reliabilist  interpretation  of 
Aquinas,  whereas,  Ross  appears  to  take  the  side  of  internalism.  In  this  chapter  we  do  not 
intend  to  offer  much  criticism  of  the  various  interpretations;  deeper  critical  appraisal  will  be 
1  Stump  1992,  page  158. 
2  MacDonald  1993,  page  186. 
3  Chisholm  1977.  page  63. 
4  Kretzmann  1992. 
5  Ross  1984. 62 
left  for  later  chapters  when  we  examine  the  different  matters  which  arise  from  our 
consideration  of  the  knowledge  of  which  ST  1a  q84  speaks. 
Mindful  of  Chisholm's  remark  concerning  the  lack  of  agreement  surrounding  the  use  of 
different  epistemological  labels  we  will  begin  this  discussion  by  defining,  for  the  purposes 
of  this  paper,  what  is  meant  by  the  terms  externalism  and  internalism,  foundationalism  and 
reliabilism.  In  order  to  give  a  flavour  of  each  position,  we  will  also  briefly  describe 
contemporary  versions. 
a.  Contemporary  categories 
We  will  begin  by  looking  at  internalism  and  foundationalism.  John  Pollock  describes 
foundationalism  in  the  following  way: 
Foundation  theories  are  distinguished  from  other  doxastic  theories  by  the  fact  that 
they  take  a  limited  class  of  "epistemologically  basic"  beliefs  to  have  a  privileged 
epistemic  status.  It  is  supposed  that  basic  beliefs  do  not  stand  in  need  of  justification- 
they  are  "self-justifying".  Nonbasic  beliefs,  on  the  other  hand,  are  all  supposed  to  be 
justified  by  appeal  to  basic  beliefs.  Thus  the  basic  beliefs  provide  a  foundation  for 
epistemic  justification.  6 
Pollock's  outline  captures  the  principle  elements  and  common  characteristics  of 
foundationalist  theories:  there  is  a  set  of  basic  beliefs  whose  justification  is  not  inferred  from 
other  beliefs.  These  basic  beliefs  are  immediately  justified,  or  to  use  Pollock's  term,  self- 
justifying;  they  carry  their  own  justification.  These  self-justifying  beliefs  form  the  basis,  the 
foundation,  from  which  all  other  beliefs  are  justifiably  inferred.  Thus  a  sketch  of  a 
foundational  theory  would  appear  something  like  D  is  justified  on  the  basis  of  C  which  is 
justified  on  the  basis  of  B  which  in  turn  is  justified  on  the  basis  of  A  which  is  self  justified. 
If  A  weren't  self  justified  the  process  of  justification  would  go  on  and  on  constituting  an 
infinite  regress  and  so  undermining  any  claim  to  knowledge. 
In  his  description  Pollock  says  that  "  Foundation  theories  are  distinguished  from  other 
doxastic  theories.  "  What  does  he  mean  by  this?  Clarification  of  this  statement  will  shed  light 
on  the  relationship  between  foundationalism  and  internalism. 
In  Contemporary  Theories  of  Knowledge  Pollock  distinguishes  between  doxastic  theories  of 
knowledge  and  non-doxastic  theories  of  knowledge.  According  to  Pollock  a  doxastic  theory 
of  knowledge  views  the  justification  of  a  belief  as  solely  a  function  of  the  beliefs  one  holds.? 
He  writes: 
Doxastic  theories  take  the  justifiability  of  a  belief  to  be  a  function  exclusively  of  what 
else  one  believes.  8 
6  Pollock  1986,  page  26. 
7  ibid  page  19. 
8  ibid  page  93. 63 
Foundationalism  is  not  the  only  doxastic  theory  Pollock  outlines.  He  also  classifies 
coherence  theories  as  doxastic.  According  to  him: 
A  coherence  theory  is  any  doxastic  theory  denying  that  there  is  such  an 
epistemologically  privileged  subclass  of  beliefs.  Coherence  theories  insist  that  all 
beliefs  have  the  same  fundamental  epistemic  status,  and  the  justifiability  of  a  belief  is 
determined  jointly  by  all  of  one's  beliefs  taken  together.....  whether  a  belief  is 
justified  is  how  it  `coheres'  with  the  set  of  all  your  beliefs.  9 
Coherence  theories,  as  classified  by  Pollock,  are  like  foundational  theories  in  focussing 
solely  on  beliefs,  but  unlike  foundations  theories  all  the  beliefs  have  the  same  epistemic 
status,  there  is  no  privileged  class  of  beliefs  bestowing  justification  on  others.  Such  doxastic 
theories  are  internalist  theories:  beliefs  are,  after  all,  internal  states.  However,  not  all 
internalist  theories  are  doxastic,  some  are  non-doxastic. 
Nondoxastic  theories  hold  that  justification  is  not  merely  a  matter  of  what  other  beliefs  one 
holds,  other  internal  states  are  also  important  in  determining  epistemic  justification.  The 
theory  which  Pollock  himself  develops,  and  which  we'll  sketch  below,  is  a  non-doxastic 
internalist  theory.  Of  intemalism  he  writes: 
Internalist  theories  insist  that  although  justifiedness  of  a  belief  is  not  a  function 
exclusively  of  one's  beliefs,  it  is  a  function  exclusively  of  one's  internal  states, 
where  the  latter  include  both  beliefs  and  non-doxastic  states.  Internal  states  are, 
roughly,  those  to  which  we  have  direct  access.  10 
Internalist  theories  see  epistemic  justification  as  determined  by  the  subject's  internal  states; 
whether  or  not  the  subject  is  cognitively  aware  of  such  justification  is  not  particularly 
important.  The  important  issue,  for  our  purposes,  is  the  emphasis  placed  on  internal  states  in 
determining  epistemic  justification,  as  opposed  to  justification  being  derived  from  conditions 
external  to  the  subject.  Of  this  type  of  internalist  theory  foundationalism  is  one  variety. 
John  Pollock  labels  his  non-doxastic  internalist  theory  Direct  Realism,  here  we  offer  no 
more  than  a  sketch  of  it.  He  describes  direct  realism  as: 
the  view  that  perceptual  states  can  licence  perceptual  judgments  about  physical 
objects  directly  and  without  mediation  by  beliefs  about  perceptual  states.  Direct 
realism  can  have  a  structure  very  much  like  a  foundations  theory.,  I 
In  Pollock's  account  of  direct  realism  justification  is  not  simply  determined  by  what  beliefs 
one  holds,  it  is  also  determined  by  other  internal  states  such  as  perception  and  memory. 
Pollock  defines  internal  states  as: 
those  states  that  are  directly  accessible  to  the  mechanisms  in  our  central  nervous 
system  that  direct  our  reasoning.  The  sense  in  which  they  are  directly  accessible  is 
that  access  to  them  does  not  first  require  us  to  have  beliefs  about  them.  12 
9  ibid  page  67. 
10  ibid  page  91. 
11  ibid  page  91. 
12  ibid  pagel  34. 64 
The  non-doxastic  nature  of  direct  realism  aside,  as  Pollock  acknowledges,  there  is  a  great 
deal  of  similarity  between  direct  realism  and  a  foundationalist  account  of  justification: 
Direct  realism  can  adopt  the  same  basic  structure  of  epistemic  justification  as  does  the 
foundations  theory....  with  the  exception  that  epistemologically  basic  beliefs  are 
replaced  by  "epistemologically  basic  mental  states,  "  the  latter  being  mental  states  that 
constitute  reasons  for  various  kinds  of  judgments.  13  r 
In  both  of  the  preceding  extracts  from  Contemporary  Theories  of  Knowledge,  Pollock 
makes  reference  to  our  reasoning.  This  is  an  central  aspect  of  Pollock's  account.  Pollock 
defines  epistemic  justification  as  follows: 
A  person's  belief  is  justified  if  and  only  if  he  holds  it  in  conformance  to  his  epistemic 
norms.  14 
Epistemic  norms  are,  in  turn,  defined  in  terms  of  our  capacity  to  reason: 
We  know  how  to  reason.  That  means  that  under  various  circumstances  we  know 
what  to  do  in  reasoning.  This  can  be  described  equivalently  by  saying  that  we  know 
what  we  should  do.  Our  epistemic  norms  are  just  the  norms  that  describe  this 
procedural  knowledge...  They  [epistemic  norms]  describe  an  internalized  pattern  of 
behaviour  that  we  automatically  follow  in  reasoning,  in  the  same  way  that  we 
automatically  follow  a  pattern  in  bicycle  riding.  This  is  what  epistemic  norms  are. 
They  are  internalized  norms  that  govern  our  reasoning.  15 
Pollock  sees  epistemic  norms  as  action  guiding  norms  grounded  in  our  ability  to  reason. 
They  can  be  observed  in  reasoning,  they  are  just  part  of  what  it  is  to  be  human,  in  fact  such 
norms  may  well  be  innate.  16  This  account  of  epistemic  norms  leads  Pollock  to  describe 
direct  realism  as  a  Naturalistic  Internalism: 
Reasoning  is  a  natural  process.  It  is  something  we  know  how  to  do.  To  say  that  we 
know  how  to  do  it  is  to  say  that  it  is  governed  by  norms.  Our  epistemic  norms  are, 
by  definition,  the  norms  that  actually  govern  our  reasoning.  This,  I  claim,  is  a 
naturalistic  definition  of  `epistemic  norm'.  17 
There  seems  to  be  echoes  of  Hilary  Kornblith's  description  of  naturalised  epistemology  in 
the  above  account  of  epistemic  norms.  18  According  to  Kornblith  the  descriptive  has  a 
13  ibid  page  176. 
14  ibid  page  168. 
15  ibid  page  131  The  parallel  drawn  to  bicycle  riding  is  surely  problematic.  If  Pollock  really  intends 
for  it  to  hold  then  it  would  seem  that  there  must  be  a  stage  akin  to  learning  to  ride  a  bike  when  we 
must  methodically  practise  reasoning  using  our  epistemic  norms,  as  we  do  when  learning  to  cycle: 
"don't  lean  too  far  to  the  right,  keep  your  balance  and  so  on.  "  Only  by  doing  this  can  we  internalise 
the  norms  and  then  do  it  automatically.  But,  this  is  manifestly  not  the  case.  Ultimately  epistemic 
norms  are  not  like  bicycle  riding  norms,  bicycle  riding  norms  govern  an  acquired  skill,  epistemic 
norms  pertain  to  a  natural.  human  activity.  As  Alvin  Plantinga  points  out  you  can  go  off  bike  riding  for 
lent,  but  you  can't  do  the  same  with  reasoning. 
16  ibid  page  132. 
17  ibid  page  168. 
18  Kornblith  1985,  page3ff. 65 
bearing  on  the  normative,  thus  the  way  we  arrive  at  our  beliefs  is  the  way  we  ought  to  arrive 
at  our  beliefs:  what  we  do  is  what  we  ought  to  be  doing.  Chisholm  in  this  regard  talks  of  the 
normative  supervening  on  the  non-normative.  19  In  Pollock's  naturalist  account  the  norms 
are  implicit  in  our  reasoning  process. 
Crucially  for  Pollock,  these  action  guiding  norms  which  we  use  in  reasoning  appeal  to  non- 
doxastic  internal  states  such  as  perception,  they  are  not  merely  applicable  to  our  doxastic 
states.  20 
Epistemic  norms  must  be  able  to  appeal  directly  to  our  being  in  perceptual  states  and 
need  not  appeal  to  our  having  beliefs  to  that  effect.  In  other  words,  there  can  be 
"half-doxastic"  epistemic  connections  between  beliefs  and  non-doxastic  states  that 
are  analogous  to  the  "fully  epistemic"  connections  between  beliefs  and  beliefs  that  we 
call  reasons.  I  propose  to  call  the  half-doxastic  connections  `reasons'  as  well,  but  it 
must  be  acknowledged  that  this  is  stretching  our  ordinary  use  of  the  term  'reason'.  21 
This  concurs  with  what  we  saw  earlier  when  he  said  that  internal  states  are  directly 
accessible  in  the  sense  that  we  don't  have  to  form  beliefs  about  them  to  be  aware  of  them. 
Moreover,  reasoning  from  the  perceptual  state  appeals  to  that  state  rather  than  a  belief  about 
its  propositional  content,  or  as  he  puts  it,  the  reasons  from  which  justification  is  inferred  are: 
the  propositions  believed  rather  than  the  states  of  believing  the  propositions.  22 
Thus,  in  Pollock's  theory  epistemologically  basic  beliefs  are  replaced  by  "epistemologically 
basic  mental  states.  "23  In  Pollock's  version  of  direct  realism  both  doxastic  and  non-doxastic 
mental  states  constitute  the  grounds  for  the  judgments  which  we  make.  In  some  cases,  he 
notes  we  can  form  beliefs  about  our  perceptual  states  24  More  usually,  however,  we  don't 
form  beliefs  about  perceptual  states  before  making  other  judgments,  rather  we  make 
judgments  on  the  basis  of  those  non-doxastic  states.  In  his  naturalistic  internalism,  it  is  these 
epistemologically  basic  mental  states  which  are  the  "reasons"  for  our  beliefs. 
We  have  offered  no  more  than  a  sketch  of  his  theory,  brushing  over  some  of  its  more 
nuanced  aspects.  Pollock  has  noted  the  close  connection  between  direct  realism  and 
foundationalism.  In  many  respects,  his  theory  is  a  reaction  to  what  he  considers  to  be 
insurmountable  problems  facing  foundationalism.  These  problems,  however,  may  have 
more  to  do  with  Pollock's  description  of  foundationalism  than  foundationalism  itself:  his 
classification  of  foundationalism  as  a  doxastic  theory. 
According  to  Pollock,  as  a  doxastic  theory  foundationalism  has  trouble  giving  a  coherent 
19  Chisholm  1989  pages  60  and  61. 
20  Pollock  1986,  page  137. 
21  ibid  page  176. 
22  ibid  page  176. 
23  ibid  page  177. 
24  ibid  page  177. 66 
account  of  the  epistemic  status  of  some  internal  states,  particularly  those  arising  from 
perception  and  memory:  beliefs  which  are  the  result  of  perception  can  often  be  mistaken.  25 
Pollock  notes  that  foundationalists  often  attempt  to  avoid  this  problem  by  going  for  what  he 
terms  a  weaker  kind  of  basic  belief,  a  belief  about  the  perceptual  state  one  has,  such  as 
sensing  redly;  this  type  of  basic  belief  makes  no  commitment  to  the  external  cause  of  that 
state:  that  there  is  something  red  causing  me  to  sense  in  the  way  I  do.  For  Pollock  the 
foundationalist's  tactic  in  restricting  basic  beliefs  to  perceptual  states  merely  undermines 
foundationalism  further  because,  as  he  states: 
I  think  it  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  evidence  of  our  senses  comes  to  us  in  the 
form  of  beliefs.  We  rarely  have  any  beliefs  at  all  about  how  things  appear  to  us.  In 
perception,  the  beliefs  we  form  are  almost  invariably  beliefs  about  the  objective 
properties  of  physical  objects-  not  about  how  things  appear  to  us.  If  only  the  latter 
are  candidates  for  being  epistemologically  basic,  then  it  follows  that  perception  does 
not  usually  provide  us  with  epistemologically  basic  beliefs  and  hence  perceptual  - 
knowledge  does  not  derive  from  epistemologically  basic  beliefs  in  the  way  envisaged 
by  foundations  theories.  26 
Bearing  Pollock's  criticisms  in  mind  we  now  turn  to  a  foundationalist  theory.  27 
In  the  various  editions  of  Theory  of  Knowledge  and,  among  other  works,  The  Foundations 
of  Knowing  Roderick  Chisholm  develops  what  he  himself  terms  a  foundational  account  of 
knowledge28  which  we  will  sketch  in  order  to  give  a  flavour  of  a  foundationalist  theory.  As 
we  do  so  we  will  also  consider  the  aforementioned  criticisms  of  Pollock:  is  it  the  case  that  a 
foundationalist  such  as  Chisholm  holds  that  we  have  beliefs  about  our  perceptual  states  and 
that  these  beliefs  constitute  that  which  is  epistemically  basic?  In  other  words,  is 
foundationalism,  as  Chisholm  describes  it,  purely  doxastic? 
The  first  comment  that  we  must  make  about  Chisholm's  theory  is  that  it  is  very  thorough  and 
rigorous,  the  result  of  years  of  thought  and  reflection.  It  is  also  complicated.  The 
foundationalist  account  that  Chisholm  offers  initially  appears  to  be  in  line  with  what  we  have 
seen  Pollock  characterising  as  the  weaker  version  of  foundationalism:  i.  e.  one  that  focuses 
on  perceptual  states  rather  than  the  causes  of  those  states  in  the  external  world.  Crucially, 
however,  we  will  see  that  Chisholm  does  not  hold  that  one  must  have  beliefs  about 
perceptual  states  in  order  for  them  to  serve  a  privileged  epistemic  role.  Furthermore, 
25  ibid  page  27. 
26  ibid  page  61. 
27  Pollock  also  makes  a  sustained  attack  on  coherence  theories.  While  such  theories  do  have  their 
own  problems,  and  indeed  while  Ross  alludes  to  coherentism  in  his  description  of  Aquinas' 
epistemology  (as  opposed  to  MacDonald's  who  calls  Aquinas  a  foundationalist)  we  will  pass  over 
Pollock's  attack,  a  sketch  of  a  contemporary  coherentist  theory  and  any  response  such  coherentist 
might  make  to  Pollock:  it  is  enough  just  to  have  given  a  description  of  coherence  earlier.  In  our 
outline  of  Chisholm's  foundationalism  we  will  show  that  Pollock's  description  of  doxastic  theories 
may  not  be  water  tight,  this  will  be  an  interesting  enough  digression  into  contemporary 
epistemology. 
28  Chisholm  1982,  page  3;  Chisholm  1989,  page  61. 67 
Chisholm  develops  an  account  of  perception  which,  as  we  shall  see,  allows  a  subject  to 
takes  it  as  evident  that  there  is  something,  i.  e.  an  external  object  appearing  to  him.  It 
amounts  to  a  complex  theory. 
According  to  Chisholm  certainty  can  be  attributed  to  propositions  about  the  mental  life  which 
he  calls  self-presenting,  and  to  some  a  priori  metaphysical  and  logical  axioms.  29  In  the 
structure  of  empirical  knowledge,  the  role  of  the  self-presenting  is  crucial,  or  to  put  it 
another  way,  foundational.  Self-presenting  properties  are  exhibited  by  various  aspects  of  the 
mental  such  as  dreaming,  hoping,  desiring;  in  fact,  "any  property  which  from  the  fact  that 
you  have  it,  it  follows  logically  that  you  are  thinking.  "30  The  awareness  of  such  self- 
presenting  properties  is  indubitable,  that  is,  if  we  are  having  them  then  we  cannot  doubt  that 
we  are  having  them.  31  The  self-presenting  can  be  said  to  be  directly  evident32  and  moreover: 
The  self-presenting  would  seem  to  be  the  closest  we  can  come  to  that  which 
constitutes  its  own  justification.  33 
Every  self-presenting  property,  then,  is  a  property  that  is  such  that,  if  while  having 
it,  you  consider  your  having  it,  then  you  will  believe  yourself  to  have  it.  34 
[Author's  emphasis] 
If  the  property  of  being  F  is  self-presenting,  if  S  is  F,  and  if  S  believes  himself  to  be 
F,  then  it  is  certain  for  S  that  he  is  F.  35 
Self-presenting  properties  are  self  justified  and  directly  evident;  if  the  subject  considers  them 
not  only  will  he  believe  he  is  having  them,  it  is  certain  for  him  that  he  is  having  them.  `Being 
evident'  and  `certainty'  are  important  in  Chisholm's  epistemology.  In  The  Foundations  of 
Knowing  he  clarifies  the  relationship  between  the  self-presenting  and  these  two  concepts:, 
I  have  not  defined  self-presenting  properties  by  reference  to  evidence  and  certainty. 
But  the  presence  of  such  properties  is  also  evident  to  the  subject  who  has  them.  And, 
if  we  think  of  certainty  as  constituting  the  highest  degree  of  epistemic  justification, 
then  we  may  say  that  a  person's  self-presenting  properties  are  objects  of  certainty 
for  that  person.  36  [Author's  emphasis] 
This  clarification,  that  the  self-presenting  is  not  defined  in  terms  of  these  two  concepts,  will 
be  important  below  when  we  consider  the  foundational  role  of  the  self-presenting. 
The  self-presenting  are  not  defined  by  reference  to  evidence  because  what  is  evident,  is 
29  Chisholm  1989,  page  12. 
30  ibid  page  19. 
31  Chisholm  1982,  page  11. 
32  ibid  page  12. 
33  ibid  page  25. 
34  Chisholm  1982,  page  11. 
35  Chisholm  1989,  page  62. 
36  Chisholm  1982,  page  11. 68 
defined  in  terms  of  the  self-presenting  and  not  vice  versa: 
everything  that  is  evident  for  any  particular  subject  has  as  a  basis  or  foundation  that 
is  entailed  by  some  property  that  is  self-presenting  to  that  subject.  37 
We  will  clarify  this  issue  shortly  when  we  consider,  for  Chisholm,  what  is  evident  but  not 
self-presenting.  For  the  moment  we  note  that  in  his  foundational  scheme  the  self-presenting 
are  of  central  importance  because  it  is  the  self-presenting,  as  opposed  to  the  directly  evident 
that  forms  the  foundation  of  what  is  not  directly  evident.  Chisholm  states  this  explicitly: 
Is  there  a  sense  in  which  the  self-presenting  may  be  said  to  justify  that  which  is  not 
directly  evident?  ..... 
It  is  the  self-presenting,...  and  not  the  directly  evident,  that 
may  be  said  to  justify  that  which  is  not  directly  evident.  38 
Importantly  we  must  note  that  if  the  subject  reflects  on  such  self-presenting  properties  then 
he  will  believe  that  he  has  them,  he  will  be  certain  that  he  has  them.  This  is  the  sense  in 
which  the  self-presenting  is  not  defined  in  terms  of  certainty.  However,  the  subject  doesn't 
have  to  reflect  on  them  for  them  to  perform  the  epistemically  basic  role  of  justifying  what  is 
not  directly  evident,  he  need  not  consider  that  he  is  having  such  and  such  a  self-presenting 
property.  In  other  words,  for  the  self-presenting  to  perform  an  epistemically  foundational 
role  the  subject  does  not  need  to  form  a  belief  about  the  self-presenting.  Thus,  on  this 
reading  the  self-presenting  are  non-doxastic  states  and  so  contra  Pollock,  we  appear  to  have 
a  non-doxastic  foundations  theory.  I  say  appear  because  it  is  at  this  point  that  we  have  to 
address  the  complexity  of  Chisholm's  theory. 
Among  what  is  evident  Chisholm  wants  to  include: 
.....  propositions  about  the  external  things  we  perceive  and  propositions  about  what 
we  remember.  39 
In  both  The  Foundations  of  Knowing  and  Theory  of  Knowledge  Chisholm  attempts  to 
show  how  propositions  about  external  things  can  be  evident  and  thus  constitute  some  of  the 
basic  beliefs  of  a  foundational  theory.  Among  the  self-presenting  properties  that  one  has, 
Chisholm  includes  the  experience  of  "being  appeared  to.  "40  Chisholm  is  very  careful  to 
clarify  what  he  means  by  this: 
The  expression  `being  appeared  redly  to'  as  we  shall  interpret  it,  must  not  be 
interpreted  as  having  the  same  sense  as  any  of  the  following  expressions,  `being 
appeared  to  by  something  that  is  red,....  `Being  appeared  redly  to'...  refers  to  a 
property  that  is  self-presenting....  That  is  to  say,  being  appeared  redly  to  is 
necessarily  such  that,  if  a  person  is  appeared  redly  to  and  if  he  considers  his  being 
appeared  redly  to,  then  he  will  attribute  to  himself  the  property  of  being  appeared 
redly  to  41  [Author's  emphasis] 
No  commitment  to  the  awareness  of  external  objects  is  given  by  such  self-presenting 
37  ibid  page  26. 
38  Chisholm  1982,  page  25. 
39  Chisholm  1989,  page  74. 
40  Chisholm  1982,  page  18. 
41  ibid  page  16. 69 
appearance  statements.  Propositions  regarding  the  external  objects  of  perception  only  acquire 
a  positive  epistemic  status  for  Chisholm  once  he  has  formulated  his  epistemic  principles;  of 
which  the  fundamental  principle  is  the  criterion  of  what  is  certain.  Both  the  Theory  of 
Knowledge  and  The  Foundations  of  Knowing  contain  thorough  accounts  of  his  epistemic 
principles,  the  details  of  which  need  not  detain  us  here  42  According  to  Chisholm 
propositions  about  perceptual  objects  can  be  evident  because  his  epistemic  principles  show 
that  it  is  grounded  on  the  self-presenting  and  secondly,  it  is  something  which  the  subject  has 
reflected  on,  that  is,  formed  a  belief  about: 
In  other  words,  if  a  person  is  appeared  redly  to,  then  it  is  evident  to  him  that  there  is 
something  that  appears  red  to  him--provided  he  considers  the  question  whether 
something  is  appearing  red  to  him  and  provided  he  has  no  reason  to  suppose  that  it  is 
not  the  case  that  something  appears  red  to  him  43  [Author's  emphasis] 
Propositions  regarding  perceptual  objects  are  doxastic  states.  Crucially,  the  person  does  not 
form  a  belief  about  the  self-presenting  property  of  being  appeared  to:  this  non-doxastic  state 
grounds  the  doxastic.  In  working  through  the  various  levels  of  epistemic  appraisal  Chisholm 
also  hopes  to  avoid  Pollock's  first  criticism  of  foundationalism,  concerning  the  unsuitability 
of  perceptual  beliefs  to  be  epistemically  basis  beliefs.  Chisholm  has  tried  to  show  how  such 
beliefs  can  be  evident. 
We  said  earlier  that  Chisholm,  in  his  account  of  the  self-presenting,  appears  to  offer, 
contrary  to  Pollock's  sketch  of  foundationalism,  a  non-doxastic  account  of  foundational  ism. 
We  used  the  word  "appears"  because  of  the  complexity  of  Chisholm's  theory.  What 
Chisholm  has  to  say  on  directly  evident  beliefs  about  perceptual  objects  takes  us  to  the  heart 
of  this  complexity.  If  they  serve  as  epistemically  basic  beliefs  then  Chisholm's 
foundationalism  is  a  doxastic  theory.  In  the  second  edition  of  Theory  of  Knowledge  such 
beliefs  are  given  a  privileged  epistemic  role: 
What,  then,  of  our  justification  for  those  propositions  that  are  indirectly  evident?  We 
might  say  that  they  are  justified  in  three  different  ways.  (1)  They  may  be  justified  by 
certain  relations  that  they  bear  to  what  is  directly  evident.  (2)  They  may  be  justified 
by  certain  relations  that  they  bear  to  each  other.  And  (3)  they  may  be  justified  by 
their  own  nature,  so  to  speak,  and  quite  independently  of  the  relations  they  bear  to 
anything  else.  [Author's  emphasis]44 
However,  in  The  Foundations  of  Knowing  45  Chisholm  indicates  that  he  would  replace 
`directly  evident'  with  `the  self-presenting'  in  the  above  passage.  Thus,  despite  what  he 
says  regarding  beliefs  about  perceptual  objects  being  evident,  the  central  epistemic 
foundation  is  the  self-presenting.  Justification  of  all  other  propositions  follow  from  these 
non-doxastic  states.  Note  however,  that  for  Chisholm  the  self-presenting  is  not  the  sole 
cause  of  the  justification  of  one's  beliefs.  Justification  is  also  the  result  of  the  relations  which 
42  Chisholm  1989,  page  62ff  and  Chisholm  1982,  page  24ff. 
43  Chisholm  1982  pagel7. 
44  Chisholm  1977,  page  63. 
45  Chisholm  1982,  page  26. 70 
exist  between  beliefs,  justified  beliefs  concur  with  each  other.  Hence,  there  is  also  an 
element  of  coherentism  in  Chisholm's  account.  Nevertheless,  it  is  the  self-justified  self- 
presenting  which  constitutes  the  evident  as  the  foundation  of  the  structure  of  empirical 
knowledge,  with  the  indirectly  evident  deriving  its  justification  from  what  is  self-presenting 
and  evident. 
It  is  not  the  object  of  this  chapter  to  offer  a  critique  of  Chisholm  or  Pollock.  However,  it 
does  seem  that  Chisholm's  foundationalism  offers  a  rebuke  of  Pollock's  criticism  and 
description  of  foundationalism.  Chisholm  has  proposed  a  foundationalist  theory  which 
avoids  the  two  main  charges  Pollock  makes  against  foundationalism:  that  we  must  form 
beliefs  about  our  perceptual  states,  and  that  beliefs  about  perceptual  objects  can't  have  a 
privileged  epistemic  status.  We  will  see  that  in  Scott  MacDonald's  foundationalist 
interpretation  of  Aquinas'  theory  of  knowledge  propositions  concerning  the  objects  of 
perception  will  play  an  important  role.  Doubtless  there  are  versions  of  foundationalism 
around  which  do  encounter  the  problems  that  Pollock  suggests  besets  all  foundationalist 
theories.  Unfortunately  for  him,  they  don't  seem  to  beset  Chisholm's.  At  the  end  of  the  day 
Pollock's  theory  is  more  similar  than  dissimilar  to  Chisholm's.  Deeper  discussion  of  this 
issue  is  outwith  the  bounds  of  this  chapter.  Here  we  have  merely  sketched  two  versions  of 
contemporary  foundationalist  and  internalist  theories  in  order  to  give  a  flavour,  of  these 
epistemological  positions,  noting  that  foundationalism  can  be  a  non-doxastic  theory.  For  our 
purposes  we  will  take  foundationalism  to  be  the  theory  that  there  is  a  privileged  set  of 
internal  states,  some  doxastic,  but  not  all,  which  are  immediately  justified.  The  immediately 
justified,  or  self-justifying,  beliefs  form  the  foundation  from  which  the  justification  of  all 
other  beliefs  is  inferred.  Now  we  must  turn  our  attention  to  another  epistemological  position, 
one  which  Pollock  derided  as  "having  nothing  to  contribute  to  the  solution  to  traditional 
epistemological  problems":  46  externalism. 
To  fully  appreciate  externalism  and  its  radically  different  approach  to  the  questions  of 
epistemology  a  few  words  must  first  be  said  about  Naturalised  Epistemology.  We  have 
already  alluded  to  this  issue  when,  in  discussing  Pollock's  naturalised  internalism,  we  made 
reference  to  Hilary  Kornblith's  description  of  the  relationship  between  the  descriptive  and 
normative  dimensions  of  naturalised  epistemology.  In  our  consideration  of  the  above 
internalist  accounts  of  justification  much  attention  has  been  given  to  normative  questions,  for 
example,  what  makes  a  proposition  evident  or  what  is  an  epistemic  norm?  Fulfilment  of  such 
norms  constitutes  knowledge.  Thus  epistemology,  as  described  by  the  internalist,  is  very 
much  a  `first  philosophy',  a  normative  discipline,  determining  what  can  and  cannot  count  as 
knowledge.  According  to  the  naturalised  epistemologist,  however,  the  internalist  programme 
is  sterile  47  Epistemology  is  better  seen  as  part  of  the  enterprise  of  science  because 
fundamentally  the  questions  of  epistemology  are  questions  about  the  human  subject  and  the 
world:  epistemology  is  thus  naturalised,  it  is  reduced  to  psychology.  Quine,  in  his  locus 
46  Pollock  1986,  page  149. 
47  Kornblith  1985,  page  4.  Kornblith  is  here  specifically  referring  to  foundationalist  programmes. 71 
classicus  on  the  subject  writes: 
Epistemology,  or  something  like  it,  simply  falls  into  place  as  a  chapter  of  psychology 
and  hence  of  natural  science.  It  studies  a  natural  phenomenon,  viz,  the  human 
subject.  This  human  subject  is  accorded  a  certain  experimentally  controlled  input, 
certain  patterns  of  irradiation  in  assorted  frequencies,  for  instance-  and  in  the  fullness 
of  time  the  subject  delivers  as  output  a  description  of  the  three  dimensional  external 
world  and  its  history.  The  relation  between  the  meager  input  and  the  torrential  output 
is  a  relation  that  we  are  prompted  to  study  for  somewhat  the  same  reasons  that 
always  prompted  epistemology;  namely,  in  order  to  see  how  evidence  relates  to 
theory  and  in  what  ways  one's  theory  of  nature  transcends  any  available  evidence  48 
The  externalist  accounts  which  follow  share  much  in  common  with  Quine's  description:  the 
role  of,  as  Quine  calls  it,  the  meagre  input,  in  our  belief  forming  process;  in  contrast  little 
attention  is  paid  to  internal  states  such  as  "being  appeared----  to".  Psychology's  role  in 
investigating  the  relationship  between  this  input  and  the  torrential  output  is  also  important  in 
these  externalist  accounts.  Unlike  Quine's  description  the  accounts  which  we  will  look  at 
maintain  the  normative  dimension  of  epistemology. 
What  then  is  externalism?  In  the  index  to  Chisholm's  Theory  of  Knowledge  the  entry  for 
externalism  reads:  "see  internalism.  "  In  the  index  to  Warrant:  The  Current  Debate  49  under 
the  entry  for  externalism  Alvin  Plantinga  does  at  least  give  a  page  reference.  Turning  to  the 
page  in  question  we  find  that  he  writes: 
I  shall  think  of  externalism  as  the  complement  of  internalism;  the  externalist  holds 
that  it  is  not  the  case  that  in  order  for  one  of  my  beliefs  to  have  warrant  for  me,  I 
must  have  some  special  or  privileged  access  to  the  fact  that  I  have  warrant,  or  to  its 
ground.  50  [Author's  emphasis] 
John  Pollock  similarly  includes  a  reference  to  internalism  in  his  description  of  externalism.  51 
If  such  giants  as  these  cannot  give  a  definition  of  externalism  without  referring  to  internalism 
then  we  will  feel  free  to  do  likewise.  We  will  take  an  externalist  theory  to  hold  that  epistemic 
justification  is  not  determined  by  the  internal  states,  doxastic  or  otherwise,  of  a  subject,  but 
is  determined  by  factors  external  to  the  subject's  internal  states;  moreover,  these  justifying 
factors  need  not  be  cognitively  accessible  the  subject.  Alvin  Plantinga  notes  that  while 
externalism  seems  to  be  the  new  kid  on  the  epistemological  block,  it  has  actually  been  the 
dominant  epistemological  tradition  in  western  philosophy.  52  Internalism  has  merely  enjoyed 
supremacy  over  the  last  three  hundred  years.  A  supremacy  now  questioned  in  the  light  of 
Gettier53  and  the  subsequent  attempts  to  naturalise  epistemology. 
48  Quine1969.  page  82. 
49  Plantinga  1993a 
50  ibid  page  183. 
51  Pollock  1986,  page  91. 
52  Plantinga  1993a,  pages  V  and  183. 
53  Gettier  1963,  pages  121-3. 72 
The  first  version  of  externalism  that  we  want  to  sketch  is  that  proposed  by  Robert  Nozick  in 
Philosophical  Explanations.  Nozick  begins  his  consideration  of  the  conditions  for 
knowledge  noting  that  for  a  subject  S  to  know  p  something  more  is  needed  to  go  alongside 
the  conditions: 
1)  p  is  true. 
2)  S  believes  that  p  54 
The  two  further  conditions  he  proposes  are: 
3)  If  p  weren't  true,  S  wouldn't  believe  p 
4)  If  p  were  true  S  would  believe  p.  55 
Nozick's  theory  is  known  under  a  variety  of  different  names:  the  Tracking  theory,  the 
Subjunctive  theory  of  knowledge,  the  Conditional  theory  of  knowledge.  We'll  see  why  it's 
called  a  the  tracking  theory  in  a  moment;  the  presence  of  the  conditionals,  and  the 
subjunctive  clauses  are  the  obvious  reasons  for  its  other  synonyms.  According  to  Nozick  the 
subjunctive  clause  of  condition  three  rules  out  some  Gettier  type  examples  being  treated  as 
cases  of  knowledge.  56  This  third  condition  on  its  own  however,  is  not  enough.  According 
to  Nozick  it  only  tells  us  half  the  story  about  how  the  subject's  belief  is  sensitive  to  the  truth. 
Thus,  he  proposes  his  fourth  condition  that  if  p  is  true  S  will  belief  that  p.  57  Of  this  account 
of  knowledge  Nozick  writes: 
A  person  knows  that  p  when  he  not  only  does  truly  believe  it,  but  also  would  truly 
believe  it  and  wouldn't  falsely  believe  it.  He  not  only  actually  has  a  true  belief,  he 
subjunctively  has  one.  It  is  true  that  p  and  he  believes  it;  if  it  weren't  true  he 
wouldn't  believe  it  and  if  it  were  true  he  would  believe  it.  To  know  p  is  to  be 
someone  who  would  believe  it  if  it  were  true  and  who  wouldn't  believe  it  if  it  were 
false.  58 
According  to  this  account  for  a  subject's  belief  to  be  knowledge,  it  must  be  sensitive,  (to  use 
Jonathan  Dancy's  phrase,  59)  to  the  truth  of  p.  Knowledge  is  intimately  connected  to  the  truth 
of  what  it  is  that  is  believed,  it  is  this  connection  to  the  truth  of  p  that  makes  a  belief 
knowledge.  As  Nozick  neatly  puts,  knowledge  tracks  the  truth: 
Let  us  say  of  a  person  who  believes  that  p,  which  is  true,  that  when  3  and  4[  the 
above  conditions]  hold,  his  belief  tracks  the  truth  that  p.  To  know  is  to  have  a 
belief  that  tracks  the  truth.  Knowledge  is  a  particular  way  of  being  connected  to  the 
world,  having  a  real  specific  factual  connection  to  the  world:  tracking  it.  60  [Author's 
emphasis] 
Here  we  see  the  externalist  credentials  of  Nozick's  theory:  it  is  the  connection  to  the  world, 
54  Nozick  1981,  page  170. 
55  ibid  pages  172  and  176. 
56  ibid  page  173  Colin  McGinn  has  provided  some  gettier  type  examples  to  which  Nozick's  theory 
seems  susceptible.  Cf:  Colin  McGinn1984,  section  2.  pages  531ff. 
57  ibid  page  176. 
58  ibid  page  178. 
59  Dancy  1985,  page  38. 
60  Nozick  1981,  page  178. 73 
the  tracking  of  truth  and  not  some  internal  state  which  constitutes  knowledge.  This 
connecting  link  between  the  subject  and  the  fact,  Nozick  writes,  is  external  to  us:  this 
"linkage  is  out  of  our  (let  us  say)  ken;  even  if  we  have  a  belief  about  this  linkage  which 
tracks  it,  that  tracking  linkage  is  out  of  our  ken.  "  [His  emphasis]61  Further  evidence  of  this 
theory's  externalist  credentials  is  the  role  of  evolution  in  shaping  our  capacity  to  track  facts62 
and  empirical  science's  task  of  investigating  the  methods  by  which  we  track.  63 
Needless  to  say  that  the  concept  of  Tracking  has  come  in  for  some  criticism,  such  as  that 
proposed  by  Colin  McGinn.  64  Such  criticisms  are  outwith  the  scope  of  this  paper,  as  are 
other  aspects  of  Nozick's  description  of  knowledge,  for  example,  its  nonclosure  under 
logical  entailment,  or  what  he  means  by  `truth'.  65  Nozick's  tracking  theory  was  not  the  first 
externalist  account  of  knowledge  to  be  given.  It  was  preceded  by  both  causal  and  reliabilist 
theories.  In  Philosophical  Explanations  Nozick  contrasts  reliabilism  and  the  tracking  theory. 
The  contrast  gives  a  flavour  of  reliabilism: 
Reliability  is  a  connection  between  belief  (by  the  method)  and  truth,  in  the  direction 
from  belief  to  truth:  if  belief  (by  the  method)  then  probably  true.  This  direction  is 
opposite  to  the  direction  of  tracking,  of  subjunctive  conditions  3  and  4  which  have 
truths  in  the  antecedents  and  belief  or  the  lack  of  it  (by  the  method)  in  the 
consequents.  When  tracking  holds,  if  it  is  true  (false)  you  would  (not)  believe  it--- 
when  reliability  holds,  if  it  is believed  (  by  the  method)  then  it  (  probably)  would  be 
true.  66 
Causal  theories  don't  focus  on  the  reliability  of  the  method  or  process  used,  but  instead 
develop  the  traditional  tripartite  definition  of  knowledge;  some,  for  example,  by  adding  a 
fourth  condition  that  the  fact  that  p  causes  S  to  believe  p.  A  moment's  reflection  reveals  more 
than  a  passing  similarity  to  Nozick's  account,  indeed  his  account  is  a  special  type  of  causal 
theory.  As  at  least  one  of  the  interpretations  of  Aquinas,  which  we'll  shortly  look  at,  labels 
Aquinas  a  reliabilist  we'll  devote  more  attention  to  that  than  causal  theories.  The  reliabilism 
we  will  sketch  is  that  proposed  by  Alvin  Goldman. 
Goldman's  reliabilism  is  squarely  within  the  boundaries  of  naturalised  epistemology. 
Nevertheless,  unlike  Quine's  naturalism,  Goldman's  is  not  merely  descriptive,  it  is  also 
evaluative  and  normative.  67  The  central  concept  of  his  theory,  is  as  its  name  suggests, 
reliability: 
The  justificational  status  of  a  belief  is  a  function  of  the  reliability  of  the  process  or 
processes  that  cause  it,  where....  reliability  consists  in  the  tendency  of  a  process  to 
61  ibid  page  281. 
62  ibid  page  285. 
63  ibid  page  287. 
64  McGinn  1984,  section  2.  pages  531ff. 
65  Nozick  1981,  page  204ff. 
66  ibid  page  266. 
67  Goldman  1986,  page  2. 74 
produce  beliefs  that  are  true  rather  than  false.  68 
The  above  quote  gives  a  rough  outline  of  what  he  means  by  reliability,  but  what  exactly  is 
reliability? 
An  object  (a  process,  method,  system  or  what  have  you)  is  reliable  if  and  only  if  (1) 
it  is  the  sort  of  thing  that  tends  to  produce  beliefs,  and  (2)  the  proportion  of  true 
beliefs  among  the  beliefs  it  produces  meets  some  threshold,  or  criterion,  value.  69 
The  crucial  word  in  the  preceding  extract  is  "process".  According  to  Goldman  "both 
knowledge  and  justified  belief  depend  critically  on  the  use  of  sufficiently  reliable  cognitive 
processes.  "70  In  Epistemology  and  Cognition  Goldman  outlines  various  types  of  reliable 
processes,  for  example  a  causal  process: 
Whether  a  true  belief  is  knowledge  depends  on  why  the  belief  is  held,  on  the 
psychological  processes  that  cause  the  belief  or  sustain  it  in  the  mind  71 
He  goes  on  to  discuss  other  reliable  process  theories  and  the  concept  of  epistemic 
justification,  but  space  militates  against  discussing  them  or  the  various  criticisms  of. 
Goldman's  reliabilism  such  as  what  proportion  of  beliefs  must  meet  the  criterion?  What  we 
can  note  is  that,  as  would  be  expected  from  a  naturalistic  account,  it  is  the  role  of  science  to 
determine  the  basic  belief  forming  processes:  72 
The  reliable-process  theory  of  knowing  entails  the  logical  possibility  of  knowledge, 
but  it  does  not  entail  that  knowledge  is  humanly  possible.  It  is  humanly  possible  only 
if  humans  have  suitable  cognitive  equipment.  And  this  is  something  of  which  we  can 
best  be  apprised  only  with  the  help  of  psychology  73  [Author's  emphasis] 
The  main  point  of  Goldman's  theory  is  that  the  epistemic  justification  of  beliefs  depends  on 
whether  they  are  formed  by  reliable  belief-forming  processes.  The  cognizer  need  not  be 
aware  of  the  processes  which  grant  justification  to  his  beliefs;  it  is  a  thoroughly  externalist 
account: 
I  leave  it  an  open  question  whether,  when  a  belief  is  justified,  the  believer  knows  it 
is  justified.  I  also  leave  it  an  open  question  whether,  when  a  belief  is  justified,  the 
believer  can  state  or  give  a  justification  for  it.  I  do  not  assume  that  when  a  belief  is 
justified  there  is  something  `possessed'  by  the  believer  which  can  be  called  a 
`justification'.  I  do  assume  that  a  justified  belief  gets  its  status  of  being  justified  from 
some  process  or  properties  that  make  it  justified.  74  [Author's  emphasis] 
The  final  version  of  externalism  which  we  wish  to  sketch  is  most  novel:  novel  because  it 
endorses  foundational  ism,  is  naturalistic  and  yet  depends  on,  as  the  author  puts  it, 
68  Goldman  1985,  page  100. 
69  Goldman  1986  page  26. 
70  ibid  page  39. 
71  ibid  page  42. 
72  ibid  page  182. 
73  ibid  page  57. 
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supernatural  theism.  It  is  the  account  proposed  by  Alvin  Plantinga  in  his  two  volumes 
Warrant:  the  Current  Debate  and  Warrant  and  Proper  Function. 
As  the  titles  of  both  works  suggest  Plantinga  is  interested  in  "warrant".  According  to  him 
warrant  is  "that  which  together  with  truth  makes  the  difference  between  knowledge  and  mere 
true  belief.  "75  In  the  first  volume  Plantinga  surveys  the  contemporary  epistemological  scene, 
critically  appraising  all  of  the  accounts  we  have  sketched  here  and  some  more  besides.  He 
finds  all  of  the  accounts:  internalist  and  externalist,  foundationalist  and  reliabilist,  wanting. 
In  the  second  volume  he  develops  his  own  theory,  his  theory  of  warrant.  A  belief  B  has 
warrant  for  a  subject  S  if  and  only  if: 
(1)  the  cognitive  faculties  involved  in  the  production  of  B  are  functioning 
properly...  (2)  your  cognitive  environment  is  sufficiently  similar  to  the  one  for  which 
your  cognitive  faculties  are  designed;  (3)  the  triple  of  the  design  plan  governing  the 
production  of  the  belief  in  question  involves,  as  purpose  or  function,  the  production 
of  true  beliefs...  and;  (4)  the  design  plan  is  a  good  one:  that  is,  there  is  a  high 
statistical  or  objective  probability  that  a  belief  produced  in  accordance  with  the 
relevant  segment  of  the  design  plan  in  that  sort  of  environment  is  true  76 
The  externalism  of  the  account  is  readily  apparent:  warrant  is  bestowed  when  the  underlying 
design  plan  is  a  good  one,  that  is,  produces  a  high  proportion  of  true  beliefs,  and  the 
cognitive  faculties  function  properly  in  the  right  sort  of  environment.  Nevertheless,  much  of 
his  account  demands  further  explanation.  We  will  do  that  by  systematically  looking  at  the 
various  terms  in  the  above  definition  and  then  considering  some  of  the  other  aspects  of  his 
account. 
The  concept  of  proper  function  is  central  to  his  account,  it  is  a  necessary  condition  for 
warrant??  This  is  a  straightforward  criterion  which  merely  stipulates  that  our  cognitive 
faculties  ought  to  be  working  properly,  this  avoids  what  he  considers  to  be  'a  flaw  in  many 
of  the  other  epistemologies  he  has  considered,  a  malfunction  of  cognitive  faculties 
undermining  any  claim  for  warrant.  Plantinga  discusses  the  notion  of  proper  function  at 
length,  for  our  purposes,  an  example  from  biology  will  give  us  a  flavour  of  what  he  means 
by  proper  function;  the  human  heart  is  functioning  properly  when  it  circulates  blood  around 
the  body,  this  is  what  it  was  designed,  or  has  evolved,  to  do.  Similarly,  our  cognitive 
faculties  function  properly  when  they  do  what  they  are  supposed  to  do. 
Another  criterion  is  also  very  important:  the  environment.  Plantinga  says  that  the 
environment  in  which  you  use  your  faculties  must'the  type  of  environment  that  God  and/or 
75  Plantinga  1993a,  page  3. 
76  Plantinga  1993b,  page  194  By  "triple  of  the  design  plan"  Plantinga  means  the  first  three 
conditions  necessary  for  warrant:  the  beliefs  are  being  formed  by  properly  functioning  organs,  in 
the  appropriate  environment,  employing  a  cognitive  mechanism  which  aims  at  truth.  Cf.  op.  cit. 
page  17. 
77  ibid  page  4. 76 
evolution  designed  your  faculties  to  be  used  in  78  However,  neither  of  these  two  criteria  are 
sufficient  for  warrant,  79  because  our  faculties  must  not  be  functioning  in  any  old  way,  they 
must  be  functioning  according  to  the  design  plan  governing  the  production  of  true  beliefs.  80 
When  he  introduces  this  notion  of  a  design  plan  Plantinga  is  quick  to  point  out  that  it  need 
not  entail  a  divine  designer,  that,  in  fact,  evolution  may  be  able  to  account  for  the  design 
plan.  As  we  shallhowever,  his  naturalism  is  built  on  supernatural  foundations.  Regarding 
the  design  plan,  he  writes: 
...  we  seem  to  have  been  constructed  in  accordance  with  a  specific  set  of 
specifications,  in  the  way  in  which  there  are  specifications  for,  for  example,  the 
1992  Buick.  According  to  these  specifications  (I'm  just  guessing),  after  a  cold  start 
the  engine  runs  at  1500RPM  until  the  engine  temperature  reaches  190F;  it  then 
throttles  back  to  750  RPM......  81 
And: 
The  purpose  of  the  heart  is  to  pump  blood;  that  of  our  cognitive  faculties  (overall)  is 
to  supply  us  with  reliable  information.....  But  not  just  any  old  way  of  accomplishing 
this  purpose  in  the  case  of  a  specific  cognitive  process  is  in  accordance  with  our 
design  plan.  82 
The  design  plan,  in  particular  that  facet  of  it  whose  goal  is  to  produce  true  beliefs,  allows 
Plantinga  to  rule  out  those  situations  where  we  may  have  warrant  accidentally: 
What  confers  warrant  is  one's  cognitive  faculties  working  properly,  or  working 
according  to  the  design  plan  insofar  as  that  segment  of  the  design  plan  is  aimed  at 
producing  true  beliefs.  But  someone  whose  holding  a  certain  belief  is  the  result  of  an 
aspect  of  our  cognitive  design  that  is  not  aimed  at  truth  but  at  something  else  won't 
be  such  that  the  belief  has  warrant  for  him;  he  won't  be  properly  said  to  know  the 
proposition  in  question,  even  if  it  turns  out  to  be  true.  83  [Author's  emphasis] 
To  these  three  criteria  Plantinga  adds  a  fourth:  the  design  plan  must  be  a  good  one.  84  This 
brings  an  element  of  reliability  into  his  account:  the  beliefs  produced  must  have  a  high 
probability  of  being  true;  functioning  properly  according  to  the  design  plan  in  the  right 
environment  must  be  a  reliable  method,  seen  in  it  producing  a  high  number  of  true  beliefs. 
So  far  we  have  unpacked  the  terms  that  Plantinga  used  in  the  definition  of  warrant,  there  is 
however,  one  other  aspect  to  the  amount  of  warrant  which  a  belief  has,  that  is  the  level  of 
conviction  with  which  the  believer  accepts  the  belief  affects  the  degree  of  warrant  which  the 
belief  has: 
78  ibid  page  7. 
79  ibid  page  7. 
80  ibid  page  13ff. 
81  ibid  page  14. 
82  ibid  page  14. 
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..  the  more  firmly  S  believes  B  the  more  warrant  B  has  for  S.  85 
It  could  have  been  thought  that  the  amount  of  warrant  a  belief  had  would  determine  the 
firmness  with  which  we  believed  it.  Does  the  above  remark  make  his  account  circular?  No, 
warrant  is  what  turns  mere  true  belief  into  knowledge.  It  is because  a  belief  has  a  certain 
amount  of  warrant  that  it  can  be  described  as  knowledge;  what  determines  that  level  of 
warrant  are  the  four  conditions  listed  above  and  the  extent  to  which  the  subject  believes  the 
belief.  This  issue  takes  us  to  an  interesting  aspect  of  Plantinga's  theory  which  parallel's  what 
Aquinas  has  to  say  about  knowledge. 
Firstly,  as  Plantinga  admits  in  the  preface  to  Warrant  and  Proper  Function  he  cannot  give  a 
complete  analysis  of  warrant,  it  is  too  complex  a  notion.  86  He  thus  intends  to  outline 
paradigmatic  examples  of  warrant  while  acknowledging  that  outside  this  core  "warrant"  can 
be  used  in  a  number  of  analogical  ways:  there  are  different  degrees  of  warrant  depending  on 
the  firmness  with  which  the  subject  holds  the  belief  in  question.  Knowledge,  he  suggests  is, 
also  like  this:  core  examples  can  be  cited,  but  around  this  core  there  are  other  examples, 
standing  in  varying  degrees  of  closeness  to  the  paradigm.  As  we  saw,  in  the  last  chapter 
Aquinas  use  of  "knowledge"  is  analogical.  Within  his  account  of  human  knowledge  Aquinas 
also  cites  various  different  types.  Secondly,  as  we  also  saw,  Aquinas  also  speaks  of  degrees 
of  acceptance  of  beliefs,  which  depend  on  the  extent  to  which  the  believer  assents  to  what  it 
is he  believes.  87 
Plantinga  applies  this  account  of  warrant  to  various  areas  of  epistemological  concern,  among 
which  is  perception.  The  account  he  gives  of  warrant  and  perceptual  beliefs  highlights 
another  interesting  aspect  of  his  theory.  According  to  Plantinga  we  form  the  perceptual 
beliefs  that  we  do  and  these  have  the  warrant  which  they  have  because  that  kind  of  belief 
formation  is  dictated  by  oyr  design  plan  and  the  particular  circumstances  in  which  we  find 
ourselves.  88  In  our  sketch  Pollock  we  saw  that  according  to  him  a  foundationalist  must  form 
a  belief  about  the  propositional  content  of  a  perceptual  state  in  order  for  such  a  state  to  serve 
as  an  epistemic  foundation.  We  saw  that  this  was  not  the  case  with  Chisholm's 
foundational  ism.  Plantinga's  account  also  disagrees  with  Pollock: 
My  perceptual  beliefs  are  not  ordinarily  formed  on  the  basis  of  propositions  about 
my  experience;  nonetheless  they  are  formed  on  the  basis  of  my  experience.  89 
[Author's  emphasis] 
What  makes  Plantinga's  account  particularly  interesting  is  that  despite  proposing  a 
naturalised  and  externalist  account  of  warrant,  it  is  foundationalist  in  structure.  The 
foundationalism  which  he  espouses  finds  its  origins  in  the  philosophy  of  Thomas  Reid.  The 
warranted  perceptual  beliefs  which  he  described  above  can  serve  as  epistemic  foundations, 
85  ibid  page  19. 
86  ibid  page  IX. 
87  ST  2a2ae  q2  al  c  What  he  actually  says  will  be  outlined  In  our  discussion  of  Ross  which  follows. 
88  Plantinga  1993b,  page  99. 
89  ibid  page98. 78 
where  warrant  is  transferred  from  one  belief  to  another.  90 
On  the  Reidian  view,  when  I  am  appropriately  appeared  to  and  the  other  conditions 
for  warrant......  are  satisfied,  then  my  belief  that  I  see  a  tiger  lily  has  warrant  for  me. 
But  it  isn't  necessary  that  I  believe  that  I  am  appeared  to  in  this  way....  What  counts 
for  warrant  of  the  belief  in  question  is  not  my  believing  that  I  am  appeared  to  in 
such  and  such  a  way,  but  simply  being  appeared  to  in  that  way.......  What  confers 
warrant  upon  that  proposition  is  not....  that  it  is  certain  or  probable  with  respect  to 
the  experiential  proposition;  rather  it  has  warrant  simply  in  virtue  of  being  formed  in 
those  circumstances......  We  may  therefore  say  that  proper  basicality...  is  a  source  of 
warrant...  In  the  typical  case  of  perception  or  memory  or  a  priori  knowledge,  the 
proposition  in  question  will  receive  warrant  just  by  virtue  of  being  accepted  in  the 
presence  of  certain  conditions-  conditions  that  do  not  themselves  directly  involve 
other  beliefs  at  all91  [Author's  emphasis] 
We  can  see  how  his  externalism  shapes  his  foundationalism  when  he  talks  of  the  belief  being 
"formed  in  those  circumstances",  and  "being  accepted  in  certain  conditions":  We  outlined' 
earlier  what  those  conditions  and  circumstances  are.  We  will  shortly  outline.  four  attempts  to 
map  the  various  categories  and  theories  which  we  have  thus  far  described  onto  Aquinas' 
account  of  human  knowledge.  Without  wishing  to  preempt  this  discussion  of  Aquinas' 
theory,  the  categories  that  Plantinga  uses  to  describe  how  a  perceptual  belief  can  be 
knowledge  and  serve  as  an  epistemic  foundation  may  well  be  the  categories  that  a 
contemporary  interpretation  of  Aquinas'  epistemology  would  use.  One  further  parallel 
between  Plantinga  and  Aquinas  reinforces  this:  theism. 
Central  to  Aquinas'  epistemology  is  his  theism  and  metaphysical  realism.  In  the  following 
chapter,  I  will  argue  that  Aquinas'  account  of  perceptual  knowledge  describes  the  normative 
in  terms  of  the  descriptive,  that  is,  to  borrow  Hilary  Kornblith's  phrase,  the  way  we  arrive  at 
our  beliefs  is  important  for  how  we  ought  to  arrive  at  them.  Aquinas'  account  is 
fundamentally  descriptive,  yet  the  normative  is  implicit  in  the  descriptive.  Plantinga  says  that 
his  account  of  warrant  does  likewise  92  He  eschews  the  radical  naturalism  of  Quine, 
preferring,  as  he  calls  it  the  more  moderate  naturalism  of  Kornblith,  and  an  even  milder 
naturalism  which  denies  that  warrant  is  a  deontological  notion.  The  natural  sciences  play  a 
normative  role  in  his  account  of  warrant.  93  This  naturalism,  however,  "flourishes  best  in  the 
context  of  a  theistic  view  of  human  beings:  naturalism  in  epistemology  requires 
supernaturalism  in  anthropology.  "94  I'm  sure  that  this  is  news  to  Quine.  Briefly,  Plantinga 
offers  three  arguments  for  this  conclusion.  The  first  argument  attempts  to  show  the 
falsehood  of  naturalism  by  showing  its  inability  to  account  for  proper  function;  that  is:  can 
90  ibid  page  183. 
91  ibid  page184ff. 
92  ibid  page  45. 
93  ibid  page  194. 
94  ibid  page  46. 79 
the  naturalist  speak  of  proper  functioning  without  speaking  of  a  designer?  95  Plantinga's 
other  two  arguments  focus  on  the  probability  of  the  reliability  of  belief  formation  in  the  light 
of  evolutionary  theory.  96  Following  Patricia  Churchland  he  says  that  naturalistic  evolution 
raises  two  problems  for  epistemology:  it  gives  us  grounds  to  doubt  that  the  purpose  of  our 
cognitive  systems  is  to  furnish  us  with  true  beliefs,  and  that  they  do  furnish  us  with  mostly 
true  beliefs.  97  Given  that  the  process  of  evolution  is  about  survival  rather  than  true  belief 
formation98  Plantinga  goes  on  to  set  out  his  two  arguments  based  on  the  reliability  of  our 
belief  forming  mechanisms,  one  which  he  alleges  shows  the  falsehood  of  metaphysical 
naturalism  and  the  other  its  irrationality.  99  It  is  enough  for  us  merely  to  note  this  interesting 
conclusion  and  sketch  his  arguments.  It  is  the  naturalist's  task  to  respond  to  them.  lOO  Of 
greater  importance  is  his  theory's  parallel  to  Aquinas'. 
Having  defined  what  we  mean  by  internalism  and  externalism,  -and  sketched  examples  of 
foundationalism  and  externalism  we  now  turn  to  the  application  of  these  labels  to  Aquinas' 
epistemology. 
95  ibid  page  198. 
96  He  systematically  expresses  this  probability  as:  P(R/  N&C&E)).  He  outlines,  not  very 
perspicaciously  what  this  means.  R  is  the  claim  that  our  cognitive  faculties  are  reliable.  N  is 
metaphysical  naturalism,  E  is  the  proposition  that  our  cognitive  faculties  arose  by  evolution  and  Cis 
a  complex  proposition  representing  the  many  cognitive  faculties  we  have.  Cf  page  220 
97  ibid  page  218. 
98  He  cites  Darwin  and  Churchland  as  agreeing  with  this  assessment  that  evolution  is  solely 
concerned  with  survival  and,  therefore,  it  is  unlikely  that  our  cognitive  faculties  have  the  formation 
of  true  beliefs  as  their  function.  Cf.  ibid  page  219 
99  In  the  first  argument  he  says  that  given  what  have  seen  about  evolutionary  theory,  it  is  probable 
that  our  belief  forming  mechanisms  are  not  reliable.  Therefore  he  writes:  "...  suppose  you  also  think, 
as  most  of  us  do,  that  in  fact  our  cognitive  faculties  are  reliable.......  Then  you  have  a  straightforward 
probabilistic  argument  against  naturalism-  and  for  traditional  theism,  if  you  think  these  two  the 
significant  alternatives.  "  [Op.  cit.  page  228]  The  second  argument  is  more  complicated.  He 
sketches  it  as  follows:  "  Once  I  come  to  doubt  the  reliability  of  my  cognitive  faculties,  I  can't  properly 
try  to  allay  that  doubt  by  producing  an  argument;  for  in  so  doing  I  rely  on  the  very  faculties  I  am 
doubting.  The  conjunction  of  evolution  with  naturalism  gives  its  adherents  a  reason  for  doubting 
that  our  beliefs  are  mostly  true;  perhaps  they  are  mostly  wildly  mistaken.  But  then  it  won't  help  to 
argue  that  they  can't  be  wildly  mistaken;  for  the  very  reason  for  mistrusting  our  cognitive  faculties 
generally  will  be  a  reason  for  mistrusting  the  faculties  generating  the  beliefs  involved  in  the 
argument.  "  [ibid  page  234]  He  concludes:  "The  conclusion  to  be  drawn,  therefore,  is  that  the 
conjunction  of  naturalism  with  evolutionary  theory  is  self-defeating:  it  provides  for  itself  an 
undefeated  defeater....  Naturalism,  therefore,  is  unacceptable.  "  [ibid  page  235] 
100  Nozick  discusses  the  relationship  between  true  beliefs  and  evolutionary  process  in  Nozick 
1981,  page  284ff.  It  seems  that  he  would  disagree  with  Plantinga's  pessimism  regarding 
evolution's  ability  to  furnish  us  with  cognitive  systems  whose  aim  is  to  furnish  us  with  true  beliefs. 
Nozick  muses:  "It  would  be  interesting  to  investigate  the  question  of  what  type  of  variation  of  belief 
with  the  truth,  what  type  of  sensitivity  of  belief  to  fact,  would  be  predicted  solely  on  the  basis  of 
evolutionary  theory;  rather,  what  (according  to  evolutionary  theory)  would  be  the  optimum  type  of 
variation  or  sensitivity?  There  is  some  reason  to  think  such  an  investigation  within  evolutionary 
theory  would  end  reasonably  close  to  our  account  of  knowledge.  "  page  286. 80 
b.  Mappings  and  interpretations 
We  will  begin  by  looking  at  the  internalist  characterisations  of  Aquinas.  Scott  MacDonald  is 
quite  robust  in  his  description  of  Aquinas  as  an  internalist: 
Aquinas  consistently  and  repeatedly  makes  it  a  requirement  of  justification  that  the 
person  possess  or  have  access  to  the  grounds  constituitive  of  his  justification...... 
Aquinas  holds  that  the  cognitive  power  distinguishing  them  from  animals,  namely, 
intellect,  makes  them  genuine  knowers  precisely,  because  it  is  a  self-reflexive  power 
that  allows  them  to  have  not  only  cognitions,  but  cognition  of  the  truth  of  their 
cognitions........  Aquinas'  main  epistemological  positions  are  virtually  unstatable 
without  appeal  to  his  own  metaphor  of  intellective  vision,  a  paradigmatically 
internalist  metaphor  . 
101 
MacDonald"s  internalist  reading  of  Aquinas  centres  on  Aquinas'  discussion  of  one  aspect  the 
second  act  of  the  intellect:,  the  intellect's  ability  to  judge  the  correspondence  of  the 
proposition  it  has  formed  to  external  reality.  102  MacDonald  writes: 
Reflective  consideration  of  whether  or  not  a  proposition  conforms  to  reality  is 
essential  to  evaluating  and  governing  our  own  judgments  and  thought  processes.  We 
might  say  that,  on  Aquinas'  view,  the  self-reflexive  capacity  of  intellect  makes 
human  beings  the  sort  of  creature  for  whom  epistemic  justification  can  be  an 
issue.  103 
This  is  indeed  an  internalist  description  of  justification:  it  refers  solely  to  internal  states. 
However,  the  type  of  internalism  that  MacDonald  sketches  here  is  different  from  that  which 
we  discussed  earlier.  MacDonald  stresses  that  justification  stems  from  the  intellect's  self- 
reflexive  capacity  to  judge  its  own  activity.  Such  overt  self-reflexivity  was  missing  in  the 
contemporary  accounts,  such  as  Pollock's  internalism.  In  the  next  chapter  we  will  see  that 
there  is  much  in  Aquinas'  epistemology  that  will  undermine  the  central  role  MacDonald  gives 
to  the  intellect's  self-reflexivity.  In  the  meantime  we  move  on  to  consider  how  MacDonald 
elaborates  this  internalist  description  by  attempting  to  identify  a  foundationalist  structure  in 
Aquinas'  epistemology. 
The  core  of  MacDonald's  thesis  focuses  on  Aquinas'  account  of  scientia.  We  have  already 
given  a  description  of  scientia  in  the  preceding  chapter.  Briefly,  in  order  to  grasp  what 
MacDonald  attempts  to  do,  we  should  recall  that  scientia  is  similar  to,  but  not  the  same  as 
our  concept  of  science.  Scientia  is  just  one  type  of  human  knowledge;  104  it  is  the  certain 
knowledge  which  is  the  result  of  a  demonstrative  syllogism,  only  what  is  universal  and 
101  MacDonald  1993,  page  186. 
102  ST  1ag16a2c;  g17a3c. 
103  MacDonald  1993,  page  163. 
104  In  the  last  chapter  we  outlined  the  various  kinds  of  human  knowledge  which  Aquinas 
discusses.  In  ST  1a  q14  al  ad2,  for  example,  as  well  as  scientia  which  is  the  knowledge  of 
conclusions,  he  lists,  understanding  which  is  the  knowledge  of  principles;  wisdom  which  Is  the 
knowledge  of  the  highest  causes  and  prudence  which  is  knowing  human  actions.  We  noted  that 
perceptual  knowledge  is  always  absent  from  these  kinds  of  lists. 81 
necessary  can  be  the  object  of  scientia.  Scientia,  like  the  other  types  of  human  knowledge,  is 
an  example  of  cognition.  Cognition  also  includes  what  we  would  term  perceptual 
knowledge. 
While  he  acknowledges  that  cognition  is  Aquinas'  basic  epistemic  category,  MacDonald 
argues  that  cognition,  as  Aquinas  describes  it,  is  not  the  same  as  what  contemporary 
epistemology  calls  knowledge,  moreover  according  to  Aquinas  we  can  have  mistaken 
cognition.!  05  According  to  MacDonald,  scientia  is  Aquinas'  paradigm  of  knowledge,  106  it  is 
the  cornerstone  of  his  whole  theory  of  knowledge.  107  It  is  when  he  looks  at  Aquinas' 
treatment  of  scientia  and,  as  he  sees  it  its  paradigmatic  role,  that  MacDonald  proposes  his 
foundationalist  interpretation  of  Aquinas'  alleged  internalism. 
Aquinas'  principle  discussion  of  scientia  takes  place  in  his  Commentary  on  the  Posterior 
Analytics.  The  conclusions  of  the  demonstrative  syllogism,  which  constitute  scientia  are,  as 
we  noted,  known  with  certainty.  This  privileged  epistemic  status  is  derived  from  the 
propositions  which  constitute  the  premises  of  the  syllogism.  This  is  because,  as.  we  noted  in 
the  previous  chapter,  the  premises  of  the  demonstrative  syllogism  are  indemonstrable,  that  is 
they  are  known  in  virtue  of  themselves,  they  are  immediately  known  once  we  know  the 
terms  which  constitute  them.  108  Aquinas'  reasons  for  this  position  are  not  particularly 
important  at  the  moment,  109  it  is  enough  to  note  that  in  contemporary  epistemological 
parlance  such  principles  are  self-justifying.  It  is  these  self-justifying,  immediate  propositions 
that  provide  the  epistemic  foundations  of  scientia: 
Propositions  that  are  known  by  virtue  of  themselves  (per  se  nota)  are  Aquinas' 
epistemic  first  principles,  the  foundations  of  scientia.  110 
There  is  undoubtedly  an  element  of  foundationalism  in  Aquinas'  description  of  scientia.  The 
problem  with  MacDonald's  interpretation  is  that  he  takes  what  Aquinas  says  about  scientia  to 
be  paradigmatic  and  thus  applies  its  foundationalist  structure  to  Aquinas'  account  of  our 
knowledge  of  the  material  world. 
ý 
MacDonald  attempts  to  show  that  scientia  with  its  foundational  structure  is  not  merely 
applicable  to  axiomatic  systems,  such  as  geometry. 
I)  t  According  to  MacDonald  as  scientia 
is  the  paradigm  of  knowledge,  its  foundationalist  structure  is  applicable  to  perceptual 
knowledge.  While  the  strict  conditions  of  scientia  will  only  be  met  in  the  paradigm  case 
involving  disciplines  such  as  geometry,  nevertheless  our  everyday  knowledge  approaches 
105  MacDonald  1993  page  162.  Cf.  ST  1a  q85  a6c. 
101  ibidpage  163. 
107  ibid  page  177. 
108  In  P.  A.  15;  6. 
109  Scott  MacDonald  gives  a  full  description  of  the  nature  of  these  indemonstrable  premises. 
MacDonald  1993,  page  168ff.  We  will  discuss  what  he  says  in  a  later  chapter. 
110  ibid  page  165. 
111  ibid  page  174. 82 
the  paradigm  without  attaining  it:  112 
Propositions  about  particular  sensible  objects,  then,  are  sometimes  better  known  to 
us  even  though  by  nature  or  considered  in  themselves  they  are  not  better  known.  As 
such,  they  can  constitute  immediate  propositions  for  us  and  function  as  epistemic 
first  principles  grounding  what  is  for  us  (though  not  unqualifiedly)scientia.  Of 
course  the  fact  that  these  sorts  of  propositions  fall  short  of  the  sort  of  metaphysical 
priority,  universality,  and  necessity  characteristic  of  paradigmatic  first  principles 
leaves  open  the  possibility  of  our  being  mistaken  about  them.  But  this  is  just  to  say 
that  the  sort  of  scientia  they  ground  is  not  paradigmatically  complete  and  certain 
cognition  but  only  approximates  it  to  some  degree.  113  [Author's  emphasis] 
Perceptual  knowledge  is  then  a  weaker  type  of  scientia,  whereas  scientia  proper  deals  with 
what  is  certain,  universal  and  necessary,  this  weaker  version  of  scientia  which  is  concerned 
with  knowledge  arising  from  perception,  focuses  on  what  is  particular  and  contingent.  This 
weaker,  non-paradigmatic  version  of  scientia  MacDonald  christens  Secondary  Scientia  .  114 
He  proposes  two  arguments  in  its  favour.  We  have  just  seen  one  of  them.  It  focuses  on 
Aquinas'  admission  that  our  knowledge  of  the  singular  comes  before  our  knowledge  of  the 
universal.  115  MacDonald  argues  that  propositions  about  the  singular  can  constitute  the 
immediate  propositions  which  ground  secondary  scientia,  in  the  way  that  immediate 
propositions  can  ground  scientia  proper.  On  the  basis  of  these  propositions  about  the 
singular  we  can  be  said  to  have  a  type  of  scientia  of  contingent  things.  His  second  argument 
is  that  we  can  have  secondary  scientia  of  contingent  things  to  the  extent  that  we  can  render 
them  universal. 
In  later  discussion  we  will  show  that  this  account  of  scientia  of  contingent  things  is  wrong 
on  three  counts:  Firstly,  we  can  have  scientia  of  the  natural  kinds  which  make  up  the  world, 
i.  e.  scientia  of  what  it  is  to  be  a  horse,  just  as  we  can  have  scientia  of  the  truths  of 
mathematics.  Secondly,  Aquinas'  account  of  perceptual  knowledge  is  not  foundationalist. 
Thirdly,  scientia  is  neither  the  paradigm  nor  cornerstone  of  Aquinas'  epistemology. 
Scientia  also  plays  a  role  in  James  F.  Ross'  internalist  reading  of  Aquinas.  Ross  in  `Aquinas 
on  Belief  and  Knowledge'  116  attempts  to  apply  Aquinas'  account  of  the  will's  role  in  urging 
assent  to  the  truths  of  faith;  to  the  soul's  knowledge  of  material  reality.  According  to  Ross 
"non-scientific  empirical  knowledge  is  disciplined  wishful  thinking  that  is  true.  "117  This 
may  seem  a  rather  strange  account  of  empirical  knowledge  but  according  to  him  since  such 
knowledge  of  material  reality  lacks  the  certainty  and  vision  of  truth  of  scientia  and  hence 
112  ibid  page  174ff. 
113  ibid  page  175. 
114  ibid  page  174. 
115  ST  1a  q85  a3c. 
116  Ross  1984,  page  248ff. 
117  ibid  page  268. 83 
lacks  the  capacity  to  compel  the  intellect  to  immediately  assent  to  its  veracity,  the  activity  of 
the  will  is  required  in  order  to  assent  to  the  truth  of  such  experiential  knowledge. 
Ross  rightly  points  out  that  a  crucial  feature  of  knowledge  is  that  it  involves  assent:  whatever 
is  taken  to  be  knowledge  must  be  assented  to.  118  St.  Thomas  discusses  the  notion  of  assent 
when  he  discusses  the  question  of  faith.  119  His  discussion  is  relatively  straightforward. 
According  to  him  there  are  three  senses  of  the  verb  cogitare.  The  sense  which  is important 
for  faith  and  other  intellectual  acts  is  what  he  calls  the  proper  sense  of  cogitatio,  this 
describes  the  activity  of  the  mind  deliberating  [deliberans]  prior  to  attaining  its  goal  in  the 
grasp  of  truth.  This  type  of  process,  he  says,  can  regard  universal  considerations,  the 
function  of  the  intellect  or  particular  considerations,  the  function  of  the  senses.  When  we 
looked  at  the  issue  of  assent  towards  the  end  of  the  last  chapter  we  saw  that  some  acts  of  the 
intellect,  such  as  understanding  and  scientia,  cause  us  to  assent  firmly  to  the  truth  of  their 
propositions.  Other  acts  only  incur  inconclusive  assent,  that  is,  what  they  state  may  or  may 
not  be  the  case;  Aquinas  calls  these  various  acts,  opinio,  dubitatio  or  suspicio  depending  on 
how  tentative  the  assent  is.  120  Faith  is  also  another  intellectual  act,  according  to  Aquinas,  the 
act  of  believing,  credere.  Of  this  Aquinas  says: 
The  act  of  believing,  however,  is  firmly  attached  to  one  alternative  and  in  this  respect 
the  believer  is  in  the  same  state  of  mind  as  one  who  has  science  or  understanding. 
Yet  the  believer's  knowledge  is  not  completed  by  a  clear  vision,  and  in  this  respect 
he  is  like  one  having  a  doubt,  a  suspicion  or  an  opinion.  121 
In  this  act,  similar  to  understanding  and  science,  the  will  moves  the  intellect  to  assent.  This 
movement  of  the  will  is  because  the  act  of  faith  does  not  have  a  clear  vision  of  truth,  that  is, 
we  cannot  know  fully  the  things  which  we  have  faith  in.  Ross  sketches  the  situation: 
The  knowledge  of  quidditative  apprehension  involves  no  judgment  at  all  and  cannot 
fall  prey  to  error.  Understanding  first  principles  and  scientific  knowledge  are  both 
said  to  involve  "manifestam  visionem  veritatis"  "a  manifest  sight  of  the  truth,  "... 
and  by  implication  are  said  to  compel,  as  well  as  cause,  the  assent...  Belief,  as  he 
uses  "credere"  is  not  possible  where  the  "manifestam  visionem  veritatis  "is 
already  present.  In  the  absence  of  such  insight,  credence,  belief,  results  from 
something  which  is  "enough  to  move  the  will  but  not  enough  to  move  the 
understanding"  [Author's  emphasis]  122 
Thanks  to  this  lack  of  a  manifest  sight  of  the  truth,  faith  is  on  the  side  of  those  intellectual 
acts  that  incur  uncertainty  such  as  opinion,  yet  the  movement  of  the  will  in  encouraging 
assent  puts  the  act  of  believing  on  the  side  of  understanding  and  scientia. 
118  ibid  pages  245ff. 
119  ST  2a2ae  q2  al. 
120  See  the  previous  chapter  for  a  fuller  description. 
121  ST  2a2ae  q2  al  c.  Sed  actus  iste  qui  est  credere  habet  firmam  adhaesionem  ad  unam  partem, 
in  quo  convenit  credens  cum  sciente  et  intelligente;  et  tarnen  ejus  cognitio  non  est  perfecta  per 
manifestam  visionem,  in  quo  convenit  cum  dubitante,  suspicante  et  opinante. 
122  Ross  1984,  page  258.  This  quotation  concludes  with  a  quote  from  De  Veritate  q14  al. 84 
Ross  tries  to  appropriate  this  schema  to  account  for  what  he  calls  empirical  knowledge,  but 
which  is  substantially  the  same  as  what  we  call  perceptual  knowledge.  He  says: 
Empirical  knowledge  has  the  element  of  discursive  thought  to  be  found  in  scientific 
knowledge,  but  does  not  have  the  `manifest  insight'  found  in  quidditative 
apprehension,  the  grasp  of  first  principles  [understanding]  and  of  scientific 
conclusions.....  123 
As  we  have  seen  such  empirical  knowledge,  as  Ross  describes  it,  has  a  great  deal  in 
common  with  understanding  and  scientia,  but  it  lacks  the  vision  of  truth  which  both  of  these 
varieties  of  knowledge  have  and  which  lead  us  to  immediately  assent  to  them. 
Where  does  our  knowledge  of  actual  contingent  states  of  affairs  stand..  our  non- 
scientific  everyday  empirical  knowledge?  Is  all  such  knowledge  the  result  of  natural 
faith  and  thereby  credence,  somehow  arising  ex  auditu  ?  There  is  a  gap:  namely 
there  is  no  contrast  of  belief(credence)  with  ordinary  empirical  knowledge. 
That  is  because  everyday  knowledge  is  mostly  from  credence.  As  "ordinary" 
knowledge,  the  evidence  is  not  sufficient  to  cause  "manifestam  visionem  veritatis.  " 
Yet,  in  coherence  with  things  already  assented  to  and  their  consistency  and 
simplicity,  the  person  may  have  no  option,  short  of  revising  whole  classes  of  beliefs, 
except  to  assent  to  the  true  proposition  empirically  supported;  he  has  motives  for 
assent.  124 
As  the  evidence  of  perceptual  knowledge  is  not  sufficient  to  cause  a  vision  of  truth,  125  Ross 
proposes  that  we  will  our  assent  to  such  knowledge  because  it  coheres  with  our  other 
beliefs:  126  Herein  lies  the  novelty  and  central  thesis  of  Ross'  interpretation.  According  to 
him  perceptual  knowledge  is  a  type  of  credence,  that  is,  it  is  of  the  same  structure  as  the  act 
of  faith;  moreover,  coherence  among  beliefs  plays  a  crucial  role  in  this  act  of  assent  and  thus 
in  determining  what  we  can  claim  to  know.  Of  perceptual  knowledge  he  writes: 
The  "plain  Joe"  neither  scientist,  philosopher,  devil  nor  reacting  to  what  is  self- 
evident  to  him  acquires  his  cognition  of  the  world  through  habitual  faith  (a  habitual 
commanding  of  assent  by  the  will),  in  the  absence  of  compelling  evidence  of  the 
demonic  combination  of  evidently  authenticating  utterance  and  bias  towards  the  truth. 
His  will  is  motivated  to  command  assent  because  of  the  value,  fittingness...  utility  of 
assenting...  In  sum,  he  is  motivated  by  what  he  thinks  he  can  get  out  of  it..... 
Because  there  is  a"fit  "among  truth,  utility  in  believing,  and  strength  of  the 
command  to  assent  that  creates  certitude  and  suppresses  all  fear  of  error,  the 
outcome  is  cognition,  knowledge.  Thus,  faith  is  the  dominant  process  in  empirical 
knowledge,  whose  chief  engine  is  the  will.  127[Author's  emphasis] 
Ross'  account  deserves  three  remarks.  Firstly,  while  Aquinas  does  involve  the  activity  of  the 
will  in  the  believing  truths  of  faith,  no  where  else  does  Aquinas  involve  the  will  in  an 
123  ibid  page  258. 
124  ibid  page  258. 
125  ibid  page  258. 
126  ibid.  page259. 
127  ibid  page  265. 85 
intellectual  activity.  Ross  makes  the  suggestion  that  when  Aquinas  speaks  of  credere,  he 
uses  religious  faith  as  merely  an  example,  not  as  what  this  act  of  believe  actually  is.  This  is 
fanciful.  If  Aquinas  did  think  that  credere  were  indicative  of  our  perceptual  knowledge  he 
undoubtedly  would  have  said  so  when  he  discussed  our  knowledge  of  singulars  and 
contingent  things.  In  fact,  as  we'll  see,  he  didn't.  Secondly,  nowhere  does  Aquinas  talk 
about  coherence  between  beliefs  having  a  role  in  determining  what  we  can  claim  to  know, 
such  talk  is  alien  to  Aquinas'  account  of  our  knowledge  of  the  material  world.  Thirdly,  how 
can  I  will  myself  to  believe  something?  The  earliest  critics  of  Descartes  were  quick  to  point 
out  the  folly  of  this  latter  position. 
We  have  looked  at  two  internalist  interpretations  of  Aquinas'  epistemology.  MacDonald 
described  St.  Thomas'  epistemology  as  internalist  because  of  the  intellect's  ability  to  judge 
the  truth  of  its  own  cognitions.  Furthermore,  he  took  scientia  to  be  Aquinas'  paradigmatic 
account  of  knowledge;  in  light  of  this  paradigmatic  reading,  he  attempted  to  give  a 
foundationalist  reading  of  Aquinas'  account  of  knowledge  of  the  material  world.  Ross,  on. 
the  other  hand,  saw  perceptual  knowledge  following  the  same  structure  as  believing  a  truth 
of  faith,  opting  at  the  same  time  for  a  coherentist  position.  In  the  previous  chapter  we 
emphasised  an  aspect  of  Aquinas'  account  of  human  knowledge,  which  although  both 
MacDonald  and  Ross  tacitly  acknowledge,  neither  seem  to  grasp  its  significance:  human 
knowledge  exists  in  a  divided  and  fragmented  fashion,  there  are  various  species  of  the 
human  knowledge.  Had  they  really  taken  this  in  board  one  wonders  if  they  would  have  tried 
to  do  what  they  did  in  using  a  specific  kind  of  knowledge  such  as  scientia,  to  explain  our 
knowledge  that  Socrates  is  sitting?  One  contemporary  author  who  does  explicitly 
acknowledge  that  human  knowledge  exists  in  a  fragmented  state,  as  we  saw  earlier,  is 
Eleonore  Stump.  We  now  turn  to  her  account. 
Eleonore  Stump  provides  a  short  externalistic  interpretation  of  Aquinas'  epistemology  in  her 
article  "Aquinas  on  the  Foundations  of  Knowledge".  128  As  the  name  of  the  article  suggests 
she  is  interested  in  Aquinas  and  the  foundations  of  knowledge.  A  good  deal  of  the  article  is 
devoted  to  refuting  a  foundationalist  interpretation  of  Aquinas.  129  She  begins  by  noting  the 
reason  for  such  an  interpretation.  Briefly,  she  sees  it  as  the  result  of  a  mistaken 
understanding  of  scientia  which  sees  it  translated  as  knowledge.  In  particular,  according  to 
Stump  scientiae  dependence  on  indemonstrable  principles  can  give  an  impression  of 
foundationalism.  130  Given  these  errors,  she  says  it  is  no  surprise  that  The  Commentary  on 
the  Posterior  Analytics  can  be  seen  as  a  statement  of  Aquinas'  epistemology.  131  This 
128  Stump  1992,  page  125ff. 
129  She  singles  out  Alvin  Plantinga  and  Nicholas  Wolterstoff  as  two  philosophers  who  given  such  a 
foundationalist  interpretation.  Interestingly  we  have  noted  that  Plantinga  describes  Aquinas  as  an 
externalist;  in  sketching  Plantinga's  own  theory  we  have  seen  that  he  embraces  both  externalism 
and  foundationalism. 
130  ibid  page  133. 
131  ibidpage  132. 86 
interpretation  is,  however,  "irremediably  inaccurate".  132 
Stump  then  goes  on  to  outline  what  she  considers  to  be  a  proper  account  of  scientia  and  its 
indemonstrable  principles,  and,  at  the  end  of  her  article,  a  short  exposition  of  what  she 
considers  to  be  the  main  emphasis  of  In  PA.  In  particular,  she  argues  that  scientia  should 
not  be  equated  with  what  we  call  knowledge;  133  she  also  questions  if  the  indemonstrable 
principles  on  which  scientia  rests  are  capable  of  serving  as  epistemically  basic 
propositions.  134  The  details  of  her  argument  need  not  detain  us  here,  they  will  be  of  interest 
to  us  when  we  look  at  scientia  in  a  later  chapter.  Suffice  to  say  she  considers  that  her  account 
of  scientia  and  related  issues  dispels  any  temptation  to  call  Aquinas  a  foundationalist. 
Stump's  positive  thesis  in  this  article  is  that  Aquinas  proposes  a  theological  externalism  with 
reliabilist  overtones.  135  Aquinas'  externalism  rests  on  his  metaphysical  realism: 
Like  Aristotle,  Aquinas  is  a  metaphysical  realist.  That  is,  he  assumes  that  there  is  an 
external  world  around  us  and  that  it  has  certain  features  independently  of  the 
operation  of  any  created  intellect,  so  that  it  is  up  to  our  minds  to  discover  truths  about 
the  world.  136 
Furthermore: 
God  has  made  human  beings  in  his  own  image,  and  they  are  made  in  his  image  in 
virtue  of  the  fact  that,  like  him,  they  are  cognizers;  they  can  understand  and  know 
themselves,  the  world,  and  the  world's  creator.  137 
On  Aquinas'  view,  our  cognitive  capacities  are  designed  by  God  for  the  express 
purpose  of  enabling  us  to  be  cognizers  of  the  truth,  as  God  himself  is.  In  particular, 
when  we  use  sense  and  intellect  as  God  designed  them  to  be  used  in  the  environment 
suited  to  them,  that  is,  in  the  world  for  which  God  designed  human  beings,  then 
those  faculties  are  absolutely  reliable.  138 
In  this  description  of  Aquinas'  reliabilism  by  Stump  there  is  more  than  a  passing 
resemblance  to  Plantinga's  description  of  warrant.  She  notices  a  parallel  between  Plantinga 
and  Aquinas  herself.  139  At  the  moment  we  are  not  interested  in  any  such  parallells.  For  the 
moment  it  is  enough  to  note  that  the  metaphysical  realism  which  Aquinas  inherited  from 
Aristotle  is  a  significant  factor  in  his  epistemology,  but  of  far  greater  importance  shaping  his 
externalism  and  reliabilism,  indeed  also  underpinning  that  metaphysical  realism,  is  his 
Christian  faith  and  its  doctrine  of  creation.  Stump  notes  that  it  is  because  of  his  Christian 
132  ibid  page  133. 
133  ibid  page  143. 
134  ibid  page  141. 
135  ibid  page  158. 
136  ibid  page  144. 
137  ibid  page  146. 
138  ibid  page  147. 
139  ibid  page  149. 87 
faith  that  there  is  no  real  explicit  statement  of  externalism  or  reliabilism,  much  of  what  would 
constitute  such  a  theory  Aquinas  just  takes  for  granted:  140 
Aquinas,  like  Aristotle,  is  clearly  a  realist;  he  thinks  that  there  are  truths  about  the 
world  which  the  human  mind  must  discover,  rather  than  invent.  This  view  flows 
from  his  theological  commitments  and  therefore  doesn't  need  or  get  a  lengthy 
argumentation.  For  these  reasons,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  look  for  explicit 
consideration  of  knowledge  as  a  function  of  the  reliable  operation  of  human  cognitive 
capacities.....  The  maker  of  human  cognitive  equipment  is  God,  and  his  purpose  in 
making  that  equipment  is  to  enable  human  intellects  to  imitate  him  in  his  activity  as  a 
knower.  This  view,  which  Aquinas  takes  to  be  revealed  by  Scripture,  is  so 
fundamental  to  his  beliefs  that  it  gets  little  explicit  attention.  141 
Our  cognitive  faculties  are  reliable  because  they  have  been  created  by  God,  moreover,  as 
Stump  notes: 
not  only  are  they  [our  cognitive  faculties]  reliable  but  as  regards  their  proper  objects 
it  is  even  the  case  that  neither  sense  nor  intellect  can  be  deceived  or  mistaken.  142 
This  startlingly  optimistic  statement  is  closely  scrutinised  by  Norman  Kretzmann  in  his 
article,  "Infallibility,  Error  and  Ignorance.  "143  Kretzmann  opens  his  article  by  admitting  that 
Stump's  reliabilist  interpretation  of  Aquinas  has  motivated  him  to  look,  not  at  Aquinas' 
reliabilism  as  such,  but  the  reliability  Aquinas  attributes  to  the  operations  of  the  senses  and 
intellect.  144  According  to  Kretzmann  there  are  two  components  of  Aquinas'  reliabilism: 
natural  and  supernatural,  Aristotle  and  God.  145 
From  those  central  doctrines  [of  the  Christian  faith,  i.  e.  God,  the  benevolent  creator 
wishing  to  manifest  himself]  alone  it  seems  to  follow  that  skepticism  is  frivolous- 
that  humans  must  have  been  created  with  reliable  access  to  created  reality  'and  with 
reliable  faculties  for  the  processing  of  the  reliably  acquired  data.  146 
Aquinas'  theistic  reliabilism  depends  on  Christian  doctrine  for  its  starting  points  and 
its  outline.  But  its  account  of  the  mechanism  of  cognition  and  of  the  details  of 
sensory  and  intellective  reliability  is  largely  drawn  from  Aristotle's 
epistemology  ....  147  [Author's  emphasis] 
Kretzmann  offers  an  assessment  of  each  component  before  addressing  the  actual  issue  of  the 
reliability  of  our  sensory  and  intellectual  mechanisms;  this  consideration  is  divided  into  three 
140  ibid  page  149ff. 
141  ibid  page  150. 
142  ibid  page  147.  Recall:  the  proper  object  of  the  intellect  is  a  quiddity.  That  of  the  senses  is  what 
they  are  designed  to  sense,  thus  the  proper  object  of  sight  is  colour. 
143  Kretzmann  1992,  page  159ff. 
144  op.  Cit.  page  159. 
145  ibid  page  160. 
146  ibid  page  161. 
147  ibid  page  168. 88 
parts:  the  reliability  of  the  mechanisms  used  by  the  external  senses,  the  internal  senses  and 
the  intellect. 
Like  Stump,  Kretzmann  finds  Aquinas'  claim  that  the  senses  and  intellect  cannot  be  mistaken 
about  their  proper  objects  astonishing.  As  Kretzmann  notes  God's  goodness  seems  not  just 
to  guarantee  the  reliability  of  our  cognitive  faculties  but  their  infallibility.  148  In  discussing 
the  reliability  of  the  various  mechanisms  involved  in  perception  he  attempts  to  to  unpack  this 
claim  regarding  infallibility.  Firstly  he  notes  that  while  our  God-given  equipment  is  flawless 
we  can  misuse  and  so  make  mistakes.  149  Secondly,  with  regard  to  the  intellect  he  proposes 
an  interpretation  of  Aquinas'  theory  which  removes  any  misunderstanding  regarding  the 
intellect's  infallible  grasp  of  its  proper  object. 
The  intellect  grasps  its  proper  object,  a  quiddity,  in  its  first  act.  Kretzmann  calls  this  first  act 
the  "alpha  cognition".  Of  this  cognition  he  writes: 
The  infallibility  claim  is  by  no  means  a  claim  that  the  first  operation  of  the  intellect 
delivers  to  us  something  like  a  set  of  true  propositions  regarding  the  quiddity  that  is 
its  object.  Whatever,  it  [the  alpha  cognition]  delivers  infallibly  leaves  us  in  a  state 
close  to  total  ignorance  about  that  quiddity.  150 
This  alpha  cognition  is  "inchoate,  unanalysed,  confused,  imprecise,  characterised  by 
ignorance  more  than  by  cognition.  "151  It  does  not  even  include  the  naming  of  the  object  of 
cognition;  that  is  part  of  the  second  act,  for  it  involves  more  than  just  having  a  cognition.  152 
The  alpha  cognition  barely  constitutes  knowledge,  but  crucially,  it  marks  the  beginning  of 
the  quest  for  knowledge,  a  quest,  which  Kretzmann  says,  ends  with  the  omega  cognition. 
The  omega  cognition  is  the  distant  goal  of  scientia,  it  is  the  complete  and  certain  cognition  of 
that  which  constituted  the  alpha  cognition.  He  describes  the  difference  between  the  alpha  and 
omega  cognition,  between  the  first  act  of  the  intellect  and  scientia  as  follows: 
For  the  science  of  nature,  no  matter  how  highly  developed,  also  has  the  quiddities  of 
things  as  its  objects,  and  Aquinas  is  under  no  illusions  about  the  difficulty  of 
achieving  scientific  knowledge.  His  account  of  intellect's  first  operation  depends  on 
our  recognising  that  a  child's  first  acquisition  of  the  concept  of  a  star  differs  only  in 
degree  from  the  most  recondite  advance  in  astronomy's  understanding  of  the  nature 
of  a  star.  Quiddities,  the  proper  object  of  the  intellect's  first  operation  and,  in  just 
the  same  respect,  the  objects  of  both  inchoate  and  culminating  (alpha  and  omega) 
intellective  cognition.  153 
The  complete  cognition  which  constitutes  the  omega  cognition  is  achieved  by  reasoning.  It  is 
during  this  process  that  error  can  occur,  as  it  can  in  the  second  act  of  the  intellect.  It  is 
148  ibid  page  169. 
149  ibid  page  178. 
150  ibid  page  187. 
151  ibid  page  190. 
152  ibid  page  190. 
153Kretzmann  1993,  page  143. 89 
interesting  to  note  that  in  his  article  when  he  discusses  the  second  act  of  the  intellect  (which 
is  an  essential  part  of  the  process  from  alpha  to  omega  cognition)  Kretzmann  like 
MacDonald  acknowledges  that  there  is  an  internalist  component  to  Aquinas'  theory  of 
cognition.  154  However,  for  Kretzmann,  it  is  only  a  component,  he  is  quite  explicit  about 
Aquinas'  externalist  credentials.  155 
Such  are  the  various  attempts  to  use  the  language  of  contemporary  epistemology  to  classify 
Aquinas.  Mindful  of  what  they  say  we  now  embark  on  a  scrutiny  of  Aquinas'  account  of 
perceptual  knowledge,  or  asST  la  q84  puts  it,  our  knowledge  of  how  the  soul,  while  joined 
to  the  body,  knows  material  things.  Hopefully,  this  consideration  will  shed  light  on  which 
of  the  above  attempts  are  "untenable"156  and  "irremediably  inaccurate.  "157 
154  Kretzmann  1992,  page  176  footnote  44. 
155  ibid  pages  173/193. 
156  MacDonald  1993,  page  186. 
157  Stump  1992,  page  133. 90 
3.  Perceptual  Knowledge 
Besides  grasping  the  existence  of  a  thing,  every  immediate  judgment 
reveals  itself  as  both  true  and  certain.  As  object  of  reflexive  simple 
apprehension  it  manifests  not  only  its  own  conformity  with  the  being  it 
apprehends  in  its  function  as  cognitive  act,  but  also  its  definite  determination 
by  the  necessity  of  this  being.  It  thereby  grounds  the  judgment  of  its  own 
truth  and  the  judgment  of  absolute  assent  by  the  intellect.  It  leaves  the 
knower  not  with  provisory  but  with  unconditional  and  intellectually  justified 
certitude.  Such  certitude  is  the  culmination  of  a  man's  natural  desire  for 
knowledge  and  truth  in  regard  to  what  is  immediately  known. 
Joseph  Owens  An  Elementary  Christian  Metaphysics.  I 
To  a  contemporary  epistemologist  the  language  which  Owens  uses  may  appear  odd;  once 
unpacked,  the  claims  he  makes  appear  outrageous.  Compare  Owens'  bold  epistemological 
assertions  with  the  Alvin  Goldman's  tale  of  Henry  and  fake  barn  country.  2  It's  a  tale  which 
illustrates  how  elusive  everyday  perceptual  knowledge,  or  immediate  knowledge  to  use 
Owens'  terminology,  can  be.  Henry  is  taking  his  son  for  a  drive  in  the  country.  As  they 
drive  along  Henry  identifies  various  elements  of  countryside  life  such  as  tractors  and  farms. 
Seeing  a  barn,  Henry  points  it  out  to  his  son.  Henry  has  indeed  seen  a  barn:  there  is  good 
visibility,  Henry  has  excellent  eyesight  and  is  driving  slowly  enough  to  have  a  good  look. 
We  would  have  little  hesitation,  Goldman  notes,  in  saying  that  Henry  knows  that  the  object 
is  a  barn.  However,  unknown  to  Henry  he  has  entered  a  district  where,  in  order  to  appear 
affluent,  the  residents  have  erected  papier-mache  facsimiles  of  barns  which,  from  the  road, 
look  exactly  like  the  real  thing.  So  real  are  they,  that  visitors  often  mistake  them  for  barns. 
Having  just  entered  the  district  Henry  hasn't  encountered  any  fake  barns.  Given  this 
situation  and  despite  the  fact  that  he  did  indeed  see  a  real  barn,  Goldman  says: 
1  Owens  1985,  page  276. 
2  Goldman1976,  page  772. 91 
We  would  be  strongly  inclined  to  withdraw  the  claim  that  Henry  knows  the  object 
is  a  barn.  3  [Author's  emphasis] 
However,  applying  Goldman's  scenario  to  Owens'  description  of  immediate  knowledge 
suggests  a  different  conclusion  regarding  the  claim  that  Henry  knows.  Prima  facie  on  Father 
Owens'  account  Henry  appears  to  be  in  a  situation  where  he  has  immediate  knowledge,  a 
situation  where  he  has  "unconditional  and  intellectually  justified  certitude"  that  it  is  a  barn 
which  he  is  looking  at.  Henry  has  formed  a  judgment  that  he  sees  a  barn,  a  judgment,  which 
according  to  Owens,  is  true  and  certain.  In  fact,  it  seems  that  Owens  would  be  committed  to 
saying  this  of  Henry's  judgment  even  if  Henry  is  looking  at  a  fake  barn.  But  manifestly, 
poor  Henry  can't  know  it's  a  barn  and  thus  his  judgment  can't  be  said  to  be  certainly  true, 
but  only  accidentally  true  and  thus  clearly  not  certain.  Despite  the  bold  tone  of  his  assertions 
Owens  seems  incapable  of  dealing  with  this  Gettier  type  example.  Three  reactions  are 
possible  to  the  application  of  the  hapless  Henry  example  to  Owens'  epistemology.  First,  we 
could  say  that  Owens  is  talking  nonsense  and  his  epistemology  is  fatuous.  Second,  we  could 
say  that,  in  Thomas  Kuhn's  celebrated  term,  the  epistemology  of  Owens  and  the  post  Gettier 
epistemology  which  spawned  the  Henry  example  are  incommensurable.  Third,  we  could 
explore  the  epistemology  of  which  Owens'  statement  is indicative. 
Doubtless  many  epistemologists  of  the  English  speaking  world  would  choose  the  first 
option.  Unsurprisingly,  it  is  not  my  option,  nor  is  the  incommensurability  thesis.  The 
epistemological  claims  made  by  Father  Owens  are  fairly  representative  of  an  epistemology 
which  owes  its  heritage  to  the  work  of  St.  Thomas;  although  we  must  acknowledge  that 
Owens  wasn't  giving  a  specific  treatment  of  that  particular  epistemology  in  the  work  cited. 
In  this  chapter  we  will  analyse  Aquinas'  account  of  perceptual  knowledge.  Hopefully  by  the 
end  of  the  analysis  we  will  see  the  motivation  for  Owens'  boldness  and  optimism  in  his 
epistemological  claims. 
The  principle  elements  of  Aquinas'  epistemology,  and  in  particular  his  account  of  our 
knowledge  of  material  reality  found  in  ST  la  q84ff,  were  outlined  in  chapter  one  of  this 
work.  Where  necessary  we  will  make  reference  to  that  outline.  In  the  preceding  chapter  we 
outlined  various  interpretations  of  Aquinas'  epistemology.  The  analysis  to  be  developed  in 
this  chapter  rests  on  the  central  thesis  that  there  are  two  fundamental  components  to  any 
judgment  which  may  constitute  an  instance  of  perceptual  knowledge  and  that  it  is  only  by 
considering  these  components  that  an  adequate  description  of  Aquinas'  account  of  perceptual 
knowledge  can  be  given.  One  component  is  metaphysical,  the  other  psychological. 
Together,  these  components  constitute  an  elaborate  and  complex  theory  in  which,  as  we 
shall  see,  traces  of  the  various  epistemological  positions,  such  as  foundationalism  and 
reliabilism,  sketched  in  the  previous  chapter  can  be  identified.  Once  we  have  offered  our 
analysis,  we  will  move  on,  in  the  next  chapter,  to  look  at  the  relationship  between  perceptual 
3  ibid  page  773. 92 
knowledge  and  scientia.  4 
a.  The  metaphysical  component 
Aquinas  opens  ST  1a  q84  with  the  question  "Does  the  soul  know  material  things  through  the 
intellect?  "5  After  a  brief  survey  of  the  thoughts  of  Heraclitus  and  Plato  on  this  question, 
Aquinas  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  "  the  soul  knows  material  things  through  the  intellect 
with  a  knowledge  that  is  immaterial,  universal  and  necessary.  "6  This  immaterial,  universal 
and  necessary  knowledge  of  material  reality,  what  we  have  called  perceptual  knowledge, 
rests  on  an  important  metaphysical  foundation.  From  the  perspective  of  contemporary 
epistemology  some  may  balk  at  the  proposed  connection  between  metaphysics  and 
epistemology.  But  in  order  to  properly  appreciate  Aquinas'  account  of  perceptual  knowledge 
we  must  leave  aside  this  and  other  prejudices  which  we  may  bring  from  our  post-Cartesian 
and  post-Lockean  heritage. 
It  hardly  needs  to  be  restated  that  as  a  Christian  St.  Thomas  had  unshakable  faith  that  God 
was  responsible  for  creation.  This  theological  tenet  finds  its  philosophical  expression  in 
Aquinas'  metaphysical  realism  which  we  have  already  alluded  to  in  the  last  chapter.  In 
Realism  and  Truth  Michael  Devitt  gives  a  description  of  realism  which,  some  of  its 
contemporary  nuances  notwithstanding,  I  am  sure  Aquinas  would  be  happy  to  subscribe  to: 
Realism  is  an  overarching  ontological  doctrine  about  what  there  is  and  what  it  is  like. 
It  is  committed  to  most  of  the  physical  posits  of  common  sense  and  science  and  to 
the  view  that  these  entities  are  independent  of  the  mental.  It  has  an  epistemic  aspect: 
the  entities  do  not  depend  for  their  existence  or  nature  on  our  opinion;  they  exist 
objectively? 
The  epistemic  aspect  of  this  realism,  as  Devitt  calls  it,  is  important  because  it  is  the 
underlying  realist  ontology,  the  objective  existence  of  things  in  the  world  which,  as  we  shall 
see,  constitutes  the  metaphysical  component  of  perceptual  knowledge. 
4  Clearly  perceptual  knowledge  is  not  merely  visual  knowledge.  We  can  have  perceptual 
knowledge  of  sounds,  smells,  tastes  and  tactile  qualities.  Moreover,  often  perceptual  knowledge 
results  from  the  interplay  of  these  different  sensory  powers.  In  this  discussion,  however,  for 
simplicity's  sake  when  we  talk  of  perceptual  knowledge,  the  knowledge  of  which  St.  Thomas 
speaks  in  ST  1a  q84,  we  will  mean  the  perceptual  knowledge  which  arises  from  sight.  What  we  will 
say  with  respect  to  visual  perceptual  knowledge  holds  good  of  perceptual  knowledge  which  arises 
from  the  other  senses. 
5  ST1a  q84  al.  In  Verbum  Lonergan  says  that  this  title  "Quomodo  anima  conjuncta  intelligat 
corporalia,  quae  sunt  infra  ipsam"  refers  not  just  to  question  84,  but  is  actually  the  general  title  used 
by  an  early  editor  to  cover  all  the  material  in  questions  84  to  86.  The  correct  title  to  question  84 
Lonergan  suggests  is  "  Per  quid  ea  cognoscit,  "  the  term  which  Aquinas  uses  to  describe  it  in  his 
preamble  to  this  section  of  the  Summa  Theologiae  the  Blackfriars'  edition  translates  this  as  "By 
what  means  the  soul  knows  corporeal  things.  "  cf.  Lonergan  1968,  page  166. 
6  ibid....  ergo  quod  anima  per  intellectum  cognoscit  corpora  cognitione  immateriali,  universali  et 
necessaria. 
7  Devitt  1991,  page  295. 93 
According  to  Aquinas  before  one  can  know  what  a  thing  is,  one  must  know  that  it  is.  In 
traditional  Thomist  language:  `an  sit?  '  [is  there  such  a  thing?  ]  is  epistemically  prior  to  `quid 
est?  '  [  what  is  it?  ].  In  the  first  book  of  the  Commentary  on  the  Posterior  Analytics  Aquinas 
writes: 
Before  one  knows  whether  something  exists,  one  cannot  strictly  speaking  know 
what  it  is:  for  there  are  no  definitions  of  what  does  not  exist.  Hence  the  question, 
does  it  exist  is  prior  to  the  question,  what  is  it.  But  one  cannot  prove  that  something 
exists,  unless  one  understands  what  the  name  signifies.  8 
Jan  Aertsen  in  his  book  Nature  and  Creature  discusses  the  connection  of  the  two  questions: 
...  when  we  inquire  concerning  whether  a  centaur  is  or  not,  then  the  question  is 
simply  whether  it  exists.  The  moment  existence  is  affirmed  the  subsequent  question 
becomes  `what  is  it?  "9 
The  relation  between  the  two  questions  is  sometimes  such  that  we  know  that  a  thing 
is  without  knowing  perfectly  what  it  is,  sometimes  we  know  both  at  the  the  same 
time.  However,  a  third  possibility  is  excluded,  namely  that  we  should  know  `what 
something  is'  and  be  ignorant  of  'if  it  is.  '  10 
Aertsen'  last  comment  may  seem  a  little  odd.  Clearly  there  are  some  things  of  which  we  do 
seem  to  know  what  it  is,  without  knowing  if  it  is.  The  centaur,  for  example,  we  know  that  it 
is  a  thing  with  a  horse's  body  and  a  man's  head  and  also  know  that  no  such  beast  exists. 
Thus,  it  appears  that  we  do  have  an  answer  to  the  question  quid  est?  without  answering  an 
sit?  Doesn't  this  contradict  Aertsen  and,  more  fundamentally,  Aquinas'  point  about  the 
epistemic  priority  of  an  sit?  No.  At  the  end  of  the  extract  from  the  Commentary  on  the 
Posterior  Analytics  Aquinas  makes  an  important  point:  we  must  know  what  a  word  signifies 
before  we  can  prove  that  there  is  such  a  thing.  Signification  is  the  key  issue.  In  the  case  of 
the  centaur  we  know  that  there  is  no  such  thing,  but  nonetheless  we  know  what  the  word 
`centaur'  signifies,  a  thing  with  a  horse's  body  and  a  man's  head.  Knowledge  of  the 
signification  of  the  word  is  not  the  same  as  answering  the  question  quid  est?  The  question 
quid  est?  ,  at  its  deepest  level,  is  really  a  search  for  a  thing's  essence  and  you  can't  know  a 
thing's  essence  unless  you  know  it  exists.  The  issue  of  an  sit?,  quid  est?  and  signification 
take  on  enormous  importance  in  Aquinas'  account  of  how  we  can  have  knowledge  of  God. 
We  are  not  interested  in  the  human  knowledge  of  God,  but  the  human  knowledge  of  material 
reality.  Our  consideration  of  perceptual  knowledge  will  show  the  importance  of  the  two 
questions  in  Aquinas'  scheme.  As  we  consider  the  metaphysical  component  of  that  scheme 
we  will  see  the  epistemic  priority  of  the  question  an  sit?  It  is  a  priority  which  rests  on  a 
central  facet  of  Aquinas'  epistemology:  the  experience  of  external  objects  is  the  ultimate 
8  In  P.  A.  I2  Antequam  sciatur  de  aliquo  an  sit,  non  potest  sciri  proprie  de  eo  quid  est:  non  entium 
enim  non  sunt  definitiones.  Unde  quaestio,  an  est,  praecedit  quaestionem,  quid  est.  Sed  non 
potest  ostendi  de  aliquo  an  sit  nisi  prius  intelligatur  quid  significatur  per  nomen. 
9  Aertsen  1985,  page  13. 
10  ibid  page  24. 94 
ground  of  the  individual's  claim  to  know. 
Crucially,  for  Aquinas,  it  is  the  being  of  the  external  object  and  its  impinging  on  our  sensory 
apparatus  that  is  the  fundamental  cause  of  our  knowing.  Our  experience  of  its  existence  is 
the  basic  ground  of  our  justification  for  our  ever  attempting  or  claiming  to  know.  As  he 
states: 
The  created  mind  only  knows  what  is  already  there  to  be  known,  for  the  first  thing 
the  mind  grasps  of  anything  is  that  it  is  something  or  other.  I  I 
The  editor  of  the  above  translation  may  well  highlight  'is,  '  but  this  translation  is  inaccurate. 
St.  Thomas  writes: 
Praeterea,  intellectus  creatus  non  est  cognoscitivus  nisi  existentium.  Primum  enim 
quod  cadit  in  apprehensione  intellectus  est  ens. 
In  this  text  we  see  that  Aquinas  actually  talks  of  `existentium  `  `existing  things'  and  uses  the 
word'ens',  `being'.  A  more  accurate  translation  clarifying  the  thrust  of  Aquinas'  argument 
is: 
Moreover,  the  created  intellect  only  knows  existing  things.  For  the  first  thing  the 
intellect  grasps  in  apprehension  is  being. 
This  grasp  of  being,  as  we  perceive  the  external  object,  is  a  sine  qua  non  condition  for 
knowledge.  This  point  is  reiterated  in  other  parts  of  the  Thomistic  corpus: 
That  which  first  appears  is  the  real,  and  some  insight  into  this  is  included  in 
whatsoever  is  apprehended.  This  first  indemonstrable  principle,  `There  is  no 
affirming  and  denying  the  same  simultaneously,  '  is  based  on  the  very  nature  of  the 
real  and  the  non-real:  on  this  principle,  as  Aristotle  notes,  all  other  propositions  are 
based.  [Editor's  emphasis,  again  presumably  to  emphasise  the  significance  of  ens 
in  the  original  text]  12 
In  the  first  operation  the  first  thing  that  the  intellect  conceives  is  being,  and  in  this 
operation  nothing  else  can  be  conceived  unless  being  is  understood...  13 
Now,  as  Avicenna  says,  that  which  the  intellect  first  conceives  as,  in  a  way,  the  most 
evident,  and  to  which  it  reduces  all  its  concepts,  is  being.  Consequently,  all  the  other 
conceptions  of  the  intellect  are  had  by  additions  to  being.  14 
11  ST1a  q12  a1.3. 
12  ST  1  a2ae  q94  a2c  Nam  illid  quod  primo  cadit  sub  apprehensione  est  ens,  cujus  intellectus 
includitur  in  omnibus  quaecumque  quis  apprehendit.  Et  ideo  primum  principium  indemonstrabile 
est  quod  non  est  simul  affirmare  et  negare,  quod  fundatur  supra  rationem  entis  et  non  entis;  et 
super  hoc  principio  omnia  alia  fundatur,  ut  dicit  Philosophus  in  IV  Meta. 
13  In  Meta.  IV  6  In  prima  quidem  operatione  est  aliquod  primum,  quod  cadit  in  conceptione 
intellectus,  scilicet,  hoc  quod  dico  ens,  nec  aliquid  hac  operatione  potest  mente  concipi,  nisi 
intelligatur  ens. 
14  DV  q1  a1  c.  Illud  autem  quod  primo  intellectus  concipit  quasi  notissimum,  et  in  quo  omnes 
conceptiones  resolvit,  est  ens,  ut  Avicenna  dicit  in  principio  Metaphysicae  suae.  Unde  oportet 
quod  omnes  aliae  conceptiones  intellectus  accipiantur  ex  additione  ad  ens. 95 
A  small  mistake  in  the  beginning  is  a  big  one  in  the  end,  according  to  the  philosopher 
in  the  first  book  of  On  the  Heavens  and  the  Earth.  And  as  Avicenna  says  in  the 
beginning  of  his  Metaphysics,  being  and  essence  are  what  is  first  conceived  by  the 
intellect.  15 
Essence  will  be  dealt  with  when  we  come  to  consider  the  psychological  component.  For  the 
moment  we  devote  our  energies  to  explicating  the  metaphysical  component  by  considering 
what  it  means  for  the  intellect  to  grasp  being. 
The  preeminence  of  the  grasp  of  being  has  been  emphasised  by  Jan  Aertsen.  According  to 
him  it  is  the  "archimedean  point  on  which  all  knowledge  is  based.  "16  Elders  and  Regis  also 
highlight  the  seminal  role  played  by  the  grasp  of  being 
Being  is  the  first  concept  to  enter  the  human  intellect,  all  other  concepts  are  reduced 
to  it.  17 
Being  is  the  first  aspect  perceived  by  the  intellect  in  its  relations  with  things  and 
underlies  the  ultimate  intelligibility  of  the  real.  18 
Maritain  and  Lonergan,  while  not  directly  addressing  the  importance  of  the  grasp  of  being 
nevertheless,  also  emphasise  its  importance  in  Aquinas'  scheme: 
... 
it  is  necessary  that  our  intuition  or  intellectual  perception,  far  from  confronting  us 
with  a  multiplicity  of  unresolvable  simple  natures,  should  confront  us  with  an  object 
found  everywhere  and  everywhere  varying,  which  is  being  itself,  and  in  which  all 
our  notions  are  resolved  without  prejudice  to  the  irreducibility  of  essences.  19 
...  to  know  means  to  know  being...  20 
It  is  the  being  of  objects  external  to  the  intellect,  their  real  existence  in  the  world,  and  our 
grasp  of  them  which  initiates  the  process  of  perceptual  knowledge.  This  is  the  metaphysical 
foundation  upon  which  the  edifice  of  his  account  of  human  epistemology  rests.  Without  this 
grasp  of  being  there  would  be  no  such  knowledge.  In  the  grasp  of  being  the  senses  and 
sensory  knowledge  play  an  essential  role  which  we  will  consider  later.  For  the  moment  we 
continue  our  analysis  of  this  metaphysical  foundation,  this  grasp  of  being. 
Regis  makes  some  comments  about  this  grasp  of  being,  as  he  calls  it  first-known  being, 
which  can  serve  as  a  useful  catalyst  for  our  analysis: 
First-known  being  is  therefore  the  real  considered  as  every  actually  existing 
15  EEE  Prooemiuml.  Qula  parvus  error  in  principio  magnus  est  in  fine,  secundum  Philosophum,  I 
Caeli  et  Mundi;  ens  autem  et  essentia  sunt  quae  primo  in  intellectu  concipiuntur,  ut  dicit  Avicenna 
in  Metaphys,. 
16  Aertsen  1985,  page  192. 
17  Elders  1993,  page  87. 
18  Regis  1959,  page  284. 
19  Maritain  1937,  page  119. 
20  Lonergan  1957  page  340. 96 
corporeal  thing......  this  knowledge  has  extraordinary  potentiality  since  all  singulars, 
whatever  they  may  be  are  virtually  contained  in  this  first  and  most  universal  of  all 
concepts.  21 
What  makes  first-known  being  the  poorest  of  concepts  is  that  it  contains  no  distinct 
knowledge,  not  only  of  any  singular,  but  also  of  any  specific  nature,  nor  even  of  the 
nature  of  being  as  such.  22 
When  we  say  that  the  intellect  grasps  being  we  are  not  making  any  claim  that  the  intellect  has 
acquired  what  we  might  term  knowledge.  As  Regis  says  it  is  the  poorest  of  concepts  that 
contains  no  distinct  knowledge  of  specific  natures  or  being  itself,  but  it  is,  nonetheless,  the 
foundation  on  which  the  whole  enterprise  depends. 
In  the  above  extracts  Regis  also  talks  about  'first  known  being'  in  terms  of  'the  real'.  This  is 
an  important  point  which,  in  a  sense,  has  already  been  alluded  to.  When  we  set  out  the 
various  texts  from  the  Thomistic  corpus  dealing  with  the  grasp  of  being  we  noted  a 
reluctance  on  the  part  of  some  translators  to  translate  'ens'  as  'being',  they  opted  for  some 
other  circumlocution  such  as  'the  real'.  Perhaps  their  reluctance  has  more  to  do  with 
attempting  to  clarify  St.  Thomas  than  with  shoddy  translation.  What  do  I  mean  by  this? 
'Being'  is  an  extremely  abstract  metaphysical  term.  When  St.  Thomas  says  of  the  intellect: 
Primum  enim  quod  cadit  in  apprehensione  intellectus  est  ens  23 
which  Timothy  McDermott  translates  as  'the  first  thing  the  mind  grasps  of  anything  is  that  it 
is  something  or  other';  St.  Thomas,  does  indeed  mean  that  the  first  thing  that  intellect 
apprehends  is  being,  but  he  is  not  saying  that  the  knower  has  arrived  at  a  knowledge  of  'ens' 
that  a  metaphysician  would  have.  The  metaphysician's  concept  is  more  accurately  labelled 
'ens  commune'  'common'  being'.  Elders  highlights  the  distinction  between  'ens  commune' 
and  the  sense  of  'ens'  used  above: 
...  when  we  speak  of  ens  commune,  we  do  not  go  as  far  as  to  denote  a  particular 
realisation  of  being  or  this  or  that  being,  but  we  consider  only  'that  which  is, 
understanding  thereby  that  we  abstract  from  what  is  proper  to  matter.  For  this  reason 
the  concept  ens  commune  is  not  the  same  as  that  first  concept  of  being  which  a  child 
acquires  as  soon  as  its  intellect  begins  to  function.  24 
When  Aquinas  says  that  the  intellect  grasps  being,  he  is  referring  to  a  particular  realisation  of 
being  in  a  given  object  that  exists  outside  the  knower.  The  translators  attempted  to  clarify 
this  by  using  terms  such  as  'the  real.  '  The  intellect  has  indeed  a  grasp  of  'being':  the 
existence  of  an  object  in  the  world.  It  is  this  encounter  between  the  intellect  and  real 
existence  which  initiates  the  epistemic  process. 
This  initial  apprehension  of  being  could  be  described  as  a  prescientific  understanding  of 
21  Regis  1959,  page288. 
22  ibid  page  289. 
23  ST  1a  q2  a1.3 
24  Elders  1993,  page  20. 97 
being.  `Being'  as  used  by  the  metaphysician  is  the  result  of  abstraction.  It  is  something  of 
which  he  has  a  `scientific'  understanding,  in  the  same  way  as  a  mathematician  has  a 
scientific  knowledge  of  geometry,  whereas  a  young  child  has  no  such  knowledge,  but  can 
still  speak  of  squares  and  triangles.  `Being'  as  used  by  Aquinas  in  the  above  extracts,  is 
technically  the  same  notion  as  that  used  by  the  expert,  but  from  the  knower's  perspective  he 
understands  it  not  as  an  abstract  concept,  but  prescientifically  as  the  real  existence  of  the 
object  before  him.  This  may  be  the  motivation  behind  Aquinas  when  he  wrote  in  the  above 
quote  from  De  Veritate  q1  a1: 
Illud  autem  quod  primo  intellectus  concipit  quasi  notissimum.....  est  ens. 
The  important  phrase  is  `quasi  notissimum'.  This  sentence  was  translated  as: 
That  which  the  intellect  first  conceives  as,  in  a  way,  the  most  evident...  is  being. 
`Being'  is  'in  a  way,  most  evident,  '  because  clearly  we  don't  grasp  `being'  in  the  abstract 
sense,  but  the  real  existence  of  the  object  in  the  external  world.  As  Etienne  Gilson  in 
Thomistic  Realism  and  the  Critique  of  Knowledge  puts  it: 
..  we  do  not  encounter  Pure  Being  in  experience:  we  encounter  the  being  of  concrete 
substances  whose  sensible  qualities  affect  our  senses.  25 
Of  course,  in  an  Aristotelian  schema  such  as  St.  Thomas',  many  things  other  than 
substances  are  termed  beings: 
Anything  which  is  real,  from  a  stone  to  an  impression,  from  a  colour,  to  a  certain 
place  in  the  universe,  is  a  being.  Being  is  not  one  class  of  things:  all  things  whatever 
class  they  belong  to,  are  beings.  26 
However,  as  Aristotle  stated  in  the  Categories  substance  has  a  primacy  and  priority  which 
the  other  accidental  beings  don't  enjoy.  It  is  the  fundamental  category  of  being.  Thus, 
following  Aertsen  and  Gilson,  we  can  say  that  the  encounter  with  the  being  of  concrete 
substances  is  the  archimedean  point  of  all  knowledge.  All  human  knowledge  springs  from 
this  encounter  with  being  external  to  it:  the  existence  of  individual  substances,  for  it  is  the 
being  of  these  individual  objects  that  the  intellect  grasps. 
Within  the  framework  of  an  Aristotelian  metaphysics,  such  as  St.  Thomas',  the  primacy,  and 
importance  of  substance  is  well  known.  Charlotte  Witt,  the  Lockean  connotations  of  her 
description  of  substance  notwithstanding,  gives  a  useful  description: 
The  view  that  substances  underlie  as  subjects  all  other  categories  of  being  and  that  no 
other  beings  underlie  substances  as  subjects,  suggests,  by  spatial  imagery,  a  thesis 
of  ontological  foundationalism.  Substances  are  the  ontological  foundations  of  what 
there  is:  they  do  not  rest  on  further  foundations.  27 
From  our  consideration  of  the  metaphysical  component  of  perceptual  knowledge  we  can  say 
that  substances  are  not  only  ontologically  foundational,  but  also  perform  an  epistemically 
foundational  role.  It  is  the  grasp  of  their  existence  which  initiates  the  epistemic  process  and 
without  this  grasp  the  epistemic  process  could  not  begin.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  the 
25  Gilson  1986,  page  205. 
26  Elders  1993,  page  33. 
27  Witt  1989,  page  51. 98 
foundationalism  sketched  here  can  be  described  as  externalist  because  it  is  this  grasp  of 
being  external  to  the  intellect  that  initiates  the  epistemic  process.  This  foundationalism  is 
different  from  that  proposed  by  Descartes  or  any  of  the  other  philosophers  which  we 
discussed  in  the  last  chapter.  In  espousing  this  form  of  foundationalism  we  need  make  no 
comments  about  self-presenting  or  doxastic  mental  states.  This  is  because,  from  the 
knower's  point  of  view,  the  actual  grasp  of  being  is  preconceptual,  it  is  part  and  parcel  of 
how  the  intellect,  according  to  Aquinas,  acquires  knowledge.  Nor,  as  we  shall  see  later, 
does  acknowledgement  of  this  foundational  element  support  MacDonald's  foundationalist 
reading  of  Aquinas. 
Lawrence  Dewan  writes: 
I  wish  to  focus  on  one  part  of  that  ontology,  viz,  the  priority  of  substance  over 
accident.  It  strikes  me  that  insufficient  attention  has  been  given  to  this  feature  of  St. 
Thomas'  explanation  of  knowledge.  28 
As  much  of  human  knowledge  is  obtained  by  consideration  of  accidents  (as  Aquinas  himself 
acknowledges  that  accidents,  although  lower  in  being,  are  more  knowable)29  it  is  not 
surprising  that  insufficient  attention  should  be  given  to  the  priority  of  substance  and  its 
importance  in  Aquinas'  explanation  of  knowledge.  Hopefully,  the  last  few  pages  have  gone 
some  way  to  giving  it  some  of  the  attention  it  merits. 
In  offering  this  analysis  of  the  grasp  of  being,  we  are  not  suggesting  that  it  is  a  distinct  act  of 
the  intellect  prior  to  its  other  operations.  The  encounter  of  external  being  is  intrinsic  to  the 
first  act  of  the  intellect.  As  Orestes  Gonzalez  in  an  article  dealing  with  the  apprehension  of 
being  in  Aquinas  puts  it: 
..  quiddity  and  act  of  being  are  related  to  one  another  as  object  to  ratio  objecti  for  the 
intellectual  faculty  just  as  colour  and  light  are  for  the  sensible  faculty  of  sight  ..... 
30 
Gonzalez'thesis  is  that  in  the  grasp  of  a  quiddity  there  is  an  apprehension  of  another  element, 
the  object's  participation  in  the  act  of  being.  Not  only  this,  we  would  hold  that  the  grasp  of 
being  is  necessary  for  the  whole  epistemic  process  to  begin,  as  it  constitutes  the  answer  to  an 
sit? 
Over  the  last  few  pages  we  have  looked  at  the  metaphysical  component:  the  importance  of 
external  being.  We  began  our  consideration  of  the  metaphysical  component  by  noting  the 
importance  of  the  two  questions  an  sit?  and  quid  est?  We  noted  that  before  one  is  in  a 
position  to  ask  quid  est?,  one  must  know  the  answer  to  an  sit?  In  the  case  of  perceptual 
knowledge  the  question  an  sit?  is  implicitly  answered  in  the  grasp  of  being,  intrinsic  to  the 
first  act  of  the  intellect.  Our  description  of  how  the  metaphysical  component  constitutes  the 
answer  to  an  sit?  is  lacking  in  one  very  important  respect.  We  have  yet  to  outline  the  activity 
of  the  senses  in  this  enterprise.  This  we  now  do  before  we  move  on  to  consider  how  the 
28  Dewan  1984,  pages  383-394. 
29  In  Meta  VII.  2 
30  Gonzalez  1994,  page  484. 99 
intellect  answers  quid  est? 
In  chapter  one  we  outlined  the  relationship  between  the  intellect  and  the  senses;  we  noted  that 
the  last  three  articles  of  ST  1a  q84  are  devoted  to  the  relationship  of  the  intellect  and  senses. 
To  risk  stating  the  obvious,  the  senses  are  human  attributes.  Perhaps,  they  ought  to  be 
considered  under  the  heading  of  the  psychological  component  of  our  account  of  perceptual 
knowledge?  However,  we  will  discuss  them  here  under  the  heading  of  the  metaphysical 
component  because  the  senses  are  essentially  the  conduit  for  the  immaterial  intellect  to 
encounter  the  material  world.  St.  Thomas  captures  something  of  this  in  the  opening  lines  of 
his  reply  in  De  Veritate  ql  all: 
Our  knowledge,  taking  its  start  from  things,  proceeds  in  this  order.  First,  it  begins  in 
sense;  second  it  is  completed  in  the  intellect.  As  a  consequence,  sense  is  found  to  be 
in  some  way  intermediary  between  the  intellect  and  things;  for  with  reference  to 
things,  it  is,  as  it  were,  an  intellect,  and  with  reference  to  intellect,  it  is,  as  it  were,  a 
thing.  31 
The  above  extract  describes  the  senses'  intermediary  place  between  the  intellect  and  the 
world.  Here  we  are  principally  concerned  with  their  relationship  to  the  world.  Nevertheless, 
we  note  Aquinas'  description  of  the  relationship  between  the  senses  and  the  intellect:  the 
senses  are  like  a  thing  from  the  perspective  of  the  intellect:  the  senses  are  an  object  suitable 
for  intellectual  activity.  32  We  have  already  seen  in  our  consideration  of  the  relationship 
between  the  intellect  and  the  senses  Aquinas  state  that  the  images  arising  from  the  sense  were 
somewhat  the  matter  of  the  cause  of  our  knowledge.  33  In  short,  the  senses  provide  the  stuff 
out  of  which  intellectual  knowledge  can  be  attained.  How  it  is  attained  is  the  story  to  be  told 
in  the  next  section.  Here  we  intend  to  examine  more  closely  the  role  of  the  senses  as  the 
intellect's  contact  with  material  reality,  an  examination  which  will  serve  as  a  means  of 
forming  a  link  with  that  following  section. 
Foundational  as  they  are  for  his  epistemic  process,  external  substances,  on  their  own,  cannot 
provide  the  answer  to  an  sit?,  this  occurs  only  when  the  properties  of  those  substances 
impinge  on  the  senses  and  on  this  basis  the  intellectual  search  for  what  it  is  can  proceed.  In 
31  Dicendum,  quod  cognitio  nostra  quae  a  rebus  initium  sumit,  hoc  ordine  progreditur,  ut  primo 
incipiat  in  sensu  secundo  perficiatur  in  intellectu;  ut  sic  sensus  inveniatur  quodammodo  medius 
inter  intellectum  et  res:  est  enim,  rebus  comparatus  quasi  intellectus;  et  intellectui  comparatus, 
quasi  res  quaedam. 
32  This  statement,  in  no  way  intends  to  contradict  Aquinas'  fundamental  thesis  that  what  we  know 
are  objects  in  the  world  and  not  their  mental  representations. 
33  See  also  page  38  of  this  work  which  quotes  ST  1a  q84  a6c.  "Secundum  hoc  ergo,  ex  parte 
phantasmatum  intellectuallis  operatio  a  sensu  causatur.  Sed  quia  phantasmata  non  suffciunt  immutare  intellectum  possibilem,  sed  oportet  quod  fiant  intelligibilia  actu  per  intellectum  agentem; 
non  potest  dici  quod  sensibilis  cognitio  sit  totalis  et  perfecta  causa  Intellectualis  cognitionis,  sed 
magis  quodammodo  est  materia  Causae.  "  [My  emphasis)  The  point  being  made  by  "quodammodo  est  materia  causae"  in  the  above  quote  is  that  on  their 
own  the  senses  cannot  cause  intellectual  knowledge.  Intellectual  knowledge  is  immaterial  and 
universal,  thus  the  activity  of  the  agent  intellect  is  required  to  abstract  from  the  particularity  and 
materiality  of  what  the  senses  provide. 100 
the  first  place  things  in  the  world  impinge  on  our  senses.  St.  Thomas  writes: 
A  sense  is  a  passive  power,  meant  to  be  set  in  action  by  a  sense  object  external  to  it. 
This  outside  source  of  internal  change  is  the  per  se  object  of  sense  perception.....  34 
It  is  this  change  into  act  by  the  sensible  object  which,  in  the  case  of  perceptual  knowledge 
provides  the  evidence  to  the  answer  an  sit?.  Thus,  the  importance  of  both  these  factors  in 
answering  an  sit?  is  apparent:  if  there  were  nothing  there,  there  would  be  no  change  in  the 
senses  and  without  the  senses,  there  would  be  no  knowledge  of  what  is  there.  The  quest  for 
knowledge  finds  its  origin  in  external  reality  as  it  moves  the  senses  from  potency  to  act. 
"In  reference  to  the  world  the  senses  are  like  an  intellect,  "  Aquinas  said  in  DV  q1  all.  We 
now  turn  to  what  the  senses  `know'  of  the  world.  On  the  one  hand  what  he  says  is  fairly 
simple  and  straightforward.  On  the  other,  it  isn't.  It  is  simple  and  straight  forward  because 
according  to  Aquinas  the  things  which  the  senses  apprehend  can  be  classified  into  two 
categories:  proper  sensibles  and  common  sensibles.  A  proper  sensible,  Aristotle  tells  us  in 
the  second  book  of  his  De  Anima,  is: 
the  proper  object  of  each  sense  which  does  not  fall  within  the  ambit  of  another 
sense.  35 
Thus  colour  is  the  proper  sensible  of  sight  and  sound  the  proper  sensible  of  hearing. 
Common  sensibles,  in  contrast, 
are  movement,  rest,  number,  shape,  dimension.  Qualities  of  this  kind  are  proper  to 
no  one  sense,  but  common  to  them  all.  36 
It  is  not  so  simple  and  straightforward  when  we  look  at  what  he  says  about  the  apprehension 
of  these  common  and  proper  sensibles  by  the  senses,  Aquinas  makes  an  important  and 
startling  distinction.  He  writes: 
The  senses  are  not  deceived  with  respect  to  their  proper  object-  sight,  for  example, 
with  respect  to  colour-  except,  as  may  happen,  in  an  incidental  way  when  there  is  an 
impediment  in  the  organ  (for  instance  when,  in  a  feverish  person,  the  sense  of  taste 
experiences  sweet  things  as  bitter  because  the  tongue  is  coated  unhealthily).  On  the 
other  hand,  the  senses  can  be  deceived  with  respect  to  common  sensibles-  for 
example  in  discerning  sizes  and  shapes.  37 
It  does  seem  an  outrageous  claim  to  make,  that  the  senses,  if  they  are  functioning  properly, 
are  never  mistaken  with  regard  to  their  proper  objects.  In  short,  they  seem  infallible! 
Experience  suggests  otherwise.  For  example,  light  affects  colour,  in  red  light  white  objects 
appear  red  even  to  someone  with  perfect  eyesight.  Surely,  this  is  an  example  of  a  well 
34  ST  1a  q78  a3c.  Est  autem  sensus  quaedam  potentia  passiva,  quae  nata  est  immutari  ab  exteriori 
sensibili.  Exterius  ergo  immutativum  est  quod  per  se  a  sensu  percipitur... 
35  De  Anima.  III  6. 
36  ibid. 
37  ST1  a  q85  a  6c.  Sensus  enim  circa  proprium  objectum  non  decipitur,  sicut  visus  circa  colorem; 
nisi  forte  per  accidens,  ex  impedimento  circa  organum  contingente,  sicut  cum  gustus  febrientium 
dulcia  judicat  amara,  propter  hoc  lingua  mails  humoribus  est  repleta.  Circa  sensibilia  vero  communia 
decipitur  sensus,  sicut  in  dijudicando  de  magnitudine  vel  figura. 101 
functioning  sense  being  deceived  with  respect  to  its  proper  object?  Does  Aquinas  really  want 
to  claim  that  the  sense  of  sight  is  not  in  error  in  this  case?  He  can't,  for  instance,  just  put  it 
down  to  an  erroneous  judgment  being  made  by  the  intellect  as  it  acts  on  the  sense  images 
because  the  colour  which  the  sense  apprehends  is  red,  in  the  above  example,  not  the  white 
that  the  object  actually  is.  Thus  the  intellect  is  presented  with  a  red  sense  image  and  all  the 
intellect  can  do  is  make  a  judgment  on  the  basis  of  this  sense  image.  38  In  the  case  of 
common  sensibles  he  puts  error  down  to  a  mistake  by  one  of  the  internal  senses,  but  since 
the  sense's  judgment  about  its  proper  object  takes  place  spontaneously  such  factors  are  not 
applicable  in  this  instance.  39 
Initially,  most  of  his  explanations  accounting  for  errors  in  the  grasp  of  proper  objects  seem 
just  as  unconvincing  as  that  outlined  above  in  ST  1a  q85  a6.  In  ST  1a  q17  a2  where  Aquinas 
discusses  the  issue  of  falsity  occurring  in  the  senses  he  maintains  the  same  position  as  he 
does  subsequently  in  question  85  and  other  places,  such  as  in  In  Meta  IV  12: 
It  [a  sense]  does  not  do  this  [make  mistakes]  with  regard  to  its  proper  sensible  object 
except  perhaps  when  the  sensory  organ  is  indisposed  40 
In  lectio  14  of  the  same  book,  arguing  against  the  view  that  truth  is  in  appearances,  he  offers 
a  further  clarification,  that  error  is  caused  by  some  impediment  of  nature  affecting  the 
imagination  (phantasia  ): 
First  the  proper  cause  of  falsity  is  not  the  sense  but  the  imagination,  which  is  not  the 
same  as  the  senses.  That  is  to  say,  the  diversity  of  judgments  made  about  sensible 
objects  is  not  attributable  to  the  senses,  but  to  the  imagination,  in  which  errors  are 
38  Aquinas  admits  this  in  DV  q1  all  where  he  states  that,  the  sense  always  produces  a  true 
judgment  in  the  intellect  with  respect  to  its  own  condition,  but  not  always  with  respect  to  the 
condition  of  things.  "  (Sic  ergo  sensus  intellectui  comparatus  semper  facit  veram  existimationem  in 
intellectu  de  dispositione  propria,  sed  non  de  dispositione  rerum).  In  the  above  case  while  the 
actual  condition  of  the  object  Is  white,  the  condition  of  the  sense  organ  is  that  it  is  sensing 
something  red.  This  redness  is  what  the  intellect  perceives  because  it  cannot  be  mistaken  about 
sense  images,  despite  the  actual  sense  image  itself  being  mistaken. 
39  DV  q1  al1.  According  to  Aquinas  the  soul  has  four  internal  sense  powers:  the  common  sense, 
imagination,  instinct  and  memory.  The  common  sense  discriminates  between  different  sense 
perceptions.  The  imagination  [  sometimes  called  phantasia  or  imaginativam  ]  retains  the  forms 
grasped  by  sense.  Memory  is  the  reminiscence  of  such  forms.  In  man,  instinct  is  called  the 
cogitative  power.  It  is  this  power  which  judges  and  compares  common  sensibles  and  accidental 
sensibles  and  it  is  here  that  error  can  occur  regarding  such  sensibles.  Strictly  speaking  an  argument 
could  be  made  for  looking  at  the  internal  sense  powers  in  the  following  section  on  the 
psychological  component  of  perceptual  knowledge.  However,  of  greater  Importance  to  us  Is  the 
external  senses  and  their  essential  role  of  providing  sense  images  on  which  the  intellect  will  act.  For 
that  reason  it  is  sufficient  for  us  to  mention  the  internal  sense  powers  in  passing  and  devote  more 
attention  to  the  role  of  the  external  senses  and  Intellectual  processes  which  occur  as  a 
consequence.  We  ought  also  to  mention  that  describing  these  internal  powers  as  'senses'  can  lead 
to  confusion.  They  have  very  little  In  common  with  the  external  powers  which  we  understand  to  be 
the  five  senses.  Cf.  ST  1aq  78  a4c  for  Aquinas'  discussion  on  the  Internal  sense  powers. 
40  ioc.  cit  Fallitur  enim  sensibilibus  communibus  et  per  accidens,  licet  non  de  sensibilibus  proprils, 
nisi  forte  ex  Indispositione  organi. 102 
made  about  sensory  perceptions  because  of  some  natural  object41 
He  goes  on  to  clarify  further  the  nature  of  this  impediment  which  leads  to  mistakes  being 
made  about  proper  sensibles.  Such  mistakes: 
are  attributable  not  to  the  senses  but  to  the  imagination;  for  when  the  imagination  is 
subject  to  some  sort  of  abnormality,  it  sometimes  happens  that  the  object 
apprehended  by  a  sense  enters  the  imagination  in  a  different  way  than  it  was 
apprehended  by  the  senses  42 
The  case  of  the  madman  is  then  cited  as  an  example.  However,  blaming  one  of  the  internal 
senses  doesn't  really  address  the  problem  raised  by  the  white  object  in  red  light  example, 
that  well  functioning  senses  can  be  mistaken  with  respect  to  their  proper  objects:  sane  people 
make  this  error  as  much  as  lunatics. 
However,  in  DV  q1  al  lc,  he  does  offer  a  more  flexible  and  convincing  account  of  the 
senses'  infallibility  which  does  address  the  white  object,  red  light  problem.  He  writes: 
the  judgment  of  sense  about  proper  sensibles  is  always  true  unless  there  is  an, 
impediment  in  the  organ  or  in  the  medium  43 
Factors,  other  than  a  deficient  organ,  can  leads  to  error.  In  the  case  of  the  white  object  seen 
in  red  light,  it  is  the  medium,  the  light  itself  which  leads  to  the  erroneous  apprehension. 
Circumstances  in  the  medium  can  lead  to  the  senses  being  mistaken. 
This  notwithstanding,  Aquinas'  point  is  that  ceteris  paribus,  in  normal  circumstances  our 
senses,  when  functioning  properly,  will  not  be  mistaken  with  respect  to  their  proper  objects. 
Or  to  put  it  anther  way,  they  are  reliable.  The  reliability  of  the  senses  is  part  of  a  wider 
reliabilist  overtones  that  we  saw  Stump  and  Kretzmann  attribute  to  him  a4  Thus  in  the 
majority  of  cases,  senses,  such  as  sight,  are  not  mistaken  with  regard  to  their  proper  objects. 
For  this  reason  when  the  intellect  judges  that  it  is  seeing  something  green  this  is  because  it  is 
seeing  something  green.  It  is  direct  realism  at  its  most  direct.  Pace  Chisholm  there  is  no  need 
for  elaborate  discussions  on  `being  appeared  to  greenly'  mental  states  before  we  can  say  that 
I  see  something  green.  In  any  case,  as  far  as  this  analysis  of  the  metaphysical  component  is 
concerned  the  instances  in  which  the  senses  may  be  mistaken  with  respect  to  their  proper 
objects  are  not  directly  relevant.  The  relevant  point,  for  us,  is  that  there  is  something  there 
41  Quorum  primum  est  quod  sensus  non  est  proprie  causa  falsitatis,  sed  phantasia,  quiae  non  est 
idem  sensui;  quasi  dicat,  diversitatis  iudicorum,  quae  dantur  de  sensibilibus,  non  provenit  ex 
sensu,  sed  ex  phantasia,  ad  quam  propter  aliquod  impedimentum  naturae  proveniunt  deceptiones 
sensuum. 
42  Et  si  obiiciatur  quod  aliquando  etiam  circa  sensibilia  propria  error  accidit,  respondet  quod  hoc 
non  est  ex  sensu,  sed  ex  phantasia,  per  cuius  indispositionem  aliquando  contigit  quod  id  quod  per 
sensum  accipitur,  aliter  ad  ipsam  perveniat  quam  sensu  percipiatur. 
43  Unde  sensus  iudicium  de  sensibilibus  propriis  semper  est  verum,  nisi  sit  impedimentum  in 
organo,  vel  in  medio. 
44  Stump  1992,  page  147. 103 
whose  sensible  properties  have  been  grasped,  45  a  grasping  which  answers  an  sit?  in  the 
process  of  perceptual  knowledge.  It  is  as  if,  via  the  sense  images  the  intellect  is  able,  to 
borrow  Nozick's  phrase,  to  track  the  existence  of  external  beings. 
Finally,  lest  there  be  any  misunderstanding  we  are  not  suggesting  that  in  the  case  of 
perceptual  knowledge  an  sit?  is  explicitly  asked  in  the  way  one  would  if  one  were 
considering  knowledge  of  such  entities  as  God,  evil,  vacuum  or  'goatstag'  46  We  do  not 
ask,  is  there  something  there?  We  just  see  that  there  is  a  thing  there.  Sensory  experience  is 
not  an  enterprise  which  we  can  consciously  intervene  in,  we  normally  and  unquestioningly 
accept,  to  adapt  Quine's  phrase,  such  torrential  input  every  moment  of  our  life.  Implicit  in 
this  sensory  experience  is  the  evidence  to  answer  an  sit?  as,  on  the  basis  of  this  experience, 
the  intellect  grasps  being  external  to  it  while  seeking  to  discover  what  it  is  that  is  there. 
Even  in  those  instances  when,  once  the  intellect  has  made  its  judgment,  one  is  not  sure  what 
it  is  that  is  there,  whether  it  is  a  man  or  a  tree,  a  table  or  chair,  it  is  nonetheless  accepted  that 
there  is  something  there.  This  will  be  a  significant  point  in  the  conclusions  which  we  will 
draw  from  our  analysis  of  Aquinas'  account  of  perceptual  knowledge,  after  we  consider  the 
psychological  component.  For  the  moment  we  conclude  this  consideration  of  the 
metaphysical  component  by  simply  reiterating  that  as  the  external  existent  sets  the  sensory 
powers  into  action,  there  is  an  answer  to  `an  sit?  '  We  know  that  it  is:  this  is  the  metaphysical 
foundation  in  perceptual  knowledge,  now  we  turn  to  what  is  it? 
b.  The  psychological  component 
Despite  the  fundamental  role  which  we  have  assigned  to  knowing  that  something  is  in  our 
immaterial,  universal  and  necessary  knowledge  of  material  reality,  man's  natural  desire  to 
know  is  essentially  a  desire  to  know  what  something  is.  This  search  for  the  answer  to  quid 
est?  with  respect  to  the  objects  of  material  reality  takes  us  to  the  heart  of  Aquinas'  account  of 
perceptual  knowledge:  the  intellect's  grasp  of  its  proper  object,  the  "whatness  of  material 
things  abstracted  from  the  sense  images"47  and  its  subsequent  judgments.  Aquinas' 
description  of  the  intellect's  quest  for  quid  est?  in  the  Prima  Pars  relies  heavily  on  his 
description  of  the  processes  of  the  intellectual  part  of  the  soul  and  the  relationship  between 
the  intellect  and  the  senses.  For  this  reason  our  consideration  of  quid  est?  in  this  analysis,  is 
given  under  the  heading,  the  psychological  component. 
Just  what  is  abstracted  by  the  intellect  from  the  sense  images  and  what  the  intellect  grasps  in 
45  Someone  may  ask  about  the  issue  of  hallucination,  surely  in  this  case  we  think  that  something  is 
there  when  it  isn't?  This  could  be  a  problem,  however,  stressing  the  proper  functioning  of  faculties 
ought  to  legislate  for  the  matter  of  hallucination.  We  will  return  to  this  later. 
46  In  regard  to  goatstag  see  In  P.  A.  11  6. 
47  ST  1a  q85  a8c  Dicendum  quod  objectum  intellectus  nostri,  secundum  praesentem  statum,  est 
quidditas  resi  materialis  quam  a  phantasmatibus  abstrahit.  We  will  use  essence  and  its  synonym 
quiddity  interchangeably. 104 
its  first  act  will  be  a  central  concern  of  this  analysis  of  the  psychological  component  because 
it  is  on  the  basis  of  what  is  grasped  in  the  first  act  that  the  intellect  forms  judgments  such  as, 
`Socrates  is  a  white  man,  '48  judgments  which  are  indicative  of  what  we  take  perceptual 
knowledge  to  be.  To  aid  us  in  this  task  we  will  use  as  a  catalyst  two  recently  published 
articles  by  Joseph  McDermott  `The  Analogy  of  Human  Knowing  in  the  Prima  Pars  part  I 
and  part  II.  '49  Both  articles  are  wide  ranging  in  the  material  which  they  cover,  some  of  it  the 
similar  to  issues  we  outlined  in  chapter  one:  the  relation  of  the  soul  and  the  body,  50  the 
soul's  potentiality,  51  man's  place  in  the  hierarchy  of  creation,  52  the  soul's  self- 
knowledge,  53  the  separated  soul.  54 
Of  particular  interest  to  us  is  what  McDermott  refers  to  as  the  ambivalence  of  abstraction55 
and  the  ambiguity  of  conversion.  56  Abstraction  and  conversion  are  of  crucial  importance  in 
Aquinas'  account  of  human  knowledge.  Consideration  of  McDermott's  interpretation  will 
show  the  complexity  of  Aquinas'  theory,  but  also  serve  to  clarify  what  is  abstracted  by  the. 
intellect  from  the  sense  images,  what  it  means  for  the  intellect  to  grasp  a  quiddity,  how  it  is 
never  mistaken  in  this  apprehension,  in  short  how  the  intellect  formulates  the  answer  to  quid 
est?  With  respect  to  the  abstraction  McDermott  writes: 
Abstraction  as  an  intellectual  process  exhibits  an  ambivalence  regarding  its  object: 
sometimes  a  pure  form,  at  other  times  the  essence  with  an  indeterminate  reference  to 
(common)  matter.  57 
In  one  sense,  McDermott's  theory  of  an  ambivalence  of  abstraction  is  more  pertinent  for  a 
discussion  of  what  the  intellect  grasps,  and  so  enabling  it  to  answer  quid  est?,  than  is  the 
matter  of  conversio  ad  phantasmata.  However,  McDermott's  so  called  ambiguity  over 
conversion  includes  reference  to  the  abstraction  constitutive  of  the  first  act  of  the  intellect 
discussed  by  Aquinas  in  ST  la  q84  a6c  and  q85  al. 
We  gave  a  fairly  standard  explanation  of  this  activity  in  chapter  one:  the  intellect,  because  it 
48  As  we  saw  in  the  sketch  of  intellectual  acts  in  chapter  one  it  is  at  this  point  In  the  intellect's 
operations  that  truth  and  falsity  become  possible.  It  is  also  at  this  point  that  the  intellect  can  claim  to 
know  something  insofar  as  it  has  judged  that  what  it  has  formed  corresponds  to  the  real  existence 
of  the  object  in  the  world.  A  further  intellectual  operation  Is  possible,  reasoning:  the  Intellect  can 
reason  from  one  piece  of  knowledge  to  another.  It  is  this  operation  that  is  the  basis  of  scientia  and 
for  this  reason  this  operation  will  be  dealt  with  in  the  next  chapter  when  we  consider  the  relationship 
between  perceptual  knowledge  and  scientia. 
49  McDermott1996,  pages  261-268  and  pages  501-525. 
50  ibid  page  263ff. 
51  ibid  page  267ff 
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54  ibid  page  513ff. 
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can  only  grasp  universals  directly,  must,  in  a  judgment  following  the  grasp  of  the  quiddity, 
turn  to  the  sense  images  (conversio  ad  phantasmata)  in  order  to  know  the  singular. 
According  to  McDermott  the  story  is  not  so  simple.  As  well  as  meaning  this,  it  can  also  refer 
to  the  abstraction  which  grounds  the  first  act  of  the  intellect: 
The  phantasm's  "mode  of  existing"  must  be  changed  before  anything  can  be 
impressed  on  the  passive  intellect.  At  this  point  in  the  intellective  process  the  agent 
intellect  intervenes  to  effect  the  requisite  change.....  This  "conversion"  apparently 
causes  the  abstraction  of  the"likeness.  "58 
Thus,  says  McDermott: 
This  conversio  can  be  interpreted  both  as  the  conceptualisation  preceding  judgment 
and  as  the  judgment  following  conceptualisation.  59 
Given  this  interpretation,  we  will  consider  his  argument  for  the  ambiguity  of  conversion 
before  moving  on  to  look  at  the  question  of  what  is  abstracted. 
McDermott  cites  two  extracts  from  the  Prima  Pars  as  evidence  of  ambiguity.  Firstly,  ST  Ia 
q85  al  ad3: 
By  the  power  of  the  agent  intellect  there  results  a  certain  likeness  in  the  possible 
intellect  from  the  conversion  of  the  agent  intellect  over  the  phantasms;  and  this 
likeness  is  representative  of  those  realities,  of  which  there  are  phantasms,  only  with 
regard  to  the  nature  of  the  species.  60  [McDermott's  translation] 
ST  la  q86  al  on  whether  the  intellect  knows  singulars  is  cited  as  containing  the  second  way 
of  understanding  conversion.  McDermott  translates  the  relevant  sections  as: 
Also  after  it  abstracted  the  intelligible  species,  [our  intellect]  cannot  understand  in  act 
except  by  turning  itself  to  the  phantasms  in  which  it  understands  the  intelligible 
species.  [His  emphasis]61 
Herein,  according  to  McDermott,  lies  the  ambiguity:  the  same  act  refers  to  two  quite  distinct 
activities  of  the  intellect,  one  prior  to  the  first  act  and  one  subsequent  to  the  second  act. 
However,  closer  consideration  of  the  issue  of  conversio  ad  phantasmata  reveals  that  there  is 
no  ambiguity,  just  the  same  term  used  in  two  different  contexts  which  are  easily  identifiable. 
First,  ST  la  q85  I  ad  3  is  not  proposing  a  novel  use  of  conversio  ad  phantasmata.  It  is 
merely  stating  the  obvious  and  reiterating  what  is  said  elsewhere  that  all  human  knowledge 
comes  from  the  senses  and  so  in  order  to  know,  the  agent  intellect  must  turn  to  the 
phantasms  in  order  to  abstract  from  them  intelligible  species: 
58  ibid  page  275. 
59  ibid  page  276. 
60  Sed  virtute  intellectus  agentis  resultat  quaedam  similitudo  in  Intellectu  possibili  ex 
conversione  intellectus  agentis  supra  phantasmata,  quae  quidem  est  repraesentativa  eorum 
quorum  sunt  phantasmata,  solum  quantum  ad  naturam  species. 
61  The  full  extract  of  the  pertinent  section  reads:  Indirecte  autem,  et  quasi  per  quandam 
reflexionem,  potest  cognoscere  singulare:  quia  sicut  supra  dictum  est,  etiam  postquam  species 
intellgibiles  abstraxit,  non  potest  secundum  eas  actu  intelligere  nisi  convertendo  se  ad 
phantasmata. 106 
It  is  impossible  for  our  intellect,  in  its  present  state  of  being  joined  to  a  body  capable 
of  receiving  impressions,  actually  to  understand  anything  without  turning  to  sense 
images.  62 
In  this  sense,  there  must  be  a  conversion  before  every  conceptualisation.  ST  la  q86  al,  on 
the  other  hand,  uses  the  same  terminology  to  refer  to  a  quite  different  process,  that  by  which 
the  intellect  knows  singulars  indirectly.  As  we  said  above,  this  has  been  the  traditional 
understanding  of  conversio  ad  phantasmata,  a  kind  of  quasi-reflection  that  the  intellect 
indulges  in,  in  order  to  know  the  singular.  ST  la  q85  al  ad5  actually  brings  together  both 
senses: 
Our  intellect  both  abstracts  species  from  sense  images-  in  so  far  as  it  considers  the 
nature  of  things  as  universal-  and  yet,  at  the  same  time,  understands  these  in  the 
sense  images,  since  it  cannot  understand  even  the  things  from  which  it  abstracts 
species  without  turning  to  sense  images.  63 
The  two  uses  of  conversion  are  obvious.  The  intellect  must  turn  to  the  sense  images  in  order 
to  abstract  the  intelligible  species.  Such  activity  is  the  intellect's  only  means  of  acquiring 
them.  With  such  intelligible  species  the  intellect  can  form  judgments  such  as  `cats  are  four 
legged  furry  animals.  '  This  judgment  can  be  made  without  reference  to  any  particular  cat. 
However,  the  intellect  can  also  form  judgments  about  particular  cats,  even  the  cat  from 
which  it  has  abstracted  the  species  `cat.  '  However,  to  make  this  judgment  about  a  particular 
cat,  that  is,  to  know  the  singular,  the  actual  cat,  Tibbles,  the  intellect  must  turn  to  the  sense 
images,  in  the  usual  sense  of  the  quasi-reflection  labelled  conversio  adphantasmata.  Simply, 
the  same  term  `conversio  ad  phantasmata'  is  used  in  two  different  contexts,  both  of  which 
are  readily  apparent.  There  is  no  ambiguity,  it  merely  reinforces  the  intellect's  dependence  on 
the  senses. 
The  ambivalence  of  abstraction,  as  McDermott  calls  it,  actually  concerns  two  distinct  issues: 
the  method  of  abstraction  and  what  is  abstracted.  Regarding  what  is  abstracted  he  writes: 
It  [what  is  abstracted]  is  described  in  turn  as  the  form,  the  species  and  the  universal. 
Indeed  the  universal  is  defined  precisely  as  "what  is  abstracted  from  individual 
matter"  (ST  la  q86  al).  64 
He  then  goes  on  to  discuss  the  various  ways  in  which  Aquinas  uses  these  different  terms 
and  the  apparent  connections  which  Aquinas  draws  between  them.  We  will  look  closely  at 
what  McDermott  has  to  say  regarding  this  ambiguity  by  examining  the  various  textual 
references  he  cites  in  his  article.  Prior  to  this  we  must  look  at  McDermott's  account  of  the 
process  of  abstraction. 
62  ST  1a  q84  a7  Dicendum  quod  impossibile  est  intellectum  nostrum,  secundum  praesentis  vitae 
statum  quo  passibili  corpori  conjungitur,  aliquid  Intelligere  in  actu,  nisi  convertendo  se  ad 
phantasmata. 
63  Ad  quintum  dicendum  quod  intellectus  poster  et  abstrahit  species  intelligibiles  a 
phantasmatibus,  inquantum  considerat  naturas  rerum  in  universaii;  et  tarnen  intelligit  eas  In 
phantasmatibus,  quia  non  potest  intelligere  etiam  ea  quorum  species  abstrahit,  nisi  convertendo  se 
ad  phantasmata,  ut  supra  dictum  est. 
64  McDermott  1996,  page  271. 107 
Processes,  rather  than  process  would  be  a  more  accurate  description.  According  to 
McDermott,  in  accord  with  his  "  oscillating  use  of  terms"  [the  ambiguity  of  conversio  and 
the  double  understanding  of  abstraction:  pure  form  and  quiddity]65  St.  Thomas  proposed  a 
double  understanding  of  abstraction: 
One  way  of  abstraction  is  by  "composition  and  division,  as  when  we  understand  that 
something  is  not  in  another  or  is  separated  from  it.  "  The  other  way  is  by  "simple  and 
absolute  consideration,  as  when  we  understand  one  [thing  or  aspect]  while 
considering  nothing  about  another.  "  The  former  corresponds  to  a  judgment  while  the 
latter  is  apparently  pure  conceptualisation.  For  falsity  can  apply  to  the  former  and  not 
to  the  latter.  66 
The  process  of  abstraction  can  take  two  forms  according  to  McDermott,  one  described  in 
terms  of  the  first  act  of  the  intellect,  the  other  described  in  terms  of  the  second  act  of  the 
intellect.  Prima  facie  such  an  understanding  seems  mistaken.  How  could  such  acts  be 
constitutive  of  the  process  of  abstraction,  when  they  themselves  actually  result  from  it?  At 
the  heart  of  McDermott's  argument  lies  what  Aquinas  writes  in  ST  1a  q85  al  ad1.  Closer 
scrutiny  of  this  text  reveals  McDermott's  error. 
In  this  passage  Aquinas  is  responding  to  the  criticism  that  the  intellect  cannot  understand 
corporeal  things  by  abstraction  from  the  sense  images  since  this  would  mean  that  the  intellect 
understands  the  object  other  than  it  really  is,  that  is,  separated  from  matter,  as  opposed  to 
what  it  really  is,  a  material  reality.  The  intellect  would  therefore  be  in  error.  To  this  argument 
St.  Thomas  responds  by  citing  two  senses  of  abstraction,  one  which  is  erroneous  the  other 
which  isn't: 
Abstraction  occurs  in  two  ways:  one,  by  way  of  combining  and  separating,  as  when 
we  understand  one  not  to  be  in  another  or  separate  from  it;  two,  by  way  of  simple 
and  absolute  consideration,  as  when  we  understand  one  without  considering  the 
other  at  all. 
And  so  although  for  the  intellect  in  the  first  way  to  abstract  objects  which  in 
reality  are  not  abstract  is  not  without  falsehood,  it  is  not  in  the  second  way,  as  clearly 
appears  with  sensible  realities.  For  example,  were  we  to  understand  or  say  that 
colour  does  not  exist  in  a  coloured  body,  or  that  it  exists  apart  from  it,  there  would 
be  falsehood  in  the  opinion  or  statement.  Whereas  were  we  to  consider  colour  and  its 
properties,  without  any  consideration  of  the  apple,  which  has  colour,  and  go  on  to 
express  verbally  what  we  thus  understand,  the  opinion  would  be  without  falsehood. 
For  being  an  apple  is  not  part  of  the  definition  of  colour,  and  thus  nothing  prevents 
colour  from  being  understood  apart  from  the  apple  being  understood. 
I  claim  like  wise  that  whatever  pertains  to  the  definition  of  any  species  of  material 
reality,  for  instance  stone  or  man  or  horse,  can  be  considered  without  individuating 
conditions  which  are  no  part  of  the  definition  of  the  species.  And  this  is  what  I  mean 
by  abstracting  the  universal  from  the  particular,  the  idea  from  the  sense  images,  to 
65  McDermott  1996,  page  276. 
66  ibid  page  276. 108 
consider  the  nature  of  the  species  without  considering  individuating  conditions 
represented  by  sense  images.  67 
There  are,  as  Aquinas  points  out,  two  senses  of  abstraction,  but  it  doesn't  follow  that  they 
have  the  significance  that  McDermott  assigns  to  them  because  Aquinas's  use  of  simple 
consideration  and  composition  and  division  in  the  above  extract  is  merely  illustrative,  used  to 
attack  the  criticism  which  has  been  made. 
Recall  that  this  criticism  suggested  that  the  intellect  is in  error  because  abstraction  means  that 
we  understand  things  differently  from  their  actual  existence.  Aquinas  agrees  that  the  criticism 
is  valid,  that  the  intellect  would  be  in  error,  if  the  abstraction  in  question  were  the  kind  of 
abstraction  illustrated  by  the  composition  and  division  example  (actually  the  examples  he 
uses  are  examples  of  division):  abstracting  colour  from  a  thing  and  saying  that  colour  does 
not  exist  in  a  coloured  body.  That  is  akin  to  abstracting  a  universal  from  a  particular  and 
saying  that  it  doesn't  exist  in  the  particular,  material  thing.  But  Aquinas  says  this  is  not  what 
is  meant  by  abstraction  of  the  universal  from  the  particular.  He  is  clear  that  we  do  not 
understand  the  species  of  stone  as  existing  apart  from  matter  because  clearly  the  species  of 
stone  does  exist  in  the  particular  stone,  as  colour  does  exist  in  a  coloured  body. 
The  abstraction  from  matter,  which  he  proposes,  is  illustrated  by  our  ability  of  simple  and 
absolute  consideration.  As  he  points  out,  in  this  activity  we  can  understand  colour  and  its 
properties  without  understanding  the  apple  whose  colour  it  is.  We  are  able  to  abstract  colour 
and  consider  it  separately  from  its  individuating  conditions  in  the  coloured  body.  Any 
statement  made  about  colour  and  its  properties  in  this  regard  would  be  without  error:  it  is  a 
simple  consideration  of  colour.  This  kind  of  abstraction  is  indicative  of  that  which  takes 
place  when  the  agent  intellect  abstracts  form  the  sense  images:  we  can  abstract  the  form  or 
whatever  pertains  to  the  definition  of  any  species  without  considering  the  actual  thing  which 
has  that  particular  nature.  This  abstraction  leads  to  a  simple  apprehension,  the  first  act  of  the 
intellect.  We  are  not  making  a  judgment  that  the  nature,  form  or  universal  doesn't  exist  in  a 
particular  thing,  so  it  is  not  erroneous.  We  are  merely  abstracting  it,  as  we  can  colour.  As  he 
67  Ad  primum  ergo  dicendum  quod  abstrahere  contingit  dupliciter.  Uno  modo,  per  modum 
compositionis  et  divisionis;  sicut  cum  intelligimus  aliquid  non  esse  in  also,  vel  esse  separatum  ab  eo. 
Alio  modo,  per  modum  simplicis  et  absolutae  considerationis;  sicut  cum  Intelligimus  unum,  nihil 
considerando  de  also. 
Abstrahere  igitur  per  intellectum  ea  quae  secundum  rem  non  sunt  abstracta,  secundum 
primum  modurn  abstrahendi  non  est  absque  falsitate.  Sed  secundo  modo  abstrahere  per 
intellectum  quae  non  sunt  abstracta  secundum  rem,  non  habet  falsitatem;  ut  in  sensibilibus 
manifeste  apparet.  Si  enim  intelligamus  vel  dicamus  colorem  non  finesse  corpora  colorato,  vel  esse 
separatum  ab  eo,  erit  falsitas  in  opinione  vel  in  oratione.  Si  vero  consideremus  colorem  et 
proprietates  ejus,  nihil  consideranted  de  porno  colorato,  vel  quod  sic  Intelligimus,  etiam  voce 
exprimamus;  erit  absque  falsitate  opinionis  et  orationis.  Pomum  enim  non  est  de  ratione  coloris;  et 
ideo  nihil  prohibet  colorem  intelligi,  nihil  Intelligendo  porno. 
Similiter  dico  quod  ea  quae  pertinent  ad  rationem  species  cujuslibet  res  materialis,  puta  lapidis  auf 
hominis  auf  equi,  possunt  considerari  sine  principiis  individualibus,  quae  non  sunt  de  ratione 
speciei.  Et  hoc  est  abstrahere  universale  a  particular],  vel  speciem  Intelligibilem  a  phantasmatibus, 
considerare  scilicet  naturam  species  absque  consideratione  individualium  principiorum,  quae  per 
phantasmata  repraesentantur. 109 
says  in  ST  la  q85  alc: 
.. 
it  is  proper  for  it  [the  intellect]  to  know  forms  which,  in  fact,  exist  individually  in 
corporeal  matter,  yet  not  precisely  as  existing  in  such  or  such  individual  matter.  Now 
to  know  something  which  in  fact  exists  in  individuated  matter,  but  not  as  existing  in 
such  or  such  individual  matter  is  to  abstract  a  form  from  individual  matter, 
represented  by  the  sense  images.  68 
Simple  consideration  and  composition  and  division  are  used  to  illustrate  two  senses  of 
abstraction.  In  particular  the  abstraction  associated  with  composition  and  division  is  used  to 
illustrate  the  erroneous  understanding  of  abstraction:  that,  if  this  were  the  actual  meaning  of 
abstraction  from  the  sense  images,  the  intellect  would,  indeed,  be  in  error.  But  this  is  not 
what  is  meant,  what  is  meant  is  illustrated  in  the  case  of  simple  consideration.  For  Aquinas 
there  is  only  one  type  of  abstraction  from  the  sense  images,  that  which  results  in  the 
intellect's  first  act:  simple  apprehension.  I  conclude  that  McDermott  is  mistaken  in  his 
interpretation.  Now  we  turn  to  the  other  aspect  of  the  ambivalence  of  abstraction  and 
consider  just  what  is  abstracted  and  apprehended. 
Earlier  we  noted  that  McDermott  identified  various  candidates  regarding  what  is  abstracted: 
form,  species,  universal  and  essence.  McDermott  notes  that  various  connections  are  made 
between  these  candidates: 
At  times  the  species  and  the  universal  are  identified  (ST  la  q85  alc;  q86  al  adl)  or 
they  are  distinguished  only  insofar  as  the  species  is  that  by  "by"or  "through"  which 
the  universal  is  understood  (ST  la  q85  alc;  q86  al).  Similarly  the  form  and  the 
species  are  considered  equivalents;  "the  likeness  of  the  reality  understood,  which  is 
the  intelligible  species,  is  the  form  according  to  which  the  intellect  understands"  (ST 
la  q85  a2c;  q14  a1c).  Yet  form  and  the  species  are  at  times  carefully  distinguished. 
[His  emphasis]69 
That  various  terms  are  used  cannot  be  denied.  Nevertheless  some  clarity  can  be  shed  on  the 
matter.  We'll  do  this  by  first  considering  the  issue  of  species,  then,  in  turn,  look  at  form, 
essence  and  universals. 
McDermott  cites  various  texts  [ST  la  q79  a4  ad4;  q84  a5c;  q86  a1c;  a2  ad2]  to  support  his 
thesis  that  species  are  abstracted.  Consideration  of  these  texts  show  that  there  are  two  senses 
of  species.  The  first  sense  of  species,  species  rerum,  pertains  to  the  nature  or  essence  of  a 
thing: 
An  intellectual  soul  is  indeed  actually  non-material,  but  it  is  in  a  state  of  potentiality 
68  Et  ideo  proprium  ejus  est  cognoscere  formam  in  materia  quidem  corporali  individualiter 
existentem,  non  tarnen  prout  est  in  tali  materia.  Cognoscere  vero  id  quod  est  in  materia  individuali, 
non  prout  est  in  tali  materia,  est  abstrahere  formam  in  materia  individuali  quam  repraesentant 
phantasmata. 
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as  regards  grasping  the  natures  of  things[determinatas  species  rerum  ].  70 
As  the  phrase  "species  taken  from  things"  indicates  this  sense  of  species  is  abstracted.  71 
While  the  other  sense  of  species  is  also  abstracted  it  differs  significantly  from  species  rerum. 
This  sense  refers  to  what  the  intellect  manufactures  in  its  operations,  which  is  why  its  proper 
name  is  intelligible  species,  species  intelligibilis.  Strictly  speaking  intelligible  species  are  the 
means  by  which  we  have  knowledge  of  reality,  they  are  not  themselves  the  objects  of  our 
knowledge.  As  Aquinas  states  in  response  to  arguments  that  intelligible  species  are  what  we 
understand: 
..  Therefore  the  species  is  not  what  is  understood,  but  that  by  which  the  intellect 
understands.  72  [Editor's  emphasis] 
The  clarity  of  Aquinas'  position  on  what  we  know  aside,  there  is  room  for  confusion. 
Confusion  may  emerge  because  `intelligible  species'  can  be  used  in  a  broad  sense  to  describe 
intellectual  entities,  such  as  forms,  universals  and  even  the  species  rerum  which  the  intellect 
grasps  by  abstraction  from  material  reality,  yet,  as  in  ST  la  q86  alc  where  Aquinas  says  that 
the  intellect  knows  the  universal  directly  by  means  of  a  species73,  species  intelligibilis  can 
also  be  used  in  a  much  narrower  sense  to  refer  solely  to  abstracted  forms,  the  means  by 
which  the  intellect  knows.  Only  by  recognising  this  can  we  avoid  the  apparent  circularity  that 
a  universal  is  an  intelligible  species  which  is  also  known  by  an  intelligible  species. 
These  broad  and  narrow  uses  of  `intelligible  species'  are  the  explanation  of  McDermott's 
observation  that  species  is  sometimes  identified  with  universal  and  form,  but  at  other  times 
species  is  distinguished  from  forms  and  universals.  The  sense  of  species  being  used  in  a 
given  context  determines  whether  form  or  universal  is  identified  with  or  distinguished  from 
it.  Apart  from  identifying  the  broader  and  narrower  sense  of  species  intelligibilis,  there  is  no 
hard  and  fast  rule  that  can  be  formulated  in  this  regard,  only  by  considering  each  context  can 
we  decide  which  sense  of  species  is  being  used.  So  for  example,  Aquinas  says  in  ST  1a  q85 
a2c  that  it  is  by  means  of  a  likeness[similitudo]  of  the  visible  thing  that  the  faculty  of  sight 
sees.  This  likeness  is  the  vehicle  by  which  we  see  the  object  in  the  world.  Similarly,  it  is  by 
means  of  intelligible  species,  an  intelligible  likeness  of  the  thing  understood,  that  the  soul 
knows  things  which  are  outside  of  it.  These  different  likenesses  in  the  sense  organs  and  the 
intellect,  are  the  vehicles  by  which  we  sense  and  understand  things  in  the  world.  In  the  case 
of  the  intellect  the  intelligible  species  are  the  forms  by  which  the  soul  understands  its  direct 
70  ST  1a  q79  a4  ad4  Ad  quartum  dicendum  quod  anima  intellectiva  est  quidem  actu  immaterialis, 
sed  est  in  potentia  ad  determinatas  species  rerum.  It  has  to  be  noted  that  the  Blackfriars'  translation 
doesn't  offer  a  literal  translation  of  'determinatas  species  rerum  "determinate  species  of  things', 
prefering  'the  natures  of  things"  instead.  The  use  of  the  word  determinate  indicates  the  sense  In 
which  species  is  used  here;  that  which  makes  this  thing  to  be  one  of  the  kind  which  it  is,  its 
determinating  factor. 
71  See  also  ST  1a  q85  al  ad  4.  Ad  quartum  dicendum  quod  phantasmata  et  illuminantur  ab 
intellectu  agente,  et  iterum  ab  eis,  per  virtutem  intellectus  agentis,  species  intelligibiles 
abstrahuntur. 
72  ST  1a  q85  a2sc.  Ergo  species  intelligibilis  non  est  quod  Intelligitur,  sed  id  quo  Intelligit 
intellectus. 
73  Sic  igitur  ipsum  universale  per  speciem  intelligibilem  directe  intelligit... 111 
object,  the  quiddity  of  material  things.  This  quiddity  is  a  universal:  a  universal  which  will  be 
known  by  means  of  a  likeness,  the  form  of  the  thing  existing  in  the  intellect.  Therefore,  in 
one  sense  a  universal  is  an  intelligible  species  yet,  in  another  sense  it  will  be  known  by  an 
intelligible  species. 
McDermott's  concern  draws  our  attention  to  a  situation  in  which  there  can  easily  be 
misunderstanding.  We  have  attempted  to  remove  the  danger  of  confusion  and 
misunderstanding:  when  Aquinas  talks  of  species  he  may  be  referring  to  species  intelligibilis 
or species  rerum.  Moreover,  species  intelligibilis  can  be  used  in  either  a  wide  or  narrow 
sense.  Consequently,  great  care  must  be  taken  to  determine  which  sense  of  species  is  being 
used  in  a  given  context.  In  the  following  discussion  we  will  see  species  used  in  its  various 
senses. 
One  kind  of  species  intelligibilis  is  an  abstracted  form.  Form  is  a  complex  notion.  For  our 
purposes  we  will  take  it  to  mean  that  which  determines  something  to  be  one  of  the  kind 
which  it  is.  Thus  it  is  the  form  catness  which  determines  that  the  particular  parcel  of  matter 
which  we  call  Tibbles  is  a  cat.  As  Aquinas  wrote  in  discussing  the  soul's  role  as  the  form  of 
the  body: 
Everything  has  its  species  determined  by  its  formative  principles  74 
Earlier,  when  we  considered  McDermott's  account  of  two  types  of  abstraction  we  noted  that 
in  ST  la  q85  a1c  Aquinas  wrote: 
It  is  proper  for  it  [the  human  intellect]  to  know  forms  which,  in  fact,  exist 
individually  in  corporeal  matter,  yet  not  precisely  as  existing  in  such  or  such 
individual  matter.  75 
It  is  the  form  of  the  object  which  the  intellect  grasps  by  abstraction  from  the  sense  images. 
So,  in  the  case  of  Tibbles,  the  agent  intellect  abstracts  the  form  catness  from  the  particular 
existent,  we  saw  this  in  ST  la  q85  a2c,  just  cited.  Haldane  describes  Aquinas'  position: 
...  the  forms  or  natures  [quiddities]  which  give  structure  to  the  world,  and  the 
concepts  which  give  `shape'  to  thought,  are  one  and  the  same.  Thus  a  cat  and  the 
idea  of  a  cat  differ  not  in  nature,  that  is  catness  in  both  cases,  but  in  modes  of  the 
exemplification  of  this  nature.  Felix,  instantiates  (or  better,  from  the  point  of  view 
of  avoiding  Platonism,  actualises  a  case  of)  felinity  in  esse  naturale,  and  in  my  ý. 
thinking  of  him  actualises  the  very  same  form  (qua  universal)  in  esse  intentionale. 
[Author's  emphasis]76 
Sandra  Edwards  expresses  similar  sentiments: 
--  Once  we  abstract  from  existence,  there  is  simply  no  difference  between  the  form  or 
74  ST  1a  q76  a1  cSortitur  autem  unumquodque  speciem  per  propriam  formam. 
75  Et  ideo  proprium  ejus  est  cognoscere  formam  In  materia  quidem  corporali  Individualiter 
existentem,  non  tarnen  prout  est  in  tali  materia. 
76  Haldane  1994,  page  21.  The  distinction  Haldane  makes  here  between  esse  intentionale  and 
esse  naturale  derives  from  Peter  Geach's  famous  paper  'Form  and  Existence'  Proceedings  of  the 
Aristotelian  Society  1954-1955  pages  250-276.  Anthony  Kenny  also  discusses  the  matter  In  his 
book  Aquinas  :  cf  Kenny  1980,  page  79ff. 112 
nature  of  the  object  known  and  the  form  or  nature  received  by  the  intellect?? 
Edwards  is  a  little  careless  to  run  together  form  and  nature.  The  terms  are  not  strictly 
synonymous.  Nevertheless,  the  sentiments  of  her  comments  and  those  of  Haldane  clarify 
succinctly  Aquinas'  thought.  Furthermore,  these  extracts  also  raise  important  issues  which 
will  be  addressed  in  due  course:  the  question  of  just  how  the  intellect  grasps  forms  from  the 
sense  images;  what  is  meant  by  a  form  having  intentional  and  natural  being.  However,  we 
leave  these  issues  for  the  moment  as  we  continue  our  consideration  of  abstraction. 
It  is  the  form  of  the  thing  which  the  intellect  abstracts.  This  is  how  it  understands  material 
things.  In  outlining  this  account  Aquinas  notes  a  possible  objection: 
Nothing  can  be  understood  without  something  which  is  required  for  its  definition. 
Hence  material  things  cannot  be  understood  without  matter.  But  matter  is  the 
principle  of  individuation.  Therefore  material  things  cannot  be  understood  by 
abstracting  the  universal  from  the  particular,  which  is  the  same  as  abstracting  species 
from  the  sense  images.  lS 
The  putative  objector's  point,  one  which  we  have  already  looked  at  in  discussing 
McDermott's  theory  of  dual  abstraction,  can  be  made  more  explicit:  even  granted  that  the 
forms  which  give  structure  to  the  world  and  the  concepts  which  constitute  thought  are  one 
and  the  same,  can  we  really  claim  that  we  can  understand  things  by  grasping  their  forms, 
when  their  forms  lack  an  essential  attribute  of  the  thing:  matter?  Yes,  for  reasons  which  have 
been  stated  earlier.  The  doctrine  of  abstraction  does  not  say  that  the  form  exists  apart  from 
matter  in  reality: 
Hence,  the  understanding  would  be  false  if  one  should  so  abstract  the  species  of 
stone  from  matter  that  he  would  understand  it  to  exist  apart  from  matter,  as  Plato 
held  79 
This  point  can  be  developed.  The  intellect  considers  the  thing  by  grasping  its  form,  and  this 
grasp  is  immaterial.  But,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  consideration  of  the  thing,  which 
consists  in  such  a  grasping  of  form,  is  a  consideration  of  the  thing  as  if  the  thing  were 
immaterial.  It  is  by  these  forms  that  we  know  material  things.  In  knowing  material  things, 
for  example,  a  cat,  the  intellect  does  not  have  to  separate  the  notion  of  cat  from  the  notion  of 
matter.  Aquinas  attempts  to  explain  this  complex  issue  in  his  response: 
Some  have  thought  that  the  species  of  natural  things  is  all  form,  that  matter  is  not  a 
part  of  the  species;  but  if  this  were  so,  matter  would  not  be  included  in  definitions  of 
natural  things....  The  intellect  abstracts  the  species  of  a  natural  thing  from  individual 
77  Edwards  1985,  page  82. 
78  ST1a  q85  a1.2  Praeterea,  res  materiales  sunt  res  naturales,  In  quarum  definitione  cadit  materia. 
Sed  nihil  potest  intelligi  sine  eo  quod  cadit  indefinitione  eius.  Ergo  res  materiales  non  possunt 
intelligi  sine  materia.  Sed  materia  est  individuationis  principium.  Ergo  res  materiales  non  possunt 
intelligi  per  abstractionem  universalis  a  particulari,  quod  est  abstrahere  species  intelligibiles  a 
phantasmatibus. 
79  ST  1a  q85  al  ad1  Unde  falsus  esset  intellectus,  si  sic  abstraheret  speciem  lapidis  a  materia,  ut 
intelligeret  earn  non  esse  in  materia,  ut  Plato  posuit. 113 
sensible  matter,  but  not  common  sensible  matter.  80 
From  the  wider  context  it  is  apparent  that  species  is  used  here  in  the  sense  of  essence.  The 
underlying  thrust  of  the  argument  is  this:  the  intellect  abstracts  the  form  of  a  material  thing 
and  knows  by  means  of  such  forms.  The  abstracted  form,  as  we  have  seen  is  the  means  by 
which  we  understand.  What  we  understand  is  the  quiddity  of  the  thing  Unlike  form, 
essence  or  quiddity  also  contains  a  reference  to  matter,  as  we  saw  in  chapter  one,  common 
matter.  For  this  reason  with  respect  to  a  material  thing's  definition,  what  the  thing  is, 
essence,  not  form,  is  offered  as  the  definition  of  the  thing  because  strictly  speaking  form 
lacks  this  essential  material  dimension. 
This  grasp  of  essence  is  the  intellect's  grasp  of  its  proper  object  and  is  the  answer  to  quid 
est?  This  grasp  of  essence  will  be  closely  scrutinised.  Before  we  begin  that  analysis  we  will 
look  at  the  final  candidate  of  abstraction  which  McDermott  offers:  the  universal. 
Aquinas  uses  the  term  `universal'  in  several  different  ways,  some  of  which  are  more  relevant 
to  our  consideration  of  quid  est?  than  others,  but  none  of  which  are  really  irrelevant.  One 
sense  of  universal  is  indicated  by  the  following 
With  respect  to  space,  for  instance,  when  a  thing  is  seen  from  a  distance,  it  is 
recognised  as  a  body  before  it  is  recognised  as  an  animal,  as  an  animal  before  being 
recognised  as  a  man,  and  as  a  man  before  Socrates  or  Plato.  81 
The  sense  of  universal  discussed  here  is  that  of  something  more  general  to  something  less 
general.,  So,  for  example,  with  respect  to  cats  and  dogs,  animal  is  a  universal  concept 
because  both  cats  and  dogs  come  under  the  term  animal.  We  can  know  such  `universal 
wholes',  as  Aquinas  calls  them,  either  distinctly,  that  is  we  can  know  that  the  class  of  animal 
includes  such  things  as  cats  and  dogs,  or  indistinctly,  we  just  know  the  class  of  animal 
without  knowing  what  comes  under  this  universal.  82  At  this  point  in  our  discussion,  this 
sense  of  universal  is  not  particularly  relevant.  It  will  be  later. 
In  The  Commentary  on  the  Metaphysics  Aquinas  notes  two  other  senses  of  universal. 
It  [the  universal]  can  be  taken  to  mean  the  nature  of  the  thing  to  which  the  intellect 
attributes  the  aspect  of  universality,  and  in  this  sense  universals  such  as  genera  and 
species  signify  the  substance  of  things  inasmuch  as  they  are  predicated 
quidditatively;  for  animal  signifies  the  substance  of  the  thing  of  which  it  is 
predicated,  and  so  also  does  man.  Second  a  universal  can  be  taken  insofar  as  it  is 
universal,  and  insofar  as  the  nature  predicated  of  a  thing  falls  under  the  aspect  of 
80  ibid  ad  2.  Ad  secundum  dicendum  quod  quidam  putaverunt  quod  species  rel  naturalis  sit  forma 
solum,  et  quod  materia  non  sit  pars  speciei.  Sed  secundum  hoc,  in  definitionibus  rerum  naturalium 
non  poneretur  materia.....  Intellectus  igitur  abstrahit  speciem  rei  naturalis  a  materia  sensibili 
individuali,  non  autem  a  materia  sensibili  communi. 
81  ST  1a  q85  a3c  Secundum  locum  quidem,  sicut,  cum  aliquid  videtur  a  remotis,  prius 
deprehenditur  esse  corpus,  quarr  deprehendatur  esse  animal;  et  prius  homo,  quarr  Socrates  vel 
Plato. 
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universality,  i.  e.  insofar  as  animal  or  man  is  considered  as  one-in-many.  And  this 
is  the  sense  the  Platonists  claimed  that  animal  and  man  in  their  universal  aspect 
constituted  substances.  83 
Both  senses  are  closely  related.  The  first  sense  noted  is  the  sense  in  which  the  universal  can 
be  said  to  indicate  what  the  thing  is.  In  other  words,  this  sense  of  universal  is  just  another 
name  for  nature  or  essence  which  signifies  what  a  thing  is.  Note  however,  that  such 
signification  can  take  place  on  either  the  level  of  genus  or  species.  This  will  be  of  relevance 
later. 
The  second  sense  of  universal  in  In  Meta  VII.  13  focuses  on  the  actual  issue  of  the 
universality  of  such  natures,  as  opposed  to  the  universal  being  the  nature.  Immediately 
following  the  extract  taken  from  In  Meta  VII.  13  Aquinas  goes  on  to  say  that  such 
universals,  abstracted  from  individuating  conditions,  only  exist  in  the  mind  and  are  not  real 
substances  as  proposed  by  Plato.  He  stresses  this  point  elsewhere,  where  drawing  together 
both  of  the  above  senses,  he  writes: 
..  the  one  outside  the  many,  not  according  to  autonomous  existence,  but  according  to 
the  consideration  of  the  intellect  which  considers  a  nature,  say  man,  without 
referring  to  Socrates  and  Plato.  But  even  though  it  is  one  outside  the  many  according 
to  the  intellect's  consideration,  nevertheless  in  the  sphere  of  existence  it  exists  in  all 
singulars  one  and  the  same:  not  numerically  however,  as  though  the  humanity  of  all 
men  where  numerically  one,  but  according  to  the  notion  of  species.  84 
This  is  the  sense  of  the  one  in  the  many,  the  sense  in  which  the  intelligible  species,  the 
nature,  abstracted  from  matter  is  a  universal  and  can  be  considered  as  such.  85  This  is  the 
sense  which  we  have  seen  creeping  up  throughout  our  discussion  of  abstraction,  the  sense  in 
which  the  intellect,  for  example,  can  grasp  what  man  is  and  think  about  what  man  is, 
independently  of  any  particular  man.  This  is  the  sense  in  which  both  form  and  essence, 
although  different,  can  be  described  as  universals.  In  this  sense  the  term  `universal'  like  the 
term  `intelligible  species'  is  something  of  a  catch  all  term.  The  ability  to  abstract  the  universal 
is  the  basis  of  science: 
Science  is  had  of  things  because  there  is  found  to  be  a  one  in  many,  as  man  in 
83  In  Meta.  VII  13  Quod  universale  dupliciter  potest  accipi,  uno  modo  pro  ipsa  natura  cul 
intellectus  attribuit  intentionem  universalitatis;  et  sic  universalia,  ut  genera  et  species,  substantias 
rerum  significant  ut  praedicantur  in  quid.  Animal  enim  significat  substantiam  eius,  de  quo 
praedicatur,  et  homo  similiter.  Alio  modo  potest  accipi  universale  Inquantum  est  universale  et 
secundum  quod  natura  praedicata  subest  intentioni  universalitatis:  Idest  secundum  quod 
consideratur  animal  vel  homo,  ut  unum  in  multis,  et  sic  posuerunt  platonici  animal  et  hominem  in  sua 
universalitate  esse  substantias. 
84  In  P.  A.  II  20.  Unum  praeter  multa  non  quidem  secundum  esse,  sed  secundum 
considerationem  intellectus,  qui  considerat  naturam  aliquam,  puta  hominis,  non  respaciendo  ad 
Socratem  et  Platonem.  quod  etsi  secundum  considerationem  intellectus  sit  unum  praeter  multa 
tarnen  secundum  esse  est  in  omnibus  singularibus  unum  et  Idem  non  quidem  numero,  quasi  sit 
eadem  humanitas  numero  omnium  hominum  sed  secundum  rationem  species. 
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common  is  found  in  all  men,  for  there  is  no  science  of  singular  things.  86 
In  his  Commentary  on  the  Posterior  Analytics,  Aquinas  says  something  very  interesting 
about  the  universal,  the  one  in  the  many: 
Universals,  from  which  demonstration  proceeds,  don't  become  known  to  us  except 
by  induction.  87 
He  expresses  similar  thoughts  in  In  P.  A.  11  20.  Commenting  on  that  text  Scott  MacDonald 
makes  the  important  point  that  Aquinas  doesn't  use  induction  in  the  sense  of  an  inductive 
generalisation,  but  rather  he  uses  it  to  describe  the  process  of  the  intellect  going  through 
individual  cases  which  cause  the  intellect  to  grasp  the  universals  contained  in  the 
particulars.  88  This  description  of  induction  will  be  a  key  issue  in  our  description  of  how  the 
intellect  abstracts  from  the  senses. 
Over  the  last  few  pages  we  have  addressed  some  of  the  issues  raised  by  McDermott  and 
clarified  what  he  considers  to  be  ambiguities  and  ambivalences  in  Aquinas'  thought.  We 
have  seen  that  there  is  no  real  ambiguity  regarding  conversio  ad  phantasmata.  More 
importantly,  we  have  also  shown  that  there  are  not  two  senses  of  abstraction.  Regarding 
what  is  abstracted  we  have  shown  how  the  various  terms,  species,  form,  essence  and 
universal  interconnect.  At  the  outset  of  this  discussion  we  said  that  our  consideration  of 
McDermott  would  serve  as  a  catalyst  for  our  consideration  of  how  the  intellect  answers  quid 
est?  It  serves  as  a  catalyst  in  this  regard:  we  have  clarified  abstraction  and  what  is 
abstracted,  but  a  far  deeper  question  still  remains:  just  how  in  its  first  act,  does  the  intellect 
grasp  the  quiddity  of  the  thing  from  the  sense  images,  as  Aquinas  claims?  Over  the  next  few 
pages  we  will  attempt  to  answer  this  question. 
Given  the  connection  between  form  and  quiddity  which  we  acknowledged  above,  our 
discussion  will  necessarily  entail  a  consideration  of  the  role  of  form  in  this  process. 
Previously,  when  discussing  the  role  of  form  in  Aquinas'  epistemology,  we  have  made 
reference  to  the  formal  identity  which  exists  between  the  object  and  the  object  as  it  is  thought 
of.  This  identity,  we  saw,  was  expressed  in  terms  of  the  natural  being  [esse  naturale]  of  the 
form  in  the  object  and  the  intentional  being  [esse  intentionale]  of  the  form  in  the  mind.  We 
have  seen  John  Haldane  attempt  to  explain  the  identity.  Haldane  also  discusses  the  identity  in 
`Forms  of  Thought',  an  article  written  for  a  work  celebrating  the  philosophy  of  Roderick 
Chisholm.  89  He  writes: 
The  application  of  the  ontology  of  forms  to  the  theory  of  cognition  requires  not  only 
that  there  are  natures  but  that  these  are  open  to  radically  different  manners  of 
86  In  Meta  III  10.  Tertia  ratio  est  quia  scientia  habetur  de  rebus  per  hoc  quod  unum  invenitur  In 
multis.  Sicut  homo  communis  invenitur  in  omnibus  hominibus,  non  enim  scientia  de  singularibus. 
87  In  P.  A.  I  30.  Universalia,  ex  quibus  demonstratio  procedit,  non  fiunt  nobis  nota,  nisi  per 
inductionem 
88  MacDonald  1993,  page  183. 
89  Haldane  1997. 116 
exemplification;  more  particularly,  that  one  and  the  same  form  can  exist  both 
naturally  and  intentionally  90 
Chisholm  once  stated  that  attempts  to  make  the  doctrine  of  formal  identity  intelligible  had 
been  unsuccessful.  Haldane  recalls  Chisholm's  remarks  91  In  the  course  of  his  discussion 
Haldane  attempts  to  meet  the  challenge  of  explaining  intelligibly  the  doctrine  of  formal 
identity: 
Consider  cases  in  which  what  John  is  thinking  of  is  a  man,  or  the  universal 
Humanity.  These  entail  that  the  same  form  is  exemplified  twice  and  it  is  John  that 
does  the  exemplifying  on  both  occasions.  We  might  say  that  the  generation  of  the 
humanity-of-John  is  something  additional  to  exemplification  as  such;  but  we  cannot 
escape  tying  some  exemplifications  to  the  existence  of  individualised  forms. 
Consequently  there  is  reason  to  distinguish  between  that  sort  of  exemplification 
which  occurs  when  so  much  stuff  exhibits  a  certain  nature,  and  which  entails  the 
existence  of  a  singular  form  -a  particular  entity  distinct  from  other  specifically 
identical  cases  -  and  another  kind  of  exemplification  which  involves  the  occurrence 
of  the  form  as  such,  and  not  the  generation  of  a  case.  This  distinction,  I  suggest,  - 
provides  a  coherent  interpretation  of  the  theory  of  esse  naturale  and  esse 
intentionale..........  Through  experience  and  reason  the  subject  comes  to  acquire 
concepts  that  are  intentional  counterparts  of  naturally  existing  substantial  and 
accidental  forms,  and  thereby  an  intrinsic  connection  between  mind  and  world  is 
established  92 
From  a  Thomist  perspective  Professor  Haldane's  account  is  an  accurate  and  intelligible 
description  of  St.  Thomas's  thought;  a  coherent  account  of  what  is  meant  by  a  form  having 
two  manners  of  existence.  Furthermore,  he  highlights,  as  we  shall,  the  importance  of 
experience.  This  praise  aside,  whether  his  non-thomist  colleagues,  particularly,  the 
Roderick  Chisholms  of  this  world,  those  trained  in  the  tradition  of  anglo-American  analytical 
philosophy,  find  the  account  intelligible,  is  another  matter. 
In  fact,  I  would  suspect  that  they  probably  don't,  not  least  because  they  consider  form  to  be 
a  mediaeval  nonsense.  Nevertheless,  even  if  they  did  grant  that  there  were  such  entities  as 
forms,  I  suspect  that  they  would  still  find  the  matter  unintelligible.  Much  of  the  blame  for 
this  rests  on  the  mystery  which  seems  to  surround  a  form  existing  in  the  world  and  then 
coming  to  exist  in  the  mind.  It  is  the  same  issue  with  respect  to  quiddities:  it  seems  that 
intellect  just  magically  grasps  them.  This  is  where  Haldane's  account  and  indeed  accounts 
by  other  interpreters  of  St.  Thomas  are  lacking,  they  don't  really  explain  how  the  intellect 
comes  to  acquire  the  form  or  quiddity  from  the  sense  images,  or  as  Haldane  put  it  above 
"come  to  acquire  concepts  that  are  intentional  counterparts  of  naturally  existing  substantial 
and  accidental  forms.  "  They  never  really  address  the  question  we  set  ourselves  above:  just 
how  in  its  first  act,  does  the  intellect  grasp  the  quiddity  of  the  thing  from  the  sense  images? 
90  ibid  page  160. 
91  ibid  page  149. 
92  ibid  page  163. 117 
Some  commentators  such  as  Owens  see  that  task  as  outside  the  remit  of  epistemology: 
The  process  by  which  the  nature  is  abstracted  from  the  individuals  is  not  a  concern  of 
epistemology.  It  gives  rise  to  difficult  questions  treated  in  metaphysics  and  in  the 
philosophy  of  nature  93 
There  is  a  sense  in  which  Owens  is  correct.  However,  we  would  disagree  with  Owens' 
assertion  that  a  consideration  of  this  process  of  abstraction  is  not  the  concern  of 
epistemology.  Indeed  we  would  go  further  and  say  that  depending  on  how  one  approaches 
the  issue,  a  digression  into  metaphysics  and  philosophy  of  nature  is  avoidable.  It  could  be 
approached  by  closely  analysing  the  working  of  the  agent  intellect  and  other  issues  such  as 
species  impressa  and  species  expressa.  94  Such  an  approach  would  inevitably  lead  to  the 
difficult  issues  of  which  Owens  warns.  However,  in  the  pertinent  sections  of  ST  1a  q84ff 
while  St.  Thomas  does  speak  of  the  role  of  the  agent  intellect  and  other  aspects  of  human 
psychology,  there  is  no  indepth  analysis  of  the  psychological  processes  involved.  For 
example,  little  mention  is  made  of  species  impressa,  species  expressa.  Aquinas  approaches 
the  issues  of  abstraction  on  a  more  general  level,  preferring  to  speak,  as  we  have  seen  about 
phantasmata  and  species  intelligibilis.  For  this  reason,  following  St.  Thomas'  example,  -we 
will  avoid  too  detailed  an  approach.  95  Like  him,  we  will  be  more  general  in  our  treatment  of 
the  issues,  analysing  the  process  of  abstraction  by  means  of  examples  which  will  allow  us  to 
sketch  broadly  the  issues  involved  without  being  distracted  by  the  nuances  of  Aquinas' 
mediaeval  psychology.  Approaching  the  issues  on  this  level  we  will  see,  contra  Owens,  how 
abstraction  is  a  concern  of  epistemology  because  it  illustrates  the  descriptive  nature  of 
Aquinas'  theory  of  knowledge:  it  illustrates  a  central  facet  how  the  intellect  answers  quid  est? 
The  first  step  in  our  analysis  how  a  form  can  have  esse  naturale  and  esse  intentionale  and 
how  the  intellect  grasps  the  quiddities  of  material  things  is  to  return  to  what  Aquinas  says 
regarding  the  formation  of  universals  by  induction.  He  writes: 
For  if  many  singulars  are  taken  which  are  without  difference  as  to  some  one  item 
existing  in  them,  that  one  item  according  to  which  they  are  not  different,  once  it  is 
received  in  the  mind,  is  the  first  universal,  no  matter  what  it  may  be,  i.  e.  whether  it 
pertains  to  the  essence  of  the  singular  or  not.  For  since  we  find  that  Socrates  and 
Plato  and  many  others  are  without  difference  as  to  whiteness,  we  take  this  one  item, 
namely  white,  as  a  universal  which  is  an  accident.  Similarly  because  we  find  that 
Socrates  and  Plato  and  the  others  are  not  different  as  to  rationality,  this  one  item  in 
which  they  do  not  differ,  namely  rationality,  we  take  as  a  universal  which  is  an 
93  Owens  1992b,  page  140. 
94  Species  impressa  is  a  form  abstracted  from  the  sense  images.  Species  expressa  is  a  mental 
word  or  concept  corresponding  to  this  form. 
95  Admittedly,  we  are  focusing  on  the  pyschological  component  of  perceptual  knowledge, 
however,  there  is  a  limit  to  the  depth  in  which  this  component  can  be  investigated  while  still 
maintaining  that  this  is  a  work  of  epistemology  and  not  pyschology. 118 
essential  difference.  96 
He  goes  on: 
For  sense  knows  Callias  not  only  insofar  forth  as  he  is  Callias,  but  also  as  he  is  this 
man;  and  similarly  Socrates  as  he  is  this  man.  As  a  result  of  such  an  attainment 
preexisting  in  the  sense,  the  intellective  soul  can  consider  man  in  both  97 
These  are  key  texts.  Of  interest  to  us  is  the  description  of  how  universals  are  formed  from 
information  preexisting  in  sensory  apprehension:  the  intellect,  searching,  as  it  were,  for 
elements  which  things  have  in  common,  and  through  abstraction  from  the  particular 
instances  represented  by  the  sense  images,  forming  universal  concepts. 
The  first  extract  describes  how  universal  forms  of  accidental  properties  such  as  colour  are 
formed.  Universals  can  be  either  accidental  or  essential  with  respect  to  the  object. 
Determining  which  is  the  case  depends  on  recognising  which  attributes  an  object  must  have 
in  order  to  be  one  of  that  kind.  Thus,  having  the  attribute  of  rationality  is  essential  to  being 
human,  if  a  thing  is  not  rational,  it  is  not  human.  However,  on  the  other  hand,  a  thing  may 
not  be  white,  but  may  still  be  a  human.  Clearly  such  a  recognition  is  a  judgment  made  after 
the  intellect  has  grasped  its  proper  object  in  its  first  act  and  on  the  basis  of  our  experience.  In 
order  to  grasp  that  proper  object,  the  intellect  must  be  informed  by  the  substantial  form  of  the 
object.  The  second  extract  deals  with  this.  It  focuses  not  on  the  formation  of  universals  of 
accidental  properties,  but  the  formation  of  universals  of  the  natural  kinds,  the  one  in  many, 
of  which  we  saw  St.  Thomas  speak.  It  is  this  which  we  are  particularly  interested  in  as  we 
try  to  explain  how  a  substantial  form  existing  in  esse  naturale  in  the  object  comes  to  exist  in 
esse  intentionale  in  the  intellect.  We  will  approach  the  matter  by  means  of  an  example. 
Walking  once  through  the  local  park  I  see  two  people  exercising  their  pets.  The  first  pet  I  can 
tell  is  a  dog.  I  have  seen  dogs  before,  so  I  am  able  to  classify  the  living  parcel  of  hair  that  I 
see  as  a  dog.  When  I  look  at  the  other  pet  I  cannot  tell  what  it  is  that  is  being  exercised.  It  is 
clearly  not  a  dog,  it  is  too  small.  Nor  is  it  a  cat.  All  I  can  tell  is  that  it  is  some  kind  of 
mammal. 
In  both  perceptions  the  same  process  has  occurred.  My  intellect  abstracts  from  the  sense 
images  what  it  is  that  I  am  sensing.  In  the  perception  of  the  dog,  the  intellect  abstracts 
assorted  universals:  the  colour  of  the  hair,  it's  shape.  Powers  are  also  universalised  98 
96  In  P.  A.  II  20.  Si  enim  accipiantur  multa  singularia,  quae  sunt  indifferentia  quantum  ad  aliquid 
unum  in  eis  existens,  illud  unum  secundum  quod  non  differunt,  in  anima  acceptum,  est  primum 
universale,  quidquid  sit  illud,  sive  scilicet  pertineat  ad  essentiam  singularium,  sive  non  quia  enim 
invenimus  Socratem  et  Platonem  et  multo  alios  esse  indifferentes  quantum  ad  albedinem, 
accipimus  hoc  unum,  scilicet  album,  quasi  universale  quod  est  accidens.  Et  similiter  quia  Invenimus 
Socratem  et  Platonem  et  alios  esse  indifferentes  quantum  ad  rationalem,  hoc  unum  in  quo  non 
differunt,  scilicet  rationale,  accipimus  quasi  universale  quod  est  differentia. 
97  ibid.  Sed  tarnen  sensus  est  quodammodo  etiam  universalis.  Cognoscit  enim  Calliam  non  solum 
in  quantum  est  Callias,  sed  etiam  in  quantum  est  hic  homo,  et  similiter  Socratem  in  quantum  tali 
aciptione  sensus  praeexistente,  anima  intellectiva  potest  considerare  hominem  in  utroque. 
98  See  In  P.  A.  1120  where  in  relation  to  Plato  and  Socrates,  rationality  is  taken  as  a  universal. 119 
Furthermore,  as  we  saw  above,  the  kind  of  thing  which  the  object  is  also  universalised.  To 
understand  how  this  is  possible  we  must  look  at  Aquinas'  ontology.  An  object  is  not  just  a 
cluster  of  properties,  nor  is  substance  a  bare  particular,  it  cannot  exist  without  any  accidents. 
Hence  the  existence  of  a  substance  is  indicated  by  the  existence  of  the  accidents  which,  of 
course,  depend  on  substance  for  instantiation.  The  kind  of  thing  a  substance  is  determines 
the  various  powers  and  most  of  the  accidental  properties  which  it  has  99  Conversely,  it  is  by 
considering  such  accidents  and  powers  that  a  substance  can  be  identified  as  one  of  a  kind. 
Thus  a  particular  substance  is  a  man  because  it  has  the  accidents  and  powers  associated  with 
that  kind  of  substance:  upright,  rational,  language-using  biped:  to  use  Haldane's  phrase 
again,  it  exhibits  a  certain  nature.  Given  these  accidental  properties  and  powers,  the  senses 
perceive  a  particular  substance,  a  man.  By  considering  various  men,  what  they  have  in 
common,  the  properties  and  powers  associated  with  that  kind  of  thing,  a  universal  form,  or 
concept  `humanity'  can  be  abstracted.  This  is  how  Aquinas  can  say  that  there  is  a  likeness 
between  the  form  as  it  exists  in  the  individual  and  the  form  as  it  exists  in  the  intellect.  The 
features  exhibited  by  the  abstracted  form  correspond  to  the  features  found  in  individual 
humans.  In  ST  la  q85  a2c  Aquinas  tries  to  describe  the  likeness  by  using  the  analogy  of' 
heat:  the  heat  of  a  heater  is like  that  of  the  thing  heated.  IOO  To  get  back  to  our  example  of  the 
park,  in  the  case  of  the  dog,  this  object  is  recognised  to  be  a  dog  because  it  is  recognised  to 
be  an  instantiation  of  the  form  'caninity'  which  my  intellect  has  formed  over  its  many 
encounters  with  dogs.  The  quiddity  which  the  intellect  grasps  is  described  by  the  concept 
`dog'.  A  judgment  can  be  formed:  "there  is  a  dog.  "  Notice  that  experience  plays  an  important 
role  in  this  process.  From  previous  experience  I  already  had  a  grasp  of  the  concept  `dog'  and 
what  it  is  to  be  a  dog.  Experience  is  crucial  in  the  formation  of  such  forms,  and  we  shall 
argue,  in  the  quiddity  which  the  intellect  is  claimed  to  grasp.  This  is  apparent  in  the  case  of 
the  other  animal. 
In  this  case,  the  unknown  animal  will  have  various  accidental  properties  and  different 
powers  which  can  be  abstracted  and  universalised.  However,  given  that  I  have  never 
encountered  such  a  beast  before  how  can  I  claim  to  grasp  the  substantial  form  of  the  thing? 
Can  we  say  that  its  substantial  form  is  abstracted  and  universalised?  Yes,  but  incompletely, 
because  the  abstracted  accidents  and  powers  will  be  indicative  of  the  substantial  form,  in  the 
way  that  the  accidents  and  properties:  upright,  rational,  language-using  biped  are  indicative 
of  the  substantial  form  humanity.  In  this  sense  the  substantial  form  is  abstracted.  However, 
given  our  ignorance  of  what  kind  of  animal  the  creature  is,  the  grasp  of  quiddity  will  be  at 
the  level  of  genus,  as  opposed  to  species  as  in  the  case  of  the  dog.  Given  the  properties  and 
powers  of  the  thing  the  concept  used  to  describe  it  is  `animal.  '  It  is  up  to  us  to  discover  what 
kind  of  animal  has  these  properties  and  powers.  Once  we  discover  this  we  can  classify  it  in  a 
more  specific  way. 
99  Clearly  some  accidental  properties  are  determined  by  extrinsic  causes.  The  heat  of  a  burning  log 
Is  the  result  of  the  fire  and  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  fact  that  the  log  is  a  piece  of  wood. 
100  Ut  calor  calefaciens  est  similitudo  calefacti;  similiter  forma  secundum  quam  provenit  actio 
manens  in  agente  est  similitudo  objecti. 120 
This  highlights  the  importance  of  experience  in  the  processes  surrounding  the  abstracting  of 
universal  forms.  Before  I  can  claim  to  know  the  universal  concept  X  that  the  thing 
instantiates  I  have  to  ask  someone  who  knows,  I  have  to  discover  to  which  species  of  animal 
the  beast  belongs  and  what  this  species  is  called  in  my  community.  Inquisitive  as  ever  I  walk 
over  to  the  owner  in  the  park  and  ask  the  owner,  "What  kind  of  animal  is  that?  " 
"It's  a  pine  marten.,  "  he  replies. 
"Oh,  so  that's  what  it  is.  "  I  reply. 
I  now  know  what  kind  of  thing  it  actually  is,  as  opposed  to  classifying  it  merely  as  a  small, 
furry,  four-legged  animal.  The  intellect  now  has  a  clearer,  grasp  of  the  substantial  form  and 
knows  the  quiddity  of  the  thing  not  at  the  level  of  genus,  but  the  level  of  species. 
The  consequence  of  this  analysis  ought  to  be  made  clear.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  the  grasp 
of  a  quiddity  can  take  place  on  various  levels.  Moreover,  sometimes  the  complete  substantial 
form  of  the  thing  is  not  abstracted  by  the  intellect.  The  key  to  understanding  this  lies  in  one 
sense  of  the  word  `universal',  namely  the  first  sense  we  outlined  above:  when  something  is 
seen  from  a  distance  we  recognise  it  as  a  body,  before  recognising  it  as  an  animal  and  so 
on.  101  Looking  from  a  great  distance,  call  this  Dl,  at  an  object  in  a  field  we  would  not  want 
to  say  that  the  intellect  is  capable  of  fully  abstracting  the  substantial  form  of  the  thing  and 
grasping  its  quiddity.  That  would  be  absurd.  All  that  can  be  abstracted  is  the  form  of  a 
material  thing,  all  that  can  be  grasped  is  that  it  is  a  thing,  a  body,  because  that  is  all  we  can 
sense.  Moving  closer,  call  this  D2,  we  see  that  it  is  alive.  Here  what  is  abstracted  and 
grasped  pertains  to  the  genus  of  animal.  Moving  closer  still,  at  D3,  we  can  see  what  kind  of 
animal  it  is.  Knowing  what  a  cow  is,  this  substantial  form  is  abstracted  from  the  sense 
images  and  the  quiddity  grasped  is  `cow'.  To  suggest  that  at  Dl  the  intellect  could  in  some 
sense  abstract  and  grasp  what  it  did  at  D3  is  absurd.  At  Dl  we  are  experiencing  it  as  a  thing, 
so  why  should  the  form  abstracted  be  much  more  specific?  Such  a  suggestion  would  seem  to 
suggest  that  the  intellect  has  some  kind  of  strange  intuition  and  doesn't  really  need  the 
senses:  it  undermines  the  thesis  that  what  is  abstracted  depends  on  what  the  sense  images 
present.  It  is  not  being  suggested  that  different  forms  are  being  abstracted  at  the  different 
stages,  just  that  at  each  stage  the  form  abstracted  is  more  specific  and  consequently  the  grasp 
of  a  quiddity  can  take  place  on  different  levels.  It  highlights  the  intellect's  dependence  on  the 
senses.  Equally  the  issue  of  previous  experience  and  knowledge,  as  we  have  seen  can  lead 
to  quiddity  being  grasped  on  various  levels. 
An  objector  might  raise  this  objection.  A  dog-lover  is  able  to  classify  the  various  dogs  he 
sees  into  different  breeds,  spaniel,  beagle  and  so  on.  Does  this  mean  that  the  substantial 
forms  abstracted  by  the  intellect  of  these  experts  is  different  and  more  detailed  than  that 
abstracted  by  the  non-expert?  That  he  abstracts  the  form  spanielity  as  opposed  to  caninity? 
101  For  simplicity's  sake  we  have  ignored  the  case  when,  out  of  the  corner  of  one's  eye,  one  thinks 
that  one  has  seen  something  move,  but  is  not  sure.  It  may  indeed  be  the  case  on  further 
investigation  that  one  discovers  that  there  Is  something  there  or  it  may  simply  turn  out  to  have 
been  a  shadow. 121 
No,  while  the  expert  may  have  various  concepts  such  as  poodle  and  Alsatian  which 
correspond  to  various  breeds  of  dogs,  he  still  abstracts  the  substantial  form  caninity.  To  see 
this,  consider  the  case  of  triangles,  we  can  describe  this  triangle  as  an  isosceles  triangle  and 
that  triangle  as  a  scalene  triangle.  Nonetheless  both  share  in  triangularity,  this  is  the  `kind'  to 
which  they  belong,  which  determines  what  it  is  that  they  are  and  what  the  intellect  abstracts. 
After  all  every  isosceles  triangle  must  be  a  triangle,  but  not  every  triangle  must  be  isosceles. 
Similarly  with  dogs,  knowing  that  something  is  a  beagle,  as  opposed  to  a  collie  depends  on 
knowing  what  a  dog  is.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  the  dog  lover,  the  form  abstracted  is  caninity  for 
it  grounds  the  other  concept  pertaining  to  the  sub-species.  The  species  is  ontologically  and 
epistemologically  more  fundamental  and  important  than  the  sub-species. 
The  objector  may  respond  by  citing  a  further  objection  that  genus  is  more  fundamental  than 
species  so  why  not  say  that  it  is  animality  as  opposed  to  caninity  that  is  abstracted  in  the  case 
of  dog,  why  put  so  much  emphasis  on  the  abstraction  of  that  latter  form?  In  a  sense  the 
genus  is  more  fundamental.  However,  it  lacks  the  ontological  and  epistemological 
importance  of  species.  Ontologically,  defence  of  this  point  rests  ultimately  rests  on  Aquinas' 
understanding  of  the  world  and  its  objects.  It  is  a  world  consisting  of  many  different 
individuals  belonging  to  different  kinds.  These  kinds  are  ontologically  important,  while 
these  kinds  may  be  grouped  into  genera,  or  subdivided  into  sub-species,  the  kind  outlines  a 
specific  difference  which  makes  object  A  to  be  a  member  of  kind  X  and  object  B  to  be  a 
member  of  kind  Y.  This  kind  is  determined  by  a  genus  and  a  specific  difference,  such  as 
animal  and  rationality  in  the  case  of  humanity.  All  humans  are  animals,  but  the  species  is 
indicated  by  their  specific  difference,  the  attribute  unique  to  their  species,  rationality. 
Epistemologically  the  importance  of  substantial  form  is  that  it  specifies  the  object  in  a  way 
that  no  other  specification,  at  the  level  of  genus  or  sub-species,  can.  To  see  this,  consider  the 
case  of  triangularity.  That  something  is  a  triangle  tells  you  how  it  differs  from  all  other 
geometric  shapes,  what  makes  it  specifically  different  from  all  other  examples  of  the  genus. 
But,  as  we  saw  above,  it  also  tells  you  what  all  the  sub-species  have  in  common  and 
determines  what  they  are. 
We  have  attempted  to  explain  how  a  form  existing  in  the  world  comes  to  exist  in  the  mind 
and  how  the  intellect  comes  to  grasp  a  quiddity.  We  saw  that  the  intellect's  grasp  of  its 
proper  object  can  take  place  on  a  number  of  levels:  insight  into  what  this  quiddity  is,  my 
ability  to  know  what  it  is,  depends  very  much  on  what  I  already  know.  Sometimes  I  have 
quite  a  full  insight  into  the  quiddity,  I  am  able  to  assign  the  object  to  a  kind.  At  other  times, 
because  of  distance  or  lack  of  knowledge  such  insight  remains  at  a  very  general  level.  This 
insight  into  the  grasp  of  a  quiddity  is  most  important,  it  demythologises  any  notions  we  may 
have  about  grasping  quiddities. 
In  De  Ente  et  Essentia  Aquinas  tells  us  that  whatness  or  quiddity  is  synonym  for  essence,  as 
are  nature  and  form.  102  This  could  suggest  that  Aquinas  believes  that  the  intellect's  first  act 
102  op.  cit.  Chapter  1.2 122 
gives  us  knowledge  of  the  essence  of  a  thing.  However,  our  discussion  of  the  grasp  of  a 
quiddity  should  lay  to  rest  any  notion  that  Aquinas  thinks  that  the  intellect  in  its  first  act 
understands  the  essence  of  things.  Nevertheless,  Aquinas  doesn't  help  himself  by  at  times 
appearing  to  say  this.  For  example,  in  the  third  book  of  the  Commentary  on  De  Anima  he 
writes: 
It  [the  intellect]  knows  the  specific  nature  or  essence  of  an  object  by  going  out 
directly  to  that  object.  103 
And  later  on  in  the  same  work: 
....  as  he  [Aristotle]  says,  essence  is  what  the  intellect  first  knows;  hence,  just  as 
sight  is  infallible  with  respect  to  its  proper  object,  so  is  the  intellect  with  respect  to 
essence.  It  cannot,  for  instance,  be  mistaken  when  it  simply  knows  what  man 
is...  l04  [Editor's  emphasis] 
On  the  other  hand,  he  unequivocally  states  the  opposite: 
We  do  not  know  a  great  many  of  the  properties  of  sensible  things;  and  in  most  cases 
we  are  not  able  to  discover  fully  the  natures  of.  those  properties  that  we  apprehend  by 
sense.  105 
... 
first  apprehension  of  any  object  does  not  show  us  what  is  implicitly  contained  in 
it.  106 
and  most  famously: 
But  our  cognition  is  so  weak,  that  no  philosopher  can  ever  perfectly  investigate  the 
nature  of  even  one  fly.  107 
It  does  seem  implausible  to  hold  that  in  apprehending  something  we  have  insight  into  its 
essence  or  nature:  there  are  many  things  we  experience,  but  of  those  things'  natures  or 
essences  we  do  not  have  a  clue.  Moreover,  such  an  intuition  seems  to  undermine  the  role  of 
the  senses  and  the  fact  that  much  of  our  knowledge  of  things  comes  from  their  accidental 
properties.  We  saw  this  above  and  also  earlier  in  a  text  from  the  Commentary  on  the  De 
Anima  quoted  in  chapter  one: 
Since  the  essential  principles  of  things  are  hidden  from  us  we  are  compelled  to  make 
103  In  D.  A.  III  8  Cognoscit  enim  naturam  speciei  sive  quod  quid  est,  directe  extendo  seipsum 
104  ibid  111  11.  Et  hujus  rationem  assignat,  quia  quod  quid  est,  est  primum  objectum  intellectus, 
unde,  sicut  visus  nunquam  decipitur  in  proprio  objecto,  ita  neque  intellectus  In  cognoscendo 
quod  quid  est.  Nam  intellectus  nunquam  decipitur  in  cognoscendo  quod  quid  est  homo. 
105  SCG  13.  '5  Rerum  enim  sensibilium  plurimas  proprietates  Ignoramus,  earumque  proprietatum, 
quas  sensu  apprehendimus,  rationem  perfecte  in  pluribus  invenire  non  possumus. 
106  ST  1a  q58  a4...  ex  hoc  scilicet  quod  non  statim  in  prima  apprehensione  alicujus  primi 
apprehensi  potest  inspicere  quidquid  in  eo  virtute  continetur.  The  Blackfriars'  translation  used 
above  is  not  as  forceful  as  it  might  be.  'Statim'  '  at  once'  is  left  untranslated,  as  is  'virtute'  .  The 
basic  thrust  of  Aquinas'  point  is  that  the  first  apprehension  of  any  object  does  not  show  us 
immediately  the  powers  contained  in  it. 
107  In  Symbolo  apostolorum  1  Sed  cognitio  nostra  est  adeo  debilis  quod  nulius  philosOphus  potuit 
unquam  perfecte  investigare  naturam  unius  muscae. 123 
use  of  accidental  differences  as  indications  of  what  is  essential.  los 
Similar  sentiments  are  expressed  elsewhere: 
Since,  according  to  the  Philosopher,  we  do  not  know  the  substantial  differences  of 
things,  those  who  make  definitions  sometimes  use  accidental  differences  because 
they  indicate  or  afford  knowledge  of  the  essence  as  the  proper  effect  affords 
knowledge  of  a  cause.  109 
It  must  be  said  that  because  substantial  forms  in  themselves  are  unknown  but  become 
known  to  us  by  their  proper  accidents,  substantial  differences  are  frequently  taken 
from  accidents  instead  of  substantial  forms  which  become  known  through  such 
accidents.  l10 
Since,  however,  the  essences  of  things  are  not  known  to  us,  and  their  powers  reveal 
themselves  to  us  through  their  acts,  we  often  use  the  names  of  the  faculties  and 
powers  to  denote  essences.  111 
Given  the  synonymy  between  essence  and  quiddity  stated  in  the  early  stages  of  De  Ente  et 
Essentia  it  is  easy  to  see  how  St.  Thomas  could  be  misunderstood  to  hold  the  position  that  in 
its  first  act  the  intellect  does  indeed  come  to  know  what  the  essence  of  a  thing  is.  The  above 
extracts,  however,  show  this  interpretation  to  be  incorrect,  insight  into  essence  is  generally 
an  arduous  task  for  our  intellect.  Furthermore,  the  extracts  on  accidental  properties  and 
powers  reinforce  the  emphasis  we  placed  on  them  earlier.  The  thrust  of  Aquinas'  argument 
is  that  we  denote  what  is  unknown  to  us,  the  essence  of  a  thing,  by  what  we  can  know  of 
the  thing:  its  faculties,  powers  and  accidents.  Knowledge  of  these  processes  is  a  necessary 
element  in  obtaining  knowledge  of  a  thing's  essence.  It  is  by  this  information,  abstracted 
from  what  our  senses  tell  us  that,  in  some  instances,  we  may  come  to  acquire  knowledge  of 
an  object's  essence. 
This  kind  of  knowledge  is  specialised,  it  is  the  stuff  of  which  scientia  consists.  This  is  what 
Aquinas  means  in  ST  I.  a  q84  a8c  when  he  says: 
The  philosopher  seeks  only  to  know  the  nature  of  stone  or  horse  in  order  to  have  an 
108  In  D.  A.  I.  1  Sed  quia  principia  essentialia  rerum  sunt  nobis  ignota,  ideo  oportet  quod  utamur 
diff  erentiis  accidentalibus  in  designitione  essentialium. 
109  DV  q10  al  ad6  Dicendum,  quod  secundum  Philosophum  in  VIII  Metaph.,  quia  substantiates 
rerum  differentiae  sunt  nobis  ignotae,  loco  earum  interdum  definientes  accidentalibus  utuntur, 
secundum  quod  ipsa  designant  vel  notificant  essentiam,  ut  proprii  effectus  notificant  causam. 
110  DSC  q11  ad3  Formae  substantiates  per  seipsas  sunt  ignotae;  sed  innotescunt  nobis  per 
accidentia  propria.  Frequenter  enim  differentiae  substantiates  ab  accidentibus  sumuntur,  loco 
formarum  substantiatum  quae  per  huiusmodi  accidentia  innotescunt. 
111  DV  q10  alQuia  vero  rerum  essentiae  sunt  nobis  ignotae,  virtutes  autem  earum  innotescunt 
nobis  per  actus,  utimur  frequenter  nominibus  virtutum  vet  potentiarum  ad  essentias  significandas. 124 
explanation  of  things  which  are  seen  with  the  senses.  112 
It  is  the  philosopher's  task,  or  as  we  would  call  him  or  her  today  the  scientist,  to  discover 
such  essences,  to  look  for  the  cause,  or  as  St.  Thomas  puts  it,  to  provide  an  explanation  of 
the  things  we  see  with  the  senses.  113 
Scientia,  complete  knowledge  of  a  thing's  essence,  is  a  deeper  insight  into  the  same  quiddity 
with  which  the  process  of  knowledge  begins.  Norman  Kretzmann  has  rightly  called  the  latter 
alpha  and  the  former  omega  cognition.  114  What  we  have  seen  here  regarding  the  complete 
knowledge  of  a  thing's  essence  is  further  proof  of  the  point  which  we  made  against 
MacDonald  in  the  last  chapter:  we  can  have  scientia  of  the  natural  kinds  which  make  up  our 
world.  In  chapter  one,  we  saw  Aquinas  discuss,  in  his  Commentary  on  Boethius'  De 
Trinitate,  11S  the  division  of  the  sciences  into  metaphysics,  mathematics  and  natural 
philosophy;  each  being  different  in  method  and  object.  116  That  St.  Thomas  has  natural 
philosophy  in  mind  is  seen  in  the  word  he  uses  in  ST  1a  q84  a8c  to  describe  the  individual 
who  seeks  to  know  the  nature  of  a  stone  or  horse,  he  describes  him  as  a  naturalis.  Such 
insight,  on  the  rare  occasions  when  it  occurs,  is  the  remit  of  the  specialist  who  seeks 
scientia,  it  is  certainly  not  what  is  grasped  in  the  first  act  of  the  intellect.  Nor  need  it  be.  At 
the  level  of  perceptual  knowledge  we  don't  need  the  kind  of  insight  which  is  indicative  of 
omega  cognition.  It's  more  important  to  know  that  there  is  a  dangerous  river  over  there  than 
to  know  the  essential  nature  of  water. 
An  important  point  of  our  consideration  of  the  psychological  component  is  that  grasping  a 
quiddity  is  not  a  magical  intuition  of  essence.  Nor  is  quiddity  itself  magically  intuited,  we 
grasp  it  through  what  is  apparent  to  us,  that  is,  by  what  we  can  sense  and  our  grasp  of  it  can 
take  place  on  various  levels.  We  will  draw  our  consideration  of  the  psychological  component 
to  a  close  by  looking  at  the  veracity  of  the  first  act  of  the  intellect.  Under  this  psychological 
heading  we  will  also  give  a  brief  recap  of  the  second  act  of  the  intellect,  the  intellect's  grasp 
of  truth  and  what  it  means  to  have  an  immaterial,  universal  and  necessary  knowledge  of 
material,,  particular  and  contingent  things.  Unlike  our  treatment  of  the  first  act  of  the  intellect, 
however,  our  treatment  of  the  second  act  will  not  be  as  detailed.  There  are  three  reasons  for 
this.  First,  the  actual  mechanics  of  the  second  act,  judging  what  has  been  grasped  in  the  first 
112  Et  similiter  naturalis  non  quaerit  cognoscere  naturam  lapidis  et  equi,  nisi  ut  sciat  rationes  eorum 
quae  videntur  secundum  sensum. 
113  We  discuss  these  matters  in  the  next  chapter  when  we  examine  the  formation  of  the  principles 
of  scientia. 
114Kretzmann  1992,  page  143. 
115  op.  cit  q5  a2c;  q6  a2c.  See  also  In  Phy.  II  On  the  principles  of  natural  science;  In  Meta  VI  11 
116  The  object  of  metaphysics  are  things  which  do  not  depend  on  matter  for  their  being,  such  as 
God,  the  angels,  being  and  its  transcendental  properties  and  so  on.  It's  proper  method  is 
intellectual  consideration.  The  object  of  mathematics  are  things  such  as  lines  and  numbers  which 
are  dependent  on  matter  for  their  being,  but  not  for  being  understood.  Mathematics  proceeds  by 
the  mode  of  learning.  Natural  philosophy  has  as  its  object  things  which  depend  on  matter  both  for 
being  and  for  being  understood:  the  material  objects  of  this  world.  This  science  proceeds  by 
reason.  Cf.  Commentary  on  Boethius'  De  Trinitate  q6  al. 125 
act,  require  less  unpacking  than  the  grasp  of  a  quiddity.  Second,  with  this  in  mind,  we  note 
that  many  of  the  relevant  issues,  such  as  composition  and  division,  conversio  ad 
phantasmata  and  so  on,  have  already  been  discussed  either  in  chapter  one  or  in  our 
discussion  of  McDermott.  Third,  of  greater  interest  to  us  is  the  knowledge  which  results 
from  the  judgments  which  constitute  the  second  act.  In  the  next  section  of  this  chapter  we 
will  look  closely  at  the  perceptual  knowledge  which  may  result  from  the  second  act  of  the 
intellect. 
In  our  sketch  of  the  first  act  of  the  intellect  given  in  chapter  one  we  noted  that  the  intellect  is 
never  mistaken  in  grasping  a  thing's  quiddity.  We  are  now  in  a  position  to  clarify  this 
statement  and  show  that  it  is  not  as  controversial  as  it  seems.  In  ST  la  q16  a2c  St.  Thomas 
writes: 
Now  since  a  thing  is  true  as  having  the  form  proper  to  its  own  nature,  it  must  follow 
that  the  mind,  in  the  act  of  knowing,  is  true  as  having  the  likeness  of  the.  thing 
known,  which  is  the  form  of,  the  intellect  in  the  act  of  knowing.  Accordingly  truth  is. 
defined  as  conformity  between  intellect  and  thing.  Hence  to  know  that  conformity  is 
to  know  truth.  117 
Earlier  we  explained  how  the  same  form  can  exist  intentionally  in  the  intellect  and  naturally 
in  the  thing.  The  above  extract  gives  another  insight  into  the  intentional  and  natural  existence 
of  a  form:  there  exists  a  likeness  between  both  existences  of  the  form.  This  likeness  is  an 
extremely  important  element  of  Aquinas'  epistemology  because  it  grounds  the  veracity  of  the 
first  act  of  the  intellect.  Its  importance  is  seen  in  the  number  of  times  it  has  been  mentioned 
in  our  discussion  of  knowledge,  whether  the  knowledge  is  divine,  angelic  or  human. 
In  the  above  extract  Aquinas  uses  'similitudo'  to  describe  this  likeness.  Unfortunately,  this 
term  doesn't  fully  express  the  kind  of  likeness  which  he  has  in  mind.  'Similitudo'basically 
means  resemblance,  in  the  sense  that  this  dog  resembles  that  other  dog  or  the  Queen's 
portrait  resembles  the  Queen  herself.  The  likeness  which  St.  Thomas  believes  to  exist 
between  the  intentional  and  natural  existences  of  a  form  is  much  more  than  mere 
resemblance.  We  get  a  hint  of  his  thoughts  in  ST  la  q16  alc  where,  referring  to  Augustine's 
definition  of  truth,  he  says: 
Truth  is  complete  likeness  to  the  source,  without  any  unlikeness.  [My 
emphasis]118 
It  is  not  a  mere  resemblance,  but  a  complete  or  total  [summa]  likeness.  Earlier  in  this  first 
article  of  ST  la  q16  the  full  extent  of  this  likeness  is  driven  home  in  the  example  he  uses. 
Discussing  whether  truth  is  only  in  the  mind,  he  draws  a  distinction  between  a  thing 
understood  having  an  essential  relation  to  some  mind  or  an  incidental  relation.  It  has  an 
incidental  relation  to  a  mind  which  understands  it,  but  an  essential  relation  to  a  mind  if  it 
117  Cum  autem  omnis  res  sit  vera  secundum  quod  habet  propriam  formam  suae  naturae,  necesse 
est  quod  intellectus,  inquantum  est  cognoscens,  sit  verus  inquantum  habet  similitudinem  rel 
cognitae,  quae  est  forma  ejus  inquantum  est  cognoscens.  Et  propter  hoc  per  conformitatem 
intellectus  et  rei  veritas  definitur.  Unde  conformitatem  cognoscere  est  cognoscere  veritatem. 
118  Veritas  est  summa  similitudo  principii,  quae  sine  ulla  dissimilitudine  est. 126 
depends  on  that  mind  for  existence.  The  example  he  use  is  that  of  a  house;  it  has  an 
incidental  relation  to  our  minds  when  we  understand  it,  but  an  essential  relation  to  the  mind 
of  the  architect  who  designed.  There  is  a  parallel  here  to  things  in  the  world  and  their  relation 
to  our  minds  and  the  mind  of  God.  These  things  have  an  essential  relation  to  the  mind  of 
God  because  they  depend  on  him  for  existence,  but  only  an  incidental  relation  to  our  minds 
which  can  know  them.  As  part  of  this  discussion  he  says  that  the  house  is  `true'  if  it  turns 
out  to  be  like  the  plan  of  the  house  in  the  architect's  mind:  not  that  it  merely  resembles  it,  but 
that  it  is  an  exact  material  copy  of  the  idea.  The  same  form  which  gives  shape  to  his  idea 
gives  shape  to  the  individual  object.  In  De  Veritate  ql  a2  the  word  he  uses  to  describe  this 
likeness  indicates  this  fuller  sense  much  more  clearly.  There  he  does  not  use  `similitudo' 
but  'adaequatio'.  He  says: 
For  the  nature  of  the  true  consists  in  conformity  [adaequatione]  of  thing  and 
intellect.  119 
We  will  look  at  the  matter  of  truth  momentarily-  For  the  moment.  'adaequatio.  `  is  of  greater 
interest.  Aquinas  holds  that  there  is  an  adequation;  .  one  thing  is  adequate  to.,  is  ordered  to,  --, 
the  other.  The  actual  house  is  ordered  to  the  architect's  idea  of  it:  it  is  the  material  existence= 
of  what  existed  immaterially  in  his  mind.  It  is  not  a  mere  resemblance,  but  an  identity.  This 
adaequatio  is  the  sense  of  likeness  intended  in  the  case  of  intentional  and  natural  existences 
of  form.  The  form  that  has  been  abstracted  can  be  said  to  be  true  because  it  is  the  same  form 
which  gives  shape  to  the  individual  giving  shape  to  our  idea  of  the  individual.  The 
conformity  between  the  intellect  and  thing  is  based  on  this  identity:  the  same  form  has  two 
different  manners  of  existence,  natural  and  intentional.  In  the  case  of  human  knowledge,  this 
conformity,  this  adaequatio,  is  what  constitutes  the  truth  of  the  first  act  of  the  intellect.  This 
is  the  sense  in  which  the  first  act  is  never  mistaken. 
This  first  act  provides  the  necessary  conditions  for  the  quest  for  knowledge  proper  to  begin, 
for  the  first  act  provides  the  answers  to  an  sit?  and  quid  est?  However,  it  is  an  act  which  is 
pre  judgmental;  it  is  knowledge  at  its  most  inchoate  stage,  to  use  Norman  Kretzmann's 
term.  120  This  is  apparent  in  what  Aquinas  goes  on  to  say: 
Intellect  can  know  its  own  conformity  to  the  thing  known,  yet  it  does  not  grasp  that 
conformity  in  the  mere  act  of  knowing  the  essence  of  a  thing.  But  when  the  intellect 
judges  that  the  thing  corresponds  to  the  form  of  the  thing  which  it  apprehends,  then 
for  the  first  time  it  knows  and  affirms  truth.  This  it  does  in  the  act  of  joining  and 
separating  concepts  in  judgment......  121 
To  actually  know  this  truth  we  must  make  a  judgment.  Knowledge  of  truth  and  falsity 
requires  judgment  that  such  and  such  is  the  case:  a  judgment  which  does  not  take  place  in  the 
first  act.  For  this  reason  while  truth  is  characteristic  of  the  first  act  of  the  intellect  we  would 
119  Veri  enim  ratio  consistit  in  adaequatione  rei  et  intellectus. 
120  Kretzmann  1992,  page  190. 
121  ST  1a  q16  a2c.  Intellectus  autem  conformitatern  sui  ad  rem  intelligibilem  cognoscere  potest; 
sed  tarnen  non  apprehendit  earn  secundum  quod  cognoscit  de  aliquo  quod  quid  est.  Sed  quando 
judicat  rem  ita  se  habere  sicut  est  forma  quam  de  re  apprehendit,  tunc  primo  cognoscit  et  dicit 
verum.  Et  hoc  facit  componendo  et  dividendo...... 127 
be  wrong  to  say  that  the  intellect  knows  or  grasps  the  truth  in  its  first  act.  Possessing  the 
truth  is  not  the  same  as  grasping  the  truth.  In  De  Veritate  Aquinas  offers  this  explanation: 
According  to  the  Philosopher,  our  understanding  has  a  twofold  operation.  There  is 
one  by  which  it  forms  simple  quiddities  of  things,  as  what  man  is,  or  what  animal  is. 
The  operation  of  itself  does  not  involve  truth  or  falsity,  just  as  phrases  do  not.  The 
second  operation  of  the  understanding  is  that  by  which  it  joins  and  divides  concepts 
by  affirmation  and  denial.  Now,  in  this  operation  we  find  truth  and  falsity,  just  as  we 
do  in  the  proposition  which  is  its  sign.  122 
This  extract  from  DV  q14  alc  in  which  Aquinas  draws  a  parallel  to  language  requires 
clarification.  His  parallel  states  that  as  we  do  not  speak  of  a  phrase  or  concept  as  being  true 
or  false,  so  too  with  respect  to  the  intellect's  first  act.  Truth  and  falsity  are  normally 
applicable  to  propositions  which  include  concepts:  propositions  which  are  formed  in  the 
intellect's  second  act.  Generally  speaking  this  is  the  case,  we  speak  of  propositions,  as 
opposed  to  concepts,  being  true  or  false.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  truth  is 
applicable  to  phrases  and  concepts.  Consider  this  example,  suppose  we  are  walking  through 
the  park  and  see  a  dog.  Our  intellect  forms  the  concept  `dog'.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  this 
concept  is  true  because  it  corresponds  to  what  we  are  seeing.  Aquinas  would  explain  this 
truth  in  terms  of  the  adaequatio  which  exists  between  the  form  as  it  exists  in  the  intellect  and 
as  it  exists  in  the  thing.  This  is  the  sense  in  which  the  intellect  in  its  first  act  possesses  the 
truth.  However,  as  we  have  seen  Aquinas  say,  123  to  actually  know  and  affirm  that  truth,  a 
subsequent  act  of  the  intellect  is  required.  That  is,  a  proposition  must  be  formed.  So,  in  the 
case  of  our  walk  in  the  park,  on  the  basis  of  grasping  the  quiddity  of  what  we  see,  the 
proposition  `there  is  a  dog'  is  formed.  The  concept  is  used  in  a  proposition.  This  proposition 
can  be  either  true  or  false.  Only  when  the  intellect  has  judged  that  what  it  has  formed 
corresponds  to  the  object  in  the  world  can  the  intellect  be  said  to  be  in  possession  of  the 
truth.  Therefore,  while  the  first  act  contains  this  truth,  we  do  not  know  it,  the  conformity 
must  be  judged  in  order  to  know  the  truth.  This  is  the  sense  in  which  truth  and  falsity  are 
applicable  to  propositions  made  on  the  basis  of  the  quiddities  grasped:  propositions  which 
constitute  the  second  act  of  the  intellect  and  which,  if  judged  true,  are  knowledge. 
In  chapter  one  we  looked  in  some  detail  at  the  second  act  of  the  intellect  and  the  intellect's 
grasp  of  truth  which  may  result,  the  grasp  of  truth  which  is  the  intellect's  goal.  We  saw  how 
the  human  intellect  differs  from  the  intellects  of  God  and  the  angels  in  that  it  does  not 
immediately  grasp  the  truth  in  its  first  act.  Aquinas  says: 
In  forming  the  quiddities  of  things,  the  intellect  merely  has  a  likeness  of  a  thing 
existing  outside  the  soul,  as  a  sense  has  a  likeness  when  it  receives  the  species  of  a 
sensible  thing.  But  when  the  intellect  begins  to  judge  about  the  thing  it  has 
122  DV  q14  a1  c  Intellectus  enim  nostri,  secundum  Philosophum  in  lib.  Do  Anima  duplex  est 
operatio.  Una  qua  format  simplices  rerum  quidditates;  ut  quid  est  homo  vel  quid  est  animal:  in  quia 
quidem  operatione  non  invenitur  verum  per  se  nec  falsum,  sicut  nec  in  vocibus  incomplexis.  Alia 
operatio  intellectus  est  secundum  quam  componit  et  dividit,  affirmando  et  negando:  et  in  hac  lam 
invenitur  verum  et  falsum,  sicut  in  voce  complexa,  quae  est  eins  signum. 
123  See  ST  1a  q16  a2c  above. 128 
apprehended,  then  its  judgment  is  something  proper  to  itself-  not  something  found 
outside  in  the  thing.  And  the  judgment  is  said  to  be  true  when  it  conforms  to  the 
external  reality.  Moreover,  the  intellect  judges  about  the  thing  it  has  apprehended  at 
the  moment  when  it  says  that  something  is  or  is  not.  124 
To  know  the  truth  the  human  intellect  must  judge  the  conformity  between  the  quiddity  it  has 
grasped  and  the  thing  as  it  exists  in  reality.  "To  know  this  conformity  is  to  know  truth.  "125 
This  is done  when  it  forms  propositions:  whether  affirmative  or  negative.  126  DV  ql  a3c 
gives  an  illustration  of  what  he  has  in  mind:  "the  intellect  judges  about  the  thing  it  has 
apprehended  at  the  moment  when  it  says  that  something  is  or  is  not.  "  This  is  how  the  human 
intellect  grasps  the  truth.  The  intellect  must  judge  the  correspondence  between  what  it  has 
formed  and  the  object,  in  order  to  know  the  truth.  Truth,  as  Owens  puts  it,  is  measured  by 
existence.  127  Such  comparison  to  existence  also  indicates  falsity:  that  is  when  we  take 
something  to  be  the  case  when  it  isn't.  128  In  a  passing  comment  in  the  Summa  Contra 
Gentiles  Aquinas  gives  an  indication  of  what  he  considers  to  be  the  source  of  such  error. 
Presumption,  he  writes,  is  mother  of  all  error.  129  When  we  draw  conclusions  from  our 
analysis  we  will  see  how  perceptive  that  comment  is. 
In  chapter  two  we  noted  that  MacDonald  placed  emphasis  on,  what  he  labelled  the  intellect's 
self  reflexive  ability,  its  capacity  to  judge  the  conformity  between  what  it  has  formed  and 
reality.  This  motivated  MacDonald  to  label  Aquinas  an  internalist.  Undoubtedly  this 
judgment  of  conformity  is  an  important  element  in  the  human  intellect's  quest  for  knowledge 
and,  moreover,  it  does  indicate  an  internalist  element  in  Aquinas'  account  of  our  acquisition 
of  knowledge.  Nevertheless,  it  does  not  make  it  internalist.  The  importance  of  things  in  the 
world  in  answering  the  question  an  sit?  and  the  subsequent  importance  of  their  objective 
existence  in  checking  the  veracity  of  what  the  intellect  has  formed  underline  the  heavily 
externalist  nature  of  Aquinas'  epistemology,  to  say  nothing  of  the  role  of  psychological 
processes  involved,  processes  to  which  we  have  no  direct  access.  If  we  want  to  use  such 
labels,  Aquinas  is  an  externalist  with  just  a  touch  of  internalism. 
Applying  such  labels  at  this  stage  is  perhaps  getting  beyond  ourselves.  There  is  still  much  to 
be  done,  not  least  a  consideration  of  how  we  can  have  an  immaterial,  universal  and 
necessary  knowledge  of  material,  individual  and  contingent  things. 
124  DVq1  a3c  Intellectus  autem  formans  quidditates,  non  habet  nisi  similitudinem  rei  existentis 
extra  animam,  sicut  et  sensus  in  quantum  accipit  speciem  rel  sensibilis;  sed  quando  Incipit  iudicare 
de  re  apprehensa,  tunc  ipsum  iudicium  intellectus  est  quoddam  proprium  ei,  quod  non  invenitur 
extra  in  re.  Sed  quando  adaequatur  ei  quod  est  extra  in  re,  dicitur  iudicium  verum  esse.  Tunc  autem 
iudicat  intellectus  de  re  apprehensa  quando  dicit  quod  aliquid  est  vel  non  est. 
125  ST1a  q16  a2c  Unde  conformitatem  cognoscere  est  cognoscere  veritatem. 
126  ibid. 
127  Owens  1992b,  page  206. 
128  Obviously  we  can  be  mistaken.  We  can  think  that  a  judgment  is  true  when,  in  fact,  it  Isn't.  We  will 
look  at  such  error  in  the  next  section. 
129  SCG  I.  S. 129 
Earlier  we  described  how,  when  walking  through  the  park,  the  intellect  grasped  the  quiddity 
`dog'.  On  the  basis  of  this,  the  intellect  could  form  a  judgment  about  dogs  in  general,  such 
as  `dogs  are  four  legged'  or  `dogs  are  not  scaly  creatures,  '  the  former  being  an  instance  of 
composition  and  the  latter  being  an  instance  of  division.  The  intellect  could  also  form  a 
judgment  about  the  particular  dog  that  the  individual  has  come  across  `this  dog  is  white', 
`this  dog  is  running  around.  '  This  kind  of  judgment  involves  conversio  ad  phantasmata.  We 
have  outlined  what  Aquinas  means  by  this  in  other  places;  in  chapter  one  when  we  discussed 
what  Aquinas  meant  by  this  phrase  and  in  this  chapter  when  we  challenged  McDermott's 
account  of  conversio.  All  we  need  do  here  is  recall  that  conversio  is  a  natural  process  of  the 
human  intellect,  it  is  something  which  it  does  spontaneously.  It  is  a  necessity  imposed  by 
two  factors:  the  particular  is  a  material  thing,  matter  is  not  knowable,  therefore  what  is 
immaterial,  the  form,  must  be  abstracted  from  the  material  individual.  This  universal  form, 
as  we  have  seen,  is  what  is  known  directly.  Secondly,  due  to  the  dimness  of  our  intellectual 
power,  unlike  the  angel's  knowledge  of  universals,  our  knowledge  of  universals  does  not 
also  include  knowledge  of  individuals'  particularity.  130  To  obtain  knowledge  of  the 
particular  the  intellect  must  turn  to  the  faculty  of  the  human  soul  by  which  it  deals  with 
particular  and  corporeal  things;  the  senses.  131  In  other  words,  to  make  a  judgment  about  a 
particular  thing,  it  must  turn  to  the  sense  images.  The  veracity  of  such  judgments,  whether 
about  dogs  in  general  or  a  particular  dog  is  tested  by  reference  to  reality,  the  self-reflexive  act 
we  discussed  above.  If  the  judgment  is  true,  the  intellect  can  be  said  to  have  knowledge  of 
material  things,  a  knowledge  which  is  immaterial,  universal  and  necessary  of  an  individual, 
material  and  contingent  thing.  132  How  is  it  that  our  knowledge  has  three  properties  directly 
opposite  to  the  properties  the  thing  has  in  its  real  existence? 
The  immateriality  clearly  derives  from  the  nature  of  the  intellect  itself.  Unlike  the  senses, 
which  use  bodily  organs,  the  intellect  is  a  power  of  the  soul  which  is  itself  immaterial.  133 
Thus,  the  only  way  that  the  intellect  can  know  is  immaterially;  it  has  to  abstract  the  quiddity 
of  an  object  from  its  material  individuating  conditions.  The  universal  and  necessary  aspects 
of  his  account  also  derive  from  the  activity  of  the  intellect.  The  universal  aspect  is,  of  course, 
the  species  or  genus  to  which  the  individual  belongs  and  which  the  individual  exemplifies;  it 
is  universal  because  the  intellect,  as  we  have  seen,  abstracts  it  from  the  material  individuating 
130  ST  1a  q57  a2c.....  so  too  the  angels,  through  representational  likenesses  imparted  to  them  by 
God,  know  things,  not  only  in  terms  of  their  natures  in  general  but  also  in  terms  of  their  Individual 
particularity;  knowing  them  as  manifold  representations  of  that  one  simple  divine  essence.  [Ita 
angeli  per  species  a  Deo  inditas  cognoscunt  res  non  solum  quantum  ad  naturam  universalem,  sed 
etiam  secundum  earum  singularitatem,  inquantum  sunt  quaedam  repraesentationes  multiplicatae 
illius  unicae  et  simplicis  essentiae.  ] 
131  ibid.  As  man  knows  all  classes  of  things  by  faculties  that  differ  from  each  other-knowing  by  his 
intellect  universals  and  things  free  from  matter,  and  by  sensation  the  particular  and  corporeal-so  an 
angel  knows  both  kinds  of  being  by  one  and  the  same  intellectual  power.  [Sicut  homo  cognoscit 
diversis  viribus  cognitivis  omnium  rerum  genera;  intellectu  quidem  universalia  et  immaterialia,  sensu 
autem  singularia  et  corporalia;  ita  angelus  per  unam  intellectivam  virtutem  utraque  cognoscit.  ] 
132  ST  1a  q84  al  c. 
133  ST  1a  q75  al. 130 
conditions.  The  necessary  aspect,  in  turn,  follows  from  the  universal.  In  ST  1a  q86  a3c 
Aquinas  writes: 
Now  anything  contingent  is  such  by  reason  of  matter,  since  the  contingent  is  what 
has  the  potentiality  to  be  or  not  to  be  and  potentiality  pertains  to  matter..  Necessity,  on 
the  other  hand  is  a  natural  consequence  of  form,  since  the  requirements  of  form  are 
necessary  properties.  134 
This  extract  highlights  the  sense  in  which  our  intellectual  knowledge  of  contingent  things  is 
necessary:  there  are  certain  powers  and  properties  that  the  thing  must  have  in  order  to  be  one 
of  that  kind.  So  despite  the  contingency  of  the  thing  it  does  entail  some  necessities,  as  he 
comments  himself  in  the  same  article,  there  is  nothing  so  contingent  that  it  has  nothing 
necessary  in  it.  135  Thus  knowing  that  Fido  is  a  dog  entails  that  we  know  that  there  are 
certain  necessary  attributes  that  Fido  must  have.  Despite  the  contingency  of  Fido's  individual 
existence,  a  certain  necessity  follows  from  his  being  what  he  is.  However,  while,  the 
universality  and  necessity  of  perceptual  knowledge  of  material  things  primarily  occurs  on  the 
side  of  the  intellect;  it  is  the  thing's  individual  existence,  what  it  actually  is,  that  causes  the 
intellect  to  have  this  knowledge  which  is  universal  and  necessary.  Moreover  it  is  only  by 
comparing  what  the  intellect  has  formed  with  the  real  existence  that  we  can  be  said  to  have 
knowledge. 
Our  analysis  of  this  knowledge  suggests  that  it  has  two  fundamental  components:  the 
metaphysical  component  grounding  the  whole  enterprise  in  indicating  that  something  is 
there,  the  psychological  process  involved  in  discerning  what  the  thing  is.  We  will  now  use 
this  analysis  to  advance  an  interpretation  of  Aquinas'  account  of  perceptual  knowledge 
which  does  not  write  it  off  as  the  poor  cousin  of  one  of  the  intellectual  virtues,  but  allows  it 
to  stand  on  its  own.  And,  moreover,  an  interpretation  which  will  show  that  Owens'  claims, 
which  set  the  scene  for  this  chapter,  are  not  as  outrageous  as  they  seemed. 
c.  Perceptual  knowledge 
Aquinas,  in  a  discussion  of  God's  knowledge  of  future  contingent  makes  the  following, 
passing  remark: 
Hence  in  that  condition  [present  and  occurring]  it  [a  contingent  event]  can  be  the' 
object  of  certain  and  infallible  knowledge,  as  a  thing  is  seen  to  vision,  as  when  I  see 
Socrates  sitting  down.  136 
While  he  doesn't  describe  it  in  terms  of  infallibility  Joseph  Owens  expresses  similar 
sentiments: 
When  you  see  that  the  traffic  light  ahead  of  you  has  turned  green  or  that  the  road  in 
134  Est  autem  unumquodque  contingens  ex  parte  materiae:  quia  contingens  est  quod  potest  esse 
non  esse;  potentia  autem  pertinet  ad  materiam.  Necessitas  autem  consequitur  rationem  formae: 
quia  ea  quae  consequuntur  ad  formam  ex  necessitate  Insunt. 
135  nihil  enim  est  adeo  contingens  quin  in  se  aliquid  habeat. 
136  ST  1a  g14  al  3c.  Et  propter  hoc,  sic  potest  infallibiliter  subdi  certae  cognitioni  ut  pote  sensui 
visus,  sicut  cum  video  Socratem  sedere 131 
front  of  you  is  curving,  your  judgment  about  these  facts  is  immediate.  It  requires 
nothing  else  to  serve  as  proof.  You  see  at  once  that  those  situations  exist.  This  holds 
for  whatever  else  is being  directly  perceived  by  the  external  senses.  137 
Such  judgments  that  Socrates  is  sitting  or  the  traffic  light  is  green  are  instances  of  perceptual 
knowledge.  The  certainty,  immediacy  and  infallibility  of  such  judgments  rest  on  the 
metaphysical  and  psychological  components  which  we  have  outlined.  We  will  look  at  these 
components  shortly.  First  we  note  two  important  corollaries  of  Aquinas'  description  of 
knowledge  that  Socrates  is  sitting.  Contra  Ross,  there  is  no  suggestion  that  such  perceptual 
knowledge  is  an  instance  ofcredere.  In  the  above  quote  Aquinas  does  not  describe  this 
judgment,  this  example  of  perceptual  knowledge,  in  the  way  have  seen  him  describe 
credere.  138  Rather  perceptual  knowledge  is  described  quite  clearly  as  certain  and  infallible 
knowledge.  Unlike  credere,  the  judgment  that  Socrates  is  sitting  involves  immediate  assent. 
This  is  alluded  to  by  Owens  when  he  talks  of  nothing  more  being  demanded  as  proof:  our 
assent  is  immediate.  Nor,  despite  the  description  of  such  knowledge  being  certain  and 
infallible,  is  there  any  mention  of  scientia.  Contrary  to  Ross  and  MacDonald  who  want  to 
describe  Aquinas'  theory  of  perceptual  knowledge  in  terms  of  credere  and  scientia,  Aquinas 
offers  no  such  interpretation. 
Aquinas'  optimism  regarding  the  certainty  and  infallibility  of  perceptual  knowledge  can  be 
easily  explained  with  reference  to  the  two  components  which  we  have  considered.  These 
components  provide  the  core  justification  for  claiming  that  knowledge  such  as  'Socrates  is 
sitting'  is  certain  and  infallible.  Without  these  components  such  knowledge  would  not  be 
possible:  they  are  necessary  for  knowledge.  The  metaphysical  component  tells  us  that  there 
is  something  there.  If  there  were  nothing  there,  there  would  be  no  change  in  the  senses.  As 
the  external  thing  moves  the  senses  from  potency  to  act,  the  conditions  exist  for  the  process 
of  knowledge.  to  begin  as  the  intellect  engages  in  its  first  act,  the  grasp  of  a  quiddity.  As  we 
have  seen,  this  act  includes  the  intellect's  grasp  of  being  external  to  it.  In  this  particular  case, 
a  grasp  of  being  which  is  the  existence  of  Socrates.  If  he  weren't  there,  there  could  be  no 
grasp  of  being  and  the  process  of  knowledge  would  not  begin.  This  is  the  necessity  of  the 
metaphysical  component.  The  psychological  component  constitutes  the  search  for  what  it  is 
that  is  there'.  We  discussed  at  length  how  this  takes  place.  In  this  particular  case  the  quiddity 
grasped  from  the  abstraction  of  the  sense  images  is  'man'.  Without  this  grasp  of  the  quiddity 
knowledge  cannot  be  attained.  On  the  basis  of  the  first  act,  certain  judgments  can  be  made. 
One  such  judgment,  involving  conversio  ad  phantasmata,  is  that  Socrates  is  sitting.  Clearly 
for  this  judgment  to  count  as  knowledge  the  intellect  must  judge  the  conformity  between 
what  it  has  formed  and  reality.  Knowing  this  conformity  is  knowing  the  truth,  139  described 
by  Aquinas  as  the  certain  and  infallible  knowledge  that  Socrates  is  sitting.  For  reasons  which 
will  become  apparent  we  will  label  this  the  paradigm  case. 
137  Owens  1992b,  page  177. 
138  Cf  ST2a2ae  q2  alc  cited  above. 
139  ST  1a  q16  a2c  Unde  conformitatem  cognoscere  est  cognoscere  veritatem. 132 
The  central  role  of  metaphysical  and  psychological  components  which  constitute  the 
intellectual  acts  leading  to  the  grasp  of  truth  in  the  paradigm  case  are  readily  apparent.  These 
components  also  ground  the  boldness  of  Father  Owens'  remarks  that  opened  this  chapter.  It 
is  because  of  these  components  that  Owens  could  claim  that  every  immediate  judgment  is 
both  true  and  certain,  involving  absolute  assent  and  leaving  the  knower  in  a  state  of 
unconditional  and  intellectually  justified  certitude.  140  Nevertheless,  some  clarification  of  his 
remarks  is  still  demanded.  We  will  do  this  shortly. 
The  above  description  of  perceptual  knowledge  notwithstanding,  matters  are  not  as  simple 
and  straight  forward  as  they  appear.  This  has  been  alluded  to  above  by  certain  qualifications 
that  have  been  made.  We  have  spoken  about  the  core  justification  provided  by,  and  the 
central  role  of  both  components.  There  are  two  reasons  for  this.  First,  the  justification  is 
described  as  `core'  because  other  non-core  factors  are  required  for  such  certain  and  infallible 
perceptual  knowledge.  These  other  factors  are  the  distance  of  the  knower  from  thing  known 
and  two  factors  Alvin  Plantinga  highlighted  in  his  description  of  warrant:  the  proper 
functioning  of  our  faculties,  and  the  environment  in  which  the  judgment  is  made.  That 
Socrates  is  sitting  has  the  certainty  and  infallibility  of  2+2=4  because  it  is  a  judgment  made 
by  a  properly  functioning  intellect  and  sensory  faculties  in  the  proper  environment  about 
something  close  by  which  is  presently  occurring.  Second,  as  we  will  see,  while 
metaphysical  and  psychological  components  underlie  every  judgment  about  perception,  in 
some  instances,  despite  a  judgment  being  made  by  a  properly  functioning  intellect  in  the 
correct  environment  about  something  close  at  hand,  it  can  be  mistaken.  Moreover,  as  well  as 
the  risk  of  being  mistaken,  in  many  instances,  judgments  which  are  broadly  labelled 
perceptual  knowledge,  are  neither  certain  nor  infallible.  Only  in  certain  instances  are  such 
judgments  certain  and  infallible  and  thus  properly  called  perceptual  knowledge. 
Consequently  many  judgments  do  not  involve  firm  assent,  in  fact,  in  some  cases,  firm 
assent  is  not  possible.  Thus  we  are  using  `Perceptual  knowledge'  as  a  broad  umbrella  term 
to  cover  the  many  different  kinds  of  judgments  which  we  make  everyday  about  the  world 
around  us.  This  myriad  of  judgments  about  everyday  matters  constitutes  a  complex  entity. 
After  we  have  outlined  the  distance,  proper  functioning  and  environmental  factors  we  will 
look  at  various  examples  of  judgments  which  show  the  complexity  of  Aquinas'  account  of 
what  we  have  broadly  labelled  perceptual  knowledge,  we  will  see  how  error  occurs  in  such 
judgments  and,  most  importantly,  clarify  the  main  features  of  perceptual  knowledge. 
The  importance  of  proper  function  is  that  proper  function  legislates  for  counter  examples 
such  as  those  suggested  by  the  possibility  of  hallucination.  In  the  analysis  which  follows  we 
will  presume  that  the  intellect  and  other  faculties  are  functioning  properly.  Introducing  the 
factors  of  distance  and  environment  into  our  account  of  perceptual  knowledge  introduces  an 
element  of  vagueness:  141  just  how  close  to  an  object  must  we  be?  what  do  we  mean  by  `the 
proper  environment'?  This  vagueness  is  something  that  we  will  have  to  learn  to  live  with.  It 
140  Owens  1985,  page  276. 
141  This  is  a  point  Alvin  Plantinga  acknowledges  too.  Plantinga  1993b,  page  11. 133 
is  not  possible  to  quantify  how  close  to  an  object  we  must  be.  In  an  important  respect  this 
depends  on  particular  sense  faculties  used.  In  the  case  of  touch  and  taste  there  must  be 
immediate  contact  between  the  sense  organ  and  the  object.  However,  in  the  case  of  sight, 
immediate  contact  is  undesirable:  we  cannot  see  something  which  is  touching  the  eye.  In  the 
case  of  sight  there  has  to  be  a  medium,  some  distance,  between  the  faculty  and  the  object. 
Aquinas  discusses  this  in  ST  la  q78  a3c.  In  this  article  he  notes  that  like  sight,  the  senses  of 
smell  and  hearing  also  require  a  medium  in  order  to  operate.  142 
The  motivation  for  introducing  this  criterion  of  distance  is  that  experience  shows  that,  in  the 
case  of  visual,  aural  and  olfactory  perception,  we  are  more  likely  to  be  mistaken  when 
making  a  judgment  about  a  thing  distant  from  us.  Aquinas  alludes  to  this  in  The 
Commentary  on  the  Metaphysics  where  he  writes: 
... 
it  is  evident  that  the  farther  an  agent's  power  is  extended  when  it  acts,  the  more 
imperfect  is  its  effect....  Hence  the  judgment  of  a  sense  is  truer  about  sensible  colours 
in  things  close  at  hand  than  it  is  about  things  far  away.  143 
For  simplicity's  sake  we  have  limited  our  discussion  to  visual  perception.  Thus  in  the  case 
of  visual  perception  the  size  of  the  object  will  also  be  an  important  factor  in  determining  the 
distance  criterion.  144  As  in  any  instance  of  perceptual  knowledge,  when  we  form  judgments 
about  objects  at  a  distance  the  same  metaphysical  and  psychological  processes  are  involved. 
However,  given  that  our  sensory  powers  are  extended,  to  use  St.  Thomas'  phrase,  the 
judgments  which  we  make  on  the  basis  of  such  components  are  more  likely  to  be  mistaken. 
So  we  form  the  judgment  that  the  tower  on  the  hill  a  mile  away  is  round,  whereas,  if  we 
were  close  to  it  we  would  make  the  correct  judgment  that  it  is  square. 
The  motivation  for  introducing  the  environmental  factor  is  basically  the  same  as  Plantinga's 
which  we  sketched  in  chapter  two.  Our  visual  faculty  is  designed  to  function  properly  in  a 
white  light  environment.  Clearly  from  Aquinas'  perspective  God  is  the  designer.  In  other 
environments,  mistaken  judgments  are  more  likely  to  be  made:  in  red  light  white  things  are 
seen  as  red,  in  poor  light  and  darkness  many  of  the  judgments  we  can  ordinarily  make 
cannot  be  made.  Nonetheless,  in  such  environments  such  judgments  will  still  involve 
metaphysical  and  psychological  components.  This  last  point  is  most  important  and  reinforces 
the  central  role  of  the  metaphysical  and  psychological  components.  Every  judgment  involves 
these  components.  It  may  lack  the  certainty  and  infallibility  that  characterises  the  knowledge 
that  Socrates  is  sitting  because  it  is  made  about  something  at  a  great  distance  and/or  in  the 
142  According  to  him  the  senses  of  touch  and  taste  involve  a  physical  change  In  the  organ  itself: 
the  hand  gets  hot  when  touches  something  warm.  The  senses  of  smell  or  hearing  are  only 
physically  affected  per  accidens:  the  noise  or  smell  impinge  on  the  sense  organ.  The  sense  of 
sight,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  affected  physically  at  all:  the  eye  does  not  become  the  red  it  sees. 
143  Op.  Cit.  N  14  Constat  enim  quod  virtus  agentis  quanto  plus  in  remotis  porrigitur  In  agendo, 
tanto  deficientior  eius  invenitur  effectus.....  Et  propter  hoc  verius  est  iudicium  sensus  de  coloribus 
sensibilibus  in  propinquo  quam  in  remoto. 
144  Similarly  the  loudness  of  a  noise  or  the  smelliness  of  the  object's  odour  would  be  important 
factors  in  the  case  of  hearing  and  smell. 134 
wrong  kind  of  environment  but  it  still  has  these  two  components.  This  is  apparent  in  the 
examples  which  follow. 
Suppose  that  we  are  not  next  to  Socrates  when  he  sits  down,  but  actually  500  yards  away. 
As  in  the  paradigm  case  the  same  metaphysical  and  psychological  components  are  involved. 
On  the  basis  of  these  components  we  could  form  the  judgment  that  there  is  someone  sitting 
down  over  there.  This  judgment  is  simply  a  more  general  version  of  the  judgment  which 
constitutes  the  paradigm  case.  It  judges  that  an  individual  man  is  sitting  down,  as  opposed 
the  particular  individual  whom  we  call  Socrates.  Alternatively,  while  we  can't  be  sure  that  it 
is Socrates,  we  could  still  form  the  judgment  that  Socrates  is  sitting  down.  This  alternative 
judgment,  like  the  previous,  more  general  version  of  the  paradigm  case  is  grounded  in  the 
same  metaphysical  and  psychological  components,  but  the  second  judgment  goes  beyond  the 
evidence  that  is  available.  We  are  making  a  judgment  which  we  are  not  entitled  to  make  and 
indeed  we  may  be  mistaken.  In  fact,  we  are,  it  is  Plato  who  is  sitting  down.  This  is  how 
error  occurs.  As  Kretzmann  pointed  out  such  mistakes  arise  when  we  misuse  our  flawless 
equipment  and  overestimate  our  grasp  of  the  evidence.  145  This  is  the  sense  in  which 
Aquinas,  in  the  Summa  Contra  Gentiles,  called  presumption  the  mother  of  error.  Aquinas 
discusses  presumption,  as  part  of  his  treatment  of  courage  and  magnanimity,  in  ST  2a2ae 
q130.  In  this  discussion  presumption  is  characterised  as  a  vice  opposed  to  magnanimity.  He 
says: 
It  is,  however,  generally  the  case  in  all  natural  things  that  each  action  is  proportioned 
to  the  power  of  the  agent  involved,  nor  does  any  agent  in  nature  strive  to  do  what  is 
beyond  its  ability.  It  is  therefore  perverse  and  sinful,  being  as  it  were  against  the 
natural  order,  for  anyone  to  take  it  upon  himself  to  tackle  what  is  above  his  powers. 
This  is  the  very  idea  of  presumption,  as  the  word  itself  indicates.  Thus  it  is  obvious 
that  presumption  is  a  sin.  146 
While  we  would  want  to  leave  aside  the  overtones  of  theological  culpability  that  colour  this 
characterisation  of  presumption,  his  description  of  the  vice  is  interesting.  Presumption 
occurs  when  one  exceeds  one's  powers,  when  the  individual  attempts  to  do  what  is  beyond 
his  or  her  ability.  The  human  intellectual  and  sensory  powers  are  limited.  When  we  go 
beyond  the  evidence  available  to  us  and  presume  to  know  something  that,  strictly  speaking 
we  can't  know  because  of  this  limited  nature  of  our  sensory  and  intellectual  faculties,  then 
we  are  epistemically  culpable.  This  epistemic  culpability,  this  presumption,  is  the  source  of 
error,  or  as  St.  Thomas  puts  it,  the  mother  of  error.  The  equipment  is  indeed  flawless,  the 
quiddity  abstracted  is `man',  but  the  judgment  we  make  on  the  basis  of  this  is  presumptive, 
it  exceeds  the  evidence  available  to  us.  We  will  return  to  the  implications  of  this  in  a 
145  Kretzmann  1992,  page  171. 
146  ST2a2ae  q130  a1c  Hoc  autem  communiter  in  omnibus  rebus  naturalibus  invenitur,  quod 
quaelibet  actio  commensuratur  virtuti  agentis,  nec  aliquod  agens  naturale  nititur  ad  agendum  id 
quod  excedit  suam  facultatem.  Et  ideo  vitiosum  est  et  peccatum  quasi  contra  ordinem  naturalem 
existens,  quod  aliquis  assumat  ad  agendum  ea  quae  praeferuntur  suae  virtuti.  Quod  pertinet  ad 
rationem  praesumptionis:  sicut  et  Ipsum  nomen  manifestat.  Unde  manifestum  est  quod 
praesumptio  est  peccatum. 135 
moment.  Firstly  we  want  to  look  at  another  example  of  presuming  we  have  perceptual 
knowledge  when,  in  fact,  the  judgment  is  mistaken.  The  example  is  Owens'.  147  Suppose 
someone  mistakes  salt  for  sugar  and  fills  the  sugar  bowl  with  salt.  Here  again,  we  have  the 
metaphysical  and  psychological  components  grounding  the  judgment.  On  the  basis  of  these 
judgments  the  individual  mistakenly  judges  that  the  white  stuff  is  sugar.  The  interesting 
point  of  this  example  is  that  it  shows  that  despite  there  being  no  problem  with  distance  or 
environment  the  judgment  is  mistaken. 
Three  characteristics  regarding  the  judgments  which  we  have  broadly  labelled  perceptual 
knowledge  can  be  drawn  from  the  above  examples.  First,  and  most  importantly,  there  is  the 
core  role  of  the  metaphysical  and  psychological  components  which  underpin  the  judgments. 
In  each  example  the  role  of  these  components  is  reinforced  to  the  point  of  repetition.  Such 
repetition  serves  to  illustrate  that  no  matter  whether  the  judgment  is  certain  and  infallible, 
correct  or  mistaken,  these  components  are  an  essential  feature.  These  components  constitute 
an  infallible  core  on  which  judgments  are  made.  This  infallible  core  is  closely  connected  to 
Aquinas'  firm  belief  in  the  veracity  of  the  first  act  of  the  intellect.  Mistakes,  as  we  saw, 
occur  when  our  judgments  go  beyond  the  evidence  that  this  infallible  core  presents  to  the 
intellect. 
In  the  above  example  we  judged  that  it  was  Socrates  sitting  down,  when  in  fact  it  was  Plato. 
This  error  could  have  been  avoided  in  two  ways.  One  way  we  have  already  seen  is  to  avoid 
going  beyond  the  evidence  presented  and  instead  merely  to  form  the  judgment  that  someone 
is  sitting  down.  Another  option  would  have  been  to  judge  that  it  is  possible  that  it  is  Socrates 
who  is  sitting  down,  but  it  may  or  may  not  be  him,  we  cannot  be  certain.  This  is  an 
important  point.  Sometimes  the  judgments  which  we  have  broadly  called  perceptual 
knowledge  are  actually  instances  of  opinio.  In  ST  2a2ae  q2  alc  Aquinas  says  that  opinio 
occurs  when  the  intellect  cannot  give  firm  assent  for  fear  that  the  opposite  of  what  it  accepts 
is  the  case.  Similar  sentiments  are  expressed  in  DV  q14  alc.  148  This  is  the  sense  in  which 
some  judgments  are  not  firm  assents.  They  have  the  infallible  core  of  the  paradigm  case,  but 
because  of  factors  such  as  distance,  an  uncertainty  is  introduced  which  means  that  firm 
assent  cannot  be  given.  Hence  such  judgments  are  not  knowledge  but  what  we  would  term 
today  'belief.  If  circumstances  change,  for  example,  we  move  closer  to  the  bench,  it  may  be 
possible  to  give  firm  assent.  In  these  new  circumstances  we  can  claim  to  have  knowledge  as 
opposed  to  belief.  This  is  the  second  characteristic  of  such  judgments:  not  all  judgments 
match  the  certainty  and  infallibility  of  the  paradigm.  The  assent  we  give  to  them  comes  in 
degrees.  Some  will  be  instances  of  firm  assent,  constituting  certain  and  infallible  knowledge 
while  others,  lacking  such  firm  assent,  are  merely  instances  ofopinio.  Alvin  Plantinga  has  a 
similar  description  in  his  account  of  perceptual  knowledge: 
The  sensible  route,  therefore,  is  to  continue  to  take  it  for  granted  that  many  of  our 
perceptual  judgments  do  indeed  have  warrant,  and  warrant  that  ranges  all  the  way 
147  Owens  1992b,  page  272. 
148  Op.  Cit.  Similiter  nec  opinans,  cum  non  firmetur  eius  acceptio  circa  alteram  partem. 136 
from  the  minimum  to  near  the  maximum  degree.  I  perceive  a  horse  at  50  yards 
through  fairly  heavy  fog:  I  form  the  belief  that  what  I  see  is  a  horse;  my  belief  may 
have  at  best  a  moderate  degree  of  warrant.  The  horse  comes  trotting  up  so  that  I  get  a 
good  clear  look  at  him  from  8  feet  away:  my  belief  that  it  is  a  horse  I  see  may  then 
have  a  great  deal  more  warrant,  no  doubt  enough  for  knowledge  of  that 
proposition.  149 
Warrant  ranging  from  the  minimum  to  the  maximum  degree  reinforces  an  aspect  of 
Plantinga's  account  of  knowledge  outlined  earlier.  He  suggested  that  with  respect  to 
knowledge  core  examples  can  be  cited  and  around  this  paradigmatic  core  stand  other 
examples  in  varying  degrees  of  closeness  to  the  paradigm.  Our  second  characteristic 
indicates  a  similar  structure  regarding  the  judgments  of  perceptual  knowledge.  Distance  and 
environment  determine  the  level  of  assent  and  therefore  whether  a  given  judgment  is  actually 
an  instance  of  knowledge  or  a  matter  of  opinio  ?  Some  judgments  will  have  the  certainty  and 
infallibility  of  the  paradigm,  some  will  indeed  be  instances  of  knowledge,  others  will  not. 
Distance  and  environment  did  not  play  any  role  in  the  error  which  occurred  in  the  salt  and 
sugar  example.  This  example  highlights  the  final  characteristic  of  judgments  of  perceptual 
C  '"" 
knowledge  they  are  defeasible.  In  the  case  of  the  salt  and  sugar  evidence  provided  by  the 
sense  of  taste  leads  to  a  revision  of  what  we  had  taken  to  be  the  case.  The  sense  of  sight  did 
not  produce  sufficient  evidence  to  make  the  judgment  which  we  made,  going  beyond  the 
available  evidence  led  to  error.  On  the  evidence  of  taste  we  are  now  in  a  position  to  make  a 
more  accurate  judgment.  150  While  some  judgments  will  be  certain  and  infallible,  in  many 
instances  the  judgments  will  be  open  to  revision  in  light  of  new  evidence  provided  by  the 
senses.  This  defeasibility  is  what  distinguishes  perceptual  knowledge  from  the  intellectual 
virtues  of  understanding  andscientia. 
We  are  now  in  a  position  to  clarify  Owens'  remarks  that  set  the  scene  for  this  discussion. 
Clearly,  Owens'  assertions  pertain  to  instances  of  the  paradigm:  that  I  know  Socrates  is 
sitting  down  because  I  am  standing  next  to  him,  that  I  know  I  am  typing  into  the  computer 
because  that  is  what  I  am  doing.  These  judgments  are  true  and  certain.  The  various  elements 
of  metaphysical  and  psychological  components  are  the  reason  for  this  confidence  and 
boldness.  There  is  no  serious  possibility  that  the  situation  could  be  otherwise  from  what  I 
have  judged  it  to  be.  However,  in  many  other  instances,  when  we  make  judgments  there  are 
serious  possibilities  that  things  could  be  otherwise.  Environment,  distance  and  misuse  of  our 
equipment  introduce  restrictions  on  the  judgments  we  make.  Sometimes  we  wisely  heed 
these  restrictions.  Often  we  do  not  and  we  ignore  the  possibility  that  things  could  be 
otherwise.  Clearly,  in  these  instances  the  attributes  of  the  paradigm  case  are  not  applicable 
and  we  do  not  have  knowledge. 
149  Plantinga  1993b,  page  90. 
150  While,  for  simplicity's  sake  we  have  focussed  on  visual  perceptual  knowledge,  this  example 
shows  a  feature  of  our  perceptual  knowledge  which  we  mentioned  in  footnote  number  four  of  this 
chapter:  often  the  judgments  which  constitute  perceptual  knowledge  result  from  the  evidence  of 
several  different  senses. 137 
As  this  chapter  draws  to  a  close  some  outstanding  issues  present  themselves.  How  can  we 
reconcile  the  defeasibility  of  perceptual  knowledge-with  the  claim  that  some  instances  of 
perceptual  knowledge  are  certain  and  infallible?  Where  does  normativity  fit  into  our  account? 
Is  there  any  way  this  account  of  perceptual  knowledge  can  account  for  Goldman's  Henry 
example? 
In  the  strict  sense  something  cannot  be  certain  and  infallible,  yet  at  the  same  time  be 
defeasible.  However,  with  respect  to  the  judgments  which  we  form  as  we  go  about  our 
everyday  business  in  the  world  there  is  a  sense  in  which  defeasibility  can  be  reconciled  with 
certainty  and  infallibility.  This  reconciliation  rests  on  the  way  we  normally  make  judgments 
about  material  objects.  Pace  Descartes'  dream  argument,  my  judgment  that  there  is  a 
computer  in  front  of  me,  into  which  I  am  typing  this  sentence,  constitutes  certain  and 
infallible  knowledge.  It  is  true  that  there  is  a  computer  in  front  of  me.  Clearly  this  kind  of 
judgment  is  indefeasible.  However,,  inmost  instances  I  make  such  judgments  without  ever 
considering  if  they  are  certain,  infallible  and  indefeasible..  As  I  form  judgments  about  the. 
world,  I  don't  usually  pause  to  reflect  on  their  possession  of  these  qualities.  It  is  only  in 
light  of  analytic  reflection  that  a  particular  judgment  may  be  shown  to  have  these  qualities. 
Similarly,  I  make  other  judgments  which  I  presume  to  be  true,  the  salt  and  sugar  case,  for 
example.  However,  these  judgments  later  turn  out  to  be  incorrect.  At  the  time  I  made  the 
initial,  incorrect  judgment  about  the  salt  and  sugar,  I  accepted  it  in  the  same  way  that  I 
accepted  that  there  is  a  computer  in  front  of  me.  I  had  no  reason  to  doubt  it,  it  seemed  a 
reasonable  judgment  to  make.  Later  evidence  showed  it  to  be  incorrect  and  a  new  judgment 
was  formed.  The  defeasibility  of  this  judgment  shows  that  it  was  not  actually  certain  or 
infallible.  The  point  is,  however,  that  in  my  everyday  dealings  with  the  world  most  of  my 
judgments  are  accepted  as  true  until  shown  not  to  be.  In  assenting  to  these  judgments, 
excluding  instances  ofopinio,  we  make  no  distinction  between  those  judgments  which  are 
true  and  so  may  be  certain  and  infallible  and  those  which  we  take  to  be  true,  but  aren't.  All 
are  presumed  to  be  true,  all  are  assented  to  in  the  same  way.  Some  indeed  will  be  true  and  be 
certain  and  infallible,  but  a  few  will  not,  a  few  will  be  incorrect.  Of  course,  we  could 
carefully  scrutinise  every  aspect  of  a  situation  before  we  make  a  judgment  about  it.  In  this 
way  we  could  ensure  that  most  of  our  judgments  will  be  certain  and  infallible.  The  kind  of 
scrutiny  involved  here  can  be  shown  by  considering  someone's  response  to  the  question:  "Is 
your  judgment  that  there  is  sugar  in  the  bowl  certain  and  infallible?  "  The  individual  would  be 
unlikely  to  answer  affirmatively  until  she  had  checked  all  the  evidence,  including  the 
evidence  of  taste.  Only  then  would  she  claim  to  have  certain  and  infallible  knowledge. 
However,  given  the  number  of  judgments  we  have  to  make  and  the  effort  this  kind  of 
scrutiny  would  involve,  it  is  completely  impractical.  Thus  we  tend  to  make  judgments  when 
we  are  not  in  full  possession  of  all  the  evidence  and  this  introduces  the  spectre  of 
defeasibility  into  perceptual  knowledge.  This  is  the  price  to  be  paid  for  being  able  to  make 138 
the  optimum  number  of  judgments  with  the  least  effort.  151  Some  judgments  will  indeed  be 
certain  and  infallible,  some  will  not.  That  some  are  and  some  aren't  is  not  something  that  we 
generally  consider  when  making  judgments.  This  is how  defeasibility  can  co-exist  with 
certainty  and  infallibility. 
Throughout  this  analysis  we  have  generally  tried  to  refrain  from  labelling  Aquinas'  account 
of  perceptual  knowledge  in  the  jargon  of  contemporary  epistemology.  At  times  we  have 
failed  to  resist  that  temptation.  We  have  seen  that  there  are  elements  of  foundationalism  and 
internalism  in  the  account  and  most  notably  towards  the  end  of  our  analysis  of  the 
psychological  component  we  did  label  his  account  externalist.  As  we  now  examine  the  issue 
of  normativity  the  externalist  credentials  of  his  theory  will  become  most  apparent. 
The  account  of  the  human  intellect's  knowledge  of  material  reality  which  St.  Thomas  gives 
in  ST  1a  q84ff  is  heavily  descriptive.  The  very  title  of  the  question  "How  the  soul,  while 
joined  to  the  body,  knows  material  things"  [quae  sunt  infra  ipsam.  ]152  is  indicative  of  the 
descriptive  tenor  of  his  account.  He  is  interested  in  the  processes  which  cause  knowledge. 
Our  analysis  of  the  two  components,  particularly  the  important  relationship  between  the 
intellect  and  senses  which  St.  Thomas  discusses  in  the  latter  part  of  ST  1a  q84,  ought  to 
drive  home  this  descriptive  emphasis.  It  is  an  emphasis  continued  throughout  ST  la  q85. 
This  emphasis  parallells  the  emphasis  placed  on  the  descriptive  in  contemporary  externalist 
theories  of  knowledge.  Within  these  externalist  theories,  the  descriptive  is  constitutive  of  the 
normative.  In  chapter  two  we  saw  Goldman  and  Plantinga  make  this  point;  their  accounts 
reiterating  Hilary  Kornblith's  neat  description  of  the  normative  dimension  of  the  descriptive: 
the  way  we  arrive  at  our  beliefs  is  the  way  we  ought  to  arrive  at  our  beliefs.  So  for  Goldman 
we  saw  that  a  belief's  justificational  status  depends  on  the  reliability  of  processes  that  cause 
it.  In  turn  Plantinga  writes: 
Well  then,  what  does  make  it  the  case  that  being  appeared  to  greenly  in  this  way 
provides  me  with  evidence  for  the  proposition  that  I  am  seeing  something  green? 
How  does  it  happen  that  this  belief  gets  warrant  for  me  under  those  circumstances? 
The  answer  is  clear:  this  sort  of  belief  formation  under  that  sort  of  circumstance  is 
dictated  by  our  design  plan.  When  our  perceptual  faculties  function  properly,  when 
they  function  in  accordance  with  our  design  plan,  we  form  that  sort  of  belief  in 
response  to  that  way  of  being  appeared  to.  Given  an  appropriate  epistemic 
environment  and  given  that  the  module  of  the  design  plan  governing  perception  is 
successfully  aimed  at  truth,  such  beliefs  will  have  warrant;  when  held  with 
151  Others  have  made  similar  proposals:  Cf.  Plantinga  1993b  page  38ff.  John  Pollock  in 
Contemporary  Theories  of  Knowledge  (Pollock  1986)  page  161  writes  "Intellection  is  the  process 
whereby  we  indulge  in  explicit  reasoning  and  form  conclusions  on  that  basis.  But  intellection  is  slow 
and  consumes  large  amounts  of  our  limited  computational  capacity.  To  get  around  this  we  also  have 
a  number  of  quick  and  dirty  systems  that  allow  us  to  form  conclusions  or  respond  to  environmental 
input  quickly  in  cases  in  which  we  do  not  have  time  to  deliberate.  These  systems  are  quick  but  dirty 
in  the  sense  that  they  sometimes  make  mistakes  in  ways  that  can  only  be  corrected  through  explicit 
reasoning.  " 
152  Quomodo  anima  cunjuncta  intelligat  corporalia,  quae  sunt  infra  ipsam. 139 
sufficient  firmness,  they  constitute  knowledge.  [His  emphasis]153 
Plantinga's  basic  argument  is  that  we  form  the  beliefs  that  we  do,  and  these  beliefs  acquire 
the  justificational  status  that  they  do,  because  of  the  way  our  faculties  are  designed  to  work 
in  their  proper  environment.  Of  this  kind  of  normativity  he  writes: 
The  sort  of  normativity  involved  is  not  that  of  duty  and  obligation;  it  is  normativity 
nonetheless,  and  there  is  an  appropriate  use  of  the  term  `ought'  to  go  with  it.  This  is 
the  use  in  which  we  say,  of  a  damaged  knee,  or  a  diseased  pancreas,  or  a  worn  brake 
shoe,  that  it  no  longer  functions  as  it  ought  to.  This  is  the  use  in  which  we  say  that  a 
human  heart  ought  to  beat  between  forty  and  two-hundred  times  per  minute,  and  that 
our  car  choke  ought  to  open  (  and  the  engine  throttle  back  to  750  RPM)  when  it 
warms  up.  154 
This  explanation  of  normativity  could  be  applied  exactly  to  Aquinas'  account  of  perceptual 
knowledge.  There  is  no  evidence  in  the  pertinent  passages  of  the  Prima  Pars  that  Aquinas 
has  a  deontic  conception  of  epistemic  normativity.  155  Nowhere  does  he  say  what  ought  to  be 
done  in  order  to  attain  perceptual  knowledge.  Rather,  it  is  a  heavily  descriptive  account, 
focussing  on  the  processes  involved.  We  have  analysed  these  processes  in  terms  of 
answering  the  two  questions  an  sit?  and  quid  est?  Within  the  processes  that  constitute  the 
metaphysical  and  psychological  components  lies  the  normative  element  of  this  part  of  his 
epistemology:  the  senses  doing  what  they  ought  to  do  in  their  proper  environment;  the  agent 
intellect  doing  what  it  ought  to  do  in  providing  the  conditions  for  the  passive  intellect  to 
grasp  the  quiddity  of  what  is  seen  and  make  judgments  on  the  evidence  available. 
Like  the  heart,  when  the  intellect  functions  properly  it  is  doing  what  it  ought  to  do.  The 
normative  is  implicit  in  the  descriptive.  What  we  do  in  making  judgments  is  what  we  ought 
to  do.  Even  when,  due  to  presumption  or  the  environment,  we  make  mistakes,  at  its  core  the 
well-functioning  intellect  is  still  doing  what  it  ought  to  do.  In  these  instances  the  limited 
human  intellectual  power  is  merely  being  over  extended  in  the  same  way  that,  while  a  clutch 
is  doing  what  it  ought  to  do,  we  can  still  burn  it  out. 
Contra  MacDonald,  Aquinas'  account  of  perceptual  knowledge  is  overwhelmingly 
externalist,  concurring  with  what  we  have  seen  of  contemporary  externalist,  descriptive 
epistemologies.  As  in  Goldman's  account  where  the  individual  need  not  have  cognitive 
accessibility  to  the  reliable  belief  forming  processes  which  determine  justification,  so  with 
respect  to  the  psychological  component,  which  we  have  shown  to  have  a  central  role  in 
153  Plantinga  1993b,  page  99. 
154ibid  page  45. 
155  Recall  that  in  chapter  two  we  noted  that  internalist  accounts  of  justification  devote  much 
attention  to  normative  questions  such  as  'what  makes  a  proposition  evident,  '  'what  Is  an  epistemic 
norm.  '  Fulfillment  of  the  norms  allows  one  to  classify  some  propositions  as  evident  and  on  this 
basis  the  justification  of  other  propositions  could  be  inferred.  This  is  what  we  mean  by  a  deontic 
conception  of  epistemic  normativity:  justification  is  a  matter  of  epistemic  duty  fulfillment.  This 
position  is  contrasted  with  that  of  externalism  which  sees  normativity,  not  as  a  matter  of  epistemic 
duty  fulfillment,  but  as  implicit  in  the  descriptive. 140 
Aquinas'  account  of  perceptual  knowledge,  the  individual  does  not  have  cognitive 
accessibility  to  the  processes  involved  in  this  component.  For  example,  we  are  not  aware  of 
the  activity  of  the  agent  intellect.  The  importance  of  the  metaphysical  component,  being 
external  to  the  knower  grounding  the  whole  enterprise,  further  reinforces  the  externalism  of 
Aquinas'  account.  Our  analysis  of  perceptual  knowledge  shows  that  the  internalist, 
foundationalist  interpretations  are  "untenable"  156  and  "irremediably  inaccurate.  "  157 
Nevertheless,  a  strict  pigeon-holing  of  his  epistemology  is  not  possible;  we  have  seen  that 
there  are  internalist  and  foundationalist  overtones  to  his  account  of  perceptual  knowledge. 
Equally  the  certain  and  infallible  judgments  which  are  strictly  speaking  perceptual  knowledge 
are  just  one  example  of  the  knowledge  of  which  humans  are  capable.  Humans  are  capable  of 
possessing  other  examples  of  knowledge  such  as  wisdom  and  scientia.  This  too  prevents  a 
strict  pigeon-holing,  for  example,  when  we  come  to  look  at  scientia,  we  will  see  that  it  is 
much  more  foundational  in  its  structure  and  that  the  normativity  pertinent  to  scientia  is  much 
more  deontological.  Given  the  many  parallells  that  have  been  drawn  in  this  chapter  and  the 
last  to  the  epistemology  of  Alvin  Plantinga  some  might  be  tempted,  despite  the 
foundationalist  character  of  Plantinga's  theory,  to  pigeon  hole  Aquinas'  account  as  a 
mediaeval  version  of  Plantinga's  account  of  warrant.  A  more  accurate  description  would  be 
to  say  that  Plantinga's  account,  its  foundationalism  notwithstanding,  is  in  some  broad 
respects  a  contemporary  version  of  Aquinas'.  Stump,  as  we  noted,  has  also  noticed  the 
resemblance. 
So  we  conclude  by  returning  to  the  example  which  opened  this  chapter,  the  story  of  hapless 
Henry  going  for  a  drive  through  fake  barn  country.  158  There  we  suggested  that  a  Thomistic 
account  of  epistemology,  that  espoused  by  Owens,  could  not  cope  with  this  Gettier  style 
example.  Can  we  now  change  our  opinion?  No,  taking  the  theory  on  its  own,  it  can't  really 
avoid  the  conclusion  Goldman  reaches  regarding  Henry's  luck.  Like  most  epistemologies 
Aquinas'  account  of  perceptual  knowledge  has  difficulty  dealing  with  Gettier  style  counter- 
examples.  But  that  is  not  the  end  of  the  world,  nor  is  it  the  end  of  Aquinas'  account  of 
perceptual  knowledge.  Two  options  present  themselves  to  us.  First,  we  can  take  advantage 
of  a  development  in  contemporary  epistemology.  Second,  if  we  wish  to  be  purist  and  not 
use  modem  developments  we  can  at  least  show  that  the  situation  is  not  as  bad  as  it  appears. 
156  MacDonald  1993,  page  186. 
157  Stump  1992,  page  133. 
158  In  his  account  of  warrant  Plantinga  puts  this  Gettier  type  example  down  to  problems  In  the  local 
cognitive  environment.  This  is  surely  implausible.  It  would  mean  that  technically  we  are  never 
mistaken,  it  is  simply  the  fault  of  the  wrong  kind  of  enviroment.  Viewing  a  white  object  In  red  light 
and  thinking  that  it  is  red  can  be  blamed  on  the  environment,  the  medium  of  the  perception.  But 
being  deceived  by  a  fake  barn  can  hardly  be  explained  away  in  the  same  manner.  In  this  case  there 
is  no  problem  with  the  cognitive  environment.  The  light  is  good,  the  senses  are  working  as  they 
ought.  The  fact  that  there  may  be  a  fake  barn  and  that  Henry  may  make  a  judgment  which  is  just  a 
lucky  guess  or  indeed  be  mistaken  has  to  do  with  Henry  and  the  judgment  he  makes.  Cf.  Plantinga 
1993b,  page  31  ff. 141 
The  modern  development  of  which  we  can  take  advantage  is  admittedly  controversial:  the 
theory  of  relevant  alternatives.  159  Alas,  there  is  no  mediaeval  version  of  such  a  concept  in 
Aquinas'  account  of  perceptual  knowledge.  But  that  doesn't  mean  to  say  that  it  can't  be 
used.  No  judgment  is  made  in  isolation.  We  can  see  the  importance  of  this  in  what  follows. 
In  order  for  Henry  to  claim  that  he  sees  a  barn,  he  must  be  apprised  of  the  likelihood  of  the 
relevant  alternative  that,  because  he  is  in  fake  barn  country,  he  may  actually  be  looking  at  a 
fake  barn.  So,  in  these  circumstances,  he  can  only  claim  to  know  that  it  is  a  barn  when  he 
actually  knows  that  he  is  not  looking  at  a  barn  facade. 
From  what  we  have  seen  in  our  analysis  of  perceptual  knowledge  we  can  describe  Henry's 
situation  as  follows.  From  his  sensory  experience,  Henry  knows  that  he  is  seeing 
something.  This  is  the  metaphysical  component.  From  his  sensory  experience  the  intellect 
grasps  a  quiddity.  On  the  basis  of  his  previous  experience  this  quiddity  is  described  by  the 
term  `barn'.  On  the  basis  of  this  Henry  forms  the  judgment  that  there  is  a  barn  over  there. 
Two  scenarios  are  possible,  there  is  indeed  a  barn,  or  in  fact  it  is  a  barn  facade.  If  the  first 
instance  is  the  case,  it  seems,  as  Goldman  said  that  he  has  just  been  lucky.  If  the  second 
instance,  Henry  is  plainly  mistaken.  If,  however,  he  had  been  aware  of  the  relevant 
information  that  he  was  in  fake  barn  country,  he  would  have  been  wary  about  making  any 
judgments  until  he  was  in  a  position  to  do  so.  He  would  not  have  made  the  judgment  that 
there  is  a  barn  over  there.  He  would  have  waited  until  he  was  in  full  possession  of  the 
evidence  and  in  a  position  to  make  a  judgment  and  then  the  judgment  would  neither  be  lucky 
or  mistaken. 
Now  we  consider  the  situation  regarding  Henry's  judgment  without  employing  the  use  of 
relevant  alternatives.  Let  us  presume  that  it  is  a  barn  facade  which  Henry  sees.  Does  this 
mean  that  the  first  act  of  the  intellect  is  mistaken  when  the  quiddity  grasped  is  'barn'?  No, 
the  intellect  can  only  act  on  the  information  the  senses  provide  and,  as  we  have  seen  again 
and  again,  unlike  the  angelic  intellect  we  do  not  know  everything  about  an  object  in  our  first 
apprehension  of  that  object.  The  senses  provide  the  information  that  there  is  something 
there,  on  the  basis  of  this  information  a  quiddity  is  grasped.  The  senses  can  only  be  set  into 
act  by  what  is  apparent  to  them.  What  is  apparent  to  them  is  that  there  is  a  barn  front  over 
there.  On  this  information  the  intellect  engages  in  its  first  act.  Clearly,  however,  there  is  no 
barn  there,  just  a  barn  facade.  So  the  subsequent  judgment  that  there  is  a  barn  is  mistaken. 
Henry  forms  a  judgment  which  he  thinks  is  correct.  He  is,  of  course,  mistaken.  He  has  been 
deceived.  Sadly  this  is  a  fact  of  the  limited  nature  of  human  intellection.  If  we  weren't 
capable  of  being  deceived  every  conjuror  would  be  out  of  work.  If  it  had  been  a  real  barn, 
his  judgment  would,  of  course,  have  been  true;  but  this  is  just  a  matter  of  luck. 
This  scenario  shows  the  defeasibility  of  perceptual  knowledge  which  we  have  outlined:  that 
many  of  our  judgments  are  neither  certain  nor  infallible.  However,  for  expedience  sake  we 
don't  scrutinise  our  judgments  to  separate  the  infallible  and  certain  from  those  which  are  not. 
159  Dretske  1981,  pp363-378. 142 
We  tend  to  treat  all  our  judgments  as  true  and  assent  as  if  they  were.  If  Henry  were  asked  if 
this  judgment  is  certain  and  infallible  he  would  most  probably  move  closer  to  the  object,  or 
change  his  position  before  stating  that  it  is  indeed  so.  In  this  way  he  will  discover  that  it  is  a 
facade  and  that  his  judgment  is  actually  untrue  or  confirm  his  earlier  lucky  judgment  that  it  is 
a  barn. 
Importantly,  regardless  of  whether  Henry  knows  of  the  relevant  alternative  or  not,  because 
his  intellect  is functioning  properly  there  is  still  an  infallible  core  to  the  judgment  that  he 
makes.  This  can  be  expressed  in  the  certain  and  infallible  judgment  that  there  is  something 
out  there.  This  kind  of  judgment,  however,  doesn't  tell  us  very  much,  we  prefer  to  know 
more.  Wanting  to  know  more  and  sometimes  exceeding  the  evidence  available  introduces 
C  10 
the  risk  of  defeasibility.  That  is  what  makes  this  kind  of  knowledgehdifferent  from  the 
intellectual  virtues,  two  of  which  we  will  look  at  in  the  next  chapter. 143 
4.  Scientia 
Sed  contra  est  quod  scientia  est  in  intellectu.  Si  ergo 
intellectus  non  cognoscit  corpora,  sequitur  quod  nulla  scientia 
sit  de  corporibus.  Et  sic  peribit  scientia  naturalis,  quae  est 
corpore  mobili. 
Summa  Theologiae  la  q84  al. 
St.  Thomas,  in  the  above  extract,  tells  us  that  if  the  human  intellect  did  not  have  knowledge 
of  material  things,  it  could  not  have  scientia  of  them.  As  it  has  scientia  of  them,  it  follows 
that  it  must  have  knowledge  of  them.  Throughout  this  work  we  have  frequently  made 
reference  to  scientia.  In  chapter  one,  when  we  outlined  the  various  kinds  of  human 
knowledge,  we  outlined  the  main  qualities  of  scientia  that  distinguish  it  from  other  kinds  of 
human  knowledge.  In  chapter  two  we  noted  Scott  MacDonald's  argument  that  Aquinas  saw 
scientia  as  the  paradigm  of  all  knowledge,  with  perceptual  knowledge  as  a  kind  of  secondary 
scientia.  However,  in  the  last  chapter,  our  analysis  showed  that  the  intellect's  knowledge  of 
material  reality  has  its  own  unique  features  and  should  not  be  described  as  some  kind  of 
watered  down  scientia. 
Having  analysed  the  intellect's  knowledge  of  material  things,  we  now  address  directly  the 
issue  of  scientia.  Aquinas'  treatment  of  scientia  in  In  P.  A.  is  complex:  a  detailed  and 
thorough  examination  of  which  would  constitute  a  volume  on  its  own.  This  chapter  does  not 
aim  to  give  a  complete  analysis  of  scientia.  Rather,  it  aims  to  examine  the  relationship 
between  scientia  and  perceptual  knowledge  by  looking  at  the  role  of  perceptual  knowledge  in 
the  formation  of  scientia's  principles.  We  will  begin  our  analysis  by  looking  at  MacDonald's 144 
and  Stump's  differing  descriptions  of  scientia,  outlining  their  principal  differences.  Their 
work  will  serve  as  a  catalyst  for  our  analysis  in  much  the  same  way  as  McDermott's  did  in 
the  preceding  chapter.  Mindful  of  MacDonald's  and  Stump's  accounts,  we  will  then  begin 
an  examination  of  how  the  principles  of  scientia  are  formed.  This  discussion  will  also 
necessitate  consideration  of  Aquinas'  account  of  understanding.  At  the  end  of  the  analysis, 
we  will  be  in  a  position  to  see  the  crucial  role  which  perceptual  knowledge  plays  in  scientia. 
We  will  also  see  whether  Stump  or  MacDonald,  or  perhaps  neither,  offered  the  more 
accurate  interpretation. 
a.  MacDonald  v.  Stump  (again) 
In  chapter  two  we  outlined  briefly  the  differing  interpretations  of  Aquinas'  epistemology 
offered  by  Stump  and  MacDonald.  We  will  now  examine  and  contrast  their  descriptions  of 
scientia.  We  begin  by  noting  two  non-contentious  remarks  each  makes  about  scientia, 
McDonald's  reminder  that  `scientia'  can  be  used  in  two  ways  and  a  brief  reference  by  Stump 
alluding  to  different  kinds  of  scientia. 
Scott  MacDonald's  point  ought  to  be  restated  first.  `Scientia'  can  be  used  in  two  ways.  It  can 
be  used  to  describe,  as  MacDonald  puts  it,  `a  kind  of  mental  state  or  disposition,  what  we 
might  call  a  propositional  attitude',  or  `scientia'  can  be  used  to  describe  an  organised  body  of 
knowledge,  such  as  geometry.  l  Presumably  the  background  to  MacDonald's  remark  is 
Aquinas'  admission  that  Aristotle  uses  `scientia'  in  a  broad  sense  to  refer  to  anything  which 
is  known  with  certainty  and  in  a  narrower  sense  in  which  `scientia'  is  said  to  deal  with 
conclusions  and  is  set  off  against  understanding  which  deals  with  principles.  2  These 
conclusions,  for  example,  the  axioms  of  geometry,  arrived  at  by  reasoning  from  principles, 
are  part  of  the  organised  body  of  knowledge  of  which  MacDonald  speaks.  Our  certain 
perceptual  knowledge  that  Socrates  is  sitting,  sketched  in  the  last  chapter,  while  not  scientia, 
could  be  classed  under  `scientia'  in  the  broad  sense. 
In  her  article  "Aquinas  on  the  Foundations  of  Knowing"  Eleonore  Stump  gives  a  brief  and 
lucid  overview  of  the  process  of  reasoning  that  is  worth  restating  here  as  it  can  serve  to 
illustrate  the  narrower  sense  of  'scientia': 
There  is  a  process  of  reasoning,  Aquinas  says,  which  yields  its  results  necessarily, 
and  in  this  process  the  certitude  of  scientia  is  acquired....  This  process  of  reasoning 
consists  in  demonstrative  syllogisms.  Each  demonstrative  syllogism  has  two 
premises,  and  these  premises  must  be  better  known  and  prior  to  the  conclusion.  But 
demonstration  does  not  give  rise  to  an  infinite  regress.  There  are  first  principles  of 
demonstration,  and  these  are  themselves  indemonstrable.  3 
The  narrower  sense  of  'scientia'  refers  to  the  process  of  reaching  the  conclusions  of  scientia 
1  MacDonald  1993,  page  188  Footnote  13., 
2InP.  A.  I.  7. 
3  Stump  1992,  page  132. 145 
by  reasoning  from  indemonstrable  principles,  4  and  to  the  relationships  between  the  different 
demonstrative  syllogisms;  as  we  will  see,  the  conclusions  of  some  syllogisms  can  serve  as 
the  premises  of  others.  Thus,  for  example,  the  principles  of  optics  are  taken  from 
geometry.  5  The  process  of  reasoning  and  the  relationships  of  the  various  syllogisms 
constitute  the  organisational  structure  of  scientia  . 
As  we  have  noted  there  are  significant 
differences  between  Stump's  and  MacDonald's  analyses  of  scientia  . 
These  differences 
apart,  MacDonald  would  have  no  difficulty  in  agreeing  with  Stump's  description  of 
scientia's  structure,  and  the  certainty  and  necessity  which  is  indicative  of  it.  However, 
before  we  begin  to  look  in  detail  at  those  different  interpretations  further  comment  on  the 
features  of  scientia  must  be  made,  not  least  the  connection  between  the  `broad'  and  narrow 
senses  of  `scientia'. 
Knowledge  of  conclusions  like  any  instance  of  knowing  that  something  is  the  case  is  a 
propositional  attitude.  In  the  case  of  scientia  it  is  a  propositional  attitude  which  is 
characterised  by  certainty.  Moreover,  it  is  a  habit  of  the  person  who  has  it.  Both  the  broad 
and  narrow  senses  of  'scientia'  are  closely  related  and  are  illustrated  by  a  description  of 
scientia,  already  cited  by  us  in  chapter  one,  that  Aquinas  himself  offers: 
Apropos  of  this  it  should  be  noted  that  to  know  something  scientifically  is  to  know  it 
completely,  which  means  to  apprehend  its  truth  perfectly.  For  the  principles  of  a 
thing's  being  are  the  same  as  those  of  its  truth.  Therefore  the  scientific  knower,  if  he 
is  to  know  perfectly,  must  know  the  cause  of  the  thing  known;  hence  he  says,  "when 
we  think  that  we  know  the  cause".  But  if  he  were  to  know  the  cause  by  itself,  he 
would  not  yet  know  the  effect  actually-which  would  be  to  know  it  absolutely-but 
only  virtually,  which  is  the  same  as  knowing  in  a  qualified  sense  and  incidentally. 
Consequently,  one  who  knows  scientifically  in  the  full  sense  must  know  the 
application  of  the  cause  to  the  effect;  hence  he  adds,  "as  the  cause  of  that  fact". 
, 
Again,  because  science  is,  the  sure  and  certain  knowledge  of  a  thing,  whereas  a  thing 
which  could  be  otherwise  cannot  be  known  with  certainty,  it  is  further  required  that 
what  is  scientifically  known  could  not  be  otherwise.  To  repeat:  because  science  is 
perfect  knowledge,  he  says,  "When  we  think  that  we  know  the  cause";  but  because 
the  knowledge  through  which  we  know  scientifically  in  the  full  sense  is  actual,  he 
adds,  "as  the  cause  of  that  fact.  "  Finally,  because  it  is  certain  knowledge,  he  adds, 
4  In  our  previous  descriptions  of  scientia  the  principles  on  which  scientia  rests  have  been 
frequently  labelled  'indemonstrable'.  So  far  we  have  not  really  discussed  this  term.  This  lacuna  will 
be  dealt  with  in  the  coming  pages. 
5  In  P.  A.  I  25  discusses  the  relationship  between  what  Aquinas  terms  the  higher  and  lower 
sciences,  the  former  being  the  mathematical  sciences,  the  latter  those  concerned  with  sensible 
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"and  that  the  fact  could  not  be  other  than  it  is"6 
Scientia  is  certain  knowledge?  In  one  sense  this  is  indicative  of  the  broad  sense  of 
`scientia',  the  propositional  attitude  that  he  knows  that  p  with  certainty,  where  p  is  the 
proposition  which  expresses  the  conclusion  of  the  demonstrative  syllogism.  In  the  case  of 
certain  perceptual  knowledge,  the  knower's  knowledge  is  certain  because  of  the  factors 
which  we  outlined  in  the  previous  chapter.  In  the  case  of  scientia  however,  the  scientific 
knower  knows  that  p  with  certainty  because  of  the  process  and  principles  involved  in  the 
production  of  scientia;  a  process  by  which  the  scientific  knower  has  `reduced  this 
conclusion  to  its  principles',  as  Aquinas  often  puts  it.  8  That  is  to  say,  p  is  a  proposition 
which  makes  a  statement  about  some  universal  kind,  for  example,  human  beings.  By  means 
of  a  demonstration  the  scientific  knower  can  show  the  connection  between  the  conclusion  p 
and  its  principles,  principles  which  express  the  causes  of  the  state  of  affairs  which  p  states. 
This  demonstration  indicates  the  narrower  sense  of  `scientia',  the  sense  in  which  scientia 
can  be  described  as  an  organised  body  of  knowledge,  part  of  which  involves  conclusions 
being  set  off  against  principles.  Both  senses  of  `scientia'  will  be  pertinent  to  our  analysis. 
The  modem  conception  of  science  classes  different  disciplines  such  as  medicine,  geometry, 
biology  and  astronomy  under  the  one  heading  of  science.  They  all  constitute  scientific 
knowledge.  Subject  matter  aside,  little  distinction  is  drawn  between  the  different  disciplines, 
for  example,  one  is  not  seen  to  be  more  certain  than  another.  Aquinas'  conception  of  scientia 
is  different.  As  Stump  points  out,  he  speaks  of  different  kinds  of  scientia  with  respect  to 
different  degrees  of  certainty.  9  This  is  a  feature  which  distinguishes  scientia  from  its  modern 
cousin.  We  will  look  at  the  reason  for  this  later  when  outlining  Stump's  account  of  scientia. 
For  the  moment  we  acknowledge  this  aspect  of  St.  Thomas'  theory  of  scientia  and  look  at 
what  the  various  kinds  of  scientia  have  in  common. 
St.  Thomas  deals  with  this  matter  in  the  latter  part  of  In  P.  A  . 
141.  There  he  states  the 
features  which  all  instances  of  scientia  share.  One  feature  the  different  instances  of  scientia 
share  is  that  each  is  concerned  with  a  genus.  Scientific  knowledge  of  a  genus  arises  from 
reasoning  based  on  prior  principles: 
61n.  P.  A.  I4A  fuller  version  reads:  Circa  quod  considerandum  est  quod  scire  aliquid  est  perfecte 
cognoscere  ipsum,  hoc  autem  est  perfecte  apprehendere  veritatem  lpsius:  eadem  enim  sunt 
principia  esse  rel  et  veritatis  ipsius.  Oportet  igitur  scientem  si  est  perfecte  cognoscens,  quod 
cognoscat  causam  rei  scitae.  Si  autem  cognosceret  causam  tantum,  nondum  cognosceret 
effectum,  in  actua,  quod  est  scire  simpliciter,  sed  virtute  tantum,  quod  est  scire  secundum  quid  et 
quasi  per  accidens.  Et  ideo  oportet  scientiem  simpliciter  cognoscere  etiam  applicationem  causae 
ad  effectum.  Quia  vero  scientia  est  etiam  certa  cognitio  rei;  quod  autem  contingit  aliter  se  habere, 
non  potest  aliquis  per  certitudinem  cognoscere;  ideo  ulterius  oportet  quod  id  quod  scitur  non 
possit  aliter  se  habere.  Quia  ergo  scientia  est  perfecta  cognitio,  ideo  dicit:  cum  causam  arbitramur 
cognoscere;  quia  vero  est  actualis  cognitio  per  quam  scimus  simpliciter,  addit:  et  quoniam  illius  est 
causa  quia  vero  est  certa  cognitio,  subdit;  et  non  est  contingere  aliter  se  habere. 
7Later  we  will  examine  the  meaning  of  'certainty'. 
8  See  for  example  DV  g14  al  c. 
9  Stump  1992,  page  143. 147 
Therefore,  if  there  be  anything  which  does  not  have  prior  principles  from  which 
reason  can  proceed,  there  cannot  be  science  of  such  things,  if  we  take  science  to 
mean  the  effect  of  demonstration,  as  we  do  here.  lo 
As  we  have  said,  the  issue  of  principles  will  be  a  central  element  of  our  analysis.  We  will 
begin  to  address  it  shortly.  Scientia  in  its  various  guises,  as  well  as  resting  on  principles,  is 
also  concerned  with  the  parts  out  of  which  its  subjects  are  composed: 
For  in  every  science  there  are  the  principles  of  its  subject,  and  these  must  be 
considered  before  all  else:  for  example,  in  natural  science  the  first  consideration  is 
about  matter  and  form,  and  in  grammar  about  the  alphabet.  I  l 
Furthermore,  scientia  is  also  concerned  with  the  essential  properties  of  its  subjects.  He 
summarises  these  features  of  scientia  in  In  P.  A..  I  42.  He  writes  that  there  are: 
two  marks  of  the  genus  which  is  the  subject  of  the  science:  one  of  these  is  that  it  be 
composed  of  first  principles,  and  the  other  is  that  its  parts  and  properties  be  per  se.  12 
This  particular  lectio  of  In  P.  A.  deals  with  two  topics,  one  of  which  appears  prima  facie  to 
undermine  our  assertion  that  it  is  possible  to  have  scientia  of  natural  kinds.  Initially,  it  states 
that  scientia  is  not  concerned  with  things  that  occur  through  fortune.  It  then  goes  on  to  state 
that  "  science  is  not  concerned  with  things  that  are  known  according  to  sense.  "13  If  this  is 
the  case,  how  can  we  claim  to  have  scientific  knowledge  of  dogs,  trees  and  all  the  other 
objects  that  we  sense?  The  answer  lies  in  the  object  of  sensory  knowledge.  Scientia  is  not 
concerned  with  things  which  are  known  according  to  sense  because  sensory  knowledge 
reveals  only  a  thing's  accidents,  but  not  its  substance  or  essence.  Moreover,  the  senses  deal 
with  singular  objects.  Herein  is  the  solution  to  our  apparent  problem.  The  object  of  scientia 
is  always  universal  and  necessary.  Obviously  then  we  cannot  have  scientia  of  things  known 
by  the  senses  because  they  are  singular  and  contingent.  However,  in  the  last  chapter  we  have 
shown  how  universals  are  formed  from  particular  instances.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  we  can 
have  scientia  of  natural  kinds.  We  can  have  scientific  knowledge  of  the  universal  which  the 
individual  instantiates.  Furthermore,  universals  and  essential  properties  explain  the  necessity 
which  characterises  scientia:  a  necessity  which  is  reinforced  in  the  demonstration  from 
premises  to  conclusion  which  characterises  scientia. 
So  far  we  have  used  two  non-contentious  aspects  of  Stump's  and  MacDonald's  accounts  to 
illustrate  some  of  the  main  features  of  scientia:  its  demonstrative  nature,  its  necessity  and 
certainty  and,  not  least,  the  role  of  principles.  Now  we  turn  to  the  analyses  of  MacDonald 
and  Stump.  Examination  of  what  they  have  to  say  will  shed  further  light  on  these  features 
before  we  move  on  to  offer  our  own  analysis. 
10  Si  qua  ergo  res  est,  quae  non  habeat  principia  priora,  ex  quibus  ratio  procedere  possit,  horum 
non  potest  esse  scienta,  secundum  quod  scientia  hic  accipitur,  prout  est  demonstrationis  effectus. 
11  ibid.  In  qualibet  enim  scientia  sunt  quaedam  principia  subiecti,  de  quibus  est  prima  consideratio 
sicut  in  scientia  naturali  de  materia  et  forma,  ut  in  grammatica  de  literis. 
12  Circa  primum  considerandum  est  quod  supra  duas  conditiones  posuerat  generis,  quod  est 
subiectum  scientiae:  quarum  una  est  ut  componatur  ex  primis,  alia  est  ut  partes  et  passiones  sunt 
eius  per  se. 
13  Scientia  non  est  eorum  quae  cognoscuntur  secundum  sensum. 148 
In  the  extract  from  In  P.  A.  14  which  we  quoted  earlier,  Aquinas  said  that  "science  is  the 
sure  and  certain  knowledge  of  a  thing".  In  his  analysis  MacDonald  emphasises  the  certainty 
of  scientia.  Much  of  his  analysis  states  what  we  have  already  seen.  Scientia,  MacDonald 
notes,  is  grounded  on  principles  which  are  known  by  themselves.  14  MacDonald  refers  to 
them  as  `first  principles'.  These  principles  are  the  epistemic  foundations  of  scientia  because 
they  form  the  premises  of  the  demonstrative  syllogism  from  which  the  conclusions,  which 
constitute  scientia,  are  drawn.  15  MacDonald  notes  that  Aquinas  calls  these  principles 
`immediate  propositions'  because  they  themselves  are  indemonstrable.  16  It  is  from  the 
indemonstrability  of  these  immediate  propositions  and  the  process  of  demonstration  that 
scientia  obtains  its  certainty;  the  conclusion  of  the  demonstration,  the  object  of  scientia,  has 
inferential  justification.  We  have  already  seen  elsewhere  that  the  inferential  nature  of  the 
conclusion's  justification  leads  MacDonald  to  emphasise  scientia's  foundationalist  structure. 
The  first  principles  which  function  as  the  epistemic  foundations  of  scientia  are  universal  and 
necessary,  they  are  metaphysically  and  epistemically  prior  to,  and  explanatory  of,  the 
conclusions  which  they  demonstrate.  17  That  first  principles  are  epistemically  prior  to  their 
conclusions  is  not  a  revelation.  However  some  of  the  other  terms  which  MacDonald  uses  to 
describe  them  require  unpacking.  The  propositions  are  explanatory  because,  as  is  frequently 
stated  in  In  P.  A.,  such  propositions  can  be  thought  of  as  offering  the  explanation  of  what  is 
expressed  in  the  conclusion.  MacDonald  acknowledges  this.  18  We  will  return  to  this  matter 
later.  The  following  extract  illustrates  the  universality,  necessity  and  immediacy  of  first 
principles  as  well  as  hinting  at  the  importance  of  metaphysics  in  the  enterprise: 
Aquinas's  logic  and  epistemology  rest  here  on  his  metaphysical  realism.  He  holds 
that  there  are  real  natures  of  naturally  occurring  substances  and  accidents  and  that 
these  real  natures  can  provide  the  content  of  universal  categorical  propositions. 
Genuine  kind  terms  refer  to  real  natures,  and  real  definitions  explicate  these  natures 
by  identifying  a  kind's  genus  and  specifying  differentia  (which  are  also  real  natures). 
Thus,  `human  being'  refers  to  the  real  nature  human  being,  the  real  definition  of 
which  is  rational  animal.  When  Aquinas  says  that  an  immediate  proposition  is  one 
in  which  the  predicate  belongs  to  the  account  (or  definition-ratio)  of  the  subject,  he 
means  that  the  real  nature  referred  to  by  the  predicate  term  is  an  element  in  the  real 
definition  of  the  subject,  that  the  predicate  term  names  the  subject's  genus  or 
specifying  differentia  (for  example,  A  human  being  is  an  animal).  19 
It  is  this  relationship  between  the  subject  and  predicate  which  grounds  the  universality  and 
necessity  of  the  proposition,  every  human  being  is  a  rational  animal  and  given  what  it  is  to 
14  MacDonald  1993,  page  178. 
15  ibid  page  165. 
16ibid  page  169  Earlier  we  saw  that  Aquinas  called  them  prior  principles. 
17  ibid  page  173. 
18  ibid  page  170. 
19  ibid  page  170. 149 
be  human,  it  is  necessarily  the  case  that  human  beings  are  rational  animals.  The  immediacy 
and  indemonstrability  of  the  proposition  also  rest  on  this  relationship  between  the  subject 
and  predicate.  The  particular  proposition  which  MacDonald  uses  as  an  example  is  manifestly 
an  immediate  proposition,  given  we  know  what  `human  being'  and  `rational  animal'  mean. 
As  we  will  see,  Stump  raises  concerns  about  the  immediacy  of  propositions  like  this.  We 
will  look  in  detail  at  such  propositions  in  the  next  section.  For  the  moment  we  note  how 
MacDonald,  after  noting  the  importance  of  metaphysics  for  epistemology,  goes  on  to  clarify 
what  is  meant  by  metaphysical  priority: 
When  he  [Aquinas]  claims  that  the  first  principles  of  demonstration  must  be 
immediate  and  indemonstrable,  he  is  claiming  that  they  must  express  metaphysically 
immediate  propositions  and  not  just  propositions  that  are  epistemically  basic  and 
unprovable  for  some  particular  epistemic  subject............  the  structure  of  the 
demonstration,  then,  is  isomorphic  with  the  metaphysical  structure  of  reality: 
immediate,  indemonstrable  propositions  express  metaphysically  immediate  facts, 
whereas  mediate,  demonstrable  propositions  express  metaphysically  mediate 
facts.  20 
MacDonald's  comments  on  the  distinction  he  makes  between  immediate  and  mediate 
metaphysical  facts  needs  to  be  clarified.  There  are  two  possible  interpretations  of  what  he 
means.  It  could  be,  and  it  does  seem  likely,  that  MacDonald  is  simply  referring  to  natural 
priority  in  the  sense  that  some  things  are  naturally  prior  to  other  things.  For  example, 
rationality  is  naturally  prior  to  risibility:  if  humans  weren't  rational  then  they  would  not  be 
capable  of  laughing  at  the  joke.  Rationality  grounds,  is  naturally  prior  to,  risibility.  This  may 
be  what  MacDonald  means  by  immediate  and  mediate  metaphysical  facts:  rationality  is  an 
immediate  metaphysical  fact  and  risibility,  being  a  consequence  of  the  former,  is  a  mediate 
metaphysical  fact.  The  immediate  and  mediate  character  of  these  facts  can  be  more  clearly 
seen  in  a  syllogism  demonstrating  the  cause  of  risibility,  In  this  demonstration  the  immediate 
indemonstrable  propositions,  the  proper  principles,  would  express  humanity's  rationality 
and  risibility.  The  mediate  demonstrated  proposition,  the  conclusion,  would  make  explicit 
what  is  contained  in  the  premises  and  express  the  cause  of  humanity's  risibility,  namely 
rationality.  However,  that  this  is  what  MacDonald  means  is  not  entirely  clear.  It  is  clouded 
by  his  reference  to  metaphysically  immediate  propositions  and  the  underlying  epistemic  tone 
of  his  discussion.  Thus,  another,  more  critical  interpretation  is  possible  which  sees 
MacDonald  confusing  epistemology  and  metaphysics.  Surely  there  are  just  metaphysical 
facts,  some  of  which  we  will  be  immediately  aware  of  and  others  not?  The  lack  of 
immediacy  in  the  latter  case  is  an  epistemic  matter,  not  a  metaphysical  matter.  This  seems  to 
undermine  his  assertion  that  propositions  can  be  metaphysically  prior:  metaphysically  prior 
to  what?  If  this  second  interpretation  is  what  is  meant,  he  would  be  better  to  say  that  some 
propositions  about  metaphysical  facts  are  epistemically  prior  to  others.  The  fact  that  we  can 
come  have  scientia  about  some  aspect  of  humanity  by  demonstrating  from  propositions  such 
as  `humans  are  rational  animals'  does  not  make  that  demonstrated  fact  of  which  we  have 
scientia  metaphysically  posterior  to  the  fact  that  humans  are  rational  animals.  It  is  merely 
20  ibid  page  170. 150 
epistemically  posterior.  While  it  seems  acceptable  to  speak  in  epistemic  terms  of  immediate 
and  mediate  propositions,  the  latter  derived  from  the  former;  on  this  interpretation  it  doesn't 
seem  acceptable  or  helpful  to  use  the  same  language  with  respect  to  metaphysics  because  we 
are  left  asking  the  question  what  is  a  metaphysically  mediate  fact? 
The  close  connection  he  draws  between  metaphysics  and  epistemology  serves  to  illustrate 
the  aforementioned  problem  with  the  immediacy  of  some  propositions.  MacDonald  says: 
Non-inferential  justification,  then,  consists  in  one's  being  directly  aware  of 
immediate  facts  that  ground  a  proposition's  necessary  truth.  When  one  sees  that  a 
proposition  expresses  an  immediate  fact  of  this  sort,  one  cannot  doubt  its  truth  (since 
one  cannot  conceive  of  it  being  false)  or  be  mistaken  in  holding  it.  Aquinas  says  that 
in  these  cases  immediate  propositions  are  evident  to  us.  21 
Propositions  are  immediate  to  us  when  we  see  that  they  express  an  immediate  metaphysical 
fact.  What  about  those  cases  when  propositions  do  express  immediate  facts,  but  we  do  not 
know  that  they  do  because  we  fail  to  see  the  relation  between  the  subject  and  predicate?  Is  a 
proposition  of  this  kind  immediate  or  mediate?  Will  it  be  immediate  for  some  people  and  not 
for  others?  MacDonald  attempts  to  deal  with  this.  His  attempt  rests  on  a  distinction  which 
Aquinas  makes: 
Aquinas  distinguishes  between  immediate  propositions  whose  terms  are  common  or 
grasped  by  everyone,  which  he  calls  common  principles  or  common  conceptions  of 
the  mind,  and  those  whose  terms  are  conceived  by  only  some  people.  22 
Aquinas  does  indeed  make  this  important  distinction.  But  as  MacDonald  tells  it,  it  is  not  the 
whole  story.  There  are  more  to  common  principles  than  the  fact  that  they  are  grasped  by 
everyone.  Eleonore  Stump  tells  a  far  more  accurate  tale  which  we  will  look  at  shortly.  Of  the 
other  kind  of  principles  not  grasped  by  everyone  MacDonald  goes  on  to  say: 
One  is  directly  aware  of  the  necessary  truth  of  an  immediate  proposition  only  when 
one  conceives  the  natures  of  the  subject  and  predicate.  Moreover,  Aquinas  holds  that 
it  is  difficult  to  attain  complete  conception  of  certain  things.  It  follows  that  direct 
awareness  of  the  necessary  truth  of  immediate  propositions  about  certain  things  will 
be  difficult  to  attain.  Propositions  of  this  sort,  then,  can  be  epistemic  foundations 
absolutely  speaking  despite  being  opaque  to  some,  or  even  many,  normal  people.  23 
While  they  may  express  `metaphysically  immediate  facts',  can  we  really  claim  that  they  are 
epistemically  immediate  if  we  have  to  be  told  that  they  are  so,  or  work  out  that  they  are  so? 
Surely,  one  has  to  know  that  a  human  is  a  rational  animal  before  one  can  see  the  immediacy 
of  that  proposition?  Only  when  we  know  the  meaning  of  the  terms  is  the  proposition  self- 
evident.  But  does  this  not  mean  that  self-evidence  is  something  that,  in  a  sense,  has  to  be 
discovered?  Yes,  but  it  doesn't  stop  the  proposition  being  self-evident.  '2+2=4'  is  self- 
evident,  but  at  some  point  in  school  we  had  to  discover  this.  Furthermore,  there  is  no  reason 
why  self-evident  propositions  cannot  be  derived  from  the  conclusion  of  another  syllogism. 
21  ibid  page  171. 
22  ibid  page  172. 
23  ibid  page  178. 151 
Stump  offers  a  fuller  analysis  than  MacDonald  of  immediate  principles.  In  due  course  we 
will  outline  her  remarks  about  them  and  then,  later,  give  a  full  analysis  of  principles  as 
discussed  in  In  P.  A.. 
Having  looked  at  what  MacDonald  has  to  say  about  principles  we  now  turn  to  his 
description  of  the  enterprise  of  scientia.  He  doesn't  actually  describe,  in  much  detail,  what  is 
entailed  in  the  demonstration.  Rather  his  description  tends  to  reflect  his  foundationalist 
leanings,  emphasising  the  derived  epistemic  certainty  of  the  conclusion.  As  he  has  describes 
it,  scientia  is  a  matter  of  reasoning  from  immediate  propositions,  the  epistemic  foundations 
of  scientia,  to  a  conclusion.  He  says: 
....  to  have  scientia  with  respect  to  some  proposition  P  is  to  hold  P  on  the  basis  of  a 
demonstrative  syllogism,  that  is,  to  hold  P  where  one's  epistemic  grounds  for  P  are 
the  premises  of  the  syllogism  and  the  fact  that  P  is  entailed  by  those  premises.  24 
Elsewhere  he  writes: 
On  the  one  hand,  our  having  scientia  with  respect  to  some  proposition  P  is 
characterised  by  certainty  by  virtue  of  our  holding  P  on  the  basis  of  valid  syllogistic 
inferences  whose  ultimate  premises  are  necessarily  true  propositions  whose  falsity  is 
inconceivable  to  us.  Inferences  of  this  sort  from  premises  of  this  sort  establish  the 
necessary  truth  (and  hence,  objective  certainty)  of  their  conclusions  and  thereby 
provide  us  with  paradigmatically  compelling  evidence  for  (and  hence,  subjective 
certainty  with  respect  to)  those  conclusions.  On  the  other  hand,  our  having  scientia 
with  respect  to  P  constitutes  complete  cognition  of  P,  because  to  hold  P  on  the  basis 
of  demonstration  is  to  have  located  P  in  a  wider  explanatory  structure  or  theory  that 
maps  objective  reality.  25  [My  emphasis] 
These  descriptions,  particularly  the  first  sentence  of  the  second  extract  highlighted  above, 
show  the  importance  he  places  on  the  premises  of  the  demonstration  in  the  move  from  what 
is  more  known  and  epistemically  prior  to  what  is  less  known  and  epistemically  posterior. 
This  kind  of  inference  gives  scientia  its  certainty.  MacDonald's  reading  suggests  a  process 
of  beginning  with  immediate  principles  and  then  reasoning  to  a  conclusion,  as  one  would  do 
in  a  mathematical  proof.  He  is  extremely  interested  in  the  matter  of  epistemic  justification.  As 
we  will  see,  this  may  not  be  as  important  as  he  believes.  As  comparison  with  Stump's 
account  will  show,  MacDonald's  analysis  appears  to  emphasise  the  foundationalism  of 
scientia  to  the  detriment  of  other  aspects  of  it,  such  as  the  explanatory  nature  of  scientia, 
which  he  does  refer  to  above.  This  feature  of  scientia  is  mentioned  but  a  few  times  in  his 
article  in  contrast  to  continual  references  to  scientia's  foundational  ism. 
Stump's  account  is  more  thorough  than  MacDonald's.  We  have  already  noted  in  chapter  two 
that  she  considers  a  foundationalist  interpretation  of  Aquinas'  epistemology  to  be  very 
mistaken.  Such  an  interpretation,  she  writes,  may  arise  because  people  have  mistakenly 
taken  'scientia'  to  be  equivalent  to  `knowledge'  and  thus  seen  In  P.  A.  as  Aquinas' 
24  ibid  page  164. 
25  ibid  page  171. 152 
exposition  of  his  theory  of  knowledge.  26  She  begins  by  noting  the  role  of  the  demonstrative 
syllogism  in  the  process  of  scientia  . 
She  notes  the  indemonstrability  of  the  first  principles: 
There  is  no  cognition  that  has  more  certitude  than  the  cognition  of  such  first 
principles,  and  they  are  the  cause  of  certitude  in  one's  cognition  of  other 
propositions.  They  are  not  only  necessary  but  known  per  se  and  any  scientia  takes 
its  certitude  from  them.  27 
She  notes  that  self-evident  propositions,  or  immediate  propositions,  such  as  the  law  of  non 
contradiction,  definitions  and  propositions  about  immediate  sensory  experience  seem  to  be 
candidates  for  first  principles.  All  this,  she  notes  "certainly  give  rise  to  the  impression  of 
Foundationalism.  "28  She  then  sets  out  to  disabuse  one  of  such  an  interpretation. 
We  have  already  noted  that  we  cannot  have  scientia  of  the  objects  of  sensory  knowledge 
because  scientia  is  always  of  what  is  universal  and  necessary.  Stump  acknowledges  this  in 
discounting  propositions  about  immediate  sensory  experience  as  first  principles  of  scientia. 
Later  we  will  return  to  this  important  matter  of  the  relationship  between  scientia  and 
perceptual  knowledge.  She  turns  her  attention  to  self-evident  propositions.  Importantly,  she 
distinguishes  between  two  kinds  of  immediate  principles:  common  principles  and  proper 
principles.  MacDonald,  as  we  saw,  did  allude  to  this  distinction,  but  Stump  gives  a  fuller 
description  of  St.  Thomas'  thought.  29  Common  principles  such  as  `a  whole  is  greater  than 
its  parts'  are  common  to  every  scientia  and  are  known  by  the  light  of  natural  reason.  Proper 
principles,  in  contrast,  are  proper  to  each  scientia.  This  is  an  important  distinction  which  we 
will  examine  in  detail  later.  For  the  moment  we  note  that  Stump  says  that  common  principles 
can't  serve  as  the  first  principles  of  scientia  because  there  is  no  guarantee  that  a  common 
principle  will  be  accepted  as  such  by  an  individual,  or  that  an  individual  will  not  mistakenly 
take  a  proposition  to  be  a  common  principle  when  in  fact  it  isn't.  30  Given  the  possibility  of 
error,  according  to  Stump,  there  is  thus  no  guarantee  that  what  is  built  on  common  principles 
will  be  knowledge.  31  We  have  previously  acknowledged  the  problem  of  being  unaware  that 
a  proper  principle  is  immediate.  At  this  point  we  merely  note  her  concern  and  reiterate 
MacDonald's  assertion  that  they  can  be  epistemic  foundations  absolutely  speaking,  in  the 
way  that  `two  plus  two  equals  four'  even  when  the  innumerate  infant  doesn't  know  that.  We 
will  leave  detailed  comment  on  common  principles  until  later,  but  we  do  note  Aquinas' 
remark  in  DV  q16  a2c  regarding  common  principles: 
Hence,  too,  it  is  that  all  speculative  knowledge  [specifica  cognitio]  is  derived  from 
some  most  certain  knowledge  concerning  which  there  can  be  no  error.  This  is  the 
knowledge  of  the  first  general  principles,  [primorum  principiorum  universalium]  in 
reference  to  which  everything  else  which  is  known  is  examined  and  by  reason  of 
26  Stump  1992,  page  132. 
27  ibid  page  133. 
28  ibid  page  133. 
29  ibid  page  138ff. 
30  ibid  page  138. 
31  ibid  page  140. 153 
which  every  truth  is  approved  and  every  falsehood  rejected.  If  any  error  could  take 
place  in  these,  there  would  be  no  certainty  in  the  whole  of  knowledge  which 
follows.  32 
It  may  be  feasible  for  someone  to  mistakenly  take  a  proposition  to  be  a  common  principle 
when  it  isn't.  However,  when  we  come  to  look  at  common  principles  we  will  see  how 
improbable  that  is.  We  will  also  see  the  ground  for  Aquinas'  assertiveness  on  the  matter. 
Stump  also  has  a  problem  with  proper  principles.  The  problem  focuses  on  the  matter  of  the 
proper  principle's  universality  which  is  established  by  means  of  induction.  She  writes: 
So  not  only  is  there  no  guarantee  that  what  a  cognizer  uses  as  a  proper  first  principle 
of  scientia  will  be  something  known  with  certainty,  there  isn't  even  a  guarantee  that 
what  the  cognizer  starts  with  as  a  first  principle  will  be  true,  since  it  the  result  of 
induction......  Since  what  we  use  as  a  first  principle  has  to  be  the  result  on  induction, 
what  we  use  as  first  principles  might  very  well  not  be  genuine  first  principles  at  all, 
and  there  is  no  simple  procedure  for  telling  the  genuine  from  the  counterfeit.  Even 
when  a  cognizer  does  begin  with  a  genuine  first  principle,  however,  he  will  not  be 
starting  with  a  properly  basic  proposition,  since  the  genuine  first  principle  he  begins 
with  will  be  derived  by  induction  33 
Given  this  question  of  induction  and  the  other  problems  concerning  the  propositions  which 
could  serve  as  first  principles  in  a  foundationalist  reading  of  Aquinas,  she  writes: 
So,  to  summarise,  then,  on  the  view  which  takes  Aquinas  to  be  a  Foundationalist, 
what  constitutes  the  foundations  for  knowledge  for  him  are  propositions  evident  to 
the  senses  and  the  first  principles  of  scientia;  these  will  be  properly  basic 
propositions  which  are  known  with  certainty  and  from  which  all  other  non-basic 
propositions  known  with  certainty  are  derived.  But,  in  fact,  the  evidence  that 
Aquinas  is  a  foundationalist  depends  on  interpreting  `scientia  'as  equivalent  to 
`knowledge'  and  we  have  seen  good  reasons  for  supposing  that  such  an 
interpretation  is  decidedly  mistaken.  34 
We  concur  with  Stump  that  there  is  more  to  Aquinas'  account  of  human  epistemology  than 
scientia.  We  have  shown  that,  generally  speaking,  Aquinas'  account  of  human  epistemology 
is  not  foundationalist.  However,  we  have  acknowledged  that  one  part  of  his  human 
epistemology,  scientia,  does  have  a  foundationalist  structure.  Stump  appears  to  disagree 
with  this. 
A  significant  part  of  Stump's  critique  of  a  foundationalist  reading  of  scientia  rests  on  the 
32  Inde  est  etiam  quod  omnis  specifica  cognitio  derivatur  ab  aliqua  certissima  cognitione  circa  quam 
error  esse  non  potest,  quae  est  cognitio  primorum  principiorum  universalium,  ad  quae  omnia  illa 
cognita  examinantur,  et  ex  quibus  omne  verum  approbatur,  et  omne  falsum  respuitur.  In  quibus  si 
aliquis  error  posset  accidere  nulla  certitude  in  tota  sequenti  cognitione  inveniretur. 
The  translator  of  the  above  text  has  translated  specifica  cognitio  as  'speculative  knowledge'.  a 
more  accurate  translation  is  specific  cognition.  33Stump  1992,  page  142. 
34  ibid  page  143. 154 
matter  of  induction  and  proper  principles.  Towards  the  end  of  his  article  MacDonald  makes 
some  remarks  regarding  induction  and  first  principles.  He  writes: 
When  Aquinas  says  that  we  cognize  these  universal  principles  by  means  of 
induction,  he  is  not  making  a  point  about  our  epistemic  justification  for  holding 
them.  He  does  not  mean  that  we  are  inferentially  justified  in  holding  these  universal 
principles  on  the  basis  of  inductive  generalisation.  35 
MacDonald  goes  on  to  clarify  this  statement.  According  to  him,  the  universal  principles 
which  Aquinas  is  writing  about  in  the  relevant  part  of  In  P.  A..  36  are  not  the  propositions 
themselves  but  the  universal  natures  which  the  terms  of  the  propositions  refer  to.  This  is  an 
important  point.  In  the  last  chapter  we  outlined  how  these  universals  are  formed  by  means  of 
induction;  a  kind  of  induction  which  is  not  the  same  as  that  of  inductive  generalisation.  This 
kind  of  induction,  abstracting  from  particular  cases  what  they  have  in  common,  is  the 
intellect's  way  of  forming  universals.  It  has  nothing  in  common  with  what  we  term  inductive 
generalisation.  That  the  terms  of  the  proposition  are  formed  in  this  way  is  of  no  particular 
significance  with  respect  the  proposition's  immediacy.  What  is  important  is  the  meaning  of 
the  terms  which  constitute  the  subject  and  the  predicate.  Crucially,  first  principles  are  not 
formed  by  the  kind  of  induction  which  Stump  believes  they  are.  Given  that  her  anti- 
foundationalist  reading  of  scientia  places  a  great  deal  of  emphasis  on  the  role  of  induction  in 
the  formation  of  principles,  one  pillar  of  her  anti-foundationalist  reading  of  scientia  seems  to 
have  crumbled.  In  the  next  section  of  this  chapter  we  will  discuss  the  relationship  between 
perceptual  knowledge  and  scientia  by  looking  at  the  formation  of  principles. 
Stump  concludes  her  anti-foundationalist  polemic  by  questioning  the  translation  of 
'certitudo'  as  'certainty'.  According  to  her,  such  a  translation  is  misleading  37  It  is  as  part  of 
her  discussion  of  'certitudo'  that  she  refers  to  different  kinds  of  scientia.  Aquinas,  she  notes, 
"compares  one  scientia  to  another  to  determine  which  has  more  certitudo.  "  38  As  stated 
above,  we  will  look  at  'certainty'  later.  Here,  having  already  looked  at  what  the  various 
different  kinds  of  scientia  have  in  common,  we  will  look  at  what  sets  them  apart. 
It  is  no  coincidence  that  reference  to  various  kinds  of  scientia  should  take  place  when  Stump 
is  discussing'certitudo'  because  certainty  (Stump's  concern  about  this  translation 
notwithstanding)  is  an  important  factor  in  distinguishing  different  kinds  of  scientia.  One  kind 
of  scientia  differs  from  another  because  according  to  Aquinas  some  kinds  of  scientia  are 
more  certain  than  others.  That  there  are  varying  degrees  of  certainty  among  the  different 
sciences  is  discussed  in  In  P.  A.  I  41.  According  to  him  there  are  three  ways  in  which  one 
science  may  be  more  certain  than  another.  First  a  science  is  more  certain  than  another  if  the 
science,  with  respect  to  its  object,  makes  one  know  quia  as  well  as  propter  quid.  The  less 
certain  science  only  makes  one  know  quia,  but  not  propter  quid.  Knowing  quia  tells  one  that 
35  MacDonald  1993,  page  183. 
36  In  P.  A.  1120. 
37  Stump  1992.  page143. 
38  ibid  page  142. 155 
a  thing  is  so,  knowing  propter  quid  tells  one  why  it  is  so.  Nevertheless,  knowing  this 
distinction  hardly  clarifies  the  point  he  is  making.  An  extract  from  In  P.  A.  123  makes  the 
same  point  more  perspicaciously: 
Hence  one  way  that  scientific  knowledge  quia  differs  from  propter  quid  is  that  it  is 
the  former  if  the  syllogism  is  not  through  immediate  principles  but  through  mediate 
ones.  For  in  that  case  the  first  cause  will  not  be  employed,  whereas  science  propter 
quid  is  according  to  the  first  cause;  consequently,  the  former  will  not  be  science 
propter  quid.  39 
The  important  issue  here  is  the  principles  on  which  scientia  is  based.  Knowledge  arising 
from  immediate  principles,  the  cause  of  the  thing,  makes  one  know  why  such  and  such  is 
the  case.  Knowledge  propter  quid  is  knowledge  of  the  cause  of  the  thing,  knowledge  why 
the  thing  is  so.  As  we  will  see  later,  to  have  knowledge  of  the  cause  of  a  thing  is  to  know  the 
thing  perfectly.  Some  kinds  of  scientia  are  not  based  on  such  immediate  principles,  but 
mediate  principles.  This  is  what  makes  these  types  of  scientia  less  certain  than  others.  These 
mediate  principles  are  the  conclusions  of  other  types  of  scientia.  In  other  words,  the  less 
certain  kinds  are  subordinate  to  other  kinds  of  scientia: 
This  is  the  relation  of  subalternating  science  to  subalternate,  as  has  been  said  above, 
namely,  that  the  subalternate  science  in  isolation  knows  quia  without  knowing 
propter  quid.  thus  a  surgeon  knows  that  circular  wounds  are  healed  more  slowly, 
but  he  does  not  know  why.  But  such  knowledge  pertains  to  the  geometer  who 
considers  that  characteristic  of  a  circle  according  to  which  its  parts  do  not  lie  close 
enough  to  form  an  angle,  the  nearness  of  whose  sides  makes  triangular  wounds  heal 
more  quickly.  40 
The  archaic  physiology  aside,  his  point  is  clear.  The  science  of  geometry  can  explain  why 
the  wound  does  not  heal.  The  science  of  surgery,  on  the  other  hand,  can  only  state  that  it 
does  not.  To  this  extent  the  science  of  surgery  is  less  certain  than  that  of  geometry  because, 
for  example,  its  conclusion  regarding  the  healing  capacity  of  circular  wound  depends  on  the 
conclusions  of  geometry. 
The  example  of  geometry  and  surgery  takes  us  to  the  second  distinction  between  a  more 
certain  and  less  certain  scientia.  Scientiae,  such  as  geometry,  are  more  certain  than  scientiae 
such  as  surgery  because  the  latter  deals  with  sensible  matter: 
Hence  he  [Aristotle)  says  here  that  arithmetic  is  both  more  certain  and  prior  to  music: 
it  is  prior,  because  music  uses  its  principles  for  something  non-mathematical;  it  is 
more  certain,  because  lack  of  certitude  arises  from  matter's  changes.  Hence  the 
39  Uno  igitur  modo  diff  ert  scire  quia  ab  hoc  quod  est  scire  propter  quid  scire  quia  est  si  non  fiat 
syllogismus  demonstratives  per  non  medium  idest  per  immediatum,  sed  fiat  per  mediata.  Sic  enim 
non  accipietur  prima  causa  cum  tarnen  scientia  quae  est  propter  quid  sit  secundum  primam  causam. 
Et  ita  non  erit  scientia  propter  quid. 
40  In  P.  A1  41  Hic  enim  est  dispositio  subaltemantis  ad  subaltematum,  ut  supra  dictum  est:  nam 
scientia  subaftemata  separatim  scit  quia  nesciens  propter  quid  sicut  chirurgicus  scit  quod  vulnera 
circularia  tardius  curantur  non  autem  scit  propter  quid.  Sed  huiusmodi  cognitio  pertinet  ad 
geometram,  qui  considerat  rationem  circuli,  secundum  quam  partes  eius  non  appropinquant  sibi 
per  medum  anguli,  ex  qua  propinquitate  contingit  quod  vulnera  triangularia  citius  sanantur. 156 
closer  one  gets  to  matter,  the  less  certain  the  science.  41 
The  final  distinction  between  more  and  less  certain  type  of  scientia  is  that  the  more  certain 
arise  from  fewer  things.  His  example  clarifies  what  he  means  by  this: 
.......  a  science  which  arises  from  fewer  things  is  prior  and  more  certain  than  one 
which  arises  from  an  addition,  i.  e.,  than  one  which  results  from  that  addition.  And 
he  gives  the  example  that  geometry  is  posterior  to  and  less  certain  than  arithmetic:  for 
the  things  of  geometry  are  the  result  of  adding  to  the  things  which  pertain  to 
arithmetic.  42 
In  chapter  one,  and  elsewhere,  we  have  referred  to  the  diversity  of  the  sciences.  The 
comparison,  in  terms  of  certainty,  drawn  between  geometry  and  arithmetic  here,  shows  that 
Aquinas,  when  he  speaks  of  different  kinds  of  scientia,  does  not  just  have  the  distinction  of 
metaphysics,  mathematics  and  natural  science  in  mind  when  he  says  that  one  science  is  more 
certain  than  and  different  from  another.  Most  importantly  the  level  of  certainty  which  a 
particular  kind  of  scientia  has,  is  not  the  central  factor  which  sets  it  apart  from  other  kinds. 
Different  kinds  of  scientia  differ  because  of  the  principles  on  which  they  rest: 
..... 
for  diversity  of  sciences,  diversity  of  first  principles  is  required  43 
We  may  have  suspected  that  the  source  of  diversity  is  the  different  objects  which  the  various 
kinds  of  scientia  have.  This,  however,  is  not  the  case  because: 
....  no  matter  how  diverse  certain  scientifically  knowable  objects  may  be  in  their 
nature,  so  long  as  they  are  known  through  the  same  principles,  they  pertain  to  one 
science,  because  they  will  not  differ  precisely  as  scientifically  knowable.  For  they  are 
scientifically  knowable  in  virtue  of  their  own  principles  4a 
The  diversity  of  one  scientia  from  another  depends  on  the  principles  from  which  its 
conclusions  derive,  not  the  objects  of  scientific  knowledge  which  constitute  the  conclusions. 
Principles,  as  St.  Thomas  says,  are  the  source  of  diversity.  Ultimately,  the  difference  in  the 
level  of  certainty  between  different  sciences  can  also  be  reduced  to  the  issue  of  principles 
because  each  of  the  three  reasons  cited  above  in  our  discussion  of  levels  of  certainty  are 
really  questions  of  principles.  The  principles  of  a  more  certain  scientia  state  propter  quid 
and  not  merely  quia,  those  principles  will  not  refer  to  sensible  matter  and  they  will  be  prior 
to,  more  basic  than,  the  principles  of  a  less  certain  scientia.  In  fact,  the  conclusions  of  this 
more  certain  scientia,  as  we  will  see,  may  also  serve  as  the  principles  of  the  less  certain 
scientia,  as  in  the  case  of  arithmetic  and  geometry. 
41  ibid.  Unde  hic  dicit  quod  arithmetica  est  certior  quam  musica  et  prior.  Prior  quidem,  quia  musica 
utitur  principiis  eius  ad  aliud:  certior  autem  quia  incertitudo  causatur  propter  transmutabilitatem 
materiae  sensibilis;  unde  quanto  magis  acceditur  ad  earn,  tanto  scientia  est  minus  certio. 
42  ibid  ...  quod  scientia  quae  est  ex  paucioribus,  est  prior  et  certior  ea  quae  est  ex  appositione, 
idest  quam  ilia  quae  se  habet  ex  additione.  Et  ponit  exemplum.  Sicut  geometria  est  posterior  et 
minus  certa  quam  arithmetica:  habent  enim  se  ea  de  quibus  est  geometria,  ex  additione  ad  ea  do 
quibus  est  arithmetica. 
43  ibid.  Uncle  requiritur  diversitas  primorum  principiorum  ad  diversitatem  scientiarum 
441n  P.  A.  I  41  Et  ideo  quantumcunque  sint  aliqua  diversa  scibilia  secundum  suam  naturam 
dummodo  per  eadem  principia  sciantur,  pertinent  ad  unam  scientam:  quia  non  erunt  lam  diversa  in 
quantum  sunt  scibilia.  Sunt  enim  per  sua  principia  scibilia 157 
We  began  this  digression  on  different  kinds  of  scientia  by  looking  at  Stump's  polemic 
against  a  foundational  reading  of  Aquinas,  we  now  return  to  her  account  because  the 
undermining  of  a  foundationalist  reading  of  scientia  is  not  her  whole  story.  The  main  thrust 
of  her  argument  develops,  as  we  noted  in  a  previous  chapter,  a  reliabilist  reading  of 
Aquinas.  She  also  gives  a  positive  description  of  scientia,  centred  on  the  explanatory  nature 
of  scientia  . 
Stump  states  that  descriptions  of  the  causes  of  the  conclusion  serves  as  the 
premises  of  the  demonstration  45  We  have  seen  that  McDonald  also  acknowledges  that 
immediate  propositions  state  causes.  He  acknowledges  this  explanatory  dimension  of 
scientia  when  he  speaks  of  premises  which  express  causes  furnishing  theoretically  deep 
explanations  of  the  conclusion  46  Nevertheless  there  is  a  fundamental  difference  between 
what  he  says  about  the  premises  and  what  Stump  says.  According  to  her,  scientia  is  not  a 
theory  of  knowledge,  as  the  foundationalist  interpreter  would  have  us  believe,  rather  scientia 
is: 
a  matter  of  cognizing  causes  of  things,  of  finding  causal  explanations  for  currently 
accepted  claims  47 
Scientia,  Stump  makes  clear,  is  not  simply  a  matter  of  beginning  to  reason  to  unknown 
conclusions  from  immediate  principles.  Rather  it  is  a  matter  of  finding  explanations  for 
propositions  which  we  already  accept  48  The  greater  emphasis  she  places  on  causal 
explanation  than  MacDonald,  undermines  the  foundationalist  slant  that  MacDonald  gave  to 
scientia.  In  that  foundationalist  account  he  emphasised  the  importance  of  epistemic  certainty. 
Stump  challenges  this  aspect  of  scientia,  rather: 
... 
demonstration  isn't  a  matter  of  starting  with  epistemically  certain  propositions  and 
deducing  conclusions  which  are  consequently  equally  certain,  in  order  to  have 
knowledge  of  a  particularly  rigorous  sort.  Rather  on  his  [Aquinas]  account,  in  order 
to  find  a  demonstration  we  need  to  look  for  causes  of  what  is  described  in  the  claim 
that  is  to  be  the  conclusion  of  the  demonstration.  Once  we  have  the  demonstration, 
we  have  scientia  of  the  subject  matter  presented  in  that  claim  in  virtue  of  having  a 
causal  explanation  of  the  state  of  affairs  described  in  the  demonstration's  conclusion. 
And  what  demonstration  confers  is  not  so  much  epistemic  certainty  as  it  is  depth  of 
understanding.  49 
For  her  scientia  is  not  a  matter  of  certainty,  but  of  deeper  understanding:  understanding  more 
fully  thanks  to  the  causal  explanations  which  constitute  the  demonstration.  This 
interpretation  could  be  called  the  causal  theory  of  scientia  and  that  proposed  by  MacDonald, 
the  foundational  theory  of  scientia. 
According  to  Stump  her  causal  theory  of  scientia  is  indicative  of  the  process  of  judgment 
which  Aquinas  outlines  in  In  P.  A.,  where  judgment  is  the  process  of  reasoning  to  first 
45  Stump  1992,  page  153. 
46  MacDonald  1993,  page  170. 
47  Stump  1992,  page  152. 
48ibid  page  152. 
49ibid  page154. 158 
principles,  by  means  of  analysis,  rather  than  starting  from  them  to  infer  other 
propositions  50  She  says: 
The  subject  matter  [the  process  of  judgment  outlined  in  In  P.  A]  has  as  its  main 
emphasis  finding  causal  explanations  for  the  states  of  affairs  described  in  claims 
which  become  the  conclusions  of  demonstrative  syllogisms,  and  tracing  those  causal 
explanations  back  to  first  principles.  And  the  point  of  this  process  is  to  yield  a  deeper 
understanding  of  the  nature  of  the  state  of  affairs  being  described.  So  a 
demonstrative  syllogism  produces  scientia  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  it  shows  the 
causes  and  so  provides  an  explanation  of  the  syllogism's  conclusion.  51 
The  certainty  and  necessity  of  scientia  rests  not  on  the  fact  that  it  is  a  foundationalist 
enterprise  resting  on  self-evident  propositions,  but  on  the  fact  that  it  gives  a  deep  causal 
explanation  of  the  conclusion:  the  fullest  explanation  possible.  The  mistaken  foundationalist 
theory  of  scientia,  as  she  sees  it,  results  from  reading  scientia  as  a  process  of  discovery 
rather  than  judgment.  According  to  her  the  process  of  discovery,  reasoning  from  first 
principles  to  other  propositions,  does  not  yield  scientia  and  in  fact,  this  process  is  not  dealt 
with  in  In  P.  A.  but  in  the  Topics. 
We  have  outlined  two  different  descriptions  of  scientia,  aspects  of  both  we  find  reason  to 
agree  with.  In  previous  chapters  we  have  acknowledged  the  foundationalist  structure  of 
scientia,  but  it  is  not  the  single  most  important  feature  of  scientia.  MacDonald's  excessive 
foundationalism  becomes  apparent  in  comparison  to  Stump's  account.  Stump's  causal 
theory  of  scientia  concurs  with  what  we  had  to  say  regarding  knowledge  of  essences  in  the 
last  chapter.  Not  only  have  we  outlined  and  contrasted  their  analyses  we  have  also,  where 
necessary,  expanded  upon  what  they  had  to  say  in  order  to  outline  the  principal  features  of 
scientia,  its  structure:  demonstration  from  principles,  its  concern  with  universals  and 
essential  properties,  its  necessity  and  certainty.  We  have  seen  that  different  principles  give 
rise  to  different  kinds  of  scientia,  with  varying  degrees  of  certainty.  In  both  analyses  we 
have  seen  a  great  deal  of  discussion  focus  on  the  principles  of  scientia.  We  now  embark 
upon  our  own  analysis  of  the  principles  of  scientia. 
b.  Scientia:  an  analysis 
The  sole  aim  of  this  section  is  to  offer  an  analysis  of  scientia  which  will  show  its  relationship 
to  perceptual  knowledge.  This  will  help  us  to  come  to  deeper  understanding  of  the  nature  of 
scientia  and  a  conclusion  regarding  the  accuracy  of  both  interpretations  which  we  have 
outlined  in  the  previous  section.  As  stated  above,  our  analysis  will  focus  on  the  principles 
which  are  used  in  scientific  demonstrations.  For  simplicity's  sake,  we  will  restrict  our 
analysis  to  principles  which  are  universal  affirmative  statements.  Consequently,  on  the 
occasions  when  we  refer  to  the  demonstrative  syllogisms  which  use  these  principles,  these 
50  ibid  page  156. 
51  ibid  page  156. 159 
syllogisms  will  be  of  the  form  AAA-1,  traditionally  labelled  `Barbara.  '52  Not  all 
demonstrative  syllogisms  are  of  this  form.  For  the  purposes  of  this  analysis  it  is  enough 
merely  to  acknowledge  this.  Furthermore,  the  focus  of  our  analysis  will  be  on  scientia  in  the 
sense  of  the  natural  sciences.  Inevitably,  some  reference  will  be  made  to  the  mathematical 
sciences,  but  our  primary  concern  will  be  with  natural  science  and  in  particular 
demonstration  propter  quid.  We  will  not  be  concerned  with  demonstration  quia.  These  self- 
imposed  restrictions  will  not  affect  the  conclusions  which  we  will  draw  concerning  the 
relationship  between  perceptual  knowledge  and  scientia. 
After  the  conflicting  views  of  the  last  section  we  begin  our  analysis  of  scientia  by  offering  a 
simple  description  of  scientia.  St.  Thomas  writes  in  In  P.  A.  118: 
For  every  demonstrative  science  is  concerned  with  three  things:  one  is  the  generic 
subject  whose  per  se  attributes  are  investigated;  another  is  the  common  (axioms) 
dignities  from  which,  as  from  basic  truths,  it  demonstrates;  the  third  are  the  proper 
attributes  concerning  which  each  science  supposes  what  their  names  signify  53 
Elsewhere  Aquinas  shows  the  relationship  between  the  three  things.  He  writes  : 
the  object  of  which  scientific  knowledge  is  sought  through  demonstration  is  some 
conclusion  in  which  a  proper  attribute  is  predicated  of  some  subject,  which 
conclusion  is  inferred  from  the  principles.  54 
And  he  [Aristotle]  says  that  proper  principles  are  things  supposed  in  the  sciences  as 
existing,  namely,  the  subjects,  whose  proper  attributes  are  investigated  in  the 
sciences.  55 
It  all  seems  very  straight  forward.  The  demonstration  will  show  why  a  proper,  or  per  se, 
attribute,  can  be  predicated  of  a  subject;  knowledge  of  this  constitutes  scientia. 
Demonstrating  from  immediate  principles  (which  contain  the  subject,  middle  term  and  proper 
attribute),  or  common  dignities  as  they  are  called  above,  a  connection  via  a  middle  term  is 
made  between  the  subject  and  a  proper  attribute.  The  conclusion  makes  explicit  this 
connection.  It  is  in  this  sense  the  demonstration  can  be  said  to  give  the  cause  why  the  proper 
attribute  can  be  predicated  of  the  subject,  since  it  shows  that  the  proper  attribute  follows 
from  the  nature  of  the  subject.  This  is  indeed  a  simple  explanation  of  scientia,  one  which 
appears  to  concur  with  Stump's  causal  description.  However,  by  the  end  of  this  analysis  we 
52  For  example,  a  syllogism  such  as:  All  Greeks  are  European.  All  Athenians  are  Greeks.  Therefore, 
all  Athenians  are  Greek. 
53  In  P.  A.  118  Omnis  enim  scientia  demonstrativa  est  circa  tria:  quorum  unum  est  genus 
subiectum,  cuius  per  se  passiones  scrutantur;  et  aliud  est  communes  dignitates,  ex  quibus  sicut  ex 
primis  demonstrat;  tertium  autem  passiones,  de  quibus  unaquaeque  scientia  accipit  quid 
significent. 
54  In  P.  A.  I2  Circa  primum  sciendum  est  quod  id  cuius  scientia  per  demonstrationem  quaeritur  est 
conclusio  aliqua  in  qua  propria  passio  de  subiecto  aliquo  praedicatur.  quae  quidem  conclusio  ex 
aliquibus  principiis  infertur. 
55  In  P.  A.  118  Dicens  quod  propria  principia  sunt  quae  supponuntur  esse  In  scientiis,  scilicet 
subiecta,  circa  quae  scientia  speculatur  ea  quae  per  se  insunt  eis. 160 
will  see  that  while  our  simple  explanation  is  not  inaccurate  it  is  superficial;  a  complex  series 
of  processes  underlie  this  search  for  causal  explanations. 
In  our  simple  explanation,  and  in  the  preceding  section  on  the  work  of  Stump  and 
MacDonald,  the  importance  of  principles  is  obvious.  Both  Stump  and  MacDonald 
acknowledge,  to  varying  degrees,  the  distinction  St.  Thomas  makes  between  common  and 
proper  principles.  For  MacDonald  common  principles  were  grasped  by  everyone,  whereas 
proper  principles  were  not.  Stump  went  further;  according  to  her  common  principles  are 
known  by  the  light  of  natural  reason  and  are  common  to  every  science,  whereas  proper 
principles  are  proper  to  each  scientia  and  only  these  serve  as  the  principles  of  scientia.  We 
will  now  analyse  common  principles  and  the  intellect's  grasp  of  them;  this  will  clarify  the 
difference  between  them  and  proper  principles.  This  will  clear  the  way  to  consider  proper 
principles  and  the  demonstration  which  results  in  scientia. 
i.  Common  principles 
Common  principles  are  absolutely  indemonstrable.  56  They  are,  as  St.  Thomas  describes 
them,  `common  conceptions  of  the  mind.  57  Two  examples  of  common  principles  which  he 
frequently  cites  are:, 
One  should  not  affirm  and  deny  the  same  thing.  (The  law  of  non  contradiction) 
There  is  either  true  affirmation  or  true  negation  of  each  thing.  (The  principle  of  bivalence) 
Of  common  principles  like  these  Aquinas  says: 
...  the  common  conceptions  in  the  mind  have  something  in  common  with  the  other 
principles  of  demonstration  and  something  proper:  something  common,  because  both 
they  and  the  others  must  be  true  in  virtue  of  themselves.  But  what  is  proper  to  the 
former  is  that  it  is  necessary  not  only  that  they  be  true  of  themselves  but  that  they  be 
seen  to  be  such.  For  no  one  can  think  their  contraries.  58 
Here  we  see  what  common  principles  have  in  common  with  proper  principles:  like  them  they 
are  true  in  virtue  of  themselves;  unlike  them,  they  must  be  seen  to  be  such.  At  first  glance 
this  may  seem  to  confirm  MacDonald's  description  of  common  principles  as  grasped  by 
everyone,  as  opposed  to  proper  principles  which  are  not.  However,  the  reality  is  somewhat 
more  complex.  To  fully  understand  what  sets  common  principles  apart  from  proper 
principles,  first,  the  phrase  'no  one  can  think  of  their  contraries'  needs  to  be  investigated. 
Second,  the  relationship  between  the  common  principles  and  demonstrative  science  also 
needs  to  be  analysed. 
56  In  P.  A.  I  20 
57  In  P.  A.  118 
58  In  P.  A.  I  19  Circa  primum  considerandum  est  quod  communes  animi  conceptiones  habent 
aliquid  commune  cum  aliis  principiis  demonstrationis,  et  aliquid  proprium.  Commune  quidem 
habent,  quia  necesse  est  tam  ista,  quam  alia  principia  per  se  esse  vera.  Proprium  autem  est  horum 
principiorum  quod  non  solum  necesse  est  ea  per  se  vera  esse,  sed  etiam  necesse  est  viderl  quod 
per  se  sint  vera.  Nullus  enim  potest  opinari  contraria  eorum. 161 
To  understand  why  no  one  can  think  of  their  contraries  we  need  to  understand  the  manner  in 
which  we  know  common  principles.  In  P.  A.  119  distinguishes  between  common  principles, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  postulates  and  suppositions,  on  the  other.  It  states: 
He  [Aristotle]  proves  this  in  the  following  way:  A  postulate  and  a  supposition  can  be 
confirmed  by  a  reason  from  without,  i.  e.,  by  some  argumentation;  but  a  common 
conception  in  the  mind  does  not  bear  on  a  reason  from  without  (because  it  cannot  be 
proved  by  any  argument),  but  bears  on  that  reason  which  is  in  the  soul,  because  it  is 
made  known  at  once  by  the  natural  light  of  reason  [lumine  naturalis  rationis  statim  fit 
nota  ].  59  , 
Common  conceptions  are  not  only  true  in  themselves,  but  are  seen  to  be  such  because  of  the 
natural  light  of  our  reason.  We  will  comment  on  this  "natural  light  of  reason"  momentarily. 
Prior  to  that,  we  need  to  outline  the  assertion  Aquinas  is  making  about  common  principles. 
His  argument  is  that  their  truth  need  not  be  proved  by  argumentation  or  rational  inquiry 
because  our  intellect  is  able  to  grasp  immediately  the  truth  of  these  principles.  The  truth  of 
propositions  like  `one  should  not  affirm  and  deny  the  same  thing'  is  grasped  as  soon  as  the 
proposition's  meaning  is  understood.  This  is  why  we  cannot  think  of  their  contraries. 
Aquinas  goes  on  to  expand  on  this: 
On  the  other  hand,  some  things  are  so  true  that  their  opposites  cannot  be  conceived 
by  the  intellect.  Therefore,  they  cannot  be  challenged  in  the  inward  reason  but  only 
by  an  outward  reason  which  is by  the  voice.  Such  are  the  common  conceptions  in  the 
mind.  60 
Once  the  meaning  of  the  principle  is  understood  the  intellect  grasps  immediately  the  truth  of 
the  principle.  Their  truth  is  so  obvious  that  we  cannot  conceive  of  their  contrary.  Clearly,  in 
the  extremely  unlikely  case  that  we  do  not  know  what  a  common  principle  means,  we  will 
not  immediately  grasp  its  truth.  This  is  what  Aquinas  means  when  he  says  that  common 
principles  can  only  be  challenged  by  outward  reason  which  is  the  voice.  This  instance  aside, 
it  is  the  intellect's  ability  to  grasp  immediately  the  truth  of  these  principles  which  sets  them 
apart  from  proper  principles. 
So  unlike  proper  principles  common  principles  are  "made  known  at  once  by  the  natural  light 
of  reason.  "  This  phrase,  `the  natural  light  of  reason'  does  not  tell  us  very  much  about  how 
or  why  the  intellect  immediately  grasps  these  principles.  More  importantly,  clarification  of 
the  phrase  is  required  if  misunderstanding  is  to  be  avoided.  In  fact  an  important  element  of 
59  In  P.  A.  1  19  To  give  the  flavour  of  Aquinas'  argument  we  begin  our  quote  one  sentence  before 
the  translation  quoted  above. 
Dicit  ergo  quod  illud  principium  quod  necesse  est  non  solurn  per  seipsum  esse,  sed  etiam  ulterius 
necesse  est,  ipsum  videri,  scilicet  communis  animi  conceptio  vel  dignitas,  non  est  neque  petitio 
neque  suppositio.  Quod  sic  probat.  Petitio  et  suppositio  exteriors  ratione  confirmarl  possunt,  Idest 
argumentatione  aliqua.  Sed  communis  animi  conceptio  non  est  ad  exterius  rationem,  quia  non 
potest  probari  per  aliquam  argumentationem,  sed  est  ad  earn  quae  est  in  anima,  quia  lumine 
naturalis  rationis  statim  fit  nota. 
60  ibid.  Quaedam  autem  adeo  vera  sunt,  quod  eorurn  opposita  Intellectu  caps  non  possunt;  et 
ideo  interiori  ratione  eis  obviari  non  potest,  sed  solurn  exteriori,  quae  est  per  vocem.  Et  huiusmodi 
sunt  communes  animi  conceptiones. 162 
Aquinas'  human  epistemology  lies  behind  this  short  phrase.  What  Aquinas  casually  refers  to 
here  as  the  `natural  light  of  reason'  he  actually  discusses  in  great  detail  elsewhere.  61  In  these 
discussions  he  refers  to  it  by  its  proper  name:  intellectus,  the  habit  of  grasping  first 
principles.  Consequently,  to  fully  understand  common  principles  we  need  to  examine  the 
manner  in  which  we  know  them,  this  habit  of  grasping  first  principles.  Only  by  doing  this 
will  we  see  why  no  one  can  think  their  contraries.  62 
As  we  embark  on  this  discussion  of  the  natural  habit  of  grasping  first  principles  we  ought  to 
recall  a  point  raised  in  chapter  one:  Aquinas  uses  the  same  word  to  refer  to  the  habit  of 
grasping  first  principles  as  he  does  to  refer  to  understanding.  An  American  scholar  writing 
on  Aquinas'  account  of  the  intellectual  virtues  describes  the  ways  in  which  intellectus  is 
used: 
Intellectus,  sometimes  stands  for  the  soul's  immaterial  faculty  of  cognition, 
sometimes  for  a  mode  of  knowledge;  and  sometimes  for  the  object  known.  Again, 
and  strictly  formally,  it  signifies  the  virtue  of  the  intellect  known  as  the  habit  of  first 
principles  63 
These  different  uses  can  sometimes  lead  to  ambiguity.  An  extract  from  In  D.  A.  shows  one 
attempt  to  avoid  ambiguity: 
Nor  is  he  [Aristotle],  apparently  speaking  of  the  understanding  as  a  faculty  (i.  e.  of 
the  intellect);  else  it  would  be  set  apart  from  science  and  opinion,  which  both  belong 
to  it  as  a  faculty.  But  `understanding'  means  here  an  infallible,  immediate  and 
intuitive  grasp  of  such  intelligible  objects  as  the  first  principles  of  knowledge,  while 
scientific  knowledge  means  certain  knowledge  obtained  by  rational  investigation.  64 
Reading  intellectus  as  the  intellect's  faculty  of  understanding,  as  opposed  to  the  intellect's 
immediate  and  intuitive  grasp  of  principles  would  have  led  to  a  misunderstanding,  one  that 
Aquinas  is  at  pains  to  avoid.  For  the  purposes  of  this  discussion  we  merely  need  to  note  the 
different  uses  of  intellectus.  We  are  primarily  concerned  with  the  habit  of  grasping  first 
principles,  the  exercise  of  which  is  an  act  of  understanding. 
Since  this  work  is  a  discussion  of  his  epistemology  from  the  perspective  of  ST  Ia  q84,  we 
will  approach  the  habit  of  grasping  first  principles  from  that  direction.  He  writes: 
Aristotle,  in  speaking  of  the  intellect,  says  that  it  is  like  a  writing  tablet  on  which  as 
61  In  the  following  discussion  we  will  look  at  references  from  various  works  including  Do  Veritate, 
Summa  Theologiae  and  De  Virtutibus  in  Communi. 
62  Since  In  P.  A  119  is  discussing  how  common  principles  differ  from  one  another  and  not  actually 
our  knowledge  of  them,  Aquinas  presumably  chose  to  use  "  the  natural  light  of  reason"  In  order  to 
keep  his  argument  as  simple  and  lucid  as  possible. 
63  Brennan  1941,  page  17. 
64  In  D.  A.  1115  Et  videtur  quod  intellectus  non  accipiatur  hic  pro  potentia;  sic  enim  contra 
intellectum  non  dividerentur  scientia  et  opinio,  quae  ad  potentiam  intellectivam  pertinent:  sed 
intellectus  accipitur  pro  certa  apprehensione  eorum  quae  absque  inquisitione  nobis  Innotescunt, 
sicut  sunt  prima  principia,  scientia  vero  pro  cognitione  eorum,  de  quibus  certificamur  per 
certitudinem  vel  investigationem  rationis. 163 
yet  nothing  is  written.  65 
As  we  have  already  seen,  in  this  particular  question  of  the  Summa  Theologiae  Aquinas 
begins  to  develop  his  epistemological  realism  by  discounting  other  sources  for  knowledge, 
such  as  that  presented  by  Plato,  or  knowledge  by  means  of  innate  species,  as  in  the  case 
with  angelic  intellection.  He  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  it  is  by  means  of  the  senses  alone 
that  the  human  soul  acquires  knowledge.  66  In  question  85  he  goes  on  to  set  out  his  account 
of  the  processes  involved  in  this  manner  of  acquiring  knowledge. 
In  the  context  of  his  epistemological  theory  his  reference  to  the  De  Anima  is  an  unambiguous 
statement  of  epistemological  realism;  yet  within  a  few  lines  of  it  Aquinas  makes  another 
statement,  in  defence  of  the  thesis  that  the  mind  does  not  know  by  means  of  innate  species 
natural  to  it,  which  seems  to  undermine  the  thrust  of  his  realist  argument.  He  writes: 
For  no  one  forgets  things  that  are  naturally  known-such  as  the  axiom  that  the  whole 
is  greater  than  any  of  its  parts,  and  so  on.  67 
Fuller  accounts  of  what  is  contained  here  are  scattered  throughout  his  works.  Consider: 
Hence  it  is  that  human  nature,  in  so  far  as  it  comes  into  contact  with  the  angelic 
nature,  must  both  in  speculative  and  practical  matters  know  truth  without 
investigation.  And  this  knowledge  must  be  the  principle  of  all  the  knowledge  which 
follows,  whether  speculative  or  practical,  since  principles  must  be  more  stable  and 
certain.  Therefore,  this  knowledge  must  be  in  man  naturally,  since  it  is  a  kind  of  seed 
plot  containing  in  germ  all  the  knowledge  which  follows,  and  since  there  preexist  in 
all  natures  certain  natural  seeds  of  the  activities  and  effects  which  follow. 
Furthermore  this  knowledge  must  be  habitual  so  that  it  will  be  ready  for  use  when 
needed. 
Thus,  just  as  there  is  a  natural  habit  of  the  human  soul  through  which  it  knows 
principles  of  the  speculative  sciences,  which  we  call  understanding  of  principles,  so 
too,  there  is  in  the  soul  a  natural  habit  of  first  principles  of  action,  which  are 
universal  principles  of  natural  law.  This  habit  pertains  to  synderesis.  68 
65  ST  1a  q84  a3sc  Sed  contra  est  quod  Philosophus  dicit,  do  Intellectu  loquens,  quod  est  sicut 
tabula  in  qua  nihil  est  scriptum. 
66  ST  1a  q84  a6. 
67  ST  1a  q84  a3c  Nullus  enim  homo  obliviscitur  ea  quae  naturaliter  cognoscit,  sicut  quod  omne 
totum  sit  majus  sua  parte,  et  alia  hujusmodi. 
68  DV  g16  a1  c  Unde  et  in  natura  humana,  in  quantum  attingit  angelicam,  oportet  esse  cognitionem 
veritatis  sine  inquisitione  et  in  speculativis  et  in  practicis;  et  hanc  quidem  cognitionem  oportet  esse 
principium  totius  cognitionis  sequentis,  sive  speculativae  sive  practicae,  cum  principia  oporteat 
esse  stabiliora  et  certiora.  Unde  et  hanc  cognitionem  oportet  homini  naturaliter  inesse,  cum  hoc 
quidem  cognoscat  quasi  quoddam  seminarium  totius  cognitionis  sequentis;  sicut  et  in  omnibus 
naturis  sequentium  operationum  et  effectuum  quaedam  naturalia  semina  praeexistunt.  Oportot 
etiam  hanc  cognitionem  habitualem  esse,  ut  in  promptu  existat  ea  uti  cum  fuerit  necesse: 
Sicut  autem  animae  humanae  est  quidam  habitus  naturalis  quo  principia  speculativarum  scientlarum 
cognoscit,  quem  vocamus  intellectum  principiorum;  ita  in  ipsa  est  quidam  habitus  naturalis 
primorum  principiorum  operabilium,  quae  sunt  naturalia  principia  luris  naturalis;  qui  quidem  habitus 
ad  synderesim  pertinet. 164 
Of  those  intelligible  objects  some  are  naturally  known  to  man  from  the  outset, 
without  any  study  or  inquiry,  among  these  are  first  principles,  not  only  of  the 
speculative  order.....  but  also  of  the  practical  order.....  These  naturally  known  truths 
are  the  principles  of  all  subsequent  knowledge  which  is  acquired  by  study,  whether  it 
be  practical  or  speculative.  69 
Among  other  things,  such  as  synderesis  the  natural  habit  of  universal  principles  of  natural 
law,  e.  g.  do  good  and  avoid  evil,  Aquinas  is  speaking  about  first,  or  common  principles  and 
how  we  know  them.  He  says  such  things  are  `naturally  known',  that  all  knowledge  follows 
from  this  naturally  known  knowledge.  These  passages  which  speak  of  the  foundations  of 
knowledge  existing  within  us,  of  knowing  these  foundations  without  investigation,  could  be 
interpreted  as  undermining  his  realism.  At  first  glance,  they  appear  to  suggest  a  kind  of 
innate  knowledge  of  first  principles  and  a  version  of  foundationalism.  However,  this  is  not 
the  case,  as  further  analysis  shows. 
It  is  an  epistemological  shibboleth  of  Aquinas  that  we  can  know  nothing  except  by  means  of 
the  senses  and  the  light  of.  the  agent  intellect.  Unlike  the  angels  we  do  not  have  innate 
knowledge.  Even  our  knowledge  of  the  most  abstract  entities  and  concepts  such  as  God 
must  in  some  sense  come  via  the  senses.  Consider  the  following: 
The  knowledge  that  is  natural  to  us  has  its  sources  in  the  senses  and  extends  just  as 
far  as  it  can  be  led  by  sensible  things:  from  these,  however,  our  understanding 
cannot  reach  to  the  divine  essence.  Sensible  creatures  are  effects  of  God  which  are 
less  than  typical  of  the  power  of  their  cause,  so  knowing  them  does  not  lead  us  to 
understand  the  whole  power  of  God  and  thus  we  do  not  see  his  essence.  They  are 
nevertheless  effects  depending  on  a  cause,  and  so  we  can  at  least  be  led  from  them  to 
know  of  God  that  he  exists  and  that  he  has  whatever  must  belong  to  the  f  rst  cause 
of  things  which  is  beyond  all  that  is  caused.  [My  emphasis]70 
Every  act  of  knowing  springs  from  the  senses  and  the  agent  intellect.  Just  as  the  senses  are 
the  ultimate  source  of  our  knowledge  of  God  so  too  they  have  a  causal  role  in  the 
understanding  of  first  principles: 
In  human  beings,  therefore,  there  are  some  natural  habits,  which  are  due  partly  to 
69De  Virt  q1  a8c  Quorum  quaedam  statim  a  principio  naturaliter  homini  innotescunt  absque  studio 
et  inquisitione:  et  huiusmodi  sunt  principia  prima,  non  solum  in  speculativis.....  sed  etiam  in 
operativis.....  Haec  autem  naturaliter  nota,  sunt  principia  totius  cognitionis  sequentis,  quae  per 
studium  acquiritur:  sive  sit  practica,  sive  sit  speculativa. 
Note  that  the  original  text  does  not  use  the  word  "truth",  but  actually  says,  "  But  these  naturally 
known  things....  "  See  also  DV  q11  al,  ST  1a  q79  a12,  Meta  IV.  6  for  similar  statements  regarding  all 
knowledge  following  from  first  principles. 
70  ST1a  q12  all  2c.  Dicendum  quod  naturalis  nostra  cognitio  a  sensu  principlum  sumit.  Unde 
tantum  se  nostra  naturalis  cognitio  extendere  potest  in  quantum  manuduci  potest  per  sensibilia.  Ex 
sensibilibus  autem  non  potest  usque  ad  hoc  intellectus  poster  pertingere  quod  divinam  essentiam 
videat;  quia  creaturae  sensibiles  sunt  effectus  Del  virtutem  causae  non  adaequantes.  Unde  ex 
sensibilium  cognitione  non  potest  tota  Del  virtus  cognosci,  et  per  consequens  nec  ejus  essentia 
videri.  sed  quia  sunt  effectus  a  causa  dependentes,  ex  eis  in  hoc  perduci  possumus  ut 
cognoscamus  de  Deo  an  est,  et  it  cognoscamus  de  ipso  ea  quae  necesse  est  ei  convenire, 
secundum  quod  est  prima  omnium  causa  excedens  omnia  sua  causata. 165 
nature  and  partly  to  external  agents;  but  we  must  distinguish  here  between  cognitive 
and  appetitive  faculties.  In  cognitive  faculties  there  are  both  habits  which  are  natural 
to  the  species  and  habits  which  are  natural  to  the  individual,  at  least  in  a  rudimentary 
form. 
The  habits  which  are  natural  to  the  species  belong  to  the  soul  itself:  the 
understanding  of  principles,  for  instance,  is  called  a  natural  habit.  It  is  because  of  the 
very  nature  of  his  spiritual  soul  that  a  human  being,  once  he  knows  what  a  whole  is 
and  what  a  part  is,  knows  that  every  whole  is  greater  than  any  of  its  parts;  and 
similarly  in  other  cases.  But  he  cannot  know  what  a  whole  is  or  what  a  part  is  except 
by  the  mental  species  which  he  receives  from  phantasms.  Aristotle  uses  this  fact  to 
show  that  the  knowledge  of  principles  comes  to  us  from  the  senses.  71 
We  must  give  a  similar  explanation  of  the  acquisition  of  knowledge.  For  certain 
seeds  of  knowledge  preexist  in  us,  namely,  the  first  concepts  of  understanding, 
which  by  the  light  of  the  agent  intellect  are  immediately  known  through  the  species 
abstracted  from  sensible  things.  These  are  either  complex  as  axioms,  or  simple,  as 
the  notions  of  being,  of  the  one,  and  so  on,  which  the  understanding  grasps 
immediately.  In  these  general  principles  however,  all  the  consequences  are  included 
as  in  certain  seminal  principles,  when,  therefore,  the  mind  is  led  from  these  general 
notions  to  actual  knowledge  of  the  particular  things,  which  it  knew  previously  in 
71  ST1a2ae  q51  a1c  Sunt  ergo  in  hominibus  aliqui  habitus  naturales,  tamquam  partim  a  natura 
existentes  et  partim  ab  exteriori  principio;  aliter  quidem  In  apprehensivis  potentiis,  et  aliter  In 
appetitivis.  In  apprehensivis  enim  potentiis  potest  esse  habitus  naturalis  secundum  Inchoationem, 
et  secundum  naturam  speciei,  et  secundum  naturam  individui. 
Secundum  quidem  naturam  speciei  ex  parte  ipsius  animae:  sicut  intellectus  principiorum  dicitur 
esse  habitus  naturalis.  Ex  ipsa  enim  natura  animae  intellectualis,  convenit  homini  quod  statim, 
cognito  quid  est  totum  et  quid  est  pars,  cognoscat  quod  omne  totum  est  majus  sua  parts:  et  simile 
est  in  ceteris.  Sed  quid  est  totum  et  quid  est  pars,  cognoscere  non  potest  nisi  per  species 
intelligibiles  a  phantasmatibus  acceptas.  Et  propter  hoc  Philosophus  ostendit  quod  cognitio 
principiorum  provenit  nobis  ex  sensu. 
The  extract  mentions  habits  which  belong  naturally  to  individuals.  The  example  Aquinas  cites  Is  of 
one  individual  being  more  intelligent  than  another  because  of  the  condition  of  their  sensory 
organs;  his  argument  is  that  since  the  intellect  makes  use  of  the  sense  faculties,  those  with  better 
sense  faculties  will  be  more  intelligent.  This  argument  is  surely  mistaken.  Some  of  the  most 
intelligent  and  creative  people  have  been  or  are  people  with  Impeded  sense  faculties,  such  as 
blindness  and  deafness.  His  point  can  only  be  salvaged  if  we  take  it  to  be  a  statement  on  the  fact 
that  some  people  are  more  intelligent  than  others  and  that  he  has  chosen  to  describe  this 
difference  in  intellectual  power  in  terms  of  natural  habits  belonging  to  individuals.  Habits  which  are 
natural  to  the  extent  that  they  are  not  acquired  in  the  way  that  we  acquire  for  example,  habitual 
knowledge. 166 
general  and,  as  it  were,  potentially,  then  one  is  said  to  acquire  knowledge  72 
Clearly  Aquinas  is  at  pains  to  defend  his  realist  account  of  epistemology.  From  the  above 
quotes  this  much  is  clear:  we  may  have  a  natural  habit  of  grasping  first  principles,  but  in 
order  for  it  to  be  actualised  we  require  the  activity  of  the  agent  intellect  and  the  species  it 
abstracts  from  the  phantasmata.  There  is  no  innate  knowledge  of  common  principles. 
Knowledge  of  such  principles  arises  from  two  factors:  reality  and  the  natural  habit  which 
exists  in  the  intellect.  Herein  lies  the  importance  of  the  senses  and  the  actvity  of  the  agent 
intellect:  without  them  there  can  be  no  grasp  of  first  principles. 
The  above  remarks  notwithstanding,  the  question  has  to  be  asked,  prior  to  the  actualising 
activity  of  the  agent  intellect  what  is  the  status  of  this  natural  habit  in  the  receptive  intellect, 
or  to  put  it  rather  crudely,  is  there  anything  lying  dormant,  as  it  were,  in  the  receptive 
intellect  waiting  for  this  illumination?  If  the  knowledge  which  we  express  in  terms  of  an 
axiom  is  there  in  some  sort  of  latent  fashion  then  Aquinas  is  saying  little  different  from  what 
Plato  says  in  the  Meno.  There  Socrates  argues  with  Meno  that  knowledge  is  not  a  matter  of 
teaching  but  recollection.  He  does  this  by  attempting  to  show  that  a  slave  boy  who  has  never 
been  taught  geometry,  and  is  thus  apparently  ignorant  of  the  basic  tenets  of  geometry, 
nonetheless  has  true  opinions  about  geometry  within  him  which  can  be  aroused  by 
questioning  and  turned  into  knowledge  73 
However,  Aquinas  is  not  positing  a  theory  of  innate  knowledge  after  the  style  of  Plato.  Yes, 
we  do  have  a  natural  knowledge  of  first  principles,  but  this  knowledge  is  very  different  from 
that  proposed  by  Plato.  This  becomes  apparent  when  we  recall  what  Aquinas  says  about 
innate  knowledge  in  his  account  of  angelic  intellection.  The  innate  knowledge  which  he 
speaks  of  there  is  different  from  the  account  being  discussed  here.  Consider: 
The  ideas[species]by  which  angels  understand  are  not  drawn  out  of  external  reality 
but  are  intrinsic  to  their  nature  74 
Angels,  unlike  humans,  have  these  ideas  [species  ]  intrinsically.  They  are  created  with  these 
ideas  already  in  their  intellects.  Humans,  on  the  other  hand,  do  not  have  these  species 
naturally.  It  is  the  task  of  the  agent  intellect  to  abstract  these  species  from  the  sense  images  in 
order  for  the  intellect  to  begin  the  process  of  knowing.  The  human  intellect  is  a  tabula  rasa.  It 
contains  no  species.  The  human  intellect  needs  the  body,  its  senses  and  the  activity  of  the 
agent  intellect  in  order  to  generate  these  species  and  to  acquire  knowledge.  Obviously  then 
72  DV  q11  a1c  Similiter  etiam  dicendum  est  de  scientiae  acquisitione  quod  praeexistunt  in  nobis 
quaedam  scientiarum  semina,  scilicet  primae  conceptiones  intellectus,  quae  statim  lumine 
inteilectus  agentis  cognoscuntur  per  species  a  sensibilibus  abstractas,  sive  sint  complexa,  ut 
dignitates,  sive  incomplexa,  sicut  ratio  entis,  et  unius,  et  huiusmodi,  quae  statim  intellectus 
apprehendit.  Ex  istis  autem  principiis  universalibus  omnia  principia  sequuntur,  sicut  ex  quibusdam 
rationibus  seminalibus.  Quando  ergo  ex  istis  universalibus  cognitionibus  mens  educitur  ut  actu 
cognoscat  particularia,  quae  prius  in  potentia,  et  quasi  in  universali  cognoscebantur,  tunc  aliquis 
dicitur  scientiam  acquirere. 
73  Plato  1983,  page  130ff. 
74  ST  1a  q55  a2c  Dicendum  quod  species  per  quas  angeli  intelligunt  non  sunt  a  rebus  acceptae, 
sed  eis  connaturales. 167 
the  innate  modification  of  the  intellect  which  Aquinas  describes  as  the  understanding  of 
principles,  prior  to  the  essential  activity  of  the  agent  intellect  in  producing  species,  is  not 
knowledge.  We  have  already  seen  Aquinas  state  that  in  order  for  us  to  know  the  common 
principles  we  require  the  activity  of  the  agent  intellect  and  the  existence  of  mental  species. 
To  answer  the  crude  question:  there  is  nothing  lying  dormant  waiting  for  illumination 
because  prior  to  the  production  of  mental  species  there  is  nothing  there  to  constitute 
knowledge.  What  there  is,  is  what  Orestes  Gonzalez  calls  an  empty  natural  habit.  75 
This  empty  natural  habit  is  better  described  as  an  innate  modification  of  the  receptive  intellect 
which  when  reduced  to  act  by  the  activity  of  the  agent  intellect  enables  the  intellect  to  grasp, 
immediately  and  intuitively,  being,  its  transcendental  properties  and  common  principles 
without  the  need  for  any  further  intellectual  activity.  The  important  point  is  that  in  order  to 
grasp  them,  there  must  be  some  contact  with  external  reality.  We  do  not  have  innate 
knowledge.  The  innate  modification  of  the  receptive  intellect  is  the  sense  in  which,  to  use  the 
terminology  of  the  translator  of  DV  ql  1  ale  `certain  seeds  of  knowledge  preexist  in  us.  ' 
Aquinas  is  saying  that  the  intellect  is  by  its  very  nature  so  constituted  that  it  cannot  fail  to 
grasp  these  fundamental  notions  when  confronted  with  them.  Such  notions  are  grasped 
intuitively  and  immediately  without  the  need  for  further  investigation. 
There  is  also  a  less  philosophical  sense  in  which  we  can  describe  this  modification  of  the 
intellect  as  something  innate,  something  natural.  This  sense  clarifies  Aquinas'  statement  that 
it  must  be  in  all  men  naturally.  The  grasp  of  first  principles  is  something  which  we  do 
intuitively  and  immediately,  it  is  something  which  we  cannot  help  doing.  Aquinas  alludes  to 
this  when  discussing  first  principles  in  Book  IV  of  In  Meta.: 
The  third  condition  is  that  it  [knowledge  of  first  principles]  is  not  acquired  by 
demonstration  or  any  similar  method,  but  comes  in  a  sense  by  nature  to  the  one 
having  it  inasmuch  as  it  is  naturally  known  and  not  acquired.  For  first  principles 
become  known  though  the  natural  light  of  the  agent  intellect,  and  they  are  not 
acquired  by  any  process  of  reasoning  but  by  having  their  terms  known.  76 
It  is  a  habit  which  Aquinas  says  belongs  to  the  human  species,  it  is  something  which  we  all 
have  qua  humans,  as  opposed  to  some  habits  which  belong  merely  to  individuals77  In 
short,  this  habit,  this  intuitive  grasp  of  being,  indemonstrable  principles  etc.,  is  part  of 
human  nature.  78 
Before  we  go  on  to  look  at  the  alleged  foundationalism  of  the  common  principles  and  the 
75  Gonzalez  1994,  page  498. 
76  In  Meta  N6  Tertia  conditio  est  ut  non  acquiratur  per  demonstrationem,  vel  alio  simili  modo:  sed 
adveniat  quasi  per  naturam  habenti  ipsum,  quasi  ut  naturaliter  cognoscatur,  et  non  per 
acquisitionem.  Ex  ipso  enim  lumine  naturali  intellectus  agentis  prima  principia  fiunt  cognita,  nec 
acquiruntur  per  ratiocinationes,  sed  solum  per  hoc  quod  eorum  termini  Innotescunt. 
77  ST  1a2ae  q51  alc. 
78  That,  of  course,  doesn't  mean  that  everyone  will  be  able  to  articulate  the  common  principles. 168 
relationship  between  them  and  demonstrative  sciences,  one  outstanding  matter  must  be 
addressed:  MacDonald's  description  of  common  principles  as  known  by  everyone. 
Hopefully,  the  foregoing  discussion  has  shown  why  and  how  common  principles  are 
known  by  everyone.  As  depicted  by  MacDonald  the  fact  that  a  proposition  was  a  common 
principle  seemed  to  be  merely  a  matter  of  the  terms  used.  The  casual  way  in  which  he 
mentions  them  in  his  discussion  certainly  gives  the  impression  that  common  principles  are 
grasped  by  everyone  because  they  employ  more  basic  terms.  As  we  have  seen  the 
fundamental  reason  that  they  are  known  by  everyone  and  that  we  cannot  think  of  their 
contraries  is  because  of  the  habit  of  grasping  first  principles.  It  is due  to  this  habit,  that 
common  principles  cannot  be  denied  79 
Throughout  this  discussion  of  the  grasping  of  first  principles  there  has  been  an  element  of 
foundationalism..  Recall,  for  example: 
These  naturally  known  truths  are  the  principles  of  all  subsequent  knowledge  which  is 
acquired  by  study,  whether  it  be  practical  or  speculative.  80 
MacDonald,  as  we  saw,  tried  to  depict  Aquinas'  epistemology  as  foundationalist.  Has  he 
been  vindicated?  No.  The  foundationalism  of  common  principles  in  the  epistemic  enterprise 
is  linked  to  the  foundationalism  which  we  saw  in  the  previous  chapter  when  we  looked  at  the 
metaphysical  component  of  perceptual  knowledge.  In  that  chapter  we  ruled  out  the  kind  of 
foundationalism  which  MacDonald  had  in  mind  because  all  we  are  doing  when  we  describe 
being  as  the  archimedean  point  is  describing  where  the  epistemic  process  begins,  the  point  at 
which  all  knowledge  has  its  origins,  since  all  knowledge  follows  from  the  intellect's  grasp 
of  being.  First  principles  are  axiomatic  expressions  of  this  grasp  of  being.  The 
foundationalism  of  the  common  principles  lies  in  the  fact  that  they  express  the  simplest  of 
truths,  which  follow  from  the  grasp  of  being,  not  that  they  provide  the  foundations  from 
which  the  whole  epistemic  edifice  is  derived.  This  understanding  of  the  foundationalism  of 
common  principles  also  addresses  a  concern  of  Stump.  She  said  that  common  principles, 
although  common  to  every  science,  could  not  serve  as  the  foundations  of  a  demonstrative 
science  because  someone  could  take  a  proposition  to  be  a  common  principle  when  in  fact  it 
wasn't.  Given  what  we  have  said  about  the  grasping  of  first  principles  it  is  difficult  to  see 
how  someone  could  make  such  a  mistake.  Difficult,  but  not  impossible.  However,  even  if 
we  allow  that  such  an  unlikely  mistake  could  be  made,  Stump's  criticism  is  irrelevant  for 
two  reasons:  the  foundationalism  of  common  principles  is  not  of  the  `Cartesian`  kind  that 
Stump  has  in  mind,  and  even  more  crucially,  common  principles  while  they  may  be 
common  to  every  science,  do  not  serve  as  the  principles  of  demonstrative  sciences. 
In  turning  to  the  relationship  between  common  principles  and  the  demonstrative  sciences,  we 
now  address  the  other  factor  which  distinguishes  common  principles  from  proper  principles. 
In  lectio  43  of  In  P.  AI  St.  Thomas  writes: 
79  In  P.  A.  1  19  We  outlined  above  the  circumstances  in  which  a  common  principle  may  be  denied. 
80  De  Virt  q1  a8c  Haec  autem  naturaliter  nota,  sunt  principia  totius  cognitionis  sequentis,  quae  per 
studium  acquiritur:  sive  sit  practica,  sive  sit  speculativa. 169 
He  says  that  there  cannot  be  certain  common  principles  from  which  alone  are 
syllogized  all  conclusions,  as  this  common  principle,  "Of  each  thing  there  is 
affirmation  or  negation,  "  which  is  universally  true  in  every  genus.  Nevertheless,  it  is 
impossible  that  all  things  be  syllogized  exclusively  from  such  common  principles, 
because  the  genera  of  beings  are  diverse.  81 
Two  important  points  are  contained  in  the  above  extract:  common  principles  are  common  to 
every  scientia,  but  not  as  the  principles  of  each  scientia.  If  common  principles  were  the 
principles  of  each  scientia,  then  all  the  different  scientiae  would  be  the  same.  As  he  says: 
..... 
if  the  principles  are  the  same,  it  will  follow  that  everything  in  the  sciences  would 
be  the  same.  82 
But,  as  experience  shows  not  all  scientiae  are  the  same,  different  scientiae  are  concerned 
with  different  genera.  Therefore: 
....  since  diverse  sciences  are  concerned  with  diverse  genera,  it  follows  that  the 
principles  of  diverse  sciences  are  diverse.  83 
These  principles  will  contain  terms  proper  to  the  genus  being  investigated  in  the  science 
because  the  principles  of  each  scientia  must  be  proper  to  it.  In  fact: 
.... 
it  is  required  that  the  principles  of  the  demonstration  belong  per  se  to  that  which  is 
demonstrated.  84 
Only  proper  principles  can  serve  as  the  immediate  principles  of  demonstration.  The  fact  that 
common  principles  are  common  to  all  sciences,  but  do  not  serve  as  proper  principles  is  an 
important  distinguishing  feature.  This  of  course,  prompts  two  questions:  in  what  way  are 
such  principles  common  to  the  various  scientiae  ?  Is  there  anything  else  to  the  relationship 
between  common  and  proper  principles,  aside  from  the  fact  that  principles  of  both  kinds  are 
true  in  virtue  of  themselves? 
In  answer  to  the  first  question  St.  Thomas  says  that  common  principles  are  used  by  the 
different  scientiae  according  to  analogy.  85  Take  the  common  principle:  `that  if  equals  be 
subtracted  from  equals,  the  remainders  are  equal.  '  No  scientia  can  demonstrate  from  a 
principle  of  this  kind.  Nevertheless,  following  Aristotle,  Aquinas  shows  how  such 
principles  can  be  used  by  different  scientiae: 
He  [Aristotle]  says  that  "it  suffices  to  accept  each  of  those  common  ones,  "  so  far  as  it 
pertains  to  the  generic  subject  with  which  the  science  is  concerned.  For  geometry 
does  this  if  it  takes  the  above-mentioned  common  principle  not  in  its  generality  but 
81  In  P.  A.  I  43  Et  dicit  quod  non  possunt  esse  aliqua  principia  communia,  ex  quibus  solum  omnia 
syllogizentur,  sicut  hoc  est  principium  commune,  de  quolibet  est  affirmatio  vel  negatio;  quod 
quidem  communiter  est  verum  in  omne  genere:  non  tarnen  est  possibile,  quod  ex  solis  aliquibus 
taliter  communibus  possint  omnia  syllogizari:  quia  genera  entium  sunt  diversa. 
82  In  P.  A.  1.43  Si  igitur  principia  sunt  eadem  sequeretur  quod  omnia  quae  sunt  in  scientiis  essent 
eadem. 
83  ibid.  Unde  cum  diversae  scientiae  sint  de  diversis  generibus,  sequitur  quod  diversa  principia 
sint  diversarum  scientiarum. 
84  In  P.  A.  117  Idest,  oportet  quod  principia  demonstrationis  Insint  per  se  ei,  quod  demonstratur. 
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only  in  regard  to  magnitudes,  and  arithmetic  in  regard  to  numbers.  For  geometry 
will  then  be  able  to  reach  its  conclusion  by  saying  that  if  equal  magnitudes  be  taken 
from  equal  magnitudes,  the  remaining  magnitudes  are  equal,  just  as  if  it  were  to  say 
that  if  equals  are  taken  from  equals,  the  remainders  are  equal.  The  same  must  also  be 
said  for  numbers.  86 
This  example  indicates  how  the  same  common  principle  will  be  used  in  the  diverse  scientiae 
of  geometry  and  arithmetic.  Using  the  principle  in  this  way  we  see  what  St.  Thomas  means 
when  he  says: 
all  the  sciences  share  alike  in  the  common  principles  in  the  sense  that  they  all  use 
them  as  items  from  which  they  demonstrate--which  is  to  use  them  as  principles.  But 
they  do  not  use  them  as  things  about  which  they  demonstrate  something,  i.  e.,  as 
subjects,  or  as  things  which  they  demonstrate,  i.  e.,  as  conclusions.  87 
Arithmetic  and  geometry  will  use  the  same  principle  but  with  respect  to  what  is  proper  to  the 
subject  matter  of  that  particular  science.  The  same  principle  will  be  used  but  in  different 
ways,  in  other  words  it  will  be  used  analogically,  as  he  says,  `proportionate  to  that 
science'.  88 
In  lectio  17  of  the  first  book  of  In  P.  A.,  Aquinas,  having  shown  that  it  is  not  enough  that 
demonstration  proceed  from  true  and  immediate  propositions  but  from  propositions  proper 
to  the  particular  scientia,  goes  on  to  say  that  it  is  not  the  job  of  a  particular  scientia  to  prove 
its  own  principles.  These  principles  can  be  proved  by  principles  prior  to  them.  Of  these  prior 
principles  he  writes: 
For  those  prior  principles  through  which  the  proper  principles  of  the  particular 
sciences  can  be  proved  are  principles  common  to  all;  and  the  science  which  considers 
such  common  principles  is  proper  to  all,  i.  e.,  is  related  to  things  which  are  common 
to  all,  as  those  other  particular  sciences  are  related  to  things  respectively  proper  to 
each.  For  example,  since  the  subject  of  arithmetic  is  number,  arithmetic  considers 
86  InP.  A.  118  Dicit  quod  sufficiens  est  accipere  unumquodque  istorum  communium,  quantum 
pertinet  ad  genus  subiectum,  de  quo  est  scientia.  Idem  enim  faciet  geometria,  si  non  acciplat 
praemissum  principium  commune  in  sua  communitale,  sed  solus  in  magnitudinibus,  et  arithmetica 
in  solis  numeris.  Ita  enim  poterit  concludere  geometria,  si  dicat:  si  ab  aequalibus  magnitudinibus 
aequales  auferas  magnitudines,  quae  remanent  cunt  aequales;  sicut  si  diceret:  si  ab  aequalibus 
aequalia  demas,  quae  remanent  sunt  aequalia.  Et  similiter  dicendum  est  de  numeris. 
87  In  P.  A.  I  20  Omnes  scientiae  in  communibus  principiis  communicant  hoc  modo,  quod  omnes 
utuntur  eis,  sicut  ex  quibus  demonstrant,  quod  est  uti  eis,  ut  principiis:  sed  non  ututur  eis,  ut  de 
quibus  aliquid  demonstrant,  ut  de  subiectis,  neque  sicut  quod  demonstrant,  quasi  conclusionibus. 
88  In  P.  A.  118  An  interesting  corollary  of  this  discussion  is  found  in  In  P.  A.  I  20.  There  he  tells  us 
that  no  science  makes  use  of  the  most  basic  common  principle  that  one  should  not  affirm  and  deny 
the  same  thing.  There  are  two  reasons  for  this:  When  used  of  the  subject  or  predicate  term  of  the 
syllogism  "nothing  more  is  verified  by  stating  that  man  is  an  animal  and  is  not  a  non-animal  than  by 
merely  stating  that  man  is  an  animal,  for  the  same  thing  is  conveyed  by  each.  "  Secondly,  when 
used  in  a  middle  term,  e.  g  "man  and  non-man"  it  contributes  nothing  to  the  conclusion. 
The  other  basic  common  principle  that  there  is  either  true  affirmation  or  true  negation  of  each  thing 
is  only  used  in  reductio  ad  absurdum.  Aquinas  says  "Et  dicit  quod  hoc  principium  [Est  affirmatio  vel 
negatio  vera]  accipit  demonstratio,  quae  est  ad  impossibile.  In  hac  enim  demonstratione  probatur 
aliquid  esse  verum  per  hoc  quod  eius  oppositum  est  falsum  " 171 
things  proper  to  number.  In  like  manner,  first  philosophy,  which  considers  all 
principles,  has  for  its  subject  "being,  "  which  is  common  to  all.  Therefore,  it 
considers  the  things  proper  to  being  (which  are  common  to  all)  as  proper  to  itself.  89 
These  principles  which  are  prior,  common  to  all  and  under  the  remit  of  metaphysics  are 
clearly  common  principles.  Thus  it  is  by  common  principles  that  proper  principles  can  be 
proved.  There  may  appear  to  be  a  hint  of  foundationalism  in  this  aspect  of  the  relationship 
between  common  and  proper  principles.  We  have  already  acknowledged  that  scientia  has  a 
foundationalist  structure:  conclusions  are  based  on  better  known  principles  and  that  such 
principles  may,  in  turn,  be  derived  from  higher  sciences,  as  the  principles  of  optics  are 
derived  from  geometry.  However,  Aquinas  should  not  be  understood  as  extending  this 
foundationalism  to  the  extent  that  common  principles  constitute  the  foundations  of  all 
knowledge,  that,  for  argument's  sake,  the  law  of  non  contradiction  is  the  indubitable  starting 
point  of  all  that  we  know,  the  Thomistic  equivalent  of  the  Cogito. 
Aquinas,  in  drawing  this  connection  between  proper  and  common  principles,  is  not 
suggesting  that  all  scientific  knowledge  can  be  demonstrated  from  common  principles,  that 
we  can  argue  from  the  law  of  non  contradiction  to  the  most  recondite  conclusions  of 
geometry.  That  would  contradict  his  assertion  that  common  principles  are  not  used  in 
demonstrations.  Rather,  the  foundationalism  of  common  principles  lies  in  their  close 
relationship  to  our  most  basic  concepts  such  as  being  and  truth.  In  fact  the  foundationalism 
of  common  principles  is  best  understood  in  light  of  a  comparison  to  terms  such  as  `being' 
and  `truth'.  Different  branches  of  philosophy,  such  as  epistemology  or  cosmology,  use 
these  terms  in  their  theories.  While  their  theories  depend,  to  an  extent,  on  these  terms,  it  is 
not  the  task  of  these  different  philosophical  disciplines  to  examine  these  terms,  they  merely 
employ  them.  It  is  the  task  of  the  highest  science,  metaphysics  to  examine  these  most  basic 
of  terms.  Like  terms,  such  as  `being',  common  principles  are  examined  in  the  highest 
science,  metaphysics.  Similarly,  just  as  epistemology  depends  on  notions  such  as  `truth',  it 
is  in  this  sense  that  proper  principles  depend  upon  common  principles.  Proper  principles 
employ  terms  which  are  species,  accidents,  genera  and  so  on,  but  it  is  not  the  task  of  proper 
principles  to  make  assertions  about  these  basic  philosophical  categories.  These  categories  are 
common  and  used  by  every  scientia.  Species,  accidents  and  genera  are  the  subject  matter  of 
metaphysics;  truths  concerning  them  are  expressed  axiomatically  in  the  common  principles. 
This  is  the  sense  in  which  common  principles  are  prior,  or  foundational,  to  proper 
principles.  Common  principles  provide  the  conceptual  framework  for  proper  principles. 
Proper  principles  can  be  proved  in  the  sense  that  they  can  be  shown  to  work  within  this 
conceptual  framework.  This  is  what  Aquinas  is  referring  to,  when  he  says  that  `those  prior 
principles  through  which  the  proper  principles  of  the  particular  sciences  can  be  proved  are 
89  In  P.  A.  117  Ilia  enim  priora  principia,  per  quae  possent  probari  singularum  scientiarum  propria 
principia,  sunt  communia  principia  omnium,  et  illa  scientia,  quae  considerat  hulusmodi  principia 
communia,  est  propria  omnibus,  idest  ita  se  habet  ad  ea,  quae  sunt  communia  omnibus,  sicut  se 
habent  aliae  scientiae  particulares  ad  ea,  quae  sunt  propria.  Sicut  cum  subiectum  arithmeticae  sit 
numerus,  ideo  arithmetica  considerat  ea,  quae  sunt  propria  numeri:  similiter  prima  philosophia, 
quae  considerat  omnia  principia,  habet  pro  subiecto  ens,  quod  est  commune  ad  omnia;  et  Ideo 
considerat  ea,  quae  sunt  propria  entis,  quae  sunt  omnibus  communia,  tanquam  propria  sibi. 172 
principles  common  to  all'.  Having  clarified  the  role  of  common  principles  we  now  turn  our 
attention  to  proper  principles. 
ii.  Proper  principles 
At  the  beginning  of  this  second  section  of  the  chapter  we  outlined  the  major  attributes  of 
scientia.  We  saw  that  every  scientia  was  concerned  with  three  things:  a  subject,  proper 
principles  and  the  proper  attributes  of  the  subject.  The  object  of  scientia  is  a  conclusion  of  a 
demonstrative  syllogism  in  which  a  proper  attribute  is  predicated  of  a  subject.  This 
predication  can  be  made  because  the  demonstration,  as  we  have  stated  frequently,  draws  a 
connection  via  a  middle  term  between  the  subject  and  the  proper  attribute.  The  connection 
between  the  subject  and  proper  attribute  via  the  middle  term  is  more  than  a  matter  of  logic. 
The  middle  term  gives  the  cause  of  a  property  being  a  proper  attribute  of  a  given  subject.  For 
this  reason  the  middle  term  is  an  important  element  in  the  demonstration: 
For  it  is  obvious  that  a  cause  is  the  middle  in  a  demonstration  which  enables  one  to 
know  scientifically,  because  to  know  scientifically  is  to  know  the  cause  of  a  thing  90 
Importantly,  the  cause  of  the  property  being  a  proper  attribute  of,  a  subject  will  be  given  in 
terms  of  the  subject's  essential  nature.  Man,  for  example,  is  risible  because  he  is  rational:  his 
rationality  is  the  cause  of  his  capacity  for  being  risible.  So  Aquinas  writes: 
Hence  a  demonstration  will  not  reach  the  first  cause  unless  one  takes  as  the  middle  of 
demonstration  the  definition  of  the  subject  91 
Thus  the  middle  term  expresses,  as  Aquinas  calls  it,  the  quod  quid  est  of  the  subject.  92  This 
quod  quid  est  is  the  reason  why  the  property  is  a  proper  attribute  93  and  once  we  know  this 
cause  we  can  also  define  the  proper  attribute: 
For  since  the  subject  is  the  cause  of  its  proper  attribute,  it  is  required  that  the 
definition  of  the  proper  attribute  be  demonstrated  by  the  definition  of  the  subject  94 
possession  of  such  systematic  demonstration  is  scientia  because  not  only  are  we  able  to  state 
the  cause,  we  are  also  able  to  know  the  conclusion  with  certainty  because  we  have  inferred  it 
from  certain  and  better  known  principles:  the  mild  foundationalism  of  scientia.  We  will  begin 
by  making  a  few  preliminary  remarks  on  proper  attributes  before  turning  our  attention  to 
proper  principles.  As  part  of  our  examination  of  proper  principles  we  will  look  in  detail  at 
the  middle  term  of  the  demonstration.  This  mirrors  the  importance  Aquinas  places  on  it  in  the 
90  InP.  A.  111  Manifestum  est  enim  quod  causa  est  medium  in  demonstratione,  quae  Tacit  scire; 
qula  scire  est  causam  rei  cognoscere. 
91  InP.  A.  111  Non  ergo  demonstratio  resolvet  in  primam  causam  nisi  accipiatur  ut  medium 
demonstrationis  definitio  subiecti. 
92  In  other  words  the  middle  term  tells  us  what  the  thing  is,  it  states  part  of  the  definiens  of  the 
definiendum,  the  subject.  When  predicated  of  the  subject  the  proposition  formed  is  a  the  definition 
of  the  subject.  The  translation  of  In  P.  A.  which  we  are  using  leaves  quod  quid  est  partially 
untranslated  and  refers  constantly  to  'the  quod  quid'.  Having  clarified  what  Aquinas  means  by  quid 
quid  est  we  will  use  quod  quid  est  and  amend  the  quoted  material  accordingly. 
93  In  P.  A.  1117. 
94  In  P.  A.  II  7  Cum  enim  subiectum  sit  causa  passionis,  necesse  est  quod  definitio  passionis 
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process  of  demonstration.  By  the  end  of  that  we  will  understand  more  clearly  what  scientia 
is  and,  importantly,  its  relationship  to  perceptual  knowledge. 
Scientia  investigates  proper  attributes.  95  The  investigation  of  proper  attributes  will  show 
why  a  subject  has  the  proper  attributes  it  has.  Clearly  there  is  more  to  the  investigation  than 
just  forming  a  demonstrative  syllogism,  there  must  be  perceptual  observation  prior  to 
explicitly  and  systematically  expressing  that  research  in  terms  of  a  demonstration.  This 
perceptual  element  is  an  important  part  of  scientia,  it  underpins  the  whole  enterprise. 
Unfortunately,  as  we  will  see,  Aquinas  only  alludes  to  it.  For  example,  in  In  P.  A.  117  he 
reports  on  a  demonstration  of  Aristotle  about  thunder  which  clearly  rests  on  perceptual 
observation,  but  makes  no  mention  of  the  actual  perceptual  component.  However,  it  should 
not  be  taken  as  surprising  that  the  In  P.  A.  has  little  to  say  on  the  perceptual  element  of 
scientia,  the  work  is  after  all  devoted  to  an  exposition  of  the  demonstrative  syllogism.  96  The 
aim  of  In  P.  A.  notwithstanding,  our  analysis  intends  to  show  that  perceptual  knowledge 
underpins  a  great  deal  of  what  In  P.  A.  has  to  say  about  scientia,  in  particular  the  importance 
of  perceptual  knowledge  in  the  formation  of  proper  principles  and  the  middle  terms  of  the 
scientific  demonstrations.  We  will  argue  that  such  input  in  no  way  undermines  the  certainty 
or  integrity  of  scientia. 
Reading  between  the  lines  of  what  Aquinas  writes,  it  seems  that  at  the  outset  of  an 
investigation,  with  respect  to  the  subject  whose  proper  attributes  are  to  be  investigated,  the 
scientist  knows  that  the  subject  exists  and  what  the  subject  is.  But,  with  respect  to  the  proper 
attribute  he  does  not  actually  know  that  it  is  a  proper  attribute  of  the  subject:  the 
demonstration  will  show  this.  All  the  scientist  knows  is  what  the  name  of  the  proper  attribute 
signifies;  that  if  indeed  it  is  a  proper  attribute,  this  is  what  it  is  called.  Some  may  object  to 
this  statement  about  the  scientist's  knowledge  of  the  proper  attribute.  They  will  argue  that 
since  the  scientist  who  is  investigating  risibility  knows  what  it  is  and  can  cite  instances  of  it, 
he  must  know  that  it  exists.  Aquinas  would  maintain  that  before  the  scientific  investigation 
and  demonstration  it  is  not  known  if  the  proper  attribute  exists.  The  defence  of  Aquinas' 
position  is  that,  for  example,  a  scientist  can  know  what  the  word  `goatstag'  means,  an 
animal  which  is  a  combination  a  goat  and  a  stag,  but  what  it  is,  the  animal,  not  just  what  the 
word  means,  can't  be  answered  until  he  knows  that  it  exists.  Only  when  he  knows  that  it 
exists  can  he  investigate  it  scientifically.  It  is  the  same  with  risibility  and  other  proper 
attributes.  Prior  to  scientific  investigation  and  demonstration  the  scientist  knows  what  the 
name  of  the  proper  attribute  signifies  but  he  doesn't  actually  know  that  the  proper  attribute 
exists,  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  risibility.  Only  the  scientific  investigation  and 
demonstration  can  show  this.  The  instances  of  risibility  which  the  scientist  can  cite  are 
evidence  pointing  to  the  existence  of  risibility,  evidence  which  will  be  employed  in  the 
scientific  investigation.  A  corollary  of  this  is  that  the  subject  of  investigation  is  better  known 
than  the  proper  attribute,  the  subject  has  epistemic  priority.  Aquinas  explains  why  this  is  the 
95  In  P.  A.  I  18. 
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case:  the  epistemic  priority  of  the  subject  arises  from  the  its  metaphysical  priority.  Hence: 
...  in  regard  to  the  proper  attribute,  it  is  possible  to  know  what  it  is,  because,  as  is 
pointed  out  in  the  same  book,  accidents  do  have  some  sort  of  definition.  Now  the 
being  of  a  proper  attribute  and  of  any  accident  is  being  in  a  subject;  and  this  fact  is 
concluded  by  the  demonstration.  Consequently,  it  is  not  known  beforehand  that  the 
proper  attribute  exists,  but  only  what  it  is.  The  subject,  too,  has  a  definition; 
moreover,  its  being  does  not  depend  on  the  proper  attribute--rather  its  own  being  is 
known  before  one  knows  the  proper  attribute  to  be  in  it.  Consequently,  it  is 
necessary  to  know  both  what  the  subject  is  and  that  it  is,  especially  since  the  medium 
of  demonstration  is  taken  from  the  definition  of  the  subject  of  the  proper  attribute  97 
The  scientist's  task  is  to  show  that  it  indeed  is  the  case  that  the  subject  has  such  and  such  a 
proper  attribute  and  why  it  has  that  particular  proper  attribute.  The  results  of  this  perceptual 
procedure  are  systematically  expressed  in  a  demonstrative  syllogism  using  proper  principles 
which  are  prior  to,  and  better  known  than  the  conclusion.  Note  that  the  epistemic  priority  of 
the  subject  parallells  its  metaphysical  priority.  Depending,  as  we  have  seen,  on  how  his 
remark  is  interpreted,  this  may  be  what  MacDonald  is  alluding  to  when  he  speaks  of  the  first 
principles  of  demonstration  expressing  metaphysically  immediate  facts  as  well  as  being 
epistemically  basic. 
The  perceptual  component  merely  provides  the  building  material  for  scientia.  What  is 
perceptually  observed  must  be  expressed  in  terms  of  proper  principles,  this  is  because  there 
can  be  no  scientific  knowledge  without  proper  principles  98  The  immediacy,  necessity  and 
universality  of  the  principles  ground  the  certainty  of  scientia.  In  this  analysis  of  proper 
principles  we  are  not  particularly  interested  in  the  fact  that  the  principles  must  be  proximate 
to  a  specific  science,  or  that  the  principles  are  immediate,  necessary  and  universal.  These 
particular  features  have  been  discussed  elsewhere  and  are  not  in  any  way  contentious.  Where 
necessary  reference  will  be  made  to  them.  Rather  we  are  interested  in  a  facet  of  proper 
principles  that  has  been  overlooked  by  other  commentators:  the  formation  of  such  principles. 
Let  us  take  a  typical  proper  principle:  'Man  is  a  rational  animal'.  This  proposition  is  a 
definition  where  the  meaning  of  the  subject  term  is  given  by  the  predicate  term.  It  is  only  by 
understanding  how  principles  like  this  are  known  and  formed  that  we  can  understand  their 
function  in  scientia  and,  in  turn,  obtain  deeper  insight  into  the  nature  of  scientia.  When  we 
look  at  the  formation  and  knowledge  of  proper  principles  we  immediately  introduce 
perceptual  knowledge  into  our  discussion  of  scientia. 
97  InP.  A.  12  Do  passione  autem  potest  quidem  scirl  quid  est;  qula,  ut  In  eodem  Iibro  ostenditur, 
accidentia  quodammodo  definitionem  habent.  Passionis  autem  esse  et  culuslibet  accidentis  est 
inesse  subiecto:  quod  quidem  demonstratione  concluditer.  Non  ergo  do  passione 
praecognoscitur  quia  est,  sed  quid  est  solum.  Subiectum  autem  et  definitionem  habet  et  eius  esse 
a  passione  non  dependet;  sed  suum  esse  proprium  praeintelligitur  ipsi  esse  passionis  In  eo.  Et 
ideo  de  subiecto  oportet  praecognoscere  et  quid  est  et  quia  est:  praesertim  cum  ex  definitiono 
subiecti  et  passionis  sumatur  medium  demonstrationis. 
98  InP.  A.  II  20. 175 
Aquinas  discusses  our  knowledge  of  proper  principles  In  P.  A.  11  20.  There  are  two  parts  to 
its  discussion:  the  formation  of  the  principles  and  our  knowledge  of  the  principles.  We  will 
look  briefly  at  our  knowledge  of  proper  principles  before  paying  much  closer  attention  to  the 
formation  of  the  principles. 
Obviously  to  be  able  to  grasp  proper  principles  we  must  know  the  meaning  of  the  terms 
used.  This  may  appear  to  undermine  the  indemonstrability  of  the  principles  and  Aquinas' 
claim  that  there,  nothing  prior  to  the  principles. 
For  if  it  is  granted  that  there  are  certain  principles  of  demonstrations,  it  is  necessary 
that  they  be  indemonstrable:  for  since  every  demonstration  proceeds  from  things  that 
are  prior,  as  has  been  established  above,  then  if  the  principles  are  demonstrated,  it 
will  follow  that  something  would  be  prior  to  the  principles,  and  this  is  contrary  to  the 
notion  of  a  principle.  99 
However,  the  priority  of  which  Aquinas  is  speaking,  is  the  priority  of  premises  to  a 
conclusion  in  a  piece  of  reasoning,  in  the  sense  that  the  premises  prove  what  the  conclusion 
states.  Our  statement  about  the  prior  knowledge  of  the  meaning  of  the  terms  used  does  not 
undermine  Aquinas'  assertion  that  there  is  nothing  prior  to  proper  principles.  It  merely  states 
the  common  sense  fact  that  we  need  to  know  the  meaning  of  the  terms  used  in  the 
proposition  before  we  can  grasp  it,  not  that  we  have  preexisting  knowledge  of  the  principle. 
That  is  impossible  because,  as  Aquinas  notes: 
...  since  a  principle  is  an  enunciation,  there  cannot  be  preexisting  knowledge  of  what 
it  is  but  only  of  the  fact  that  it  is  true.  100 
It  is  by  knowing  the  meaning  of  the  terms  that  we  can  see  the  truth  and  the  indemonstrability 
of  the  proposition,  in  that  the  principle  expresses  an  immediate  fact  which  does  not  require 
proof.  The  immediacy  and  indemonstrability  of  proper  principles  determines  the  way  in 
which  we  know  them.  Given  their  particular  qualities  we  grasp  them  intuitively:  our 
knowledge  of  them  is  an  instance  of  understanding: 
Moreover,  it-cannot  be  through  science  that  we  have  those  principles,  because 
science  is  the  result  of  reasoning,  namely,  demonstrative,  whose  principles  are  the 
very  things  about  which  we  are  speaking.  Therefore,  because  nothing  can  be  truer 
than  science  and  understanding  (for  wisdom  is  included  in  them),  what  follows  from 
our  consideration  of  the  foregoing  is  that,  properly  speaking,  the  knowledge  of 
principles  is  understanding.  101 
99  In  P.  A.  1  35  Et  quod  hoc  sequatur  ostendit.  Posito  enim  quod  sint  aliqua  principia 
demonstationum,  necesse  est  quod  ilia  sint  indemonstrabilia;  qula  cum  omnis  demonstratio  sit  ex 
prioribus,  ut  supra  habitum  est,  si  principia  demonstrarentur,  sequeretur  quod  aliquid  esset  prius 
prinicipiis,  quod  est  contra  rationem  principii. 
100  InP.  A.  12  Unde  cum  principium  sit  enunciato  quaedam,  non  potest  de  ipso  praecognoscl  quid 
est,  sed  solum,  quia  verum  est. 
101  InP.  A.  II  20  Non  autem  potest  esse  scientia  ipsorum  principiorum,  quia  omnis  scientia  fit  ex 
aliqua  ratiocinatione,  scilicet  demonstrativa,  culus  sunt  principia  ilia  do  quibus  loquimur.  Oula  igitur 
nihil  potest  esse  verius  quam  scientia  et  intellectus  (nam  sapientia  In  his  inteiligitur)  consequens  est 
ex  consideratione  praemlssorum  quod  principiorum  proprie  sit  intellectus. 176 
No  process  of  reasoning  is  required  to  grasp  the  truth  of  first  principles,  they  are 
immediately  known. 
This  intuitive  grasp  of  proper  principles  sounds  very  similar  to  our  grasp  of  common 
principles  which  we  indicated  was  a  significant  factor  in  distinguishing  common  principles 
from  proper  principles.  We  should  recall  however,  that  while  there  is  a  similarity  between 
the  grasp  of  the  two  kinds  of  principles,  in  that  both  are  instances  of  understanding,  in  the 
case  of  common  principles  there  is  a  special  habit  of  the  intellect,  the  habit  of  grasping  first 
principles  which  predisposes  the  intellect  to  grasping  such  principles.  There  is  no  such  habit 
with  respect  to  proper  principles.  One  understands  proper  principles  simply  in  the  way  that 
one  understands  other  immediate  things  such  as,  in  the  case  of  perceptual  knowledge,  when 
in  the  first  act  of  a  properly  functioning  intellect,  we  understand  that  something  is  there 
without  the  need  for  further  proof.  Provided  one  knows  the  meaning  of  the  terms  used  one 
will  intuitively  grasp  the  proper  principle.  If  one  doesn't  know  the  meaning  of  the  terms, 
then  there  will  be  no  intuitive  grasp. 
Our  intuitive  grasp  of  proper  principles  is  not  a  particularly  contentious  issue.  Contention 
emerges  when  we  look  at  the  formation  of  the  principles,  a  contention  which  has  already 
surfaced  in  Stump's  brief  reference  to  how  the  principles  of  scientia  are  formed.  Hopefully, 
we  can  remove  contention  from  the  discussion.  We  have  already  seen  that  in  respect  of  our 
understanding  of  principles  there  is  no  preexisting  knowledge  of  them.  Similarly,  with 
respect  to  the  process  of  forming  indemonstrable  principles  there  is  no  preexisting 
knowledge.  Aquinas  says: 
Hence  he  [Aristotle]  concludes  that  there  do  not  preexist  any  habits  of  principles  in 
the  sense  of  being  determinate  and  complete;  neither  do  they  come  to  exist  anew  from 
other  better  known  preexisting  principles  in  the  way  that  a  scientific  habit  is 
generated  in  us  from  previously  known  principles;  rather  the  habits  of  principles 
come  to  exist  in  us  from  pre-existing  sense.  102 
Our  knowledge  and  the  formation  of  proper  principles  comes  from  what  we  have  sensed. 
Herein  lies  the  relationship  between  perceptual  knowledge  and  scientia:  without  perceptual 
knowledge  there  would  be  no  scientia  because  there  would  be  no  principles.  MacDonald 
tried  to  write  off  perceptual  knowledge  as  a  kind  of  secondary  scientia.  Here  we  see  quite 
explicitly  that  scientia  depends  on  perceptual  knowledge  because  like  all  human  knowledge 
scientia  finds  it  ultimate  origins  in  what  we  sense.  St.  Thomas  outlines  Aristotle's  thoughts 
on  the  process: 
Then  he[Aristotle]  shows,  in  view  of  the  foregoing,  how  the  knowledge  of  first 
principles  comes  about  in  us;  and  he  concludes  from  the  foregoing  that  from  sensing 
comes  remembrance  in  those  animals  in  which  a  sensible  impression  remains,  as  has 
been  stated  above.  But  from  remembrance  many  times  repeated  in  regard  to  the  same 
102  1nP.  A.  II  20  Unde  concludit  quod  neque  praeexistunt  in  nobis  habitus  principiorum,  quasi 
determinati  et  completi:  neque  etiam  fiunt  de  novo  ab  aliquibus  notioribus  habitibus 
praeexistentibus,  sicut  generatur  in  nobis  habitus  scientiae  ex  praecognitione  principlorum:  sod 
habitus  principiorum  fiunt  in  nobis  a  sensu  praeexistente. 177 
item  but  in  diverse  singulars  arises  experience,  because  experience  seems  to  be 
nothing  else  than  to  take  something  from  many  things  retained  in  the  memory.  103 
[My  emphasis] 
He  goes  on: 
that  just  as  from  memory  is  formed  experience,  so  from  experience  or  even  from  the 
universal  resting  in  the  mind.........  the  principle  of  art  and  science  is  formed  in  the 
mind.  104 
From  perception  universals  are  formed.  The  terms  which  we  use  to  refer  to  these  universals 
are  the  terms  from  which  the  proper  principles  of  scientia  are  formed.  These  universal  terms 
must  be  placed  in  the  proper  order,  that  is,  arranged  in  such  a  way  that  they  constitute  a 
definition.  This  is  the  sense  in  which  proper  principles  depend  on  perceptual  knowledge. 
This  is  what  Aquinas  means  when  he  says  `from  the  universal  resting  in  the  mind  the 
principle  of  art  and  science  is  formed.  ' 
We  will  use  the  example  of  human  rationality  and  risibility  to  illustrate  the  formation  of 
proper  principles.  Perceptual  observation  indicates  that  people  have  the  ability  to  see 
something  as  funny.  The  demonstration  is  the  scientist's  explanation  why  this  is  the  case. 
The  scientist  will  also  be  able  to  explain  what  risibility  is  by  showing  how  it  differs  from 
other  per  se  attributes  which  arise  from  humans'  rationality  such  as  the  ability  to  use 
language.  The  demonstration  will  contain  three  terms:  the  subject  of  the  demonstration,  in 
this  case  man;  a  proper  attribute,  risibility;  and  a  middle  term,  rationality.  The  formation  of 
two  of  the  terms  is  relatively  straightforward.  The  universal  employed  as  the  subject  of  the 
demonstration  is  formed  in  the  way  that  any  universal  is  formed.  This  is  something  which 
we  discussed  in  the  last  chapter.  So  too  the  universal  used  to  signify  the  proper  attribute. 
Experience  shows  that  different  individuals  appear  to  have  this  property,  the  ability  to  see 
something  as  funny.  From  this  experience  and  by  the  intellect's  ability  to  abstract  the 
universal  from  the  singular  the  scientist  is  able  to  consider  the  property  separately  from 
particular  instances,  he  forms  a  universal  concept  which  signifies  this  putative  property.  This 
is  the  thrust  of  Aquinas'  remark  when  he  says  'from  remembrance  many  times  repeated  in 
regard  to  the  same  item  but  in  diverse  singulars  arises  experience,  because  experience  seems 
to  be  nothing  else  than  to  take  something  from  many  things  retained  in  the  memory.  '  The 
universality  of  scientia  partially  rests  on  the  universality  of  these  terms. 
The  subject  and  the  proper  attribute  constitute  the  two  extremes  of  the  syllogism  and  are 
103  In  P.  A  II  20  Deinde  cum  dicit:  ex  sensu  quidem  igitur  etc.,  ostendit  secundum  praedicta 
quomodo  in  nobis  fiat  cognitio  primorum  principiorum,  et  concludit  ex  praemissis  quod  ex  sensu  fit 
memoria  In  illis  animalibus,  in  quibus  remanet  impressio  sensibilis,  sicut  supra  dictum  est.  Ex 
memoria  autem  multoties  facta  circa  eamdem  rem,  in  diversis  tarnen  singularibus,  fit  experimentum: 
quia  experimentum  nihil  aliud  esse  videtur  quam  accipere  aliquid  ex  multis  In  memoria  retentis. 
104  Quod  sicut  ex  memoria  fit  experimentum,  ita  etiam  ex  experimento,  aut  etiam  ulterlus  ex 
universali  quiescente  in  anima.....  ex  hoc  Igitur  experimento,  et  ex  tall  universals  per  experimentum 
accepto,  est  in  anima  id  quod  est  principium  artis  et  scientiae. 
I  haveomitted  a  large  section  in  parenthesis  which  is  found  in  the  text,  but  that  doesn't  account  for 
the  fact  that  the  translation  does  not  correspond  to  what  the  original  text  says. 178 
connected  via  a  middle  term.  Predicating  the  middle  term  of  the  subject  gives  a  definition  of 
the  subject.  This  is because  the  middle  term  is  a  statement  which,  we  have  seen,  signifies 
what  Aquinas  calls  the  quod  quid  est  of  the  subject.  By  the  quod  quid  est  Aquinas  means  the 
essential  nature  of  the  subject: 
For  the  quod  quid  est  of  a  thing  must  signify  its  essence.  105 
The  formation  of  this  term,  the  middle  term,  is  more  complicated  than  the  formation  of  the 
other  two  terms.  As  in  the  case  of  the  other  two  terms  of  the  demonstration,  perceptual 
knowledge  is  important  in  constructing  the  middle  term.  We  saw  that  in  case  of  the  other  two 
universal  terms  of  the  demonstration,  their  formation  was  a  matter  of  abstracting  from 
experience:  the  universal  concept  `man'  was  formed  from  consideration  of  individual  men, 
and  the  universal  concept  `risibility'  formed  to  describe  a  property  which  individual  men 
seemed  to  possess.  The  middle  term  will  also  be  universal,  but  in  order  to  acquire  this 
universal  some  research  needs  to  be  done.  The  construction  of  the  middle  term  is  not  simply 
a  matter  of  abstracting  from  our  experience.  Rather  it  emerges  from  a  careful  examination  of 
the  subject  of  the  demonstration.  So  important  is  the  formation  of  the  middle  term  that 
Aquinas  devotes  most  of  the  second  book  of  the  Commentary  on  the  Posterior  Analytics  to 
it. 
The  middle  term  will  state  the  quod  quid  est  of  the  subject.  As  it  states  the  quod  quid  est,  it  is 
predicated  universally  and  necessarily  of  the  subject.  106  A  hint  as  to  what  the  quod  quid  est 
will  look  like  is  given  in  the  following  remark  which  occurs  in  several  places  in  the  second 
book  of  In  P.  A.: 
.....  there  is  no  more  in  a  definition  than  genus  and  differences,  and  that  it  is  possible 
for  a  definition  to  be  formed  of  two  things,  one  of  which  is  a  genus  and  the  other  a 
difference.  107 
The  quod  quid  est,  the  predicate  term  of  the  definition,  will  consist  of  a  genus  and  a 
difference,  for  example,  animal  and  rational.  This  genus  and  difference  will  state  the  essence 
of  the  subject.  Much  of  the  early  part  of  Aquinas'  discussion  of  the  middle  term  is  devoted  to 
showing  in  what  ways  the  middle  term,  this  statement  of  essence,  is  not  obtained.  Most 
importantly,  it  is  not  obtained  by  demonstration.  The  first  twelve  lectiones  of  In  P.  A.  II 
offer  detailed,  and  sometimes  esoteric  argument  on  this  matter,  details  of  which  need  not 
detain  us.  The  core  reason,  worth  noting,  for  the  inability  to  demonstrate  the  quod  quid  est 
is  as  follows: 
.....  there  does  not  seem  to  be  any  possible  way  for  a  person  to  demonstrate  that 
some  quod  quid  est  is  man:  and  this  because  whoever  knows  a  quod  quid  est  to  be 
105  In  P.  A.  II  13  Huius  rationem  necesse  est  significare  quod  quid  est  rel. 
106  In  P.  A.  1113. 
107  In  P.  A.  II  13  Nihil  est  aliud  In  definitione  quam  genus  et  differentiae,  et  quod  possibile  est 
definitionem  ex  duobus  constitul,  quorum  unum  sit  genus,  aliud  differentia. 
See  also  In  P.  A.  II  5. 179 
of  man  or  of  any  other  thing  is  required  to  know  that  the  thing  exists.  108 
To  know  the  essence  of  a  thing,  as  opposed  to  what  the  name  of  the  thing  signifies,  one 
must  know  that  the  thing  exists.  However,  knowing  something  by  demonstration  does  not 
mean  that  the  thing  which  is demonstrated  exists.  Demonstration  does  not  lead  to  knowledge 
of  a  thing's  existence.  109  Therefore,  we  cannot  acquire  knowledge  of  the  quod  quid  est  of  a 
thing  by  means  of  a  demonstration.  Given  that  the  subject  and  the  quod  quid  est  together  are 
going  to  constitute  an  indemonstrable  principle  this  must  be  good  news;  it  is difficult  to  see 
how  something  indemonstrable  could  be  logically  demonstrated. 
For  similar  reasons,  regarding  knowledge  of  essence  entailing  knowledge  that  the  thing 
exists,  we  cannot  simply  state  a  definition  and  say  that  this  gives  knowledge  of  quod  quid 
est.  He  uses  an  example  to  make  his  point: 
Wherefore  he  [Aristotle]  says  that  it  is  clear  not  only  in  the  light  of  the  foregoing  but 
also  in  view  of  the  modes  of  terms,  i.  e.,  of  definitions,  which  are  presently  in  vogue 
that  those  who  define  do  not  manifest  the  quia  est.  For  example,  one  who  defines  a 
circle  as  something  all  the  lines  from  whose  centre  to  the  circumference  are  equal,  is 
still  left  with  the  question  why  there  must  be  such  a  thing  as  he  has  defined,  i.  e.,  why 
it  is  necessary  to  posit  that  there  exists  such  a  thing  as  was  defined;  for  example,  why 
it  is  required  to  posit  that  there  is  a  circle  which  is  defined  in  the  way  mentioned.  For 
it  is  acceptable  to  give  a  like  description  of  a  brass  mountain  by  saying,  for  example, 
that  it  is  a  brass  body  which  is  lofty  and  extensive;  but  the  task  would  still  remain  to 
establish  whether  there  is  such  a  thing  in  nature.  And  this  because  terms,  i.  e., 
defining  notions,  do  not  state  that  their  counterpart  either  exists  or  is  capable  of 
existing;  rather,  whenever  such  a  notion  is  formulated,  it  is  legitimate  to  ask  why 
such  a  thing  should  exist.  110 
Definitions  and  demonstrations  do  not  tell  us  that  something  is  or  why  it  is,  they  only  tell  us 
what  something  is.  The  thrust  of  Aquinas'  argument  seems  to  be  that  the  quod  quid  est  must 
be  obtained  by  perceptual  means.  By  our  perceptual  research  we  know  that  the  thing  is;  only 
108  In  P.  A.  116  Non  videtur  esse  possibilis  aliquis  modus,  quo  aliquis  demonstrat  quod  quid  est 
esse  hominis;  et  hoc  ideo,  quia  necesse  est  quod  quicunque  scit  quod  quid  est  esse  hominis,  vol 
cuiuscunque  alterius  rel,  quid  sciat  rem  illam  esse. 
109  This  may  appear  to  contradict  our  earlier  point  that  we  come  to  know  that  the  proper  attribute 
exists  via  scientific  demonstration.  In  fact  it  does  not.  When  we  discussed  the  matter  of  the  proper 
attribute's  existence  we  stressed  the  importance  of  scientific  Investigation.  Demonstration  provides 
the  logical  and  systematic  framework  for  what  has  been  empirically  discovered,  viz.  that  the  proper 
attribute  exists  and  belongs  to  subjects  of  this  kind. 
110  In  P.  A.  II  6  Unde  dicit  manifestum  esse  non  solum  secundum  praedicta,  sod  etlam  socundum 
modos  terminorum,  ldest  definitionum,  quae  nunc  sunt  in  usu,  quod  llli  qui  definlunt,  non 
manifestant  quia  est.  Puta  qui  definit  circulum,  dicens  quod  est  aliquid  ex  culus  medio  linae  ad 
circumferentiam  ductae  sunt  aequales,  adhuc  restat  quaestio  propter  quid  oportoat  poni  esse  Id 
quod  definitur;  puta  propter  quid  oporteat  poni  quod  sit  circulus,  qui  praedicto  modo  definitur. 
Convenit  enim  aliquam  similem  rationem  dicere  montis  aenel,  puta  quod  est  corpus  aenum  in  altum 
et  usquequaque  diffusam;  et  tarnen  adhuc  restat  quaerere  an  sit  aliquid  tale  In  rerum  natura.  Et  hoc 
ideo  quia  termini,  Idest  rationes  definitivae,  non  declarant  quod  illud  de  quo  assignantur.  aut  sit  aut 
possibile,  sit  esse,  sod  semper,  assignata  tali  ratione,  licit  quaerere  quare  oporteat  tale  aliquid  esse. 180 
then  can  we  state  what  the  thing  is,  and,  on  the  basis  of  this,  why  the  thing  has  the  proper 
attributes  it  has.  In  short,  the  quod  quid  est  cannot  be  obtained  by  logic  or  human  intuition 
alone.  That  is  not  to  say  that  logic  is  completely  unhelpful;  Aquinas  devotes  a  lectio  to 
showing  how  logic  and  demonstration  can  help  in  manifesting  a  quod  quid  est.  This 
discussion  centres  on  the  role  of  quod  quid  est  serving  as  a  the  middle  term  in  a  propter  quid 
demonstration,  but  this  is  more  an  incidental  manifestation  of  an  already  known  quod  quid 
est  rather  than  the  demonstration  of  a  quod  quid  est  which  was  hitherto  unknown.  111 
Discovery  of  a  quod  quid  est  demands,  as  we  will  see,  a  perceptual  process.  Before  we  look 
at  that  perceptual  process  we  must  mention  one  other  excluded  means  of  finding  the  quod 
quid  est:  induction.  Aquinas  writes: 
However,  besides  these  three  modes  [this  refers  to  various  aspects  of  demonstration) 
there  is  a  fourth,  namely,  through  induction.  But  it  turns  out  that  the  quod  quid  est 
cannot  be  proved  by  manifest  singulars,  namely,  in  such  a  way  that  something  is 
predicated  of  all  and  is  not  anything  that  might  be  otherwise:  because  one  who  thus 
proceeds  by  induction  will  not  demonstrate  the  quod  quid  est  but  will  demonstrate 
that  something  is  or  is  not;  for  example,  that  every  man  is  an  animal,  or  that  no 
animal  is  a  stone.  112 
This  is  an  interesting  statement  about  induction.  We  will  argue  that,  this  statement 
notwithstanding,  there  has  to  be  an  element  of  induction  in  the  formation  of  the  principles. 
That  induction,  however,  takes  place  after  the  quod  quid  est  has  been  identified  and  is  not 
employed  in  the  determination  of  the  quod  quid  est  which  is  the  very  issue  Aquinas  is  ruling 
out  here.  Induction  is  ruled  out  as  a  method  because  it  does  not  lead  to  an  identification  of 
the  quod  quid  est,  it  can  only  use  the  quod  quid  est  as  part  of  a  generalisation.  The  quod 
quid  est  of  a  subject  must  be  acquired  by  another  way. 
In  fact  there  are  two  ways  in  which  the  quod  quid  est  can  be  obtained,  both  of  which  have 
the  perceptual  dimension  which  demonstration  and  definition  lack.  The  first  way  is  by 
dividing  the  genus,  113  the  other  way  is  by  examining  things  similar  and  dissimilar  to  the 
thing  whose  quod  quid  est  is  sought.  114  Both  processes  are  straight  forward.  In  the  first 
case  the  scientist  must  identify  a  genus.  Once  identified,  he  then  seeks  to  identify  what 
makes  one  species  different  from  another  by  searching  for  the  very  qualities  which  make 
them  different  species: 
111  In  P.  A.  H7. 
112  In  P.  A.  II  5  Relinquitur  autem  praeter  tres  modos  quartus  modus,  qui  est  per  Inductionem.  Sod 
nec  contingit  probare  quod  quid  est  per  singularia  manifesta,  Ita  scilicet  quod  aliquid  praedicotur  do 
omnibus,  et  non  sit  aliquid  eorum  quod  aliter  se  habeat;  qui  sic  Inducendo  non  demonstrabit  quod 
quid  est,  sed  demonstrabit  aliquid  esse  vel  non  esse,  puta  quod  omnis  homo  est  animal,  vol  nullus 
homo  est  lapis. 
The  translation  used  above  Incorrectly  translates  the  last  sentence.  It  should  read  "  or  no  man  is  a 
stone.  " 
113  In  P.  A.  II  14. 
114  In  P.  A.  II  16. 181 
.....  when  someone  wishes  to  deal  with  some  whole,  i.  e.,  a  universal,  in  order  to 
define  it,  it  is  recommended  that  he  first  divide  the  genus  into  the  first  parts  of  that 
genus,  i.  e.,  those  that  are  not  further  divisible  into  species;  for  example,  he  should 
divide  number  into  two  and  three.  Having  accomplished  this  division  through  which 
the  genus  is  known,  he  should  then  try  to  obtain  the  definition  of  each  species  as  is 
done  in  other  matters,  say  in  the  matter  of  straight  line  and  circle  and  right  angle.  For 
all  these  are  fittingly  defined  after  one  has  divided  the  genus.  115 
The  next  lectio  details  the  rules  which  must  be  followed: 
..... 
in  order  to  achieve  a  term,  i.  e.,  a  definition,  by  the  method  of  division  three 
things  must  be  observed:  first,  that  the  things  which  are  taken  be  predicated  in  quod 
quid  est;  secondly,  that  they  be  arranged  according  to  what  is  first  and  what  is 
second;  thirdly,  that  everything  taken  pertain  to  the  quod  quid  est  and  that  nothing 
be  omitted.  116, 
The  meaning  of  the  first  rule  is  clear,  we  identify  a  genus  and  a  difference  which  will  be 
used  in  the  quod  quid  est.  Aquinas  outlines  the  second  rule: 
And  he  [Aristotle]  says  that  the  parts  of  a  definition  are  arranged  as  they  should,  if 
one  takes  what  is  first--and  he  will  do  this,  if  he  first  takes  that  which  is  implied  by 
the  other  things  that  are  taken  later,  and  not  conversely.  For  this  is  more  common 
and  prior.  But  such  a  thing  must  be  taken  in  the  definition  as  a  genus,  as  when  it  is 
stated  that  man  is  an  animal,  two-legged  and  walking.  For  if  he  is  a  two-legged 
walker,  he  is  an  animal;  but  not  vice  versa.  Therefore,  when  I  have  taken  animal  as 
first,  the  same  method  must  be  observed  in  arranging  the  other  items.  For  the  second 
item  to  be  employed  in  the  definition  will  be  that  which  according  to  the 
foregoing  description  will  be  first  among  all  the  others;  likewise,  the  third  item  to  be 
taken  will  be  that  which  is  first  in  respect  of  the  items  had,  i.  e.,  following.  For  it  will 
always  turn  out  that  when  the  more  general  item  has  been  removed,  that  which  is 
had,  i.  e.,  that  which  immediately  follows,  will  be  true  in  regard  to  all  the  other  items, 
115  In  P.  A.  II  14  Dicit  ergo  primum  quod  cum  aliquis  vult  negotlarl,  ad  definiendum,  aliquld  totum, 
idest  universale,  congruum  est  ut  primo  dividat  genus  In  primas  partes  iliius  generis,  quae  sunt 
Indivisibiles  secundum  speciem  puta  quod  dividat  numerum  binarium  et  ternarlum:  et  hac  divisione 
praemissa,  per  quam  cognoscitur  genus,  tenet  postea  accipere  definitionem  singularum 
specierum;  sicut  etiam  fit  in  aliis,  puta  in  recta  linea  et  in  circulo  et  in  recto  angulo.  Omnia  enim  haec 
congrue  definiuntur,  praemissa  divisione  generis. 
116  In  P.  A.  1115  Dicit  ergo  primo  quod  ad  hoc  quod  aliquis  consituat  terminum,  Idest  definitionem, 
per  viam  divisionis,  tria  oportet  considerare:  quorum  primum  est,  ut  ea  quas  accipiuntur, 
praedicentur  in  eo  quod  quid  est;  secundum  est,  ut  ordinetur  quid  sit  primum  et  quid  secundum; 
tertium  est,  quod  accipiantur  omnia  quae  pertinent  ad  quod  quid  est,  et  nihil  eorum  praetermittatur. 182 
say  a  fourth  and  a  fifth,  if  that  many  parts  are  needed  for  the  definition.,  17 
This  rule  could  have  been  concisely  paraphrased.  However,  it  contains  a  point  which  will  be 
of  importance  shortly.  The  third  rule  to  be  observed  ensures  that  the  definition  is  as  accurate 
as  possible  by,  ensuring  that  all  the  differences  have  been  noted.  Succinctly,  in  this  process 
of  dividing  the  genus  we  take  the  genus  and  then  divide  by  its  differences;  then  we  divide  the 
difference  by  the  differences  which  follow  from  it  and  so  on  until  we  reach  the  ultimate 
difference.  All  these  differences  together  with  the  genus  constitute  the  quod  quid  est.  Man, 
for  example,  can  be  defined  as  a  two-legged,  walking  animal.  Therefore,  in  identifying  the 
differentiae  which  follow  from  other  differentiae  we  are  constructing  something  of  a 
porphyrian  tree;  each  branch  of  which,  on  the  way  to  the  ultimate  differentia,  cites 
differentiae  which  will  be  used  in  the  definition. 
Aquinas  tells  us  how  we  investigate  the  differences: 
investigate  the  differences  by  considering  the  proper  attributes  which,  as  has  been 
said,  are  signs  manifesting  the  forms  proper  to  the  species.  And  this  should  first  be 
done  by  means  of  certain  common  items.  118 
By  these  means  the  scientist  obtains  the  quod  quid  est  of  man:  man  is  an  animal,  and  the 
difference  which  sets  him  apart  from  other  animals,  which  manifests  his  form,  is  his 
rationality.  In  the  second  method  the  scientist  examines  things  similar  and  dissimilar  to  the 
subject  whose  quod  quid  est  is  sought.  He  describes  what  is  involved: 
......  in  those  things  which  are  similar,  one  should  consider  some  item  that  is  the 
same  in  all;  for  example,  what  is  found  to  be  the  same  in  all  men  is  that  they  all 
coincide  in  being  rational.  After  that,  one  should  investigate  the  things  which  agree 
with  the  first  things  in  genus  and  are  specifically  the  same  among  themselves, 
although  specifically  different  from  the  things  first  taken,  as  horses  from  men.  It  is 
also  necessary  to  investigate  what  is  the  same  in  these  things,  namely,  these  horses; 
117  In  P.  A.  II  15  Et  dicit  quod  tunc  ordinantur  partes  definitionis  sicut  oportet,  si  aliquis  primo 
accipiat  id  quod  est  primum;  et  hoc  erit  si  aliquis  primo  acciplat  Id  quod  consequitur  ad  alia  posterlus 
accepta,  et  non  e  converso.  Hoc  enim  est  communis  et  prius.  Necesse  est  autem  aliquid  hulusmodi 
accipi  in  defintione  tanquam  genus,  puta  cum  dicitur  quod  homo  est  animal  gressibile  bipos.  SI 
enim  est  gressibile  bipes,  est  animal,  sed  non  e  converso.  Cum  ergo  lam  acciperimus  animal 
tanquam  primum,  Idem  modus  observandus  est  in  ordinatione  inferlorum.  Accipletur  onim  quasi 
secundum  in  definitione  illud  quod  secundum  rationem  praemissam  erit  primum  inter  omnia 
sequentia;  et  similiter  accipietur  tertium  Id  quod  est  primum  respectu  habitorum,  ldest 
consequentium.  Semper  enim,  remoto  superiori,  illud  quod  est  habitum,  idest  immediate 
consequens,  erit  primum  omnium  aliorum.  Et  ita  est  etiam  in  omnibus  aliis,  puta  in  quarto  et  in 
quinto,  si  tot  oporteat  partes  definitionis  esse. 
118  In  P.  A.  II  14  Oportet  ad  investidandum  differentias  considerare  proprias  passiones,  quae,  sicut 
dictum  est,  sunt  signa  manifestantia  formas  proprias  specierum.  Et  hoc  oportet  primum  facere  per 
aliqua  communia. 183 
say  neighing.  -119 
Having  identified  how  these  two  subjects,  men  and  horses,  differ  the  scientist  must  then 
seek  whether  there  is  anything  in  common  between  rationality  and  neighing.  If  there  is,  this 
will  constitute  the  common  form  of  the  two  things  and  be  given  in  the  definition  of  the  thing. 
If  there  is  no  common  element,  then  both  things  will  have  different  definitions,  definitions 
which  state  the  genus  in  which  they  share  and  the  manner  in  which  they  differ.  Man  is  a 
rational  animal  because  all  men  are  animals,  but  their  rationality  sets  them  apart  from  other 
animals.  Horses  are  neighing  animals,  because  it  is  the  ability  to  neigh  which  sets  them  apart 
from  cows  and  sheep. 
Several  remarks  ought  to  be  made  about  these  methods.  First,  they  are  perceptual.  The 
research  in  question  is  clearly  an  example  of  perceptual  knowledge.  It  is  by  looking  at  things 
that  one  comes  to  obtain  the  quod  quid  est,  a  quod  quid  est  which  will  be  part  of  an 
indemonstrable  principle  of  scientia.  This  is  the  relationship  between  perceptual  knowledge 
and  scientia,  the  terms  from  which  the  principles  are  formed  are  perceptually  obtained.,  " 
Scientia  relies  on  perceptual  knowledge  for  the  formation  of  its  principles.  Some  might  see 
this  perceptual  element  as  undermining  the  indemonstrability  of  the  principles.  We  do  not. 
The  indemonstrability  of  the  principles  is  a  matter  of  logic,  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  fact 
that  the  principles  are  perceptually  derived.  They  are  indemonstrable  because  their  truth  is 
not  grasped  by  syllogising  but  because  of  the  meaning  of  the  terms  they  contain: 
But  those  immediate  principles  are  not  made  known  through  an  additional  middle  but 
through  an  understanding  of  their  own  terms.  120 
These  indemonstrable  principles  are  definitions  which  are  necessarily  true.  The  necessary 
truth  of  these  principles  and  the  role  of  empirical  research  in  their  construction  can  be  seen  in 
a  comparison  with  modern  science.  In  science  today  we  find  definitions  such  as  `water  is 
H20',  'an  acid  is  a  proton  donor'.  Once  we  know  the  meaning  of  the  terms  used  we  grasp 
immediately  the  truth  of  these  propositions.  Nonetheless,  that  water  is  H2O,  once  had  to  be 
empirically  obtained.  This  empirical  dimension  in  no  way  undermines  the  necessary  truth 
that  `water  is  H20'.  If  something  is  not  H2O  then  it  is  not  water.  If  it  is  H2O  then 
necessarily  it  is  water.  121  In  a  similar  vein  the  role  of  perceptual  knowledge  in  the  formation 
of  proper  principles  does  not  undermine  either  the  indemonstrability  or  the  necessity  of  the 
principles.  In  the  case  of  the  definitions  from  modern  science,  scientists  can  then  go  on  to 
explain  why  acid  or  water  behave  in  the  way  which  they  do.  So,  for  example,  since  acid  is  a 
119  In  P.  A.  II  16  Ostendit  subdens  quod  primo  oportet  similia  considerare  quid  Idem  In  omnibus 
Inveniatur:  puta  quid  Idem  inveniatur  in  omnibus  hominibus,  qui  omnes  conveniunt  In  hoc  quod  est 
esse  rationale.  Postea  considerandum  est  iterum  In  aliis,  quae  conveniunt  cum  primis  In  eodem 
genero,  et  sunt  sibi  invicem  idem  specie,  sunt  autem  altera  specie  ab  illis,  quae  primo 
accipiebantur,  sicut  equi  ab  hominibus:  oportet  etiam  accipere  quid  sit  Idem  in  his,  scilicet  equis 
puta  hinnibile. 
120  In  P.  A.  17  Ipsa  autem  principia  immediata  non  per  aliquod  medium  extrinsecum  cognoscuntur, 
sed  per  cognitionem  proporum  terminorum. 
121  Later,  when  we  look  at  the  role  of  induction  in  the  construction  of  principles  we'll  recall  what 
Putnam  has  to  say  on  statements  such  as  'water  is  H2O'. 184 
proton  donor  hydrochloric  acid  will  react  with  sodium  hydroxide  to  produce  salt  and  water. 
Clearly,  other  factors  besides  the  acid's  tendency  to  donate  protons  are  important,  but 
nonetheless  here  we  see  how  a  definition  can  be  used  to  give  a  broad  explanation  of  why 
something  happened.  Aquinas  sees  indemonstrable  principles  as  playing  a  similar  role,  they 
explain  why  the  object  has  the  proper  attributes  it  has.  We  will  return  to  that  explanatory  role 
later.  First  some  further  comments  about  the  methods  employed  in  obtaining  proper 
principles. 
In  the  first  method  when  discussing  how  one  arrives  at  the  specific  difference,  Aquinas 
emphasises  the  importance  of  proper  attributes  in  this  process.  This  appears  problematic; 
after  all,  which  proper  attributes  does  one  choose?  Isn't  there  a  danger  of  circularity,  using 
proper  attributes  to  define  the  quod  quid  est  which  in  turn  will  be  used  to  verify  that  a  certain 
property  is  a  proper  attribute?  A  hint  at  one  possible  resolution  of  this  apparent  circularity 
may  lie  in  In  P.  A.  11  7. 
But  there  is  the  further  consideration  that  since  the  quid  est  is  the  cause  of  the  very 
being  of  the  thing,  then  according  to  the  diverse  causes  of  one  thing,  there  are 
various  ways  of  assigning  the  quod  quid  est  of  the  same  thing.  For  example,  the 
quod  quid  est  of  house  can  be  formulated  in  terms  of  its  material  cause,  so  that  we 
might  say  that  it  is  something  composed  of  wood  and  stones;  and  also  in  terms  of  the 
final  cause,  namely,  that  it  is  an  artifact  constructed  for  habitation.  Thus,  therefore,  it 
will  occur  that  since  there  are  several  quod  quid  est  of  the  same  thing,  one  of  them 
will  be  demonstrated  and  another  not  demonstrated  but  supposed.  Hence  it  does  not 
follow  that  there  is  a  begging  of  the  question,  because  one  quod  quid  est  is 
supposed  and  the  other  proved.  Nor  is  this  a  method  proving  the  quod  quid  est 
demonstratively,  but  of  syllogizing  it  logically,  because  by  this  method  it  is  not 
sufficiently  proved  that  what  is  concluded  is  the  quod  quid  est  of  the  thing  of  which 
it  is  concluded,  but  merely  that  it  is  in  it.  122 
Given  that  each  subject  will  have  material,  efficient,  formal  and  final  causes,  it  is  possible  to 
state  the  quod  quid  est  in  a  variety  of  ways.  On  the  basis  of  this  multiplicity  of  quod  quid 
est,  we  could  argue  that  we  can  prove  that  a  particular  property  is  a  proper  attribute  of  a 
subject  by  using  a  quod  quid  est  which  doesn't  presuppose  the  proper  attribute  in  question, 
but  is  derived  from  another  proper  attribute.  This  method,  however,  is  unsatisfactory,  not 
least  because  Aquinas  himself  is  unsatisfied  with  it  as  a  method  of  acquiring  a  quod  quid 
122  In  P.  A.  II  7  Est  autem  considerandum  quod,  cum  quid  est  sit  causa  ipsius  esse  rel,  secundum 
diversas  causas  elusdem  rei  potest  multipliciter  quod  quid  est  elusdem  rel  assignari.  Puta  quod  est 
domus  potest  accipi  per  comparationem  ad  causam  materialem,  ut  dicamus  quod  est  aliquid 
compositum  ex  lignis  et  lapidibus;  et  etiam  per  comparationern  ad  causam  finalem,  ut  dicamus  quod 
est  artificium  praeparaturn  ad  habitandum.  Sic  ergo  continget  quod,  cum  sint  multa  quod  quid  est 
elusdem  rei,  aliquod  illorum  monstrabitur,  et  aliquod  non  monstrabitur,  sed  supponetur.  Undo  non 
sequitur  quod  sit  petitio  principii,  quia  aliud  quod  quid  est  supponitur,  et  aliud  probatur.  Nec  tarnen 
est  modus  logice  syllogizandi;  quia  non  suffienter  per  hoc  probatur  quod  Id  quod  concluditur  sit 
quod  quid  est  illius  rei  de  qua  concluditur,  sed  solum  quod  Insit  ei. 
In  this  quotation  the  translator  merely  follows  Aquinas  in  jumping  between  quid  est  and  quod  quid 
est  as  the  technical  phrase  for  the  thing's  essence. 185 
est.  Furthermore,  how  do  we  know  that  the  proper  attribute  is  not  presupposed?  Finally,  one 
major  criticism  tells  against  the  whole  process  of  using  proper  attributes  to  investigate 
specific  differences,  not  just  this  attempted  resolution.  Prior  to  the  demonstration  we  do  not 
actually  know  if  the  proper  attribute  exists;  we  only  know  what  its  name  signifies.  Since  this 
is  the  case,  how  can  we  use  a  proper  attribute  which  we  don't  know  exists,  to  identify  a 
difference  that  we  know  exists,  and  which  will  be  used  in  an  essential  definition,  as  for 
example,  `two-legged'  in  `man  is  a  two-legged  walking  animal'?  Given  these  difficulties 
this  attempted  resolution  must  be  ruled  out.  The  value  of  what  the  above  extract  states  lies  in 
the  connection  which  it  draws  between  essential  definitions  and  causal  explanations,  not  in 
solving  the  apparent  circularity  of  Aquinas'  position. 
Unsurprisingly,  Aquinas  is  aware  of  the  circularity  problem.  He  alludes  to  it  in  In  P.  A.  II 
13: 
But  because  the  essential  forms  are  not  known  to  us  per  se,  they  must  be  disclosed 
through  certain  accidents  which  are  signs  of  that  form,  as  is  stated  in  Metaphysics 
VIII.  However,  one  should  not  take  the  proper  accidents  of  that  species,  because, 
they  are  the  ones  that  will  be  demonstrated  by  the  definition  of  the  species;  rather  the 
form  of  the  species  must  be  made  known  by  certain  accidents  that  are  more  common. 
Hence  according  to  this,  the  differences  which  are  used  are  indeed  called  substantial, 
inasmuch  as  they  are  adduced  in  order  to  declare  the  essential  form;  but  they  are  more 
common  than  the  species,  inasmuch  as  they  are  taken  from  signs  which  follow  upon 
higher  genera.  123 
The  key  to  avoiding  the  charge  of  circularity  lies  in  the  phrase,  `the  form  of  the  species  must 
be  made  known  by  certain  accidents  that  are  more  common'.  A  similar  phrase  is  found  in  the 
extract  from  In  P.  A.  11  14:  where  he  says  that  we  can  use  proper  attributes,  but  begin  with 
`certain  common  items.  ' 
An  understanding  of  this  phrase  and  the  method  which  Aquinas  has  in  mind  is  best  obtained 
by  considering  the  example  which  he  uses  in  lectio  13.  This  lectio  is  devoted  to  illustrating 
the  characteristics  which  should  be  present  in  the  items  which  are  used  in  definitions.  As  part 
of  this  illustration  he  outlines  how  one  would  obtain  the  quod  quid  est  of  the  number  three. 
It  should  be  noted  that  Aquinas  sees  numbers  such  as  one,  two,  three  and  so  on,  as  distinct 
species  of  the  genus  of  number.  Thus,  two  is  a  different  species  from  three.  To  obtain  the 
quod  quid  est  of  three,  as  one  would  obtain  any  quod  quid  est,  we  begin  by  dividing  the 
genus  and  taking  accidents  that  are  applicable  to  the  subject  and  other  species  of  the  same 
genus.  We  obtain  the  quod  quid  est  of  a  species  by  using  attributes  common  to  different 
123  In  P.  A.  II  13  Sed  quia  formae  essentiales  non  sunt  nobis  per  se  notae  oportet  quod 
manifestentur  per  aliqua  accidentia,  quae  sunt  signa  illius  formae,  ut  patet  in  Meta  VII.  Non  autem 
oportet  accipere  accidentia  propria  illius  speciei,  quia  talia  oportet  per  definitionem  species 
demonstrari;  sed  oprotet  notificari  formam  species  per  aliqua  accidentia  communiora:  et  secundum 
hoc  differentiae  assumptae  dicuntur  quidem  substantiales,  in  quantum  inducuntir  ad  declarandum 
formam  essentialem,  sunt  autem  communiores  specie,  In  quantum  assumuntur  ex  aliquibus  signis, 
quae  consequuntur  superiora  genera. 186 
species  of  the  same  genus.  In  this  case  we  take  items  which  are  applicable  to  three  and  to 
other  numbers.  He  outlines  what  is  involved: 
He  [Aristotle]  says  therefore  first  that  in  order  to  manifest  the  quod  quid  est,  we 
must  take  items  which  are  both  always  and  applicable  to  more  (but  not  outside  the 
genus),  until  the  term  is  reached.  And  they  should  be  so  selected  that  each  item  when 
first  taken  should  be  applicable  to  more,  but  when  all  are  taken  together  the 
combination  does  not  apply  to  more,  but  is  converted  with  the  thing  whose  quod 
quid  est  is  sought.  For  the  quod  quid  est  of  a  thing  must  signify  its  essence.  124 
In  the  case  of  three  the  items  taken  are:  number  (the  genus),  odd  and  both  senses  of  prime. 
One  sense  of  prime  means  a  number  which  is  divisible  by  no  other  number  except  one;  the 
other  sense  means  numbers  which  are  not  composed  of  other  numbers.  125  Aquinas  says  that 
these  items  can  be  predicated  of  every  three  but  they  can  also  be  predicated  of  other  numbers; 
five  is  odd  for  example,  seven  is  prime  in  the  first  sense  of  the  word  and  so  on.  When  taken 
together  however;  these  items  signify  the  quod  quid  est  of  three  because  they  describe  what 
sets  three  apart  from  other  numbers.  Three  is  a  number  which  is  odd  and  prime  in  both 
senses.  Two,  in  contrast,  is  a  number  which  is  even  and  prime  in  both  senses.  This  is  how 
the  form  of  the  species  is  made  known  by  accidents  that  are  more  common.  We  don't 
actually,  as  he  suggested  in  In  P.  A.  II  14  investigate  the  differences  by  examining  the 
proper  attributes  of  the  subject.  Rather  since  the  essential  form  is  not  known  to  us  per  se, 
we  use  accidents  common  to  several  species  within  the  genus,  `signs  which  follow  upon 
higher  genera'  to  reach  a  definition  of  the  essence  of  the  subject. 
This  procedure  underpins  both  means  of  obtaining  the  quod  quid  est.  It  is  clearly  apparent  in 
the  second  rule  of  investigating  the  quod  quid  est  by  dividing  the  genus.  There  the  scientist 
begins  by  considering  what  is  most  common  and  prior;  in  the  example  used,  animal,  then 
what  is  most  common  and  prior  of  the  other  accidents  must  be  listed,  in  this  case,  two 
legged,  then  what  is  first  in  respect  of  the  other  items  is  taken,  walking  and  so  on.  This  use 
of  common  accidents  and  the  manner  in  which  they  are  arranged  in  the  phrase  which 
indicates  the  quod  quid  est  avoids  any  danger  of  circularity.  It  is  possible  to  acquire  the  quod 
quid  est  without  recourse  to  an  investigation  of  proper  attributes.  This  quod  quid  est  is 
predicated  universally  and  necessarily  of  the  species:  so,  for  example,  all  humans  are  rational 
animals.  This  is  where  induction  is  important  in  the  formation  of  principles.  Some,  like 
124  In  P.  A.  II  13  Dicit  ergo  primo  quod  ad  manifestandum  quod  quid  est  accipienda  sunt  talia,  quae 
quidem  sunt  semper  et  in  plus,  non  tarnen  extra  genus,  usque  ad  talem  terminum,  ut  primo  quidem 
unumquodque  quod  accipitur  sit  in  plus,  omnia  autem  non  sint  in  plus,  sod  convertantur  cum  re, 
cuius  quaeritur  quod  quid  est.  Huius  enim  rationem  necesse  est  significare  quod  quid  est  rei. 
125  This  second  sense  of  prime  requires  clarification.  Aquinas  describes  it  as  follows: 
"In  another  way  a  number  is  called  prime  because  it  Is  not  composed  of  other  numbers,  as  opposed 
to  seven,  which  is  prime  in  the  first  way,  because  it  is  not  divided  by  any  other  number  except  one, 
but  is  not  prime  In  the  second  way,  for  it  is  composed  of  three  and  four.  Three,  however,  Is  not 
composed  of  several  numbers,  but  only  of  the  number  two,  and  one.  " 
In  P.  A.  II  13.  Alio  modo  dicitur  aliquis  numerus  primus,  quia  non  componitur  ex  pluribus  numeris; 
sicut  patet  per  oppositum  de  septenario,  qui  primo  modo  est  primus,  non  enim  mensuratur  nisi 
unitate;  non  autem  est  primus  secundo  modo,  componitur  enim  ex  ternario  et  quaternario:  sed 
ternarius  non  componitur  ex  pluribus  numeris,  sed  ex  sola  dualitate  et  unitate. 187 
Stump,  may  see  this  as  undermining  the  certainty  of  the  principles.  What  if,  as  Goodman's 
riddle  suggests,  the  future  may  not  be  like  the  past?  What  if  we  come  across  a  man  who  is 
not  rational?  Doesn't  this  undermine  the  necessity  of  our  proper  principles  and  the  necessity 
and  certainty  of  scientia  which  follow  from  it?  The  structure  and  very  purpose  of  the 
principles  as  essential  definitions  rules  this  possibility  out.  It  is  impossible  to  come  across  a 
man  who  is  not  rational,  in  the  same  way  that  it  is  impossible  to  discover  a  triangle  which  is 
not  three  sided.  If  it  is  not  three  sided  it  cannot  be  a  triangle,  if  it  is  not  rational  it  is  not 
human,  or  to  paraphrase  Putnam,  if  it  is  not  H2O,  it  is  not  water.  126  In  short,  with  respect 
to  indemonstrable  principles  like  `man  is  a  rational  animal'  there  is  no  problem  of  induction. 
It  is  on  the  basis  of  universal  and  necessary  principles  that  scientific  demonstration  takes 
place.  This  analysis  has  sought  to  emphasise  the  perceptual  basis  of  these  principles.  We 
will  draw  conclusions  from  our  analysis  of  principles  shortly.  Prior  to  that  we  need  to 
address  two  outstanding  issues  concerning  the  formation  of  principles. 
The  first  concerns  the  emphasis  we  have  placed  on  the  role  of  perceptual  knowledge  in  the 
formation  of  principles.  Several  times  in  the  earlier  part  of  this  chapter  we  stated  that  the 
principles  of  some  demonstrations  are  in  fact  the  conclusions  of  other  demonstrations.  We 
showed,  for  example,  how  the  conclusion  of  a  higher  science,  such  as  geometry,  can  be 
used  as  principles  in  a  lower  science,  such  as  optics.  As  part  of  this  discussion  we  also 
restated  Aquinas'  belief  that  no  science  demonstrates  its  own  principles,  such  principles  are 
demonstrated  by  a  higher  science.  How  does  our  account  of  the  formation  of  indemonstrable 
principles  square  with  this?  Are  all  principles  formed  in  the  way  we  suggest? 
Clearly,  some  principles  will  not  actually  be  formed  in  the  way  which  we  suggest.  Some 
principles  will  be  derived  from  other  principles  and  it  is  on  the  basis  of  this  derivation  that 
we  assent  to  them.  However,  the  assorted  derivations  notwithstanding,  there  will  be  input 
from  perception  at  some  point.  Recall,  that  even  the  most  basic  of  principles,  the  common 
principles,  require  an  input  from  perception  in  order  to  be  grasped.  Still  other  principles  will 
not  be  formed  in  the  way  we  suggest,  but  be  assented  to  on  the  authority  of  experts.  For 
example,  if  we  take  the  definition  of  a  square  as  a  proper  principle:  'a  square  is  a  plane  figure 
having  four  equal  sides  and  four  right  angles'.  Nobody  is  now  going  to  form  this  definition 
or  search  for  the  quod  quid  est  of  `square'  by  the  method  which  we  outlined  above.  We  do 
not  need  to  do  it.  It  has  already  been  done  for  us.  In  fact,  in  many  instances  of  scientia  we 
will  be  assenting  to,  rather  than  forming,  principles.  Nonetheless,  this  does  not  undermine 
the  importance  which  we  have  placed  on  perceptual  knowledge  in  the  formation  of 
principles.  As  science  develops,  new  principles  will  be  formed  either  by  the  methods 
126  Putnam  writes:  "  In  fact,  once  we  have  discovered  the  nature  of  water,  nothing  counts  as  a 
possible  world  in  which  water  doesn't  have  that  nature.  Once  we  have  discovered  that  water  (in  the 
actual  world)  is  H20,  nothing  counts  as  possible  world  in  which  water  isn'  t  H2O.  In  particular,  if  a 
'logically  possible'  statement  is  one  that  holds  in  some  logically  possible  world,  it  isn't  logically 
possible  that  water  isnt  H20.  "  [Author's  emphasis]  Putnaml  975,  page  233 188 
outlined  by  Aquinas  in  In  P.  A.  11  14  and  16  or,  in  some  instances,  by  means  of 
demonstrations.  For  the  natural  scientist  engaged  in  scientia,  the  methods  outlined  in  In  P. 
A.  11  14  and'  16  will  be  particularly  important,  as  it  is  always  possible  that  previously 
unknown  species  will  be  discovered.  In  these  instances  the  scientist  must  determine  the 
genus  to  which  the  species  belongs  and  what  constitutes  its  specific  difference  in  order  to 
acquire'its  quod  quid  est. 
The  second  issue  concerns  the  premise  of  the  syllogism  which  contains  the  quod  quid  est 
and  the  proper  attribute.  As  we  have  stated  frequently,  the  quod  quid  est  is  the  syllogism's 
middle  term.  At  the  beginning  of  the  second  book  of  In  P.  A.  Aquinas  reminds  us  why  we 
use  a  middle  term: 
......  the  middle  in  demonstrations  is  employed  in  order  to  make  known  something 
about  which  there  might  have  been  doubt  or  question.  127 
In  a  natural  science  we  are  seeking  to  show  that  a  proper  attribute  does  indeed  belong  per  se 
to  a  given  subject  and  in  showing  this  offer  a  causal  explanation  of  the  proper  attribute;  just 
as  modern  science,  knowing  that  acids  are  proton  donors,  seeks  to  explain  why  acids  behave 
as  they  do.  Thus,  the  middle  term  has  an  important  explanatory  role;  it  gives  the  reason  why 
the  subject  has  this  proper  attribute.  In  the  minor  premise  the  middle  term,  the  quod  quid  est 
is  predicated  of  the  subject.  In  the  major  premise  the  proper  attribute  is  predicated  of  the 
quod  quid  est.  Herein  lies  the  importance  of  the  quod  quid  est  as  the  middle  term  through 
which  the  proper  attribute  is  able  to  be  predicated  of  the  subject  in  the  conclusion.  128  The 
conclusion  makes  explicit  the  connection  between  the  subject  and  predicate  implicitly 
contained  in  the  premises.  The  conclusion  states  that  the  subject  does  indeed  have  this 
property.  The  demonstration  shows  why  the  subject  has  this  property,  i.  e.  that  as  a  thing 
with  such  and  such  an  essence,  such  a  quod  quid  est,  it  will  have  this  proper  attribute. 
So  far  in  this  discussion  we  have  shown  how  the  quod  quid  est  is  predicated  of  the  subject 
of  demonstration,  but,  we  have  said  nothing  about  how  the  major  premise  is  formed.  We 
must  now  consider  how  the  connection  is  made  between  the  proper  attribute  and  the  quod 
quid  est  which  allows  the  former  to  be  predicated  of  the  latter.  This  is  a  complex  matter,  not 
helped  by  the  fact  that  Aquinas  says  very  little  directly  about  the  formation  of  the  major 
premise.  He  spends  most  of  the  second  book  of  In  P.  A.  discussing  how  the  quod  quid  est 
is  obtained.  Then  devotes  attention  to  a  discussion  of  the  investigation  of  propter  quid  in 
special  circumstances  and  the  relationship  between  a  cause  and  an  effect,  rather  than 
systematically  dealing  with  the  formation  of  the  major  premise.  129  What  little  material  there 
is  on  the  formation  of  the  major  premise  must  be  extricated  from  these  discussions  on 
127  In  P.  A.  II  1  Quia  vero  medium  in  demonstrationibus  assumitur  ad  aliquid  innotescendum  do 
quo  poterat  esse  dubitatio  vel  quaestio. 
128  Schematically:  all  M  are  P,  all  S  are  M,  therefore,  all  S  are  P.  Where  M  Is  the  middle  term,  S  Is  the 
subject  and  P  is  the  predicate.  Recall  that  for  our  puposes  we  are  only  intersted  In  the  syllogism 
known  as  Barbara 
129  In  P.  A.  II  17-19. 189 
propter  quid  and  the  relationship  between  a  cause  and  effect.  Given  Aquinas'  own  reticence 
on  the  topic,  we  intend  to  offer  no  more  than  a  sketch  of  what  the  formation  of  the  major 
premise  may  be  like. 
Firstly,  it  ought  not  to  be  surprising  that  material  on  the  formation  of  the  major  premise  is 
bound  up  with  discussions  on  propter  quid  and  the  relationship  between  a  cause  and  an 
effect.  After  all,  in  formulating  the  major  premise  we  are  seeking  to  explicate  a  connection 
between  an  effect,  a  proper  attribute,  and  its  cause,  the  quod  quid  est.  A  premise,  which  in 
the  context  of  demonstration,  allows  us  to  state  the  reason  why,  propter  quid,  a  subject  has 
this  proper  attribute.  How  then  might  the  scientist  go  about  forming  the  major  premise, 
making  the  connection  between  the  quod  quid  est  and  the  proper  attribute? 
The  first  thing  which  we  must  note  is  that  the  question  propter  quid,  the  question  why  is  this 
the  case?,  is  closely  connected  to  the  question  quid  est,  the  question  what  is  it? 
For-if  one  asks  what  is  a  chord,  the  answer  is  given  that  it  is  a  numerical  ratio 
according  to  high  and  low  notes.  Again,  if  one  asks  why  a  high  note  and  a  low  note 
are  concordant,  the  answer  is  given  that  it  is  because  the  high  note  and  the  low  note 
have  a  numerical  ratio.  And  so  the  question  what  is  it  and  the  question  why  reduce  to 
the  same  thing  subjectively,  although  they  differ  in  formality.  130 
Thus,  in  possessing  the  middle  term,  the  quod  quid  est,  we  possess  the  answer  to  propter 
quid.  In  possessing  the  quod  quid  est  we  possess  the  information  necessary  for  offering  an 
explanation  of  why  this  thing  has  this  proper  attribute  because  we  possess  the  reason  why  a 
given  property  may  be  a  proper  attribute.  It  is  the  scientist's  task  to  show  the  connection 
between  the  thing's  essence  and  the  property  in  question.  The  scientist  cannot  simply  do  this 
by  making,  what  we  might  term,  a  conceptual  connection,  that,  for  example,  humans' 
rationality  gives  them  the  proper  attribute  of  risibility.  The  scientist  must  reach  this 
conclusion  by  using  perceptual  methods  similar  to,  and  for  the  same  reasons  as,  those  used 
in  the  formation  of  the  quod  quid  est.  Aquinas  outlines  several  methods  which  we  will  take 
as  sketches  of  the  scientist's  methodology  in  connecting  the  quod  quid  est  and  the  proper 
attribute. 
One  method  is  outlined  in  In  P.  A.  11  17.  He  says: 
in  order  to  get  the  propter  quid  in  regard  to  individual  problems  that  are  proposed,  it 
is  required  to  consider  divisions  and  subdivisions,  and  so  to  proceed  to  the 
individual  cases  by  disputing,  having  first  supposed  a  common  genus.  For  example, 
if  someone  wished  to  consider  why  something  belongs  to  certain  types  of  animals, 
he  would  have  to  discover  what  items  belong  to  every  animal.  Once  these  have  been 
discovered,  he  would  once  more  consult  the  divisions  to  determine  what  things 
130  In  P.  A.  111  Si  enim  quaeratur  quid  est  consonantis:  respondetur  quod  est  ratio,  idest  proportio 
numerorum  secundum  acutum  et  grave.  Et  rursum  si  quaeretur  propter  quid  acutum  consonat 
gravi;  respondetur  propter  quid  id  quod  habent  numeralem  proportionem  acutum  et  grave.  Sic 
ergo  quaestio  quid  est  et  quaestio  propter  quid  redeunt  in  idem  sublecto,  quamvis  differant 
ratione. 190 
follow  first  upon  that  common  item  which  is  contained  under  animal;  for  example, 
what  things  follow  upon  every  bird.  Then  one  would  continue  in  this  manner, 
always  taking  the  first  item  into  which  a  given  division  is  immediately  divided.  This 
is  the  very  thing  that  was  observed  above  in  the  divisions  by  which  one  proceeds  to 
investigate  quod  quid  est.  131 
Aquinas  then  goes  on  to  give  an  example  in  terms  of  offering  an  explanation  of  why 
creatures  like  humans  and  cattle  sleep.  In  this  explanation  the  middle  term  used  is  `animal'. 
Thus  the  reason  humans  sleep,  the  reason  that  they  have  this  proper  attribute  is  because  they 
are  animals.  This  connection  is  only  made  after  empirical  investigation  of  what  belongs  to 
animals.  In  this  case  the  explanation  of  the  proper  attribute  is  given  in  terms  of  the  genus,  the 
common  element,  which  these  different  animals  have  in  common.  This  may  appear  to 
undermine  our  assertion  that  the  quod  quid  est  is  the  explanation.  It  must  be  recalled 
however,  that  the  genus  constitutes  an  important  element  of  the  quod  quid  est. 
In  other  demonstrations  it  will  be  the  genus  and  specific  differences,  the  quod  quid  est, 
which  will  be  used  as  the  explanation: 
On  the  other  hand,  some  middles  are  the  same  not  absolutely  but  in  genus,  and  these 
are  diversified  by  certain  differences  which  are  based  either  on  the  diversity  of 
subjects  or  on  the  diversity  of  their  ways  of  coming  to  be.  For  example,  if  it  is  asked 
why  an  echo  comes  to  be,  or  why  something  appears,  namely,  in  a  mirror,  or  why  a 
rainbow  is  formed.  For  they  are  the  same  problem  as  to  the  middle  propter  quid, 
which  is  generically  the  same,  since  all  are  caused  by  a  reverberation.  However,  the 
reverberations  differ  specifically.  For  an  echo  comes  to  be  through  the  reverberation 
of  air  set  in  motion  by  a  sounding  body  toward  a  concave  body;  an  image  in  a  mirror 
comes  to  be  by  the  fact  that  the  modification  of  the  medium  is  rebounded  at  the 
mirror;  but  the  rainbow  is formed  by  the  rays of  the  sun  being  reflected  back  by 
moist  vapours.  132 
The  example  used  is  a  little  odd,  echoes  and  reflections  being  caused  by  specifically  different 
reverberations.  Aquinas'  discussion  of  this  method  which  employs  the  quod  quid  est  may 
131  In  P.  A.  II  17  Dicit  ergo  primo  quod  ad  hoc  quod  habeamus  propter  quid  circa  singula 
problemata  quae  ponuntur,  oportet  considerare  divisiones  et  subdivisionos,  et  sic  ad  singula 
procedere  disputando,  supposito  communi  genere.  Ut  si  aliquis  velit  considerare  propter  quid 
aliquid  conveniat  aliquibus  animalibus,  oportet  accipere  quaiia  sunt  quae  conveniunt  omni  animals. 
Quibus  acceptis,  oportet  iterato  accipere  secundum  divislonem  quaiia  sunt  quae  consequuntur  ad 
omnem  avem:  et  sic  semper  debemus  procedere  accipiendo  illud  quod  est  primum,  in  quod  scilicet 
fit  immediate  divisio:  quod  etiam  supra  observabatur  in  divisionibus  quibus  proceditur  ad 
investigandum  quod  quid  est. 
132  In  P.  A.  11  17  Sunt  autem  quaedam  media  eadem  non  simpliciter,  sod  genera,  quae 
quisbusdam  differentiis  diversificantur,  quae  sumuntur  vei  ex  diversitate  subiectorum,  vel  ex 
diversitate  modi  fiendi.  Sicut  si  quaeratur  propter  quid  fit  echo,  aut  propter  quid  apparet,  scilicet 
aliquid  in  specuio,  vel  propter  quid  generatur  iris.  Omnia  ad  medium  propter  quid,  quod  est  idem 
genere:  omnia  enim  causantur  ex  repercussione.  Sed  repercussiones  differunt  specie.  Nam  echo 
fit  sonante  ad  aiiquod  corpus  concavum;  apparitio  autem  rei  in  speculo  fit  propter  hoc  quod 
immutatio  medii  repercutitur  ad  speculum;  iris  autem  fit  propter  hoc  quod  radii  solares 
repercutiuntur  ad  vapores  humidos. 191 
become  a  little  clearer  if  we  consider  the  parallel  case  of  the  proper  attributes  of  different 
animals  being  caused  by  different  species  which  are,  nonetheless,  animals.  Just  as  the  cause 
of  an  echo  is  the  reverberation  of  air  set  in  motion  by  a  sounding  body  toward  a  concave 
body  and  a  reflection  in  a  mirror  is  caused  by  the  fact  that  the  modification  of  the  medium  is 
rebounded  at  the  mirror,  so  the  cause  of  risibility  is  rationality  and  the  cause  of  neighing, 
equinity. 
The  connection  made  by  this  method  and  the  preceding  method  may  appear  to  state  a  very 
shallow  explanation:  rationality  is  the  cause  of  risibility,  equinity  is  the  cause  of  neighing, 
animality  is  the  cause  of  sleep.  Saying  that  equinity  causes  neighing  doesn't  appear  to  tell  us 
very  much:  horses  neigh  because  they  are  equine.  It  has  echoes  of  the  empiricist's  cliched 
ridicule  of  Moliere's  "opium  puts  people  to  sleep  because  it  has  a  dormitive  power.  " 
Christopher  Martin,  however,  has  challenged  that  cliched  understanding: 
I  have  claimed  that  the  answer  `opium  puts  people  to  sleep  because  it  has  a  dormitive 
power'  is  perfectly  true,  and,  indeed,  if  the  account  of  science  I  have  just  offered  is 
in  any  way  accurate,  it  is  in  some  sense  a  model  answer.  But  `model'  answer  is 
exactly  right;  or  perhaps  I  should  call  it  a  blueprint  for  an  answer,  or  the  framework 
for  an  answer.  It  is  after  all  wholly  uninformative.  133 
Martin  argues  that  just  because  explanations  like  Moliere's  and  `horses  neigh  because  they 
are  equine'  are  uninformative  this  does  not  make  them  bad  explanations  because  they  prepare 
the  ground  for  informative  answers.  He  goes  on: 
Against  the  beliefs  of  any  empiricists,  or  any  believers  in  magic,  it  tells  us  that  opium 
has  a  dormitive  power  and  thus  prepares  us  for  an  investigation  into  what  that  power 
consists  in.  Kenny  would  say  it  prepares  us  for  an  investigation  of  the  vehicle  of  that 
power.  134 
Similarly,  despite  the  apparent  vacuity  of  `horses  neigh  because  they  are  equine'  the  scientist 
engaged  in  scientia  can  argue  that  in  connecting  equinity  and  neighing  he  is  offering  a  much 
deeper  explanation  than  the  above  vacuous  statement  appears  to  offer.  He  can  argue  that 
knowing  what  equinity  is,  involves  knowing  that  it  entails  certain  physiological 
consequences:  physiological  consequences  which  are  the  vehicle  for  the  equine  power  we 
call  neighing.  It  is  here  that  the  connection  between  equinity  and  neighing  offers  the  fullest 
explanation. 
Another  method  of  acquiring  an  explanation  is  to  take  something  common  which  different 
genera  have  and  use  the  term  analogously  to  show  why  these  different  genera  have  the 
properties  which  they  have.  The  example  he  uses  is  the  vertebrae  with  respect  to  squid,  fish 
and  land  animals.  Other  examples  which  he  uses  are  why  leaves  fall  off  vines  and  what 
proper  attributes  we  can  expect  horned  animals  to  have. 
133  Martin  1997,  page  190. 
134  ibid  page  191.  The  Kenny  reference  is  to  The  Metaphysics  of  Mind  (1991  edition)  pages  71- 
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We  have  offered  no  more  than  a  sketch  of  a  solution  to  the  question  we  posed  earlier  about 
how  the  scientist  may  form  the  major  premise,  making  the  connection  between  the  quod  quid 
est  and  the  proper  attribute.  The  various  methods  outlined  above  give  a  hint  as  to  how  the 
relationship  between  a  proper  attribute  and  its  cause  will  be  identified.  In  some  cases  the 
cause  will  be  put  down  to  specific  difference  of  the  species  and  not  simply  the  genus,  the 
risibility  of  humanity  being  an  example  of  the  former  and  sleep  being  an  example  of  the 
latter.  Like  other  elements  in  the  formation  of  the  terms  and  principles  used  in 
demonstrations,  the  methods  outlined  above  are  fundamentally  perceptual  as  the  various 
divisions  are  made  and  the  connection  grasped.  Perceptual  research,  as  the  above  methods 
show,  is  an  important  element  in  the  process  of  making  the  connection  that  such  and  such  a 
property  follows  from  a  given  essential  nature.  Once  the  connection  is  made  a  demonstration 
can  be  formed,  for  example,  in  the  case  of  sleep: 
All  animals  are  capable  of  sleeping 
All  humans  are  animals 
Therefore,  all  humans  are  capable  of  sleeping. 
With  this  demonstration  we  have  scientia  with  respect  to  why  humans  sleep.  It  is  a 
demonstration  which  logically  describes  what  has  been  discovered,  a  demonstration  which 
shows  why  the  proper  attribute  belongs  to  the  subject. 
Some  people  may  balk  at  the  above  demonstration  being  called  scientia,  since  it  doesn't 
appear  especially  scientific.  Others  will  say  that  they  always  knew  that  humans  slept  so  why 
do  we  need  to  demonstrate  it?  The  first  thing  that  must  be  said  is  that  we  should  not  let  the 
banality  of  the  above  example  blind  us  to  the  theory  that  it  illustrates.  Yes,  everyone  knows 
that  humans  sleep,  but  the  demonstration  seeks  to  show  why  they  sleep.  Some  may  rejoin 
that  this  seems  to  contradict  what  was  said  earlier  when  we  stated  that  prior  to  the 
demonstration  we  only  know  what  the  name  of  the  proper  attribute  signifies  not  that  it 
actually  exists.  This  is  problematic.  Aquinas  is  aware  that  some  conclusions  are  better 
known  than  their  principles.  He  admits  that  those  conclusions  based  on  sense  perception, 
such  as  humans  sleep,  are  most  evident  and  in  fact  better  known  than  their  principles.  135 
Nevertheless,  within  the  reasoning  process  this  does  not  undermine  the  priority  of  the 
principles.  Perhaps  the  only  way  to  avoid  the  contradiction  is  to  admit  the  banality  of  the 
above  example,  no  one  is  seriously  going  to  offer  a  demonstration  of  why  humans  sleep, 
and  say  that  in  the  case  of  real  scientific  enquiry  there  will  be  uncertainty  surrounding  the 
status  of  the  supposed  proper  attribute.  That  is,  we  may  be  able  to  cite  evidence  for  it,  but 
that  is  not  the  same  as  saying  that  such  a  proper  attribute  actually  exists. 
c.  Concluding  remarks 
We  conclude  our  analysis  of  scientia  by  examining  the  consequences  of  our  analysis  for  the 
certainty  of  scientia.  After  all: 
135  InP.  A  1  6. 193 
.....  science  is  the  sure  and  certain  knowledge  of  a  thing,....  136 
We  have  already  acknowledged  that  Stump  has  problems  with  the  whole  issue  of  the 
certainty  of  scientia  . 
137  She  says  that  given  that  Aquinas  talks  of  arithmetic  being  more 
certa  ,  certain,  than  geometry  we  should  not  translate'certitudo'  as  'certainty'.  We  have 
already  shown  Aquinas'  grounds  for  such  a  comparison  and  do  not  intend  to  go  over  them 
here.  Nor  will  we  take  up  the  gauntlet  that  Stump's  unsolved  difficulties  with  certitudo 
leaves  for  any  commentator  who  analyses  scientia.  Rather  we  simply  intend  to  examine  what 
kind  of  certainty  is  the  certainty  of  scientia.  What  we  mean  by  this  will  be  apparent  shortly. 
The  first  thing  to  state  is  that  the  perceptual  formation  of  principles  does  not  detract  from  the 
certainty  of  scientia.  This  is  because  despite  the  manner  of  their  formation  the  principles  are 
still  necessary  and  universal.  The  certainty  of  scientia  of  which  Aquinas  speaks  attaches  both 
to  the  knower  and  the  object  known.  In  the  case  of  the  knower,  an  individual  who  has 
scientia  has  certain  knowledge.  In  other  words,  there  is  no  room  for  doubt,  nor  is  there  any 
possibility  that  the  individual  may  be  mistaken.  It  is  the  kind  of  certainty  which  is  indicative 
of  our  knowledge  that  Socrates  is  sitting  when  we  are  standing  close  beside  him.  This  sense 
of  certainty  is  an  epistemic  sense. 
This  epistemic  certainty  of  the  knower  depends  on  the  certainty  which  attaches  to  the  object 
known.  Aquinas  refers  to  this  kind  of  certainty  when  he  refers  to  Aristotle's  statement  that: 
That  of  which  there  is  unqualified  scientific  knowledge  must  be  something 
necessary.  138 
This  kind  of  certainty  can  be  twofold.  It  can  be  logical,  or  it  can  be  metaphysical.  Logical 
certainty  pertains  to  necessary  truths  such  as  2+2=4.  For  the  mathematically  competent  this 
logical  certainty  can  lead  to  epistemic  certainty.  While  2+2=4  may  well  be  logically  certain, 
for  the  innumerate  it  is  hardly  a  matter  of  epistemic  certainty.  Logical  certainty  also  arises 
from  the  process  of  demonstration  in  so  far  as  conclusions  follow  from  premises. 
Metaphysical  certainty  is  harder  to  pin  down.  We  could  cite  the  necessary  existence  of  God 
as  an  example.  However,  it  is  questionable  if  that  particular  metaphysical  certainty  can  give 
rise  to  epistemic  certainty.  Another  candidate  would  be  the  essential  properties  of  objects. 
For  example,  it  is  metaphysically  necessary  that  if  a  subject  is  a  human  then,  it  is  necessarily 
a  creature  with  flesh,  bones  and  other  essential  properties. 
Knowledge  of  such  metaphysical  necessities  or  certainties  could  be  seen  as  a  ground  of 
epistemic  certainty  which  together  with  the  obvious  logical  certainty  of  the  principles  and 
demonstration  ground  the  epistemic  certainty  of  the  knower.  The  certainty  of  scientia  is 
therefore  twofold,  mirroring  the  distinction  which  is  made  between  scientia  as  a 
propositional  attitude  and  scientia  as  an  organised  body  of  knowledge.  On  the  one  hand  the 
certainty  of  scientia  refers  to  the  certainty  of  the  organised  body  of  knowledge.  An  organised 
body  which  expresses  logical  and  metaphysical  necessities.  The  certainty  of  scientia  also 
136  In  P.  A.  I  4.  cf  footnote  6. 
137  Stump  1992,  page  142. 
138  In  P.  A.  14  Scilicet  quod  id  de  quo  simpliciter  habetur  scientia,  oportet  esse  necessarium. 194 
refers  to  the  knower's  propositional  attitude:  what  is  known  is  known  with  certainty.  The 
knower  knows  with  certainty  because  he  has  followed  the  rules,  he  has  done  what  a  scientist 
ought  to  do.  In  our  analysis  of  perceptual  knowledge  we  claimed  that  the  normative  element 
of  this  epistemology  is implicit  in  the  descriptive.  In  the  case  of  scientia  normativity  is  much 
more  explicitly  deontological.  There  are  certain  things  that  the  scientist  must  do  in  order  to 
possess  scientia.  He  must  demonstrate  properly,  he  must  begin  from  proper  principles  and 
so  on.  While  we  have  only  alluded  to  it,  the  emphasis  on  fulfilling  these  epistemic  duties  is 
an  important  characteristic  of  scientia. 
Our  analysis  of  scientia  has  been  far  from  extensive.  We  have  merely  sought  to  show  the 
relationship  between  perceptual  knowledge  and  scientia  and,  in  this  way,  address  the  various 
issues  raised  by  Stump  and  MacDonald.  Important  elements  of  scientia  have  been  left 
unanalysed  or  at  best  merely  hinted  at.  We  have  said  nothing  about  the  importance  of  the 
form  of  the  syllogism  in  the  process  of  demonstration,  very  little  about  demonstration  quia, 
the  four  causes  and  the  four  questions  which  can  be  asked  of  every  thing.  139  Nevertheless, 
we  have  fulfilled  the  task  which  we  set  ourselves.  In  examining  how  the  principles  of 
scientia  are  formed  we  have  shown  the  close  relationship  between  perceptual  knowledge  and 
scientia.  Scientia  relies  on  perceptual  knowledge  to  provide  its  most  basic  elements.  This 
relationship  explains  the  vignette  which  we  cited  at  the  start  of  this  chapter.  In  the  sed  contra 
of  ST  la  q84  al  Aquinas  says  that  if  we  do  not  have  knowledge  of  material  things  we 
cannot  have  scientia.  Now  we  know  how  important  the  relationship  between  perceptual 
knowledge  and  scientia  is.  It  is  a  relationship  which  is  two  way,  perceptual  knowledge 
provides  the  material  for  the  formation  of  principles  and  by  the  demonstrations  of  scientia  we 
obtain  deeper,  causal  knowledge  of  the  things  we  sense.  Aquinas  is  clearly  referring  to  this 
in  ST  la  q84  a8c  when  he  says  that  the  philosopher  seeks  to  offer  an  explanation  of  the 
things  we  sense.  This  contradicts  MacDonald's  assertion  that  there  is  no  scientia  of  natural 
kinds.  We  have  spent  most  of  this  analysis  discussing  the  very  issue  of  natural  science. 
In  chapter  two  we  saw  that  MacDonald  attempted  to  account  for  perceptual  knowledge  in 
terms  of  a  watered  down  version  of  scientia.  In  the  previous  chapter  we  gave  an  account  of 
perceptual  knowledge  which  shows  that  there  is  no  need  to  describe  it  in  terms  of  scientia.  In 
this  chapter  we  have  shown  that  what  MacDonald  took  to  be  the  paradigm  and  cornerstone 
of  Aquinas'  epistemic  theory  is  actually  heavily  dependent  on  the  humdrum  knowledge  that 
constitutes  our  dealings  with  the  world.  Scientia  is  neither  the  cornerstone  nor  the  paradigm. 
However,  that  is  not  intended  to  disparage  it:  it  is,  after  all,  an  intellectual  virtue.  In  his 
analysis  MacDonald  emphasised  the  foundationalist  structure  of  scientia.  MacDonald  is 
correct  to  identify  it.  A  brief  glance  at  the  first  five  lectiones  of  book  one  of  in  P.  A.  ought  to 
convince  anyone  who  doubts  the  foundationalism  of  scientia.  We  did  not  address  directly  the 
issue  of  scientia's  foundationalism,  but  it  has  been  an  underlying  theme  in  this  analysis. 
Despite  the  manner  in  which  the  principles  of  scientia  are  formed,  we  have  shown  that  the 
principles  are  necessary,  universal  and  logically  indemonstrable.  They  constitute  the 
139  Quia  est?  Propter  Quid?  Quid  est?  and  An  est? 195 
epistemic  foundations  from  which  mediate  principles  are  inferred.  The  foundationalist 
structure  is  more  clearly  apparent  in  the  mathematical  sciences  than  in  the  natural  science  on 
which  we  chose  to  base  our  analysis. 
Our  analysis  also  finds  grounds  for  agreement  with  Stump's  assessment  of  scientia.  Scientia 
is  indeed  about  finding  causal  explanations.  Our  analysis  goes  further  in  detailing  what  is 
causally  explained  and  the  way  in  which  it  is  causally  explained.  The  analysis  disagrees  with 
Stump's  assessment  of  the  indemonstrability  of  principles.  It  will  be  recalled  that  she  saw 
the  induction  involved  in  the  formation  of  the  principles  as  undermining  their 
indemonstrability.  We  do  not  accept  this. 
Our  analysis  has  clarified  Stump's  criticism  that  foundationalist  readings  of  scientia 
mistakenly  see  scientia  as  a  process  of  discovery  which  reasons  from  first  principles  to  other 
propositions,  rather  than  a  process  of  judgment  to  first  principles  which  offer  a  causal 
explanation  for  what  we  already  know.  The  perceptual/empirical  element  of  scientia  which 
we  have  emphasised  is  indicative  of  the  process  of  judgment,  of  searching  for  the  most 
fundamental  causal  explanation.  However,  in  order  to  be  an  instance  of  scientia  this 
empirical  research  must  be  expressed  systematically  in  a  demonstrative  syllogism  which 
follows  the  laws  of  logic.  A  syllogism  which  will  reason  from  principles  to  a  conclusion. 
Scientia,  in  its  different  stages  can  be  a  search  for  first  principles  and  a  reasoning  from  first 
principles.  Therefore,  while  Stump's  reliabilist,  externalist  reading  of  Aquinas'  account  of 
perceptual  knowledge  is  in  direct  opposition  to  MacDonald's  foundationalist,  internalist 
interpretation  of  the  same  topic,  their  causal  and  the  foundationalist  readings  of  scientia  are 
not  mutually  exclusive.  Both  are  legitimate  interpretations  which  emphasise  different  aspects 
of  scientia  . 
Unfortunately  Stump  and  MacDonald  place  greater  emphasis  on  one  element  of 
scientia  to  the  detriment  of  the  other  and  herein  lies  the  shortcoming  of  their  interpretations. 
This  interpretation  has  highlighted  the  reliance  of  scientia  on  perceptual  knowledge  for  the 
formation  of  its  principles.  It  is  the  universality  and  necessity  of  these  principles  which 
constitute  the  universality,  necessity  and,  with  other  elements  such  as  the  form  of  the 
syllogism,  the  certainty  of  scientia.  Earlier  we  drew  a  parallel  between  the  indemonstrable 
principles  of  Aquinas'  scientia  such  as  `man  is  a  rational  animal'  and  definitions  from  the 
world  of  contemporary  science  such  as  'an  acid  is  a  proton  donor'.  There  are,  of  course, 
differences  between  the  two  principles,  differences  which  show  the  difference  between 
scientia  and  contemporary  science.  The  latter  is  an  extremely  detailed  and  technical  piece  of 
knowledge.  Aquinas'  example  is  not.  Scientia  is  limited.  While  some  examples  of  scientia 
will  not  be  as  banal  as  the  risibility  or  sleep  examples,  scientia  is,  in  comparison  to 
contemporary  science,  limited  in  detail. 
Furthermore,  despite  the  emphasis  we  have  placed  on  perceptual  research  in  the  formation  of 
principles  some  of  the  principles  are  formed  on  the  basis  of  hypothetical  suppositions  that,  in 
the  light  of  modem  science,  are  just  wrong,  for  example,  the  principles  that  leaves  fall  off 196 
trees  because  they  are  broad  and  that  homed  animals  don't  have  an  upper  set  of  teeth  because 
the  dental  matter  is  turned  into  horns.  140  With  the  benefit  of  scientific  hindsight  principles 
like  these  clearly  undermine  scientia. 
However,  we  did  not  examine  the  principles  of  scientia  in  order  to  use  hindsight  to  dismiss 
it.  The  limitedness  of  scientia  is  not  really  our  concern.  We  have  attempted  to  analyse  what 
St.  Thomas  had  to  say  on  the  formation  of  principles  in  order  to  shed  fresh  light  on  the 
relationship  between  scientia  and  perceptual  knowledge.  This  we  have  done. 
140  In  P.  A.  I117;  18 197 
5.  Aquinas  on  Human 
Knowledge: 
A  Mediaeval  Naturalism 
Epistemology,  or  something  like  it,  simply  falls  into  place  as  a 
chapter  of  psychology  and  hence,  of  natural  science. 
W.  V.  0.  Quine:  `Epistemology  Naturalised'  1 
In  chapter  two  we  outlined  attempts  by  various  contemporary  authors  to  apply  the  categories 
of  contemporary  epistemology  to  the  epistemology  of  St.  Thomas.  There  we  saw  his 
epistemology  labelled  a  bewildering  variety  of  '-ists':  internalist,  externalist,  foundationalist 
and  reliabilist.  These  attempts  to  map  categories  from  the  contemporary  epistemology  onto 
his  epistemology  were  catalysts  for  this  work. 
In  the  opening  chapter  we  began  this  work  by  showing  that  Aquinas'  epistemology  is  much 
more  complex  and  broad  ranging  than  contemporary  epistemological  theories.  Consideration 
of  this  ought  to  have  warned  those  contemporary  authors  that  mapping  categories  from 
contemporary  epistemology  onto  Aquinas'  epistemology  is  not  a  simple  and  straightforward 
task.  Towards  the  end  of  our  outline  of  Aquinas'  epistemology  in  chapter  one  we  noticed  an 
apparent  lacuna  in  his  theory  of  human  epistemology.  We  noticed  that,  in  comparison  to 
divine  knowledge,  Aquinas  holds  that  human  knowledge  exists  in  a  fragmented  fashion. 
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Thus  in  discussing  divine  knowledge  in  ST  la  q14  al  ad2  he  shows  the  perfection  and 
simplicity  of  God's  knowledge  by  emphasising  the  divided  condition  of  human  knowledge, 
as  seen  from  the  fact  that  we  have  different  kinds  of  knowledge  diversified  by  different 
objects.  These  different  kinds  of  knowledge  are  the  intellectual  virtues:  understanding, 
scientia,  wisdom,  prudence  and  art.  Furthermore,  in  other  places,  such  as  ST  2a2ae  q2  al, 
he  outlines  intellectual  acts,  such  as  opinio  and  dubitatio  which  fall  short  of  a  firm  grasp  of 
the  truth  and  lack  the  firm  assent  which  characterises  knowledge.  In  all  of  these  occasions  no 
reference  is  ever  made  to  perceptual  knowledge,  for  example,  the  knowledge  based  on  the 
evidence  of  my  eyes  that  Socrates  is  sitting  beside  me.  When  he  does  discuss  our  knowledge 
of  material  reality,  as  in  ST  la  q84ff,  he  discusses  the  processes  which  cause  it  without 
really  saying  very  much  about  the  properties  of  this  kind  of  knowledge,  as  he  does,  for 
example,  in  the  case  of  scientia.  In  short,  there  seemed  to  be  a  lacuna  in  his  theory  of  human 
epistemology  concerning  perceptual  knowledge.  This  lacuna  may  well  have  been  the 
motivation  for  MacDonald  and  Ross,  in  their  accounts  of  his  epistemology,  to  offer 
interpretations  of  Aquinas'  theory  of  perceptual  knowledge  which  saw  it  as  kind  of  scientia 
or  instance  of  credere  respectively,  that  is,  as  a  watered  down  version  of  one  kind  of  human 
knowledge  or  intellectual  act. 
Given  this  apparent  lacuna  and  the  various  attempted  mappings  and  descriptions  of  Aquinas' 
epistemology  which  we  set  out  in  chapter  two,  in  chapter  three  we  offered  our  own  analysis 
of  his  account  of  perceptual  knowledge.  In  that  analysis  we  showed  how  some  of  our 
judgments  about  everyday  states  of  affairs  are  certain  and  infallible,  and  are  properly  called 
knowledge,  while  other  judgments  lack  firm  assent  and  are  instances  of  opinio  or  dubitatio. 
We  also  showed  that  at  times  our  perceptual  judgments  can  be  mistaken  and  we  sketched  an 
important  feature  of  perceptual  knowledge:  its  defeasibility.  Our  analysis  allowed  perceptual 
knowledge  to  stand  on  its  own  and  did  not  write  it  off  as  a  watered  down  version  of  an 
intellectual  virtue  or  another  intellectual  activity,  such  as  Ross'  attempt  with  credere. 
Furthermore,  as  part  of  this  analysis  we  saw  which  of  the  contemporary  epistemological 
theories  can  be  most  successfully  mapped  onto  Aquinas'  account  of  perceptual  knowledge. 
In  the  previous  chapter  we  developed  our  analysis  further  by  looking  at  the  relationship 
between  perceptual  knowledge  and  scientia.  We  saw  that  the  principles  of  scientia  rest  on 
perceptual  knowledge.  As  part  of  this  discussion  we  also  saw  how  the  understanding  of 
principles,  to  an  extent,  depends  on  perceptual  judgments. 
On  the  basis  of  our  analysis  we  can  draw  three  general  conclusions.  Two  conclusions 
concern  perceptual  knowledge  and  its  role  in  Aquinas'  account  of  human  knowledge. 
Another  concerns  the  epistemology  of  ST  1a  q84ff. 
Our  first  conclusion  is  that  there  is  no  lacuna  concerning  perceptual  knowledge  within 
Aquinas'  human  epistemology.  This  conclusion  builds  on  the  analysis  of  perceptual 
knowledge  given  in  chapter  three.  There  we  saw  that  perceptual  knowledge  is  a  complex 
entity.  At  times  we  can  make  perceptual  judgments  which  are  certain.  These  judgments 199 
constitute  what  we,  after  Plantinga's  account  of  warrant,  have  labelled  the  `paradigm  case'. 
These  judgments  are  properly  called  knowledge.  Judgments  such  as  "Socrates  is  sitting  next 
to  me"  have  the  certainty  and  the  grasp  of  truth  indicative  of  the  intellectual  virtues.  In 
particular,  there  is  a  similarity  between  judgments  like  these  and  intellectus,  the  intellectual 
virtue  of  grasping  first  principles.  In  the  case  of  understanding  of  simple  truths,  such  as 
principles,  the  intellect  grasps  their  truth  and  assents  immediately.  Similarly,  the  intellect 
assents  immediately  to  the  proposition  that  Socrates  is  sitting  beside  me.  The  truth  of  this 
judgment  is  readily  apparent  and  the  judgment  has  the  certainty  and  infallibility  characteristic 
of  the  understanding  of  principles.  Perceptual  knowledge  like  this  closely  resembles 
understanding.  Of  course,  unlike  the  understanding  of  principles,  perceptual  knowledge  is 
defeasible.  Therefore,  the  certainty  of  judgments  such  as  Socrates  is  sitting  beside  me 
notwithstanding,  the  defeasibility  of  perceptual  knowledge,  the  possibility  that  we  may  be 
mistaken,  is  what  distinguishes  perceptual  knowledge  from  intellectus. 
Other  perceptual  judgments  fall  short  of  the  paradigm  and  are  not  strictly  speaking  perceptual 
knowledge.  We  are  unsure  if  it  is  Socrates  or  Plato  who  is  sitting  down.  We  are  unsure  if 
the  tower  is  square  or  round.  It  is  due  to  the  limitedness  of  our  cognitive  faculties  that 
sometimes  the  judgments  which  we  make  about  the  world  around  us  are  instances  of  opinio, 
when  we  think  it  is  Socrates,  but  have  a  niggling  fear  that  it  might  be  Plato.  At  other  times, 
they  may  be  instances  of  suspicio:  we  tentatively  decide  that  it  might  be  Socrates.  At  still 
other  times  we  will  be  left  doubting,  we  just  can't  decide  if  it  is  Socrates  or  Plato.  Properly 
speaking  having  an  opinion  or  a  doubt  is  not  an  instance  of  perceptual  knowledge,  although 
such  judgments  constitute  much  of  what  we  loosely  label  perceptual  knowledge.  These 
judgments  lack  the  firm  assent  which  characterises  knowledge.  Like  judgments  of  perceptual 
knowledge  proper,  the  intellectual  process  constituting  these  inconclusive  judgments  will 
involve  a  grasp  of  a  quiddity,  but  the  second  act  of  the  intellect  is  not  a  firm  knowing  of  the 
truth  that  such  and  such  is  the  case  and  so  firm  assent  is  lacking.  The  evidence  is  just  not 
there  for  the  intellect  to  attain  its  end,  a  certain  knowledge  of  the  truth.  As  we  saw,  it  is  when 
we  go  beyond  the  evidence  that  we  make  mistakes. 
Aquinas  discusses  these  inconclusive  acts  of  the  intellect  in  the  context  of  his  discussion  of 
credere,  the  act  of  faith,  in  ST2a2ae  q2  ale.  Earlier,  in  chapter  two,  we  saw  that  Ross  tried 
to  write  off  perceptual  knowledge  as  credere.  We  can  now  reiterate  that  Ross  is  wrong. 
Perceptual  judgments  may  be  instances  of  opinio  or  suspicio,  they  are  never  instances  of 
credere.  Credere  is  a  unique  kind  of  act,  involving  the  intellect  and  the  will,  with  a  unique 
kind  of  object:  God.  It  is  an  intellectual  act  which,  as  we  have  seen,  straddles  the  divide 
between  human  knowledge  such  as  scientia  and  judgments  such  as  opinio.  This  is  not  to  say 
however,  that  perceptual  judgments  will  have  no  role  in  credere.  We  will  see  what  their  role 
is  momentarily  when  we  look  at  the  virtue  of  wisdom. 
The  complexity  of  perceptual  judgments,  that  in  some  cases  they  can  be  like  the  intellectual 
virtues  and  in  other  cases  be  inconclusive  acts,  is  one  reason  why  perceptual  knowledge  is 200 
omitted  from  the  two  lists  we  mentioned  above.  However,  this  omission  does  not  mean  that 
there  is  a  lacuna  concerning  perceptual  knowledge  within  Aquinas'  human  epistemology. 
This  is  our  first  conclusion. 
Our  second  conclusion  is  based  on  our  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  perceptual 
judgments  and  scientia  in  the  preceding  chapter.  It  also  offers  further  clarification  of  the  first 
conclusion.  We  conclude  that  perceptual  judgments  play  a  seminal  role  in  Aquinas'  account 
of  human  epistemology.  All  the  different  kinds  of  human  knowledge  and  judgments  that  St. 
Thomas  identifies,  be  they  in  the  shape  of  scientia,  or  opinio  and  dubitatio,  are  all 
fundamentally  connected  to  perception  and  are  fundamentally  judgments,  in  various  shapes 
and  forms,  about  what  we  perceive.  Hence,  there  is  no  lacuna  involved  in  omitting 
perceptual  knowledge  from  the  lists  of  intellectual  virtues  and  inconclusive  intellectual  acts. 
In  many  respects,  this  is  simply  a  further  clarification  of  the  previous  conclusion.  This 
second  conclusion,  however,  intends  to  state  something  more.  We  conclude  that  the  seminal 
role  of  perceptual  judgments  is  such  that  they  underpins  all  human  knowledge,  or  to  put  it 
another  way,  the  intellectual  virtues,  with  the  exception  of  understanding,  depend  on 
perceptual  judgments.  This  conclusion  is  illustrated  by  Aquinas'  remark  in  ST  Ia  q84  a1  sc 
where  he  says  that  if  the  intellect  didn't  have  knowledge  (cognitio)  of  material  things  it  could 
not  have  demonstrative  knowledge  (scientia)  of  them.  In  the  preceding  chapter  the  seminal 
role  of  perceptual  knowledge  in  scientia  was  seen  in  the  formation  of  scientia's  principles.  In 
fact,  like  scientia  all  the  intellectual  virtues,  except  understanding,  depend  on  perceptual 
judgments.  This  can  be  seen  in  the  following  sketches  of  the  relationships  between 
perceptual  judgments  and  the  intellectual  virtues  of  scientia,  wisdom,  prudence  and  art.  Once 
we  have  offered  these  sketches  we  will  address  our  final  conclusion  concerning  the 
epistemology  of  ST  1a  q84. 
Scientia  has  its  own  structure  and  is  different  from  other  intellectual  virtues,  yet  it  is  closely 
related  to  perceptual  knowledge.  Importantly  scientia  offers  a  deeper  knowledge  of  the 
things  which  are  objects  of  perceptual  judgments.  Like  all  human  knowledge,  scientia  cannot 
be  acquired  without  information  received  from  perception.  In  the  last  chapter  we  saw  the 
importance  of  perceptual  knowledge  in  the  formation  of  the  principles  of  scientia.  Some  may 
question  this  assertion.  How  are  the  truths  of  mathematics  related  to  perceptual  judgments? 
What  role  does  perception  play  in  learning  that  2+2=4?  To  answer  these  questions  we  must 
recall  Aquinas'  assertion  that  humans  do  not  have  innate  knowledge.  Only  the  angels  have 
innate  knowledge.  Therefore,  according  to  him  we  do  not  innately  know  that  2+2=4.  Thus 
mathematical  knowledge  must  be  obtained  in  the  way  which  we  obtain  all  our  knowledge, 
from  the  senses.  Within  mathematics  perceptual  knowledge  will  be  involved  in  the  use  of 
examples,  sketches  of  geometric  figures,  explanations  of  proofs  and  so  on.  On  the  basis  of 
these  simple  mathematical  truths  we  can  then  go  on  to  derive  other  truths,  in  the  manner 
which  scientia  suggests,  reasoning  from  what  is  better  known  to  what  is  less  well  known. 
Even  as  we  progress  towards  more  recondite  knowledge,  we  use  information  derived  from 
perception.  We  put  examples  before  people  so  that  they  can  understand  what  they  are  being 201 
taught,  for  example,  the  triangle  on  the  blackboard  to  illustrate  that  a  triangle  is  a  three  sided 
figure  the  sum  of  whose  angles  equal  two  right  angles.  As  Aquinas  comments: 
This  is  the  reason;  -indeed,  why,  when  we  want  to  help  someone  understand 
something,  we  propose  examples  to  him  so  that  he  can  form  images  for  himself  in 
order  to  understand.  2 
We  are  not  suggesting  that  such  images  are  perceptual  knowledge,  rather  we  are  merely 
showing  the  reliance  of  an  intellectual  virtue  on  information  received  from  perception.  At  its 
most  basic  level  scientia  is knowledge  which  comes  from  perception. 
Wisdom,  the  intellectual  virtue  which  considers  the  highest  and  deepest  causes  and  which 
judges  and  orders  all  things,  3  the  virtue  which  furnishes  us  with  our  limited  knowledge  of 
the  first  cause,  God,  is  also  at  its  most  basic  level  dependent  on  perceptual  judgments: 
The  proper  object  of  the  human  intellect,  on  the  other  hand,  since  it  is  joined  to  a 
body,  is  a  nature  or  `whatness'  found  in  corporeal  matter  -  the  intellect,  in  fact,  rises 
to  the  limited  knowledge  it  has  on  invisible  things  by  way  of  the  nature  of  visible 
things.  4 
It  is  from  our  knowledge  of  material  reality  that  we  attain  our  imperfect  knowledge  of  God.  5 
Strictly  speaking  this  knowledge  of  God  is  characteristic  of  the  knowledge  which  we  would 
assign  to  the  theologian,  but,  in  any  act  of  faith  there  must  be  an  intellectual  component.  The 
believer  must  believe  in  something.  Therefore,  in  an  act  of  faith  there  must  be  some  limited 
knowledge  of  God.  This  is  the  sense  in  which  perceptual  judgment  plays  a  role  in  credere.  It 
plays  a  role  in  so  far  as  perceptual  knowledge  facilitates  humanity's  imperfect  knowledge  of 
God.  It  is  this  imperfect  knowledge,  lacking  the  manifest  vision  of  truth,  to  borrow  Ross' 
translation  of  Aquinas'  phrase,  which  constitutes  the  intellectual  component  of  credere. 
Wisdom  is  not  merely  a  matter  of  our  imperfect  knowledge  of  God,  it  is  also  the  virtue 
which  deals  with  our  knowledge  of  being,  causes,  substance,  accidents  and  the  many  other 
things  in  the  panoply  of  metaphysics.  These  concepts  are  abstractions  from  our  experience 
and  judgments  about  the  world.  In  this  sense,  wisdom  like  scientia  offers  a  deeper  insight 
into  the  reality  of  which  we  are  a  part  and  about  which  we  make  judgments. 
Wisdom,  and  scientia  are  virtues  of  the  speculative  intellect.  As  well  as  these  virtues, 
Aquinas  also  lists  two  other  intellectual  virtues  which  are  like  the  speculative  virtues  but  also 
different  from  them.  These  intellectual  virtues  are  art  and  prudence.  He  says  of  art  that: 
2  ibid.  Et  inde  est  etiam  quod  quando  alium  volumus  facere  aliquid  Intelligere,  proponimus  ei 
exempla,  ex  quibus  sibi  phantasmata  formare  possit  ad  Intelligendum. 
The  verb  'proponere  '  in  this  extract  literally  means  'to  set  forth',  'to  display'.  This  literal  meaning 
reinforces  the  point  we  make  above  about  using  perceptual  aids  to  help  grasp  particular  Instances 
of  scientia. 
3  ST  1  a2ae  q57a2c. 
4  ST  1a  q84  a7c  Intellectus  autem  humani,  qui  est  conjunctus  corporl,  proprium  objectum  est 
quidditas  sive  natura  in  materia  corporali  existens:  et  per  hujusmodi  naturas  visibilium  rerum  etiam  In 
invisibilium  rerum  aliqualem  cognitionem  ascendit. 
5  ST  1a  q88  a2c. 202 
Art  is  nothing  other  than  right  judgment  about  things  to  be  made.  Yet  the  good  of 
these  depends,  not  upon  the  disposition  of  the  maker's  appetite,  but  on  the  worth  of 
the  very  work  done.  An  artist  as  such  is  not  commendable  for  the  will  which  makes  a 
work,  but  for  its  quality.  Art  properly  speaking,  then,  is  a  practical  habit.  6 
Art,  unlike  the  other  virtues  of  the  speculative  intellect  has  a  practical  dimension  which  these 
other  virtues  lack.  Nonetheless  it  is  like  them  because  it  gives  only  the  ability  to  act  well,  as 
opposed  to  virtues  of  the  appetite  which  entail  acting  well  when  used?  This  may  seem  a  little 
confusing.  Aquinas'  point  is  that  in  the  case  of  art,  the  good  depends  on  the  work  the  artists 
does,  not  on  the  actual  exercise  of  the  virtue,  as  is  the  case  with  the  moral  virtues  of  the  will. 
Prudence  is  akin  to  the  virtue  of  art  in  being  like  the  speculative  virtues,  yet  different  from  art 
and  the  other  speculative  virtues  because  it  involves  the  will: 
The  reason  for  the  difference  is  that  art  is  right  judgment  about  things  to  be 
produced,  while  prudence  is  rectified  judgment  about  things  to  be 
done......  Consequently,  prudence,  which  is  right  reason  about  things  to  be  done, 
requires  that  a  man  be  rightly  disposed  with  regard  to  ends;  and  this  depends  on  the 
rightness  of  his  appetite.  Consequently  moral  virtue,  which  makes  the  appetite  right, 
is  a  precondition  of  prudence.  8 
The  differences  between  the  assorted  virtues  are  not  particularly  relevant  to  our  discussion. 
We  are  interested  in  the  role  of  perceptual  judgments  in  art  and  prudence.  In  the  case  of  art 
the  role  of  perceptual  judgment  is  obvious.  Art  is  'right  judgment  about  things  to  be  made'; 
this  judgment  will  have  been  shaped  by  what  we  and  our  society  consider  art  to  be.  It  will  be 
shaped  by  the  artist's  experience  of  art  and  by  the  skill  he  has  acquired  as  an  artist.  The 
connection  between  prudence  and  perceptual  judgment  is  also  obvious.  Prudence  is  right 
judgment  about  things  to  be  done  (agibilium).  We  are  not  born  with  a  knowledge  of  the 
things  to  be  done,  agibilia.  Knowing  what  things  are  to  be  done  requires  experience  and 
herein  lies  the  connection  between  perceptual  judgments  and  prudence. 
Unlike  the  other  intellectual  virtues  understanding  does  not  depend  on  perceptual  judgments. 
6  ST  1  a2ae  q57  a3c  Dicendum  quod  ars  nihil  aliud  est  quam  ratio  recta  aliquorum  operum 
faciendorum.  Quorum  tarnen  bonum  non  consistit  in  eo  quod  appotitus  humanus  aliquo  so  habet, 
sed  in  eo  quod  ipsum  opus  quod  fit,  in  se  bonum  est.  Non  enim  pertinet  ad  laudom  artificis, 
inquantum  artifex  est,  qua  voluntate  opus  faciat,  sed  quale  sit  opus  quod  tacit.  Sic  igitur  ars,  proprio 
loquendo  habitus  operativus  est 
7  ibid  Et  Ideo  eo  modo  ars  habet  rationem  virtutis,  sicut  et  habitus  speculativi,  Inquantum  scilicet 
nec  ars  nec  habitus  speculativus  faciunt  bonum  opus  quantum  ad  usum,  quod  est  proprium  virtutis 
perficientis  appetitum,  sed  solum  quantum  ad  facultatem  bane  agendi 
8  ST  1  a2ae  q57  a4c  Cujus  differentiae  ratio  est,  qula  ars  est  recta  ratio  factibilium,  prudentia  vero  est 
recta  ratio  agibilium.......  Et  ideo  ad  prudentiam,  quae  est  recta  ratio  agibilium,  requiritur  quod  homo 
sit  bene  dispositus  circa  fines;  quod  quidem  est  per  appetitum  rectum.  Et  ideo  ad  prudentiam 
requiritur  moralis  virtus,  per  quam  fit  appetitus  rectus. 
The  translation  of  this  text  above  translates  "  ...  prudentia  vero  est  recta  ratio  agibilium  "  as  "while 
prudence  is  rectified  judgment  about  things  to  be  done.  "  This  is  an  unfortunate  translation.  To 
describe  the  judgment  as  "rectified"  suggests  that  there  was  something  wrong  with  the  judgment 
which  has  been  mended.  A  better  translation  would  be  "  prudence  is  right  judgment  about  things 
to  be  done.  " 203 
It  is  clearly  not  the  case  that  we  make  a  perceptual  judgment  before  we  understand 
something.  However,  in  the  previous  chapter  we  saw  that  the  understanding  of  principles 
could  not  take  place  without  some  input  from  perception.  Thus,  even  the  understanding  of 
principles,  the  most  basic  truths,  depends,  to  some  extent,  on  perception.  This  is hardly 
surprising.  Recall  ST  la  q84  a7c: 
It  is  impossible  for  our  intellect,  in  its  present  state  of  being  joined  to  a  body  capable 
of  receiving  impressions,  actually  to  understand  anything  without  turning  to  sense 
images.  9 
We  are  not  suggesting  that  turning  to  the  sense  images  is  a  perceptual  judgment  or  an  act  of 
perceptual  knowledge.  Rather  our  point  is  to  stress  that  even  our  grasp  of  the  simplest 
truths,  is  based  on  what  we  have  received  from  the  senses  and  is  therefore  at  its  most 
fundamental  dependent  on  what  we  perceive. 
On  the  basis  of  these  brief  analyses  of  the  relationships  between  perceptual  judgments  and 
the  intellectual  virtues  it  could  be  argued  that  the  intellectual  virtues,  despite  the  differences  in 
their  objects  and  procedures,  are  simply  special  instances  of  perceptual  knowledge,  special 
instances  of  our  knowledge  of  material  reality.  Importantly,  perception  grounds  the  whole 
human  epistemic  edifice.  The  judgments  of  that  edifice,  whether  inconclusive,  or  those 
which  are  indicative  of  the  intellectual  virtues,  are  all  judgments  to  some  degree  about  what 
we  perceive,  even  our  judgments  about  God  because,  as  we  have  seen,  we  come  to  know 
him  through  his  creation.  Perceptual  judgments  play  a  seminal  role  in  human  knowledge, 
underpinning  the  intellectual  virtues  we  have  identified.  This  is  not  exactly  a  ground 
breaking  conclusion,  but  for  some  reason  commentators  seem  to  have  missed  it  and  to  have' 
seen  perceptual  judgments  in  the  light  of,  for  example,  scientia  rather  than  scientia  in  the 
light  of  perceptual  judgments. 
Our  investigation  of  the  processes  involved  in  perceptual  knowledge  revealed  that  Aquinas 
gives  a  descriptive  and  externalist  account  which  contains  elements  of  foundational  ism, 
internalism  and  most  noticeably  reliabilism.  The  fact  that  these  theories  can  be  found  in 
varying  degrees  is  a  testimony  to  the  complexity  of  perceptual  knowledge.  As  we  said 
earlier,  a  mapping  from  contemporary  epistemological  theories  onto  St.  Thomas' 
epistemology  is  not  easily  achievable.  Moreover,  we  observed  that  some  parts  of  Aquinas' 
epistemology  can  be,  for  example,  more  foundationalist  than  others.  Woe  betide  the 
commentator  who  ignores  the  complexity  of  Aquinas'  theory  of  knowledge  and  tries  to  take 
one  element  of  it  as  indicative  of  his  whole  theory.  Unfortunately,  this  seems  to  have  been 
the  tendency  of  the  commentators  whom  we  looked  at  in  chapter  two. 
These  criticisms  aside,  we  now  wish  to  draw  a  conclusion  about  the  epistemology  of  ST  la 
q84  and  offer  our  own  mapping.  The  account  of  our  knowledge  of  material  reality  which  he 
begins  to  address  in  ST  la  q84,  and  develops  in  subsequent  questions,  relies  heavily  on 
9  ST  1a  q84  a7c  Dicendum  quod  Impossibile  est  Intellectum  nostrum,  secundum  praesentis  vitae 
statum  quo  passibili  corpora  conjungitur,  aliquid  Intelligere  in  actu,  nisi  convertendo  se  ad 
phantasmata. 204 
mediaeval  psychology.  This  account  describes  how  the  human  intellect  understands  material 
things  by  abstracting  from  the  sense  images.  The  epistemology  outlined  in  ST  Ia  q84ff  is 
fundamentally  a  descriptive  epistemology,  no  reference  is  made  to  epistemic  norms  or 
criteria  which  must  be  fulfilled  in  order  to  claim  that  we  know  that  p.  In  our  discussion  of 
perceptual  knowledge  we  noted  that  this  psychological  component,  as  we  called  it,  is 
complemented  by  a  metaphysical  component:  Aquinas'  metaphysical  realism.  Moreover,  we 
should  also  recall  that  his  mediaeval  psychology  uses  metaphysical  categories,  such  as  esse 
intentionale. 
These  metaphysical  components  notwithstanding.  It  is  by  recognising  the  descriptive  nature 
of  Aquinas'  epistemology  that  a  mapping  can  be  most  successful.  The  complexity  of  his 
epistemology  meant  that  epistemic  labels  such  as  externalism,  internalism,  reliabilism  and 
foundationalism  could  not  adequately  describe  Aquinas'  epistemology.  However,  regardless 
of  the  complexity  of  his  epistemology,  human  knowledge,  for  him,  will  always  begin  in  the 
manner  described  in  ST  la  q84.  The  same  psychological  processes  will  always  take  place  in 
wisdom,  scientia,  understanding  and  perceptual  knowledge.  In  some  of  these  types  of 
knowledge  other  elements  will  be  required,  such  as  demonstration  in  scientia,  but  these 
elements  do  not  undermine  the  fundamental  role  of  the  psychological  processes.  On  the  basis 
of  this  evidence  we  conclude  that  Aquinas  anticipates  Quine  by  700  years.  For  Aquinas 
human  epistemology  fell  into  place  as  a  chapter  of  psychology.  When  one  recognises  the 
descriptive  nature  of  Aquinas'  epistemology,  one  recognises  that  the  most  successful 
mapping  from  contemporary  epistemology  onto  that  of  Aquinas  is  epistemic  naturalism,  as 
espoused,  not  so  much  by  Quine,  but  by  less  radical  naturalists  such  as  Goldman,  Kornblith 
and  Plantinga;  naturalists  who  describe  the  normative  in  terms  of  the  descriptive.  This 
mapping  of  such  a  broad  contemporary  epistemic  theorylo  on  to  the  complex  and  nuanced 
human  epistemology  of  Aquinas  is  the  best  that  can  be  achieved.  `Naturalism'  can  be  applied 
to  Aquinas'  epistemology  without  attaching  the  assorted  caveats  required  when  we 
characterise  that  epistemology  as  externalist  or  reliabilist. 
Within  contemporary  naturalisms  the  account  of  warrant  offered  by  Plantinga  comes  closest 
to  matching  elements  of  Aquinas'  epistemology,  particularly  perceptual  knowledge.  Of 
course,  there  are  differences:  Plantinga's  account  is  foundationalist  and  he  does  not  employ 
metaphysics  within  his  descriptive  account  in  the  way  that  Aquinas  does.  Nevertheless,  there 
is  a  close  similarity.  Plantinga,  in  Warrant  and  Proper  Function,  draws  the  conclusion  that: 
The  right  way  to  be  a  naturalist  in  epistemology  is  to  be  a  supernaturalist  in 
metaphysics.  I  t 
Given  an  obvious  interpretation  of  this  passage,  there  is  hardly  any  daylight  between 
Aquinas'  position  and  Plantinga's. 
10  Just  how  broad  naturalism  is  can  be  be  seen  in  chapter  two  of  this  work.  There  we  saw  both  an 
internalist,  foundationalist  naturalism,  as  offered  by  Pollock,  and  an  externalist,  reliabilist  account, 
as  offered  by  Goldman. 
11  Plantinga  1993b  page  211 205 
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